Tree-huggers and baby-killers:

 1. These terms exemplify extreme but not uncommon stereotypical thinking about NGOs (‘tree-huggers’) and PMSCs (‘baby-killers’).

The relationship between NGOs and PMSCs and its impact on coordinating actors in complex operations

Abstract

Private military and security companies' (PMSCs) relationship with state actors has received significant scholarly attention; their interaction with other private actors such as humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has remained largely neglected. This article looks at the evolving relationship between NGOs and PMSCs in three parts. First, it assesses the current state of NGO–PMSC interaction. Two aspects stand out: contracting and conflict. By drawing on existing research on different forms of inter-cultural cooperation such as military–military and humanitarian–military cooperation, the second part of the article will show that conflict between PMSCs and NGOs can inter alia arise from their differing backgrounds, mandates, approaches to security, and short- and long-term goals. By looking at both differences and similarities between the two actors, the third part of the article will sketch out possible pathways for the future.

Keywords:

• private military and security companies
• NGOs
• inter-cultural cooperation
• civil–military cooperation

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Chiara Ruffa, Peter Haldén, and the participants of the workshop ‘Coordinating Actors in Complex Operations’ at Uppsala University for comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

 1. These terms exemplify extreme but not uncommon stereotypical thinking about NGOs (‘tree-huggers’) and PMSCs (‘baby-killers’).

 2. This definition is close to Okumu's, who defines a humanitarian international NGO as ‘a private, not-for-profit organization that engages in transnational activities to relieve human suffering wrought by human activities such as wars, and by natural disasters, such as floods and earthquakes’ (Okumu, ‘Humanitarian International NGOs’, 120). Mills also includes the United Nations in his definition (Mills, ‘Neo-Humanitarianism’), while the Humanitarian Futures Programme of King's College London extends this to all ‘those organizations deemed to have roles and responsibilities to prevent, prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises’ (Humanitarian Futures Programme, ‘Definition’.

 3. A good overview of differences between humanitarian NGOs is provided by Joachim and Schneiker, ‘New Humanitarians?’, 372f.

 4. Thuerer, ‘Dunant's Pyramid’, 47.

 5. Mills goes so far as to state that ‘[h]umanitarianism has, to a significant degree, lost its core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence’ (‘Neo-Humanitarianism’, 166). This is in part because ‘of actions by the organizations themselves, and partly because combatants and other interested parties see them as ripe targets for manipulation’ (178).

 6. The most infamous example is certainly the involvement of PMSC employees in the maltreatment and degradation of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2004.

 7. Powell, ‘Remarks’.

 8. For the British take on it, see Ministry of Defence, ‘The Comprehensive Approach’. For an overview of the NATO view on the comprehensive approach, see Petersen and Binnendijk, ‘From Comprehensive Approach’.

 9. Edmunds, ‘The Defence Dilemma in Britain’, 390.

10. See e.g. , ‘Providing Aid’ and ‘Providing Aid… 2009 Update’.

11. Linda Norgrove tragically died during a failed rescue operation by US Special Forces. For a good overview, see Borger, ‘Linda Norgrove’.

12. This led Peter W. Singer to speak of a ‘coalition of the billing’, not a coalition of the willing. Singer, ‘Warriors for Hire’.

13. Glaser, Engaging Private Security Providers.

14. While this data shows that contracting is by no means an exceptional phenomenon, initial findings from the authors' research suggest that NGO contracting from PMSCs might actually be less frequent than suggested in the ODI study. It is worth noting here that PMSCs are just one provider of security services for NGOs. Others are local guarding companies, local militias, and police or military forces.

15. See Singer, ‘Humanitarian Principles’, 70; Cockayne, Commercial Security, 2. Stoddard et al., ‘The Use of Private Security’, 13.

16. Stoddard et al., ‘Providing Aid’, 11. Well-known from this period are the bomb attacks against UN headquarters and ICRC offices in Baghdad in 2003.

17. Stoddard et al., ‘Providing Aid’, 2.

18. Stoddard et al., ‘Providing Aid’, 6.

19. For a detailed account on the three approaches to security, see Brabant, Operational Security Management, 57ff.

20. Brooks and Chorev, ‘Ruthless Humanitarianism’.

21. Donald, ‘After the Bubble’, 69.

22. International Stability Operations Association, ‘About ISOA’. As Joachim and Schneiker have shown in their paper on frame appropriation, numerous PMSCs are trying to be perceived as humanitarian actors or at least as companies with a strong humanitarian component in order to lose the mercenary image (‘New Humanitarians?’).

23. Cockayne, Commercial Security, 2.

24. Soeters et al., ‘Military Culture’, 238.

25. Resteigne and Soeters, ‘Managing Militarily’, 325.

26. Soeters et al., ‘Military Culture’, 245. The institutional/occupational distinction was initially applied to the US military by Charles Moskos. An institution relies strongly on norms, values, and a common purpose, while an occupation places more emphasis on the interests of the individual, for example visible in higher pay. See Moskos, ‘From Institution to Occupation’. There is also the important distinction between formal and informal culture.

27. Darcy, The MDGs, 1.

28. Darcy, The MDGs, 1

29. Moelker et al., ‘Sympathy’, 497.

30. ‘Empathy’ might actually capture this sentiment better.

31. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 62.

32. See Gaag-Halbertsma et al., ‘Civil-Military Cooperation’.

33. As explained above, this can also have a negative effect on NGO staff security.

34. Rana, At a Crossroads, 230.

35. Moelker et al., ‘Sympathy’, 498.

36. An interesting aspect for future research would be how the perception of PMSCs by NGOs and vice versa develops over time. The contact hypothesis stipulates that increased contact will lead to people like each other more. Ibid. Could this mean that the more PMSCs and NGOs interact, the more they will like each other? For the moment, this seems very far off track, given the enormous reservations on the side of NGOs.

37. , Civil-Military Cooperation, 24.

38. In her paper on NGO–military cooperation, Laura Miller mentions two cases – Bosnia and Haiti – where aid worker have cooperated with the US military despite persisting cultural differences (‘From Adversaries to Allies’).

39. Singer, ‘Humanitarian Principles’, 72.

40. As Singer puts it ‘[t]he field is perhaps unique among industries in one's former profession is integral to one's present job. The very name “ex”… defines the employee base of the private military industry.’ (Corporate Warriors, 76.)

41. There are also undirected funds which NGOs can spend on any purpose they like.

42. There have been some changes over the years, as demand in Iraq and Afghanistan was so high that it could not be met any more by purely drawing on ex-soldiers from the US, Britain, and South Africa, but increasingly from third country nationals or locals.

43. The author encountered these stereotypes time and again in three years of research on this subject. As this kind of comment is always given outside of formal interview situations, no systematic data could be gathered on this.

44. This is a difference from state aid and development organisations, which don't share the reservations NGOs have against armed guards.

45. Barnett, The International Humanitarian Order, 174.

46. This kind of self-regulation did not work to plan in the case of US PMSC Blackwater USA. The company withdrew from the US industry association (then still named IPOA – International Peace Operations Association) in 2007. Following the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians by a Blackwater employee, the association initiated a review process to investigate if the company was fully compliant with the IPOA code of conduct (International Peace Operations Association, ‘Statement’). Due to Blackwater's withdrawal, the investigation was never carried out.

47. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, ‘Signatory Companies’. The ICOC was established on initiative of the Swiss government, but in consultation with PMSCs. The code contains provisions on appropriate personnel and company conduct. As of December 2012, an oversight and compliance mechanism is being discussed but not yet in place.

48. Kinsey, Private Contractors, 63.

49. The idea of a PMSC setting up or administering a refugee camp has been around for years now. One of the first to mention this was then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who suggested the UN could hire private security companies to carry out peacekeeping tasks and the administration of refugee camps, but soon had to come to the conclusion that ‘the world may not be ready to privatise peace’ (quoted in Griffin, ‘Blue Helmet Blues’, 48).