Relations between uniformed and contractor personnel in complex operations

Abstract

Contemporary operations require the US military to work with enormous numbers of private contractors. The official reasoning for this is that private contractors are more cost-effective than military personnel, as contractors can be hired and paid for specific jobs, while military personnel must be maintained year-round at a high cost. On the other hand, many service-members bring back stories of contractor failure or misconduct. Is it in fact more efficient to use contractors on a battlefield? How can multi-agency operations be made most effective? This article attempts to contribute to these questions by determining the conditions under which contractors will ‘work’ for the military. Theory indicates that they will do so if the likelihood of being caught and punished for shirking is high. I examine the relations between military personnel deployed in Iraq and the contractors accompanying them through a questionnaire and targeted interviews.

Keywords:

• privatization
• military operations
• security contractors

Notes

 1. Singer, Corporate Warriors.

 2. Avant, The Market for Force; Cohn, ‘It Wasn't In My Contract’.

 3. Kümmel, ‘Die Privatisierung der Sicherheit’.

 4. Fontaine and Nagl, ‘Contractors in American Conflicts’, 14.

 5. Cf. Feaver, Armed Servants.

 6. See e.g. Nordland, ‘Risks of Afghan War’.

 7. See e.g. Krahmann, States, Citizens and Privatization of Security.

 8. Anderson et al., ‘From Chaos to Clarity’.

 9. Kidwell, ‘Public War, Private Fight?’; Reports of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 2009, 2011; Fontaine and Nagl, ‘Contractors in Conflicts’.

10. Anderson et al., ‘From Chaos to Clarity’, ix ff.

11. See esp. Final Report to Congress, ch. 3.

12. Feaver, Armed Servants.

13. Ballesteros, ‘Use of Mercenaries’; Singer, Corporate Warriors; Kümmel, ‘Die Privatisierung der Sicherheit’; Avant, The Market for Force; Krahmann, States, Citizens and Privatization of Security; Cohn, ‘It Wasn't In My Contract’.

14. Krahmann, States, Citizens and Privatization of Security.

15. Singer, Corporate Warriors, ch. 10, 14.

16. Avant, The Market for Force, 253

17. Cohn, ‘It Wasn't In My Contract’.

18. Cohn, ‘It Wasn't In My Contract’, 386.

19. Feaver, Armed Servants.

20. Singer, Frequently Asked Questions; Elsea et al., Private Security Contractors in Iraq; Fontaine and Nagl, ‘Contractors in American Conflicts’, 14ff.; Cohn, ‘It Wasn't In My Contract’, 382ff.

21. Cohn, ‘It Wasn't In My Contract’.

22. Fontaine and Nagl, ‘Contractors in American Conflicts’, 10f.

23. This type of punishment is called non-judicial punishment, or an Article 15, after the UCMJ article that defines the circumstances under which it may be applied. It can range from a letter of reprimand to forfeiture of pay and brief imprisonment.

24. General Services Administration, Federal Acquisition Regulation.

25. FAR 4.6, 42.11, 42.15.

26. Fontaine and Nagl, ‘Contractors in American Conflicts’, 10f.

27. FAR 42.1501.

28. Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007; Fontaine and Nagl, ‘Contractors in American Conflicts’, 10f.; CWCIA, Special Report on Contractor Business Systems.

29. FAR 37.104. That is, unless specifically authorized by statute. For example, USC title 5 part III subpart B chapter 31 subchapter 1 §3109 (5 USC 3109), which states that agencies may hire individual experts or consultants temporarily (up to one year).

30. FAR 37.104(c)(1–2), (d)(6)(i–ii), emphasis added.

31. FAR 3.104–7 (d)(2)(ii); see subpart 3.7 for rules on voiding and rescinding, esp. 3.703 Authority; see also 2.101 ‘termination for default.’ For punishable actions, see subsection 27(e) of the Procurement Integrity Act 41 USC 423.

32. FAR 3.104–7 (d)(1)(ii); FAR 9.407; FAR 2.101 ‘suspension’.

33. FAR 3.104–7 Violations or possible violations (b)(3) and (5).

34. FAR 3.104–7 (d)(1)(iii), (d)(2)(i).

35. FAR 3.704–5.

36. Fontaine and Nagl, ‘Contractors in American Conflicts’, 15.

37. Avant, Political Institutions.

38. Feaver, Armed Servants.

39. Feaver, Armed Servants