Changing civilian support for the Maoist conflict in India

Abstract

Prolonged domestic political conflicts change over time. The Maoist conflict in India which began in the late 1960s is one such conflict. Over time, the ‘old’ Maoist conflict has become a ‘new’ Maoist conflict. Important changes have occurred both in the macro and micro processes of the conflict. Some of these changes include the strategic relocation of the Maoist bases, a shift in the class character of the conflict, the nature of civilian support, and the rebels' methods of operation. While in the 1960s, the conflict was involved in land redistribution with the aim of annihilating class enemies, the recent conflict focuses on caste identities. In addition, it is intrinsically linked with territorial control and local political competition. This has automatically led the Maoists to become involved with local criminal networks and also local business networks based. This involvement has led to financial resources for the conflict. Furthermore, it has forced the local population to become linked with the conflict. Studying these changes is important, especially for counterinsurgency policies.

Keywords::

• Maoist conflict
• caste politics
• territory
• civilian support
• counterinsurgency

Notes

^1.Kalyvas, ‘“New” And “Old” Civil Wars’.

^2.Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance’.

^3.Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Nordstrom, ‘The Backyard front’.

^4.Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Perlez, ‘Kosovo Clans Massacre’.

^5.Kalyvas, ‘“New” And “Old” Civil Wars’.

^6. The Naxalite movement gained prominence in 1967. It was marked by an armed conflict led by Charu Majumder in Naxalbari in Northern West Bengal. Land redistribution was the main motive guiding this movement.

^7.Kennedy and Purushottam, ‘Beyond Naxalbari’.

^8.De la Calle and Cuenca, ‘Rebels without a Territory’; Behlendorf, LaFree, and Legault, ‘Microcycles of Violence’.

^9.Behlendorf et al., ‘Microcycles of Violence’, find that groups of events recur in proximity in both space and time. They term these clusters as ‘violent micro-cycles’.

^10.Krueger and Laitin, ‘Kto kogo?’.

^11.Lohman and Flint, ‘The Geography of Insurgency’.

^12.Behlendorf et al., ‘Microcycles of Violence’.

^13.De la Calle and Cuenca, ‘Rebels without a Territory’.

^14.Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance’. By ‘greed’, these authors mean financial resources based on extortion of primary commodity exports.

^15.Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War’.

^16.Times of India, 2 April 2006.

^17.Times of India, Kolkata, 10 June 2007: 6.

^18. Ibid.

^19. Koteswar Rao was recently intercepted and killed by Bengal state police in 2011.

^20.Times of India, Kolkata, 28 March 2006: 7.

^21.Times of India, 12 February 2010.

^22. Three districts: West Midnapore, Bankura, and Purulia.

^23. Kanu Sanyal's (an ex-activist) interview in Times of India, October 3, 2009.

^24. Interviews were conducted during field research in India, September 2011 to January 2012. Names of interviewees have been changed to maintain anonymity. This interview held in January 2012.

^25. Interview with ex-activist, January 2012, Kolkata, West Bengal.

^26.Bhattacharya, ‘The Lalgarh Story’.

^27. Interview with Amol continued.

^28.Mehra, ‘Naxalism in India’.

^29.Banaji, ‘The Ironies of Indian Maoism’.

^30.Olzak, ‘The Dynamic of Ethnic Competition’, 44.

^31.Bhattacharya, ‘The Lalgarh Story’.

^32.Mancini, Horizontal Inequality and Communal Violence.

^33.Stewart, ‘Crisis Prevention’.

^34.Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, ‘Why do ethnic groups rebel?’; Østby, ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Civil War’; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, ‘Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict’.

^35.Thorp et al., ‘Group Inequalities and Political Violence.’

^36.Østby, Nordås, and Rød, ‘Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict’.

^37. District Human Development Report, Development and Planning Department, Government of West Bengal, 2011.

^38. The human vulnerability index is measure as presented in District Human Development Report, Development and Planning Department, Government of West Bengal, 2011, is based on seven indicators, namely (1) percentage of malnutrition, including moderate and severe; (2) percentage of immunization; (3) percentage of BPL; (4) percentage of female literacy; (5) landless households; (6) percentage of landless laborers; and (7) percentage of households having less than one meal a day. In calculating the Vulnerability Index (VI), we have attempted to follow the methodology suggested by UNDP as far as possible. Each of these indicators is defined as a dimension with value between 0 and 1 with reference to minimum and maximum value. The general formula for calculating each dimension index is: The Vulnerability Index is then calculated as a simple average of the seven dimension values.

^39. Other castes constituting the sub-castes are Bagdi, Dom, Jele, Mal, Bairi, etc. The Mahatos, Bagals, Kumbahar, Tanti, Teli, Raju, and Tambli constitute the OBCs.

^40. Interview with Sushil Ranjan in 2011.

^41.Kalyvas, ‘“New” And “Old” Civil Wars’.

^42.Mahadevan, ‘The Maoist Insurgency in India’; Harriss, ‘The Naxalite/Maoist Movement in India’.

^43.Sahay, ‘Naxalism, Caste-based Militias’.

^44.Mahadevan, ‘The Maoist Insurgency in India’.

^45. Ibid., 204.

^46. Interview with Arun Biswas held in 2012.

^47.Le Billon, ‘The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia’.

^48.Ross, ‘What Do We Know About Natural Resources?’, 354.

^49.Ballentine and Nitzschke, Beyond Greed and Grievance.

^50.Ross, ‘What Do We Know About Natural Resources?’.

^51. Goredama, ‘Organized Crime and Terrorism’.

^52. Sukyens, ‘Diffuse Authority’.

^53.Balagopal, ‘Maoist Movement in Andhra Pradesh’.

^54. Bert Sukyens presents a brief timeline of how the Maoists entered the economic circuit in central India. In Dantewada, the Maoists first entered the tendu business in 1982 and by 1995 they had become firmly entrenched. The Maoists themselves clearly acknowledge that the struggle for higher wages for tendu leaves is used to gain entry and support in new territories.

^55.Ray, ‘A Peace in Pieces’.

^56.Mahadevan, ‘The Maoist Insurgency in India’.

^57.Kumar, ‘Changing Face of Naxalites in Bihar’.

^58. Interview with ex-government official, December 2012.

^59.Mahadevan, ‘The Maoist Insurgency in India’.

^60.Jason Miklian and Kristian Hoelscher are researchers at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo. Miklian works primarily on the Maoist conflict in India, and Hoelscher's research work focuses on urbanization, politics, and conflict in developing democracies.

^61. Interview with four ex-officials (Lipi Chaki, Mani Ray, D. Ray, and S. Majumder), December 2012.

^62. Information from Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) in one of the Maoist-affected areas in West Bengal.