Enmeshed in insurgency: Britain's protracted retreats from Iraq and Afghanistan

Abstract

Ten years of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced little in Britain's national interest. This article examines the political objectives set in these wars and the reasons why they have proved elusive. The core foreign policy aim was to sustain Britain's position as a great power by assuming responsibility for global order. Alliances with the United States and NATO would be the diplomatic tool for pursuing this aim. These alliances brought obligations, in the shape of agreed common threats. Rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorists harboured in failed states were deemed the primary threats to British security. Military means were therefore used in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack them. Whether Tony Blair's vision of global order ever made sense is debatable, and it attracted scepticism from the outset. The article argues experience in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that a strategy to eliminate terrorism (the WMD threat turned out never to have existed) by expeditionary counterinsurgency could only fail. Therefore the attention lavished on operational-level performance by most studies is misplaced, because no amount of warfighting excellence could make up for strategic incoherence. Finally, the article proposes the more important question arising from the last ten years is why the UK pursued a futile strategy for so long. The difficulties associated with interpreting events, a malfunctioning strategic apparatus, weak political oversight, and bureaucratic self-interest are posited as the most significant explanations.

Keywords::

• Iraq
• Afghanistan
• counterinsurgency
• British strategy

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Matthew Ford for inviting me to the workshop where the ideas in this paper were first presented, and for his subsequent patience, support, and advice. Thanks also to Patrick Porter for discussing the major themes outlined here.

Notes

^1.Mason and Wintour, ‘Mission Accomplished in Afghanistan’.

^2.Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 128.

^3.Haynes, ‘Taleban “Poised to Regain Helmand”’.

^4.Jones and Smith, ‘Myth and the Small War Tradition’, 453–4.

^5.Strachan, The Direction of War, 45, 77.

^6. Ibid., 118.

^7.Betz and Cormack, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy’, 324.

^8.Miskimmon, ‘Continuity in the Face of Upheaval’, 283.

^9.Atkins, ‘A Renewed Social Democracy’, 179, 188.

^10.Heng, ‘What did New Labour Ever Do for Us?’, 563, 568–9.

^11.McCormack, ‘From “Ethical Foreign Policy” to National Security Strategy’, 104–5.

^12.Ellis, ‘“Mission Accomplished” in Afghanistan?’.

^13.Bailey, ‘The Political Context’, 13, 15.

^14.Freedman, ‘Alliance and the British Way in Warfare’, 148, 152.

^15.Daddow and Gaskarth, ‘Introduction’, 7.

^16.Strachan, ‘British Generals in Blair's Wars’, 330–1.

^17.Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 301.

^18.Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan, 48–9.

^19.Ledwidge, Investment in Blood, 32.

^20.Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 573.

^21.House of Commons Defence Committee, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, 65.

^22.Stewart, ‘Southern Iraq 2003–2004’, 80.

^23.Maciejewski, ‘Best Effort’, 157.

^24.Strachan, The Direction of War, 11.

^25.Biddle, Christia, and Thier, ‘Defining Success in Afghanistan’, 50.

^26. For an extended analysis, see Suhrke, When More is Less.

^27.Betz and Cormack, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy’, 323.

^28.Chin, ‘The United Kingdom and the War on Terror’, 137–8.

^29.Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 674.

^30.Griffin, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine’, 318, 320.

^31.Egnell, ‘Winning “Hearts and Minds”?’, 283, 292.

^32.Urban, Task Force Black, 214.

^33.Chaudhuri and Farrell, ‘Campaign Disconnect’.

^34.Pritchard and Smith, ‘Thompson in Helmand’, 65.

^35.King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign’.

^36.Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level’.

^37.Bennett, ‘The Reluctant Counter-Insurgents’.

^38.Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State’.

^39.Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 304.

^40.Burke, ‘Leaving the Civilians Behind’, 38.

^41.Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan, 157.

^42.White-Spunner, ‘Great Expectations’, 89.

^43.Maciejewski, ‘Best Effort’, 161, 170.

^44.Shaw, ‘Basra 2007’, 179–80.

^45.Iron, ‘Basra 2008’, 187, 196.

^46.Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis, 64, 73.

^47.Williams, ‘Enduring, but Irrelevant?’, 372.

^48.Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 309.

^49.House of Commons Defence Committee, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, 54, 56.

^50. Ibid., 16–18, 28, 32–3.

^51. Ibid., Ev 43.

^52. Ibid., Ev 57.

^53.Anderson, No Worse Enemy, 122, 146, 256.

^54.Coughlin, ‘Taliban Could Retake Key Territory’.

^55.Londono, DeYoung, and Miller, ‘Afghanistan Gains Will Be Lost Quickly After Drawdown’.

^56.Alizada, ‘Afghan Police in Taleban Arms Sales’.

^57.Derksen, ‘Armed, Disarmed, Rearmed’.

^58.Chin, ‘The United Kingdom and the War on Terror’, 125.

^59.Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship’, 65.

^60.Porter, ‘Last Charge of the Knights?’.

^61.McColl, ‘Modern Campaigning’, 116.

^62.Parker, ‘Twenty-First-Century Operational Leadership’, 134.

^63.Maciejewski, ‘Best Effort’, 158.

^64.Stewart, ‘Southern Iraq 2003–2004’, 79.

^65.Cross, ‘Rebuilding Iraq 2003’, 77.

^66.Stewart, ‘Southern Iraq 2003–2004’, 85.

^67.Urban, Task Force Black, 67–9, 86.

^68.Maciejewski, ‘Best Effort’, 162.

^69.Urban, Task Force Black, 250.

^70.Alderson, ‘Too Busy to Learn’, 290.

^71.Dunn, ‘The Double Interregnum’, 1133.

^72.Chandrasekaran, Little America, 206–7.

^73.Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan, 182, 186.

^74.Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul, 219.

^75.Chandrasekaran, Little America, 234.

^76.Ledwidge, Investment in Blood, 5.

^77.Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; US Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List.

^78.Tuck, ‘Afghanistan’, 47, 49.

^79.Miller, ‘Finish the Job’, 57.

^80.House of Commons Defence Committee, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, 15.

^81.Chaudhuri and Farrell, ‘Campaign Disconnect’, 272–83.

^82.Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 310–11.

^83.Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94.

^84.Strachan, ‘British National Strategy’, 44.

^85.Cornish and Dorman, ‘Blair's Wars’.

^86.Chin, ‘The United Kingdom and the War on Terror’, 126.

^87.Pritchard and Smith, ‘Thompson in Helmand’, 83.

^88.Porter, ‘Why Britain Doesn't Do Grand Strategy’.

^89.Strachan, The Direction of War, 71–2, 75, 90.

^90.Strachan, ‘British National Strategy’, 49–50.

^91.Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis, 86.

^92.House of Commons Defence Committee, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, 6, 15, 58.

^93.Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis, 129.

^94.Strachan, ‘British National Strategy’, 43.

^95.De Waal, Depending on the Right People, vii.

^96.Strachan, The Direction of War, 281.

^97.Kriner and Wilson, ‘Elites, Events and British Support’, 12, 14.

^98.Kreps, ‘Elite Consensus’, 195.

^99.Kettell, ‘Dilemmas of Discourse’, 267, 272.

^100.Reifler, Clarke, Scotto, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley, ‘Prudence, Principle and Minimal Heuristics’, 7.

^101.Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship’, 66–7.

^102.Dunn, ‘The Double Interregnum’, 1136–7.

^103.Whitman, ‘The Calm After the Storm?’, 834, 836–7, 845, 847.

^104.King, ‘Military Command in the Last Decade’, 393.

^105.Cochran, ‘The Civil-Military Divide’.

^106.Foley, Griffin, and McCartney, ‘Transformation in Contact’, 259, 262–5, 268.

^107.King, The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces.

^108.Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul, 176.

^109.De Waal, Depending on the Right People, 23.

^110.King, ‘Understanding the Helmand campaign’, 312, 322, 329.

^111.Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level’, 528.

^112.De Waal, Depending on the Right People, 20.

^113.Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul, xx.

^114.Ralph, ‘No Longer Special?’, 337.

^115.Ledwidge, Investment in Blood, 206.

^116.Strachan, The Direction of War, 125.

^117.Urban, Task Force Black, 86, 117.

^118. Ibid., 173–4, 180, 185.

^119. Ibid., 219, 270.

^120.Shaw, ‘Basra 2007’, 177.

^121.Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan, 179–81.

^122.Riley, ‘NATO Operations in Afghanistan 2008–2009’, 246.

^123.Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan, 190.

^124.House of Commons Defence Committee, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, Ev 24.

^125. Ibid., Ev 49.

^126.Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship’, 74.

^127.Posen, ‘Pull Back’.

^128.Ledwidge, Investment in Blood, 223.

^129.Schott, Scherer, and Lambert, ‘Casualties of War’, 47 (2011), 1134–1145.

^130.Harnden, Dead Men Risen, 558.

^131.House of Commons Defence Committee, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, Ev 25.

^132. Ibid., Securing the Future of Afghanistan, 5, 7.

^133.Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis, 166.

^134.Cornish and Dorman, ‘Fifty Shades of Purple?’, 1187.