Military intelligence and the war in Dhofar: An appraisal

Abstract

This article examines the role military intelligence played in the Dhofar campaign between 1970 and 1976. Drawing on an array of sources, it examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in prosecuting a successful operational campaign against a Marxist inspired insurgency, but equally, the importance that intelligence played in consolidating the Al Bu Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar itself, the material benefits to be had from the discovery and production of oil had yet to be realised.

Keywords::

• intelligence
• military; Dhofar; Oman

Notes

^1.Jeapes, SAS Secret War; Geraghty, Who Dares Wins. Not all who served in an intelligence capacity in Dhofar had a high opinion of the SAS. Alan Abbott, who served as a GSO3 (Int) in the mid 1970s, noted that ‘Although excellent fighters they (the SAS) antagonised the OIS (Oman Intelligence Service) by (allegedly) taking planeloads of captured weapons as booty back to Herford in the early days of the campaign.’ Such activities undermined a potential source of intelligence derived from weapons analysis. Personal notes: Lessons Learnt by Lt Col (Retd) Alan Abbott, Int Corps MBE, GSO 3 Int, HQ Dhofar Brigade, On Loan Service in 1975–1977 under Brigadier John Akehurst.

^2. See, for example, Hawkins, ‘Assessing Afghanistan’, 10–13; BRITISH ARMY Field Manuel Countering Insurgency, Vol. 1 – Part 10: January 2010.

^3. See Eickelman and Dennison, ‘Arabizing’.

^4. Durham University Library Special collections: Papers of Sir Donald Hawley, HAW 14/8/1–134 (Official Correspondence January–April 1974), Letter from Donald Hawley to Lt. Col N. B. Knocker (MoD) 16 January 1974. See also Skeet, Oman, 48.

^5. Durham University Library Special collections: Papers of Sir Donald Hawley, HAW 14/1/30, From Brigadier JDC Graham OBE to Colonel HRD Oldman OBE MC. ‘Personal in Confidence’, 29 July 1972.

^6. A vivid description of the appalling social conditions endured by Omanis during this period can be found in Townsend, Oman.

^7. The political agenda of the PFLOAG has been the subject of a number of studies. For two conflicting views, see Halliday, Arabia without the Sultans; and Kelly, Arabia, 104–63.

^8.Brehony, Yemen Divided, 76.

^9. Middle East Archive, St Anthony's College, Oxford. File GB165-0336: ‘Report of tenure of Command of SAF by Col. D.de C. Smiley from April 1958 to March 1961’.

^10. FCO 8/1422, Confidential: from J.M Ides to P.H.H Wright, ‘Oman State Office in Italy’, 19 March 1970. In this memo, it was stated clearly that ‘The Arabian peninsula and the Gulf are vital to Western Europe. Since much of our oil comes from there… [the] stability in Oman is essential to the area as a whole.’

^11. POWE /63/449 (JIC (68) 24), JIC Report on the Implications of Oil Supplies and British Oil interests in the Middle East, 9 September 1968. Cormac, Confronting the Colonies, 180–1.

^12.Rose, ‘Counter Insurgency Warfare’, 68.

^13. For such an account, see Jeapes, SAS Secret War.

^14. ICMA/Oman: Accession No.753. Report of SIO Dhofar Salalah 15th February 1972.

^15.Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 87–110.

^16. Personal notes: Lessons Learnt by Lt Col (Retd) Alan Abbott, Int Corps MBE, GSO 3 Int, HQ Dhofar Brigade, On Loan Service in 1975–1977 under Brigadier John Akehurst.

^17. The failure of Sultan Said bin Taimur to redress the many socio-economic ills of his country was fully recognised by a senior British intelligence officer, working for ‘G2Int’, the Sultan's Intelligence service. In a cable to his superiors just prior to the palace coup, this intelligence officer declared that, ‘He[bin Taimur] is fiddling while Rome burns and no one will change him.’ See Eickelman and Dennison, ‘Arabizing’, 8–9.

^18. See Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, 1–8.

^19. ICMA/Oman: Accession No.1140. Papers of Major D.J. Venn Intelligence Corps (November 1971 – November 1972) GSO 3 Operations and Intelligence.

^20.Eickelman and Dennison, ‘Arabizing’, 8.

^21. Quoted in ibid., 9–10. See also Eickelmann, ‘Intelligence in an Arab Gulf State’, 107–8.

^22. See e.g. Thwaites, Muscat Command, 20–1. Thwaites reveals that because of the suspicions of Sultan bin Taimur, he neutered the efforts of his DIO, Bob Brown, to provide accurate operational intelligence to SAF troops fighting on the Jebel Dhofar.

^23. NA/DEFE 25/186 Secret: From Secretary For Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Secretary of State for Defence, ‘Special Air Service (SAS Assistance to the Sultanate of Oman)’, 4 September 1970.

^24. NA/DEFE 25/186. Secret: SAS Assistance in the Sultanate of Oman, 17 August 1970. The original intelligence section deployed with the BATT was WO2 Bill Birrel, WO2 Bill Capper, Cpl David Duncan, L/Cpl Joe Davis, L/Cpl Pete Davis.

^25. An account of the Secondment to the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces (January 1971 – August 1972), by Captain D.J. Venn, Intelligence Corps, GSO3 Operations and Intelligence Headquarters, Dhofar. (Unpublished), 13. As time went on, these leaflets came to target particular vulnerabilities faced by the ‘adoo. For example, leaflets came to extol the virtues of medical facilities set up by BATT along the coastal plain, knowing full well that many ‘adoo suffered from malaria.

^26. See Akehurst, We Won a War, 28; ICMA/Oman: Accession No:748. Brief notes on conclusion of loan service tour in Sultanate of Oman (ORD) January–May 1979 by W.M.W. Jackson.

^27. I am grateful to Lt. Col. Alan Abbott MBE for pointing out the importance of weapons analysis.

^28. An account of the Secondment to the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces (January 1971 – August 1972), by Captain D.J. Venn, Intelligence Corps, GSO3 Operations and Intelligence Headquarters, Dhofar. (Unpublished), 10.

^29. Personal notes: Lessons Learnt by Lt Col (Retd) Alan Abbott, Int Corps MBE, GSO 3 Int, HQ Dhofar Brigade, On Loan Service in 1975–1977 under Brigadier John Akehurst. Point 5.

^30. ICMA/Oman: Accession No.1140. Papers of Major D.J. Venn, Intelligence Corps (November 1971–72 GSO3 Ops and Intelligence). Email correspondence with Brigadier David Venn, 7 May 2009.

^31. An account of the Secondment to the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces (January 1971 – August 1972), by Captain D.J. Venn, Intelligence Corps, GSO3 Operations and Intelligence Headquarters, Dhofar. (Unpublished), 23–4. The Riyal Saidi was replaced by the Omani riyal in 1973.

^32. ICMA/Oman: Accession No.753. ‘From SIO Dhofar, Salalah. Subject Food Supplies’, 15 February 1972. Reliability of a source was denoted by a letter and numeral suffix. For example, C6 meant ‘source fairly reliable but information provided could not be judged’, while B2 was ‘source usually reliable, information probably true’.

^33. ICMA/Oman: Accession No.94. Papers of WO2 S.H. Ravens. The Intelligence Corps cell produced a ‘Defector and Prisoner of War Debrief Report’, in essence a 25-point questionnaire for each SEP. Aside from the normal name, tribe, age, and unit, it included questions on training, foreign aid, intelligence, communications, attitudes of the population towards the guerrillas, resupply routes, and so forth.

^34. ICMA/Oman: Accession Ref ‘Intelligence Report Camel Train Movements: INT/13 List “C” JAN/FEB 72 – Int Cell DHOFAR’, 18 February 1972.

^35. Ibid.

^36. See http://www.britains-small-wars.com/Desert_song/Hearts.htm. Even so, such projects were crucial statements of physical intent. However incremental, such projects should not be judged only in volume, but by impact relative to the size of the population. Because the population was small on the Jebel, the magnitude of the impact was relatively high, making it hard for the ‘adoo to compete for behavioural support.

^37.Peterson, ‘Oman's Insurgencies’, 251–3.

^38. ICMA/Oman: Accession No. 2782. Papers of Lieutenant Colonel Mike Jackson.

^39. ICMA/Oman: Accession No.753. ‘Second Debrief Report for Ali Salim Tamaan – SEP 360, Intelligence Cell, Dhofar (Ref: INT/8/6)’, 6 January 1972.

^40. Email correspondence with British Army Colonel (retired) 3 June 2010. Name withheld on request.

^41. ICMA /Oman: Accession No.904. Warrant Officer Steve Ravens, Defector and Prisoner of War Debrief Report.

^42. An account of the Secondment to the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces (January 1971 – August 1972), by Captain D.J. Venn, Intelligence Corps, GSO3 Operations and Intelligence Headquarters, Dhofar. (Unpublished), 17.

^43. ICMA/Oman. Irregular forces – SAF view: Origin and Formation of the Firqats (sic). (Undated).

^44. NA/FCO 8/2233/337937. Secret: From Col. C.E. Welch. Defence Attaché Report, British Embassy Muscat, 29 November 1973.

^45. Imperial War Museum Sound Recording 22124, David Mason Reel 2. See also ICMA/Oman (undated) Irregular forces – SAF view: Origin and Formation of the Firqats (sic). In this report, it was noted of the Firqat that they are ‘Completely unreliable and unpredictable. [They] argue over what to do, usually end up doing nothing and will seize the slightest excuse such as rain, sickness, family trouble to avoid an operation. After weeks of this sort of behaviour the same men are very likely to rush off without prompting and conduct a successful raid. Such raids may be to rescue a family member or to rustle cattle.’

^46. Some 11 Firqa units operated with BATTS by 1972. These ranged in size from about 25 tribesmen in the case of the Firqa Salahadin to 140 in the Firqa Khalid bin Walid who recruited mainly from the Bayt Maasheni tribe.

^47. Personal notes: Lessons Learnt by Lt Col (Retd) Alan Abbott, Int Corps MBE, GSO 3 Int, HQ Dhofar Brigade, On Loan Service in 1975–1977 under Brigadier John Akehurst, point 4: Firqats.

^48. FCO 8/2018 338047 Secret: From D.F. Hawley, British Embassy Muscat to P.R.H. Wright, Middle East Department FCO, ‘ PFLOAG Plot’, 15 January 1973.

^49. FC0 8/2018 338047, Top Secret: From Major General Timothy Creasy to His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, Annex ‘C’, Organisation and Future Intentions of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 4 January 1973.

^50. FCO 8/2018 338047, Secret: Brief on Operation Jason for Distribution to Ministers and Embassies; FC0 8/2018 338047, Top Secret: From Major General Timothy Creasy to His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, Annex ‘C’, Organisation and Future Intentions of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 4 January 1973.

^51. FCO 8/2018 338047 Secret: Letter from Donald Hawley, British Embassy Muscat to P.H.R. Wright, Middle East Department FCO, Subject: PFLOAG plot, 15 January 1973.

^52. DEFE 25/186. Confidential: Covert letter accompanying report of Defence attaché Col. Welch from Donald Hawley to Alec Douglas-Home, 14 January 1973.

^53. FC0 8/2018 338047, Top Secret: From Major General Timothy Creasy to His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, 4 January 1973, 2.

^54. FCO 8/2018 338047 Secret: From P.R.H. Wright to Mr Le Quesne, Subject: Oman – Request for Interrogation Team, 4 January 1973.

^55. FCO 8/2018 338047 Secret: From C.M. Le Quesne to Mr Coles, 10 January 1973.

^56. FCO 8/2018 338047 Secret: Telegram from Muscat to FCO: Subject PFLOAG, 4 January 1973.

^57. FCO 8/2018 338047 Secret: Telegram from Defence attaché Muscat to MODUK, 6 January 1973.

^58. FCO 8/2018 338047 Secret: Telegram from FCO to Muscat, 16 January 1973.

^59. FCO 8/2018 338047 Confidential: Telegram from British Embassy Dubai to FCO, Muscat, Doha, Bahrain, Kuwait, 24 January 1973.

^60. Personal notes: Lessons Learnt by Lt Col (Retd) Alan Abbott, Int Corps MBE, GSO 3 Int, HQ Dhofar Brigade, On Loan Service in 1975–1977 under Brigadier John Akehurst, point 27: History.