Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups

Abstract

The Shia militia has emerged as one of the most powerful and important actors in the Middle East security environment. Despite this trend, they remain poorly understood by scholars and policymakers alike. This article seeks to expand our understanding of the militia as a type of non-state armed group through an examination of Shia militia movements in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. More than simply warlords, paramilitaries, or foreign proxies, Shia militias in Iraq enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy, pursued a broad social and political agenda, and participated actively in the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the triangular relationship between the militia, the state, and the population is essential in explaining the rise and fall of the Shia militias during the US occupation as well as in developing strategies to deal with their most recent resurgence

Keywords::

• militias
• insurgency
• political violence
• Iraq
• Iran
• Syria

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Richard Shultz, Matthew Herbert, Jamie Lynn DeCoster, the editorial team at Small Wars and Insurgencies, and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts.

Notes

^1.Cordesman, Iraq, 12. See also Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database.

^2. In 2007 SCIRI changed their name to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). However, for simplicity's sake alone, this article will refer to the group as SCIRI throughout.

^3. For example, see Marten, ‘Warlordism in a Comparative Perspective’.

^4. For a history of the role of militias in the formation of medieval states, see Strayer, Medieval Origins of the Modern State; Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan.

^5.Tilly, ‘War Making’.

^6.Millis, Arms and Men, 23.

^7. Credit goes to an anonymous reviewer of this article who points out the irony that National Guard and Reserve units, the descendants of the American militias, played an outsized role in combat against the contemporary Iraqi militias who are the focus of this article.

^8. See e.g. Reno, Warlord Politics.

^9.Lezhnev, Crafting Peace, xi.

^10.Shultz, Farah, and Lochard, Armed Groups, 22.

^11.MacKinlay, ‘Defining Warlords’.

^12.Jackson, ‘Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance’, 144.

^13. Marten, ‘Warlordism in a Comparative Perspective’, 48.

^14.Ahram, Proxy Warriors.

^15.Bruce, ‘Terrorism and Politics’.

^16. See e.g. Rozema, ‘Urban DDR-Processes’; McDowell, Godfathers.

^17.Bruce, ‘Turf War and Peace’.

^18.Ahram, Proxy Warriors.

^19.Forrest, ‘Coercive Engagement’.

^20. See e.g. Kagan, Iran's Proxy War.

^21.Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’.

^22.Hills, ‘Warlords, Militia and Conflict’, 37.

^23. Paul Jackson, ‘Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance’.

^24.Cammett and Issar, ‘Bricks and Mortar Clientelism’.

^25.Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook’.

^26.Cole, ‘The United States and Shi‘ite Religious Factions’.

^27.Cockburn, Muqtada, 31.

^28.Nakash, ‘The Shi‘ites and the Future of Iraq’, 21.

^29.International Crisis Group, Shiite Politics in Iraq, 34.

^30.Aziz, ‘The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr’, 210.

^31.Bengio, ‘Shi‘is and Politics’, 5.

^32. The 1977 protests served to create additional tension between Sadr and the al-Hakims. While Mahdi al-Hakim negotiated a compromise with the regime, Sadr undermined the agreement by tacitly encouraging continued protest. Al-Hakim was subsequently arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. See Aziz, ‘The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr’, 214.

^33.Cole, ‘The United States and Shi‘ite Religious Factions’, 547.

^34.International Crisis Group, Shiite Politics in Iraq, 2.

^35.Marr, Modern History of Iraq.

^36.Duss and Juul, The Fractured Shia of Iraq, 9.

^37.Cole, ‘The United States and Shi‘ite Religious Factions’, 553.

^38.Daly, ‘Iraq's Unknown Future’.

^39.International Crisis Group, Shiite Politics in Iraq, 8.

^40.Daly, ‘Iraq's Unknown Future’.

^41.Dodge, ‘Causes of U.S. Failure in Iraq’, 94.

^42. Cockburn, Muqtada, 112.

^43.Cole, ‘The United States and Shi‘ite’, 554.

^44.International Crisis Group, Iraq's Muqtada al-Sadr, 20.

^45.Pollack, ‘Muqtada al-Sadr’, and as cited in Hubbard, ‘Plague and Paradox’, 347.

^46.Bremer and McConnell, My Year in Iraq, 129.

^47. International Crisis Group, Iraq's Muqtada al-Sadr, 10.

^48.White and Philips, ‘Sadrist Revolt Provides Lessons’.

^49.Worth and Tavernise, ‘Radical Cleric Rising’.

^50.Knickmeyer and Fekeiki, ‘Sunni Arabs Tell of Abuse’.

^51.Allam, ‘Wolf Brigade’.

^52. Cockburn, Muqtada, 154.

^53.Felter and Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq, 37.

^54.Glanz and Tavernise, ‘U.S. Is Holding Iranians’.

^55. Cockburn, Muqtada, 168.

^56. To maintain clarity, this article will continue to refer to the group as SCIRI.

^57.International Crisis Group, Iraq's Civil War, 6–7.

^58. Ibid., 8.

^59.MacAskill, ‘Al-Sadr Declares Ceasefire’. A similar ceasefire was struck between al-Sadr and the Maliki government after fighting in Sadr City in the spring of 2008. See Lafranchi, ‘Hasty Truce with Moqtada al-Sadr’.

^60.Khoury, The 2009 Iraqi Provincial Elections, 1.

^61.Wong, ‘Shiite Morality Is Taking Hold’.

^62.Fadel, ‘Basra Sings Again’.

^63.Visser, The Sadrists of Basra.

^64. Fadhilla was a militia of the followers of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Yaqoobi. Yaqoobi had been a student of Sadiq al-Sadr, but broke away from the Sadrist movement upon Moqtada's rise to leadership. For a detailed discussion of militia factions in Basra, see Visser, The Sadrists of Basra.

^65.Farrell and Glanz, ‘More than 1,000 in Iraq's Forces Quit Basra Fight’.

^66.Goode, ‘U.S. Airstrikes Aid Iraqi Army’.

^67.Cole, ‘Why Al-Maliki Attacked Basra’.

^68.Cochrane, The Battle for Basra, 13.

^69. For a detailed account, see Weiner, Maliki Makes a Play.

^70.Dagher and Myers, ‘Disparate Iraqis Vote for Stability and Security’.

^71. Khoury, The 2009 Iraqi Provincial Elections, 4.

^72.Pollack, The Fall and Rise and Fall of Iraq, 13.

^73. For an analysis of the divisions within the Supreme Council since 2009, see Ali, ‘Revival of the Islamic Supreme Council’.

^74.Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Shia Militias Are Back’.