Delusions of survival: US deliberations on support for South Vietnam during the 1975 ‘Final Offensive’

Abstract

When North Vietnam launched a military offensive in March 1975, there was little expectation that South Vietnam would collapse 55 days later. As the South’s forces quickly crumbled and the scale of the military disaster became increasingly apparent, the United States considered a number of options to provide emergency assistance to its ally. This article will examine the evolution of the diplomatic, economic, military, and covert options US policymakers developed to support the South during the Final Offensive. These policy options will be set against the backdrop of the ‘scripts’ US officials devised to justify emergency assistance, as well as their delusions about the South’s prospects for survival.

Keywords:

• Vietnam War
• Saigon
• South Vietnam
• CIA
• Final Offensive
• US Military
• scripts

Notes

1. The PRG was formerly known as the National Liberation Front until the name was changed in 1969. This group of ‘Southern’ insurgents was informally known as the ‘Viet Cong’.

2. Duiker, Sacred War, 240–4; Prados, Vietnam, 518–25; Berman, No Peace, 240–62.

3. This point was also observed in a 1971 meeting in which US officials discussed the ceasefire terms. See: Transcript of Senior Review Group Meeting, July 22, 1971, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS). Likewise, Kissinger noted to presidential aide John Ehrlichman that he didn’t expect South Vietnam to survive for more than one and a half years: Berman, No Peace, 8.

4. CIA/DIA/INR Memorandum, ‘Assessment of the Current Military Situation in Vietnam,’ Digital National Security Archive (DNSA).

5. Karnow, Vietnam, 658–9.

6. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Response to Part I of NSSM 213,’ DNSA.

7. Young, The Vietnam Wars 1945–1990, 290.

8. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Response to Part I of NSSM 213’.

9. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 193.

10. Palmer, ‘US Intelligence and Vietnam’, 105.

11. Anderson, ‘Gerald R. Ford and the Presidents’ War’, 187; Karnow, Vietnam, 656–7.

12. Berman, No Peace, 240–62.

13. Anderson, ‘Gerald R. Ford and the Presidents’ War’, 190.

14. Ibid., 191–3.

15. Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, 18–25; Karnow, Vietnam, 661–6.

16. Palmer, ‘US Intelligence and Vietnam’, 108.

17. Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, 120.

18. South Vietnam was divided into four military regions (I, II, III, and IV) running north to south. Military Region I was located along the Demilitarized Zone with North Vietnam. Military Region II consisted of the Central Highlands. Military Region III comprised the area around Saigon. Military Region IV was responsible for the Mekong Delta.

19. Blair, Ted Serong, 157–9.

20. Backchannel Message from Lehmann to Martin, March 17, 1975, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 188.

21. Vien, The Final Collapse.

22. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 162–4.

23. Memo from Stearman to Kissinger, March 12, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 185.

24. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 164; Blair, Ted Serong, 168.

25. Palmer, ‘US Intelligence and Vietnam’, 117.

26. Thieu letter cited in Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 259.

27. Ibid.

28. Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 53/14.3-75, March 27, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973-July 1975, Doc. 195.

29. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, March 28, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 196.

30. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Regionals Staff Meeting, March 31, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 198.

31. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Regionals Staff Meeting, April 2, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 201.

32. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, April 2, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 202.

33. Snepp, Decent Interval, 222.

34. Ibid., 224; Veith and Pribbenow, ‘Fighting Is an Art’, 162–213.

35. Memo from Weyand to Ford, April 4, 1975, DDRS.

36. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, April 9, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 212.

37. ‘Report to the President of the United States on the Situation in South Vietnam’, April 4, 1975, DDRS; See also Weyand’s comments in: Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, April 9, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 212.

38. See for instance: Memo from Granger to Scowcroft, April 5, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 208.

39. Address by President Gerald R. Ford Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on United States Foreign Policy, April 10, 1975. Available at http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/750179.asp.

40. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 262–3.

41. Snepp, Decent Interval, 223.

42. Backchannel Message from Martin to Kissinger, April 15, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 233; Memo from Ellerman to Butler, April 17, 1975, DDRS.

43. This phrase was used by Nguyen Cao Ky to describe American actions during this period. See chapter 19 of his memoirs: How We Lost the Vietnam War, 203–17.

44. Snepp, Decent Interval, 227–8.

45. Colby memo, cited in Ibid., 290–1.

46. Ibid., 291; See also Michaels, ‘Helpless or Deliberate Bystander’, 575–6.

47. Snepp, Decent Interval, 228. [AQ1]

48. CIA-INR-DIA memo, cited in Ibid., 229.

49. Memo from Quinn to Kissinger, April 5, 1975, DDRS.

50. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 542; Memorandum of Conversation, April 21, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc 248.

51. Snepp, Decent Interval, 291.

52. Memorandum for the Record of National Security Council Meeting, April 24, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 258.

53. Snepp, Decent Interval, 292.

54. Interview with Pierre Brochand, WGBH Media Library and Archives. Available at http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-b73429-interview-with-pierre-brochand.

55. During French colonial rule, this southern portion of Vietnam was called ‘Cochin China’.

56. By 1975, the ICCS consisted of some 1000 personnel divided among Hungarian, Polish, Iranian, and Indonesian delegations responsible for monitoring the 1973 ceasefire.

57. Snepp, Decent Interval, 249–52, 255.

58. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 184–5; Snepp, Decent Interval, 300.

59. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 175, 182–3.

60. Snepp, Decent Interval, 268–9.

61. Ibid., 307.

62. Backchannel Message from Martin to Kissinger, April 26, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 261; See also: Backchannel Message from Kissinger to Martin, April 28, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976 Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Doc. 269.

63. After Saigon’s collapse, Polgar remained convinced that Martin’s delay in immediately bringing Minh to power caused the breakdown of the negotiating gambit. See Snepp, Decent Interval, 340.

64. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 191.

65. Ibid., 197.

66. Snepp, Decent Interval, 310–12.

67. Ibid., 311; Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 195; Ky, How We Lost the Vietnam War, 220–1.

68. Snepp, Decent Interval, 336–44.

69. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 198.

70. Ibid., 202; Snepp, Decent Interval, 339.

71. The FPJMT, responsible for POW and MIA issues, consisted of delegations from the US, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the PRG.

72. Snepp, Decent Interval, 340.

73. Ibid., 346.

74. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 207–8.

75. Snepp, Decent Interval, 354.

76. Ibid., 353.

77. Ibid., 365.

78. Ibid., 405, 427–8.

79. Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 201–11.

80. Karnow, Vietnam, 669.