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Abstract
This article is intended to serve as a ‘think piece’ which invites readers to view current perceived changes to the conduct of modern warfare in the broader historical light outlined by proponents of epochal change theory. Neo-medievalists have gone a step in this direction and posited that these changes represent the future of warfare and are evidence of a return, in a sense, to the primary tenets of political and social organization that existed in the period commonly referred to as the Middle Ages. The contention herein is that the answer gains more accuracy if one takes a much longer historical standpoint beginning with classical civilization and moving through the medieval period to our modern world. With regard to the present, this epochal warfare analysis projects that a shift from a Westphalian to post-Westphalian global system is underway. During this period of transition – as in the transition periods between epochs which have preceded it – the dominant state form undergoes a deinstitutionalization process, and war is less about traditional issues of state sovereignty, and instead increasingly over ‘what the new form of social and political organization will be’.
Notes
1. The United States Department of Defense defines irregular warfare (IW) as ‘A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will’. IW, so defined, was meant to replace the term ‘low-intensity conflict’ and encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. US Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare, 5–6.
2. One such forum, entitled ‘Proxy Actors, Psyops & Irregular Forces: The Future of Modern Warfare’, was convened in June 2015 through the auspices of The Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow. The authors thank their fellow participants, particularly its moderator Alex Marshall, for their insightful contributions in stimulating further thought on these topics.
3. Kaldor, New & Old Wars, 1–7.
4. Falk, ‘A “New Medievalism”?’, 107, 111.
5. For more on the concepts of humanspace and cyberspace, see Bunker and Heal, Fifth Dimensional Operations.
6. This should not be equated with Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’. Rather, it is derived from modern and postmodern views on human existence and lawful and illicit behaviors.
7. See Kaldor, New & Old Wars, 7–8.
8. Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict.
9. Ibid., 16–17.
10. Ibid., 10.
11. For the initial archival document related to this collaboration dating from 1987, see Moore, ‘The Structure of War’. Two related lines of investigation by other scholars were also taking place concerning the rise of non-state threats during this era, see, for instance, Lind et al., ‘The Changing Face of War’ and van Creveld, The Transformation of War.
12. One of the more pronounced influences of this theory has been related to the establishment of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (LA TEW) in 1996 and its initial replication in over a dozen cities in the United States. The TEW national expansion program was supported by DHS monies after 9/11 with this early warning network eventually being superseded by the DHS based intelligence fusion-centers program. See Sullivan and Bauer, Terrorism Early Warning.
13. Early publications written for US military journals explaining this process are Bunker, ‘The Transition to Fourth Epoch War’ and Bunker, ‘Epochal Change’.
14. Medieval epoch attributes are not as clear cut as classical and modern epoch attributes because the full-scale utilization of animal energy did not impact naval warfare as both human and mechanical energy did. As a result, galley warfare that had dominated during the classical era continued into the medieval epoch. This required human energy for its motive force and a continued reliance upon slaves to man the galleys of the various Italian city-states and other political entities of the Mediterranean.
15. For modal warfare and RMA analyses, see Bunker, ‘Modes of Warfare’, Bunker, ‘Ricochets and Replies’, and Bunker, ‘Cycles of War?’.
16. For an international political economy interpretation of the present epoch shift, see Bunker and Bunker, Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies.
17. Specific individuals will be noted where appropriate.
18. Bull, The Anarchical Society, 254–66.
19. Ibid., 265–7.
20. Friedrichs, ‘The Meaning of New Medievalism’.
21. Ibid., 476.
22. Ibid., 481–2.
23. Ibid., 482.
24. Ibid., 491.
25. Bull, The Anarchical Society, 308.
26. McFate, The Modern Mercenary.
27. Ibid., 75–85, 166–7.
28. Ibid., 26–32, 90–100.
29. Ibid., 79–85.
30. Ibid., 93.
31. Ibid., 159.
32. Ibid., 69, 162–9.
33. Ibid., 165.
34. Williams, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age, 4, 30–31.
35. Ibid., ix–x and, in more detail, 11–30, 38–9.
36. Ibid., 49.
37. Ibid., 42–7.
38. Ibid., 44.
39. The transition from the classical to the medieval epoch is typically dated from the Battle of Adrianople in 378 (demise of the legion) to the Battle of Tours in 732 (creation of a viable Western cavalry force). The transition from the medieval to modern epoch is typically dated from the Battle of Crecy in 1346 (first use of hand ‘gonnes’ on the Western battlefield) to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (recognition of nation-state sovereignty). These dates are to some extent arbitrary but can be considered important markers of epochal change. Another important date is the Siege of Constantinople in 1453, which resulted in the demise of the castle in the face of modern artillery. Of note is the fact that this defeat resulted in the final demise of the Byzantine Empire, the surviving eastern half of the old Roman Empire, which was dominant for much of the medieval epoch in its spheres of influence. For an additional Western epochal figure with important dates listed, see Moore, ‘The Contemporary Clash in Civilization’, 41. Also see Schrodt and Cantir, ‘Medievalism for Dummies’ section of ‘Fragmented Sovereignty’, 4.
40. Machiavelli, ‘How Many Kinds Of Soldiery There Are’.
41. US Marines and soldiers commonly hold terrorists and insurgents in utter contempt. During red teaming training – such as the Mirror Image terrorism immersion training offered by the Terrorism Research Center in the 2000s – some servicemen were simply unable to assume their role as terrorists. Such hubris can get a military force wiped out as was evident in the Marine Corps Barracks bombing in Lebanon in October 1983 when a Hizballah suicide truck bomber drove into the facility through almost non-existent perimeter defenses.
42. Concerning these cycles, see Bunker, ‘Don’t Ritualize Armor’ and Bunker, ‘Foreword’.
43. Cervantes, Don Quixote.
44. This is opposed to classical battlespace which operated in two dimensions – the x axis for infantry movement and the t axis for time. While cavalry forces were utilized by both the Macedonians under Phillip II and Alexander the Great and the Carthaginians under Hannibal, they never became part of the fully institutionalized military forces of the classical world. Still, when utilized by these leaders, they resulted in impressive victories over opposing forces such as the celebrated Macedonian victory over the Persians at Gaugamela in 331 bc and the Carthaginian victory over the Romans at Cannae in 216 bc. These military forces can be said to have created ‘dimensional bubbles’ that provided them with medieval epoch equivalent battlespace capabilities that drew upon the y axis for cavalry mobility.
45. The advent of nuclear weapons has also resulted in conventional warfare being constrained between states that both possess such weapons. See van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation.
46. Whitehead, Prince, and Smith, ‘British Army Could Be Cut’.
47. See Information Security Oversight Office, Report for Fiscal Year 2014, 6.
48. Gangs, organized crime, and warlord threats are also being recognized by both epochal theorists and medievalists. See, respectively, Sullivan and Bunker, ‘Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords’ and Cantir and Schrodt, ‘Neomedievalism in the Twenty-First Century’.
49. For research conducted for the FBI related to VNSA directed energy weapons use concerns, see Bunker, ‘Terrorists and Laser Weapons Use’.