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Abstract
Following the February 2014 fall of Viktor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Western government in Kiev, Russia initiated an irredentist intervention to annex the Crimean peninsula. Although much attention has focused on the use of military forces without country or unit insignia (the ‘little green men’ of irregular warfare), a crucial part of this operation involved a complex and multilayered perception management campaign to advance a self-interested narrative, which defined the contours of debate, justified their actions at home and abroad, and provided those actions with legal and normative legitimacy. This article examines the Kremlin’s rhetoric in three areas: Crimea’s secession from Ukraine was a legal act of self-determination; Russia possesses justifiable historical, cultural, and legal claims to Crimea; and, Western criticism of Russia’s actions are dishonest and a reflection of their anti-Russian, Cold War mentality.
Notes
1. Darczewska, ‘Anatomy of Russian’; Cimbala, ‘Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics?’
2. He was referring specifically to the Global War on Terrorism, but this insight is clearly applicable more broadly. Betz, ‘The Virtual Dimension’, 510.
3. Dean Cheng quoted in Blank, ‘Russian Information Warfare’, 38.
4. Siegel, ‘Perception Management’.
5. Larson, Foundations.
6. US Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook.
7. Siegel, ‘Perception Management’, 118.
8. Cimbala, ‘Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics?’, 368.
9. Huhtinen and Rantapelkonen, ‘Perception Management’, 243.
10. Betz, ‘The Virtual Dimension’, 515.
11. Siegel, ‘Perception Management’, 119.
12. Brunner and Cavelty, ‘Formation and In-formation’, 635.
13. Esch, ‘Legitimizing the “War on Terror”’, 357.
14. Vlahos, ‘The Long War’.
15. Thomas, ‘The Russian View’; Thomas, ‘Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy’; Darczewska, ‘Anatomy of Russian’, 9–14.
16. Quoted in Blank, ‘Russian Information Warfare’, 34.
17. Simons, ‘The Use of Rhetoric’.
18. Akhvlediani, ‘The Fatal Flaw’.
19. Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash, 86–103.
20. In this instance, the government and the state are conceptually conflated. Blank, ‘Russian Information Warfare’.
21. As opposed to colonial self-determination.
22. International Court of Justice, ‘Accordance’, ¶82–3.
23. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement’, 3 March 2014.
24. Ibid.; Lavrov, ‘Answers’, 21 March 2014.
25. Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 29 March 2014. Churkin, ‘Speech’, 27 March 2014.
26. Lavrov made an attack along the same lines two weeks earlier in Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 3 March 2014. For Putin’s speech, see Putin, ‘Address’.
27. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 20 March 2014.
28. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement’, 1 March 2014.
29. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 8 March 2014.
30. Putin, ‘Address’.
31. Putin went the furthest in acknowledging the veto, saying that it as ‘set aside, but clearly reserved for the future’, only after great pressure from the new government’s ‘foreign sponsors’. Ibid.
32. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 3 March 2014.
33. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Comment’, 11 March 2014.
34. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘White Book on Violations’.
35. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 20 March 2014.
36. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 21 March 2014.
37. Lavrov, ‘Introductory Speech’, 14 March 2014; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement’, 11 March 2014; Putin, ‘Address’.
38. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 20 March 2014.
39. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 4 March 2014.
40. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Comment’, 16 March 2014.
41. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Comment’, 11 March 2014.
42. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Declaration of Independence’.
43. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement’, 17 February 2008.
44. Ibid.
45. Putin, ‘Address’.
46. Lavrov: ‘Of course, as you know, we have been hearing accusations against Russia regards the illegality of the connection of Crimea, even the use of the term ‘annexation’ lately’. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 21 March 2014.
47. This is how it was presented in the laws passed by the Russian Duma ratifying the accession of Crimea to Russia – the territory is referred to as the ‘Republic of Crimea’.
48. The latter option was unclear as the original version of Crimea’s 1992 constitution declared Crimea to be an independent state, whereas the later amended version identified Crimea as an autonomous republic within Ukraine. BBC News, ‘Crimea Referendum’.
49. The legality of Russian actions under the Budapest Memorandum was mentioned by officials far more than the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, which included a stronger legal obligation since it was a formal treaty, rather than a multilateral memorandum of understanding. One reason for this may be that these statements were directed primarily at the larger international community where the Budapest Memorandum would have greater resonance, since it was signed by the United States and the United Kingdom as well.
50. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement’, 1 April 2014.
51. This was over the politically motivated trial and imprisonment of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
52. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 5 March 2014.
53. Esch, ‘Legitimizing the “War on Terror”’.
54. Putin, ‘Address’.
55. Later, in his December 2014 presidential address, Putin referred to Crimea having ‘invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism’. ‘Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly’.
56. Plokhy, Ukraine and Russia, 182–95.
57. Moreover, the revival of the orange-and-black striped St George ribbon in Russian-dominated Ukraine and Russia itself during the spring of 2014 was telling since it was a symbol of the Soviet victory over fascism in World War II. This further reinforced the claim that the new government in Kyiv was fascist.
58. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 21 March 2014.
59. There are questions, however, about the fairness of the referendum and the legitimacy of its result. Russian and Crimean authorities cited the fact that over a hundred international observers were on hand for the referendum, but these were almost entire unofficial or, in fact, pro-Russian in the first place. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe refused to take part in any observer mission. Regardless, the results were promoted by the Russian government as indisputable and inviolable.
60. Lavrov, ‘Answers’, 21 March 2014 and Churkin, ‘Speech’, 27 March 2014.
61. Kramer, ‘Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?’
62. As well as the agreements which led to the CIS Charter, such as the Belavezha Accords.
63. Woronowycz, ‘Ukraine and Russia Complete’.
64. Putin, ‘Address’.
65. Bohm, ‘Six More Russian Myths’.
66. Lavrov, ‘Introductory Speech’, 20 March 2014.
67. Herd, ‘Russia and the “Orange Revolution”’.
68. Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 29 March 2014.
69. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 3 March 2014.
70. Putin, ‘Address’.
71. Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 29 March 2014.
72. Brzezinski served as National Security Advisor to US President Jimmy Carter and has been a forceful advocate for a neo-containment strategy against post-Soviet Russia. Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 30 March 2014.
73. Ibid.
74. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Comments’, 15 March 2014.
75. Ambrosio, Challenging America’s Global Preeminence.
76. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Comments’, 15 March 2014.
77. Putin cited possibility of a pro-Western Ukraine joining NATO and the establishment of NATO naval bases in Crimea. Putin, ‘Address’.
78. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement’, 3 March 2014.
79. Lavrov, ‘Answers’, 21 March 2014.
80. Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 29 March 2014.
81. Lavrov, ‘Speech’, 25 April 2014.
82. Putin, ‘Address’.
83. In a related manner, Lavrov claimed that the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the annexation of Crimea was a result of American pressure, threats, and bribes. (Russia vetoed a similar resolution in the UN Security Council.) Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 30 March 2014.
84. For additional insights into this speech, see Rywkin, ‘Russia’.
85. Putin, ‘Annual Address’.
86. There is a widespread belief in Russia that, in the early 1990s, the United States promised Moscow that it would not expand NATO.
87. See, for example, Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 29 March 2014; Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 11 April 2014.
88. Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 61–73.
89. Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash, 69–86.
90. Smith, ‘Russia and Multipolarity’.
91. This included Putin’s use of the term ‘Novorossiya’ in April 2014 (which suggested further irredentist claims on Ukraine), referenda by the pro-Russian separatists to secede from Ukraine and join Russia, and Moscow’s continuing military and financial support for these separatists.
92. Lavrov, ‘Interview’, 11 April 2014.
93. Putin, ‘Presidential Address’.
94. Shaun, ‘Russia Calls for Talks’.
95. Holmquist, ‘Kazakhstan after Crimea’.