The limits of soft balancing: the frozen conflict in Transnistria and the challenge to EU and NATO strategy

Abstract

Both the EU and NATO have greatly expanded efforts to address the frozen conflict in Transnistria since 2003. These efforts by and large fall neatly into the category of ‘soft balancing’ actions against Russian influence in the conflict and in Moldova more generally. Given that soft balancing is normally seen as a strategy undertaken by relatively weak actors vis-à-vis a global or regional hegemon, this behavior is puzzling. The actions of these institutions demonstrate that soft balancing is a logical strategy for stronger actors when the conflict is not as salient as for the weaker actor. The EU and NATO’s desire to resolve the conflict is not salient enough to warrant a costlier hard power strategy. Recent developments in Ukraine also demonstrate the limitations of this strategy. Specifically, the application of this soft power has done little to change the incentives for separatist leaders or their Russian backers, meaning they have little ability to resolve the conflict. They have also fallen short of creating a permanent pro-Western consensus in Moldova. They do, however, augment Moldova’s ability to adapt to the challenges posed by the conflict and provide a paper wall against more aggressive Russian ambitions in the region.

Keywords:

• Frozen conflicts
• soft balancing
• soft power
• Moldova
• Transnistria
• European Union
• NATO

Notes

1. Dempsey, ‘Moldova Is Next Battleground’; Kristof, ‘Moldova’.

2. See Popescu, EU Foreign Policy; Cantir and Kennedy, ‘Balancing’.

3. See, for example, Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts, 150; Popescu, EU Foreign Policy, 38; Wolff, ‘A Resolvable Frozen Conflict?’, 864; Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy Towards Transnistria’, 53.

4. Cantir and Kennedy, ‘Balancing’.

5. Walt, ‘Taming American Power’; Pape, ‘Soft Balancing’.

6. For example, Lebow, ‘The Long Peace’; Vasquez, ‘The Realist Paradigm’.

7. For example, Pape, ‘Soft Balancing’; Paul, ‘Soft Balancing’; Art, ‘Striking the Balance’.

8. Pape, ‘Soft Balancing’.

9. McDougall, ‘Responses to “Rising China”’; Oswald, ‘Soft Balancing’; Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘Hard Times’; He and Feng, ‘If Not Soft Balancing’.

10. Paul, ‘Soft Balancing’; He and Feng, ‘If Not Soft Balancing’.

11. For example, Elman, ‘Introduction’, 8; Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats’.

12. Saltzman, ‘Soft Balancing’; Corrales, ‘Using Social Power’; He, Institutional Balancing.

13. Saltzman, ‘Soft Balancing’; Pape, ‘Soft Balancing’.

14. Pape, ‘Soft Balancing’; Saltzman, ‘Soft Balancing’; He, Institutional Balancing.

15. For example, Oswald, ‘Soft Balancing’; Lanteigne, ‘Water Dragon?’; Corrales, ‘Using Social Power’.

16. Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘Hard Times’.

17. He and Feng, ‘If Not Soft Balancing’.

18. Cantir and Kennedy, ‘Balancing’; Kennedy, ‘A Quiet Revolution?’

19. Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts, 64–5.

20. Orenstein and Mizsei, ‘Moldova in the Middle’.

21. Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts.

22. The effect of the settlement on the stationing of Russian troops is somewhat unclear. ‘President’ Igor Smirnov of Transnistria argued that the settlement must also include a treaty guaranteeing a Russian military presence in Moldova for 30 years. Ciobanu suggests that the settlement included the stationing of Russian troops in the region ‘for another couple of decades’ (Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts, 152). None of the texts of the Kozak Memorandum itself, at least that we have acquired, have explicitly mentioned such a provision, suggesting that it was an understood, rather than an explicit, part of the settlement or was part of a secret version of the text. See Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts; Popescu, EU Foreign Policy.

23. Infotag, ‘Duma Ready’; Interlic, ‘The RM President Considers’.

24. Shapovalova and Boonstra, ‘The European Union’, 60.

25. Cantir and Kennedy, ‘Balancing’.

26. Kennedy, ‘A Quiet Revolution?’; Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanut, ‘Contested Neighborhood’.

27. Permanent neutrality is enshrined in the Moldovan constitution (Article 11).

28. NATO Istanbul Summit Communiqué, May 2004, article 32.

29. Vershbow, ‘Moldova and NATO’.

30. NATO, ‘Joint Press Point’.

31. Nantoi, ‘Key-Points’; Popescu, ‘Outsourcing’; Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts.

32. Tudoroiu, ‘The European Union’, 142.

33. Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts; Popescu, EU Foreign Policy.

34. Blakkisrus and Kolsto, ‘From Secessionist Conflict’, 187; Dura, ‘The EU Border Assistance Mission’.

35. Delegation of the European Union to Moldova, ‘Civilian Peace-Building’.

36. When the AEI assumed power, it disbanded the Ministry of Reintegration and did not replace it for a period of time. The Bureau for Reintegration is still considered to have limited capacity. Whitman and Wolff, The European Union as Global Conflict Manager, 125.

37. NATO, ‘NATO’s Relations’.

38. NATO, ‘NATO Secretary General’.

39. Gelb, ‘Russian Natural Gas’.

40. The Economist, ‘Why Has Russia Banned Moldovan Wine?’; Alexandrova, ‘Russia Freezes’.

41. Barbarosie and Coalson, ‘Empty Pipeline’.

42. Sobják, ‘The Romania-Moldova Gas Pipeline’.

43. Barbarosie and Coalson, ‘Empty Pipeline’.

44. Shapovalova and Boonstra, ‘The European Union’, 50.

45. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that ‘[T]here is absolutely no contradiction between your [Moldovan] neutrality and our partnership’. (NATO, ‘Joint Press Point’.)

46. Cantir and Kennedy, ‘Balancing’.

47. Popescu, EU Foreign Policy.

48. Lowenhardt, ‘The OSCE’, 4.

49. Popescu, EU Foreign Policy.

50. See Kennedy, ‘A Quiet Revolution?’; Bosse, ‘The EU’s Relations’; Korosteleva, ‘Moldova’s European Choice’.

51. Litra, ‘European Integration’.

52. Cantir and Kennedy, ‘Balancing’.

53. See, for Example, Pape, ‘Soft Balancing’; He and Feng, ‘If Not Soft Balancing’; Whitaker, ‘Soft Balancing Among Weak States’.

54. Shlapak, ‘Russia Is Outmanned’.

55. Norman, ‘EU Projects’.

56. The Economist, ‘Conscious Uncoupling’.

57. He and Feng, ‘If Not Soft Balancing’.

58. The Economist, ‘Conscious Uncoupling’.

59. See, for example, Baker and Higgins, ‘US and European Sanctions’.

60. The Economist, ‘Conscious Uncoupling’.

61. Mankoff, ‘Russia’s Latest Land Grab’.

62. See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, European Community Decision Making; Bueno de Mesquita, ‘The End of the Cold War’.

63. For example, in his statement at Moldova State University, NATO Deputy Secretary General Vershbow repeatedly emphasized that NATOs primary goal was the promotion of democracy and stability within the country. See Vershbow, ‘Moldova and NATO’.

64. Wolff, ‘A Resolvable Frozen Conflict?’, 866.

65. Ibid.

66. Quoted in Ciobanu, ‘NATO/EU Enlargement’, 8.

67. Kaljurand, ‘Russian Influence’; Rojanski, ‘“Frozen” Transnistria Conflict’; Tsyiganok, ‘Moldaviya’.

68. Nantoi, ‘Key-Points’.

69. Simão, ‘EU-South Caucasus Relations’.

70. Emerson and Kosanyan, ‘Putin’s Grand Design’; Delcour and Kostanyan, ‘Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood’.

71. Chifu, ‘Russian Interests in Moldova’.

72. Mankoff, ‘Russia’s Latest Land Grab’.

73. Dyner and Sobják, ‘European Perspectives for Moldova’.

74. Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts.

75. Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy Toward Transnistria’.

76. Popescu, EU Foreign Policy.

77. See, for example, Nantoi, ‘Key-Points’.

78. For example, Ghilascu, ‘The New Face of Transdniester’. For a less optimistic initial assessment, see Socor, ‘Tiraspol’s New Leader’.

79. For example, Euronews, ‘Interview’; BBC News, ‘HARDtalk Interview’.

80. BBC News, ‘Moldova’s Trans-Dniester Region’.

81. Popescu, EU Foreign Policy.

82. Socor, ‘Tiraspol’s New Leader’.

83. Orenstein and Mizsei, ‘Moldova in the Middle’.

84. O’Loughlin et al., ‘Divided Space’; O’Loughlin et al., ‘Inside’.

85. Kommersant, ‘The Old Guard Wins’.

86. Ibid.

87. King, The Moldovans.

88. Socor, ‘Tiraspol’s New Leader’.

89. Litra, ‘European Integration’.

90. IPP, ‘Barometrul Opiniei Publice, Noiembrie 2014: Anexe’.

91. Respondents were asked, ‘Dacă duminica viitoare va avea loc un referendum cu privire la aderarea RM la Uniunea vamală, Dvs. aţi.’ (If a referendum on joining the [Russia–Belarus–Kazakhstan] Customs Union were held next Sunday in the Republic of Moldova, you would . . .).

92. Rodina, ‘$1 Billion Disappears’.

93. IPP, ‘Barometrul Opiniei Publice, Noiembrie 2014: Reportul Finale’.

94. IPP, ‘Barometrul Opiniei Publice, Aprilie 2014: Reportul Finale’.

95. It should be noted that, at the time of this survey (March/April), it is possible that Putin had still not acknowledged Russian military involvement. This did not occur until mid-April. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that most of the respondents who believed that no military intervention occurred would have supported the military intervention once it was acknowledged.

96. Radeke, ‘The Cost of Russian Trade Sanctions’.

97. IMF, World Economic Outlook.

98. Lynch, ‘The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy’, 12.

99. ESI, ‘The Surprising Front-Runner’. This is not to say that Moldova’s efforts at Europeanization are without problems. See, for example, Soloviev, ‘Moldova’, for an accounting of Moldova’s shortcomings in its Europeanization efforts.

100. Zarroli, ‘Sanctions Intensify’.