Selling the end of terrorism: a framing approach to the IRA’s disengagement from armed violence

Abstract

Experiences from the end of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s campaign of armed violence have informed broader debates on how terrorism ends, yet this research has underplayed the internal dynamics which made the IRA’s disengagement successful. The article utilises a framing approach to explain how a network within the IRA managed to ensure the majority of the movement supported an end to violence. A disengagement frame was constructed by this network within the IRA which maintained narrative fidelity, it utilised the credibility of mid-ranking commanders, and there were sufficient linkages to diffuse the frame due to generational hegemony, the structure of the IRA, and the unique structure of the prisons system. Finally, the article challenges the utility of decapitation strategies because organisational stability can maintain the components which ensure a disengagement frame will resonate.

Keywords:

• Terrorism
• disengagement
• framing
• IRA
• negotiations

Notes

1. See Cronin, How Terrorism Ends; Alterman, “How Terrorism Ends”; Gvineria, “How Does Terrorism End?”.

2. Weinberg and Perliger, “How Terrorist Groups End”.

3. See Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists”.

4. Gvineria, “How Does Terrorism End?”; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends.

5. Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End.

6. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends.

7. Zartman, “Ripeness”.

8. Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War.

9. Tonge, Shirlow, and McAuley, “So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?”.

10. O’Kane, Eamonn. “Decommissioning and the Peace Process: Where Did It Come from and Why Did It Stay So Long?”.

11. Pruitt, “Whither Ripeness Theory”.

12. LKowalchuk, “The Discourse of Demobilisation”.

13. Goddard, “Brokering Peace”.

14. Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists”.

15. Lilja, “Ripening Within?”.

16. Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists”. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (2007).

17. Patterson, “Beyond the ‘Micro Group’”.

18. Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma; Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War.

19. Pruitt, “Whither Ripeness Theory”; Schiff, “Reaching a Mutual Agreement”.

20. Pruitt, “Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict”; Lilja, “Ripening Within?”.

21. Tonge, Shirlow, and McAuley, “So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?”; O’Kane, “Decommissioning and the Peace Process”; O’Kane, Eamonn. “Decommissioning and the Peace Process: Where Did It Come from and Why Did It Stay So Long?”; Hancock, “The Northern Irish Peace Process”.

22. Haysom, “Engaging Armed Groups in Peace Processes”; Pruitt, “Whither Ripeness Theory”.

23. Snow et al., “The Emergence, Development, and Future of the Framing Perspective”.

24. Readiness Theory, for example, utilises this distinction to explain how groups successfully engage in negotiations, but it is unclear how so-called ‘moderates’ persuade and pressure ‘radicals’ to joining the former’s side, and the distinction obfuscates how radicals and hawks can be supportive of negotiations. See Pruitt, “Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict”.

25. While Stedman argues that it is not necessary to mobilise the support of the entire movement, the need for understanding how dialogue persuades a military elite to support negotiations vindicates the focus on how leaders engage in framing processes. Furthermore, a key part of convincing the military elite to support negotiations was that the majority of the movement was brought along as not doing so would threaten Republican identity – therefore framing processes do need to apply throughout the movement. Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War; Morrison, “Why Do People Become Dissident Republicans?”.

26. Goffman, Frame Analysis.

27. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization”, 469.

28. Karagiannis, “Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization”.

29. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements”.

30. Ibid.

31. Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists.

32. Risse, “Let’s Argue!”; Rabasa et al., “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists”.

33. Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists.

34. Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism.

35. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013; Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 4, Belfast, 3 September 2013

36. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013; Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 3, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

37. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (2002); Tonge, Shirlow, and McAuley, “So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?”.

38. Tonge, Shirlow, and McAuley, “So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?”.

39. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements.

40. Smith, Fighting for Ireland?.

41. Tonge, Shirlow, and McAuley, “So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?”.

42. Of course, at the time both groups were all in the IRA, although the split had begun slightly before the vote. Other issues were the leftist nature the leadership was taking the movement in, the perceived inactivity in the armed campaign and the end of abstentionism.

43. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

44. CFNI, “From Prison to Peace”; Interview, Former INLA Member, Belfast, 26 August 2013.

45. Interview, Former INLA Member, Belfast, 26 August 2013.

46. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation”; Interview, Former INLA Member, Belfast, 26 August 2013.

47. White, “The 1975 British-Provisional IRA Truce in Perspective”.

48. Zald and Ash, “Social Movement Organizations”.

49. Control beliefs refer to the extent an actor perceives they are able to actually behave in a certain way. For example, an actor may believe it to be beneficial to assassinate a political figure, but if they perceive this to be impossible through experience (low control beliefs), then they may begin to re-evaluate the utility of assassinating the political figure.

50. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

51. This includes Operation Motorman and the policy of Ulsterisation and Normalisation.

52. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (2007).

53. With regard to debates on decapitation, imprisonment of the most influential members – as opposed to killing them – allows for the tactical learning which can facilitate the disengagement process, but the effect of this may be contingent on the extent a new group of members become influential on the outside.

54. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 2, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

55. The policy of reducing the presence of British soldiers and increasing the role of security services in Northern Ireland.

56. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 2, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

57. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 4, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

58. Although, the conflict was still portrayed as an anti-imperialist struggle against Britain.

59. Smith, Fighting for Ireland?

60. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 2, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

61. Silke, “Rebel's Dilemma”.

62. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 2, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

63. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

64. Silke, “Disengagement or Deradicalization”.

65. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

66. Interview, 32 County Sovereignty Movement Member, Belfast, 15 August 2013.

67. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

68. Pruitt, “Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict”.

69. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

70. Shirlow et al., Abandoning Historical Conflict?

71. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 3, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

72. Interview, Community Worker DE, Belfast, 13 September 2013.

73. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 4, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

74. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

75. Weinberg and Perliger, “How Terrorist Groups End”; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends.

76. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

77. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 2, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

78. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013.

79. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013.

80. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (2007).

81. Horgan and Gill, “Who Are the Dissidents?”.

82. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 2, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

83. Shirlow et al., Abandoning Historical Conflict?, 13.

84. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013.

85. Guelke, “Comparatively Peaceful”.

86. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 2, Belfast, 2 September 2013.

87. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 3, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

88. Guelke, “Comparatively Peaceful”.

89. International events such as the Israel–Palestine peace process in 1993 and the 11 September 2001 attacks were utilised by the leadership to build a narrative that the tide was turning against armed violence, although the latter actually had more tangible consequences in terms of a crackdown on Republican funding in the US.

90. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013.

91. These conditions state that if the ex-prisoner commits an offence or breaches specific conditions of release, such as participation in Republican marches, then the person can be re-detained. Republicans, such as the Real IRA’s political wing, currently mobilise on this, which they refer to as internment-on-remand.

92. Interview, Former INLA Member, Belfast, 26 August 2013.

93. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013.

94. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013.

95. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 3, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

96. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 1, Belfast, 22 August 2013.

97. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 3, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

98. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 4, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

99. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 4, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

100. Frampton, “Dissident Irish Republican Violence”.

101. Morrison, “Why Do People Become Dissident Republicans?”.

102. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 3, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

103. Interview, Former Provisional IRA Member 5, Belfast, 3 September 2013.

104. Morrison, “Why Do People Become Dissident Republicans?”.

105. O’Farrell, Hinsliff, and McDonald, “IRA Declares Peace”.

106. Brady, “Wikileaks”.

107. Weinberg and Perliger, “How Terrorist Groups End”.

108. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends.

109. Tsvetovat and Carley, “Structural Knowledge and Success of Anti-Terrorist Activity”.