The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

Abstract

This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.

Keywords:

• SAS
• Confrontation
• Borneo
• Special Forces
• Strategy
• Military effectiveness

Notes

1. Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror, 4.

2. Cohen, Commandoes and Politicians – Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 101 quoted in MacKenzie, Special Force, 24.

3. Walker, “Brunei and Borneo, 1962-1966,” 220–1.

4. Dickens, SAS, 1983.

5. MacKenzie, Special Force.

6. Dickens, SAS, 231.

7. McCreery, The Complete History of the SAS, 136.

8. Gregorian, “CLARET Operations and Confrontation, 1964-1966,” 50.

9. The National Archive (TNA), DEFE 5/156, “Security Operations in the Borneo States, October 1, 63–March 31, 64,” Part 1 to CINCFE 117/64, January 7, 1965.

10. TNA, DEFE 5/172, CINCFE 9/67, “The Joint Report on the Borneo Campaign,” January 27, 1967, Chapter 11.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Walker, “Brunei and Borneo 1962-1966,” 216.

14. A Battalion Commander, “Reflections on Borneo,” 20.

15. Dickens, SAS, 228.

16. Ibid.

17. James and Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War, 192.

18. Kemp, The SAS, 71.

19. MacKenzie, Special Force, 17–8.

20. Ibid., 127.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 128.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., 130.

25. For a discussion of these points, see Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 15–22.

26. Gregorian, “CLARET Operations,” 63.

27. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 13.

28. Luttwak, Strategy, 88.

29. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 143.

30. Luttwak, Strategy, 88.

31. Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 31–2.

32. For more detail on the Brunei Revolt see van der Bijl, The Brunei Revolt, 1962-63; Majid, Rebellion in Brunei.

33. TNA, DEFE 5/172, CINCFE 9/67, “The Joint Report on the Borneo Campaign,” Part 2, Chapter 2, January 27, 1967.

34. TNA, DEFE 5/155, COS 321/64, “Military Measures to Counter Indonesian Confrontation,” December 30, 1964.

35. Walker, Fighting On, 170.

36. Hall and Ross, “The Political and Military Effectiveness of Commonwealth Forces in Confrontation, 1963-66,” 242–3.

37. TNA, DEFE 5/172, CINCFE 9/67, “The Joint Report on the Borneo Campaign,” January 27, 1967, Part 2, Chapter 3.

38. Technically, Walker was only COMBRITBOR (Commander British Forces, Borneo) for the early part of this; Lea remained COMBRITBOR until November 1966.

39. Walker, “How Borneo Was Won,” 16–7.

40. TNA, WO305/1771, CBB 1/26, “Director of Borneo Operations Instruction No. 10: Command, Roles and Employment of the Special Air Service Regiment in Borneo,” January 10, 1964.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. TNA, DEFE 5/172, CINCFE 9/67, “The Joint Report on the Borneo Campaign,” January 27, 1967, Chapter 11.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., Part 2, Chapter 3.

47. Ibid., Part 2, Chapter 2.

48. Ibid., Chapter 11.

49. Ibid.

50. The Joint Report extends this period to November 1964, but the SAS records indicate that the first SAS Claret cross-border operations took place in September of that year.

51. TNA, DEFE 5/156, “Security Operations in the Borneo States, October 1, 63–March 31, 64,” Part 1 to CINCFE 117/64, January 7, 1965.

52. TNA, DEFE 5/172, CINCFE 9/67, “The Joint Report on the Borneo Campaign,” January 27, 1967, Chapter 11.

53. Dickens, SAS, 230.

54. The following analysis is based upon a review of the SAS documents contained in TNA WO 305, 4292–4.

55. Pocock, Fighting General, 196.

56. Charters, “Two Years of Living Dangerously” in Gray, ed., Special Operations, 226.

57. Gregorian, “CLARET Operations,” 64.

58. Dickens, SAS, especially 144–5, 182–3, 187–8, 203–8.

59. Ibid., 217.

60. TNA, WO305/4292, Ops/90/22, “Report of a Patrol to the Area West of LZ 147 (GR 6384),” February 22, 1965.

61. TNA, WO305/4293, Ops/90/27, “Patrol Report: Area of Batu Hitam 553864,” March 8, 1965.

62. Ibid.

63. TNA, WO305/4293, Ops/90/42, “Patrol Report: SEP Escort Patrol to Bt Berpayong Area GR 62685,” April 22, 1965.

64. Ibid.

65. TNA, WO305/4293, Ops/90/56, “Patrol Report: Patrol Red Bravo Area Batu Hitam,” May 12, 1965.

66. TNA, WO305/4293, Ops/90/64, “Report on Patrol Red Zulu Recce to Batu Hitam Area: approx GR 5687,” June 15, 1965.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. TNA, WO305/4294, Ops/90/102, “Report on Operation Red Fort 10 September to 29 September by ‘A’ Sqn 22 SAS Regt – to Locate Batu Hitam Training Camp,” October 3, 1965.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. TNA, WO305/4294, “Op Red Fort – Intelligence Info,” Annex C to Ops/90/102, October 3, 1965.

73. TNA, WO305/4294, Ops/90/102, “Report on Operation Red Fort 10 Sep to 29 Sep by “A” Sqn 22 SAS Regt – to Locate Batu Hitam Training Camp,” October 3, 1965.

74. TNA, WO 305/4294, Ops/90/107, “Report on 6 Troop and Border Scout Operation to Locate Batu Hitam Training Camp,” November 6, 1965.

75. Ibid.

76. TNA, WO 305/4294, Ops/90/112, “Report on Patrol Red Zulu to Find Batu Hitam Training Camp,” November 29, 1965.

77. TNA, WO 305/4294, Ops/90/115, “Operation Bed Socks: Report on Ambush of Track to the West of LZ 148, GR 6298874,” December 29, 1965.

78. Gray, Modern Strategy, 17.

79. Drew and Snow, Making Strategy, 27.

80. Ibid., 218.

81. TNA, DEFE 4/179, Confidential Annex to COS 1st Meeting 1965, “Meeting with Lord Head,” January 5, 1965.

82. TNA, CAB 148/19), OPD(65)1, “Indonesia: Memo by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,” January 8, 1965.

83. TNA, DEFE 5/156, COS 11/65, “Military Measures to Counter Indonesian Confrontation,” January 13, 1965; TNA, CAB 148/18, OPD(65) 1st Meeting, January 14, 1965.

84. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, 5th Edition, 20.

85. TNA, DEFE 5/164, Annex A to COS 219/65, December 30, 1965.

86. TNA, DEFE 13/385, COSSEA 143, MoD UK to CINCFE, July 1, 1964.

87. Pocock, Fighting General, 197; De La Billiere, Looking for Trouble, 243.

88. http://wingedsoldiers.co.uk/sas-borneo/

89. De La Billiere, Looking for Trouble, 246.

90. See, e.g. Harrison and Heron, Jungle Conflict, 51–80.

91. TNA, DEFE 5/164, Annex A to COS 219/65, December 30, 1965.

92. TNA, DEFE 13/475, Annex A to COS 176/65, “Measures to Counter Indonesian Confrontation,” October 21, 1965.

93. Easter, Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960–66, 152–5.

94. TNA, DEFE 5/147, Annex A to COS 19/64, “Military Measures to Counter Indonesian Confrontation,” January 21, 1964.

95. TNA, DEFE 4/179, Part I to COS 3rd Meeting/65, “Military Measures to Counter Indonesian Confrontation,” January 12, 1965.

96. TNA, DEFE 13/475, Annex A to COS 176/65, “Measures to Counter Indonesian Confrontation,” October 21, 1965.

97. See Easter, “British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the ‘confrontation’, 1963-66,” 195–208.

98. TNA, DEFE 5/155, Appendix 2 to Annex to COS 321/64, “Operations Against Indonesian Bases and Targets of Opportunity in the Malacca and Singapore Straits,” December 30, 1964; TNA, DEFE 5/155, Appendix 3 to Annex to COS 321/64, “Intensification of the War of Nerves Against Indonesia – Possible Measures,” December 30, 1964.

99. See Tuck, Confrontation, Strategy and War Termination, Chapter 5.

100. TNA, DEFE 11/591, Extract from COS 18th Meeting/65, “Graduated Military Options in Kalimantan,” April 6, 1965.