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Abstract
The utility of naval gunfire support (NGS) during the Malayan Emergency has been the subject of significant scrutiny. While the limitations of NGS were demonstrated in Malaya, it also has proven to be extremely useful under certain circumstances. The circumstances in which NGS has proven effective during earlier and later insurgencies have generally reflected those of the Malayan Emergency. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been less conducive to the application of maritime power, but they did not denote the end of the naval role or the potential usefulness of NGS in counterinsurgency operations. NGS is an unheralded capability, but, aside from the historical significance, it remains relevant in the contemporary era under the right conditions.
Notes
1. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 372.
2. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 14.
3. Miller, “An Unparalleled War and The Special Branch,” 327.
4. Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 69–70.
5. Gentile, Wrong Turn, 22.
6. Drew, “Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict,” 342.
7. Corum, “On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency,” 93–4.
8. Harris, “The Navy’s Role in Confronting Irregular Challenges”.
9. Mumford, “Unnecessary or Unsung,” 636.
10. Corum, “On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency,” 94.
11. Murphy, “The Blue, Green, and Brown,” 63.
12. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 1.
13. Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 8.
14. Benbow, “Maritime Forces and Counterinsurgency,” 80.
15. Hoffman, “The First Non-State Use of a Chemical Weapon in Warfare,” 468.
16. Marks, “Counterinsurgency and Operational Art,” 181.
17. Murphy, “The Blue, Green, and Brown,” 67.
18. For more on the maritime role in Sri Lanka, see: Smith, “Maritime Interdiction in Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency,” 448.
19. Devitt, “The ‘Navalization’ of Ireland,” 388.
20. Benbow, “Maritime Forces and Counterinsurgency,” 82.
21. Underwood, Waters of Discord, 31; Meilinger, Airwar, 194; and Moon, Wellington’s Two-Front War, 175.
22. Kurth, “The New Maritime Strategy,” 599.
23. Imperial War Museum (IWM), Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower, Director of Operations, Malaya, “Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the End of 1954,” 10 January 1955.
24. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 169.
25. For more information on the contributions of the Royal Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force and Royal New Zealand Air Force see: Postgate, Operation Firedog.
26. Benbow, “Maritime Forces and Counterinsurgency,” 84; and Tuck, “The Royal Navy and Confrontation,” 205.
27. Directorate of Operations, Malaya, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 12–13.
28. Australian War Memorial (AWM), AWM 121, 402/A/2, “Attachment of Her Majesty’s Australian Ships to the Far East Fleet for Service with the Strategic Reserve,” Undated.
29. See note 23 above.
30. IWM, Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower, Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower, “Final Review of the Emergency in Malaya,” 17 September 1957.
31. The National Archives of the UK (TNA), AIR 20/10377, Director of Operations, Malaya, “Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957,” September 1957.
32. See note 24 above.
33. See note 1 above.
34. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey have contended: ‘There was no evidence to suggest that CTs were being smuggled into Malaya by sea routes, when overland trails, through the dense jungle that covered much of Malaya and which extended into the border areas with Thailand where the CTs found ready sanctuary, provided acceptable, if slow, lines of communication.’ Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 69; and Smith, Counterinsurgency Operations, 35.
35. Grey, “Naval Operations in Peripheral Conflicts,” 133.
36. See note 1 above.
37. Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 36.
38. TNA, AIR 20/10377, Director of Operations, Malaya, “Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957,” September 1957.
39. IWM, Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower, Director of Operations, Malaya, “Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the End of 1955,” January 1956.
40. See note 35 above.
41. IWM, Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower, Director of Operations, Malaya, “Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the End of 1956,” January 1957.
42. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 372; and TNA, ADM 53/138066, “H.M.S. Defender: Ship’s Log, March 1954,” March 1954.
43. TNA, AIR 20/10375, Director of Operations, Malaya, “Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the End of 1955,” January 1956.
44. The vessels involved were: HM Ships Comus, Concord, Cossack, Newcastle and Opossum. TNA, ADM 1/26140, Office of Flag Officer, Malayan Area to Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, “Joint Operations Against Communist Terrorists in Kuala Langat (Operation ‘NASSAU’),” 3 November 1955.
45. TNA, ADM 1/26140, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, to the Secretary of the Admiralty, “Joint Operations Against Communist Terrorists in Malaya (Operations ‘NASSAU’ and ‘REX’),” 30 November 1955.
46. See note 35 above.
47. Directorate of Operations, Malaya, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 24; and TNA, AIR 20/10375, Director of Operations, Malaya, “Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the End of 1955,” January 1956.
48. TNA, ADM 1/26140, Office of Flag Officer, Malayan Area to Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, “Operation Rex – Report,” 17 November 1955.
49. Ibid.
50. See note 45 above.
51. See note 48 above.
52. Ibid.
53. TNA, ADM 1/25556, Signal from H.M.S. Newfoundland to the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, “Operation Eclipse – Bombardment in Support of Security Forces Operating Against Communist Terrorists in the Peak District of Central Kedah,” 15 June 1954.
54. Ibid.
55. TNA, ADM 1/25556, Message from Second in Command, Far East Station, to Flag Officer, Malayan Area, “Operation Eclipse – Bombardment in Support of Security Forces Operating Against Communist Terrorists in the Peak District of Central Kedah (The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Newfoundland’s Letter No. 229/2 dated 15 June, 1954),” 15 June 1954.
56. TNA, ADM 1/2555, Message from 56 Ground Liaison Section, RAF Station Butterworth, to Naval Liaison Officer, HQ Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, “Op Reports – Operation Eclipse,” 22 June 1954.
57. TNA, ADM 1/25556, Message from HQ 1 Federal Division District, Taiping to HQ Malaya, “Bombardment Kedah Peak by HMS Newfoundland,” 3 July 1954.
58. See note 53 above.
59. The Flag Officer, Malayan Area, conceded: ‘inch to 1 mile maps of the coasts of Malaya, are maintained in the Chart Deport and are issued to ships on the Malayan ration. These are normally adequate for bombardments. It is agreed that larger scale maps are desirable where exceptionally high or steep terrain is involved. These are usually available from the Army and will be obtained for future bombardments of this nature.’ TNA, ADM 1/25556, Message from Second in Command, Far East Station, to Flag Officer, Malayan Area, “Operation Eclipse – Bombardment in Support of Security Forces Operating Against Communist Terrorists in the Peak District of Central Kedah (The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Newfoundland’s Letter No. 229/2 dated 15 June, 1954),” 15 June 1954; and TNA, ADM 1/25556, Signal from H.M.S. Newfoundland to the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, “Operation Eclipse – Bombardment in Support of Security Forces Operating Against Communist Terrorists in the Peak District of Central Kedah,” 15 June 1954.
60. See note 53 above.
61. Pfennigwerth, Tiger Territory, 61.
62. AWM, AWM 78, 34/4, “HMAS Anzac: Report of Proceedings, September 1956,” 1 October 1956.
63. AWM, AWM 78, 343/5, Part 1, “HMAS Tobruk: Report of Proceedings, September 1956,” 6 October 1956.
64. See note 61 above.
65. AWM, AWM 78, 300/4, “HMAS Quickmatch: Report of Proceedings, January 1957,” 7 February 1957.
66. AWM, AWM 78, 298/5, “HMAS Queenborough: Report of Proceedings, January 1957,” 3 February 1957.
67. AWM, AWM 78, 34/5, “HMAS Anzac: Report of Proceedings, July 1957,” 2 August 1957.
68. AWM, AWM 78, 343/5, Part 1, “HMAS Tobruk: Report of Proceedings, August 1957,” 5 September 1957.
69. Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency, 77–8.
70. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 370.
71. Postgate, Operation Firedog, 22.
72. TNA, ADM 1/26140, Office of Flag Officer, Malayan Area to Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, “Joint Operations Against Communist Terrorists in Kuala Langat (Operation ‘NASSAU’),” 3 November 1955.
73. The term ‘hate’ was applied to ritualised forms of aggression and was particularly prominent during the First World War.
74. See note 72 above.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 78.
78. A First World War memorandum was just as applicable during the Emergency: ‘by constantly harassing the enemy … we can greatly improve the morale of our own troops and wear out and depress the enemy’. Ashworth, Trench Warfare, 91.
79. See note 48 above.
80. See note 45 above.
81. See note 48 above.
82. See note 77 above.
83. See note 48 above.
84. French, The British Way in Counterinsurgency, 44.
85. Marston, “Lost and Found in the Jungle,” 96.
86. Arnold, A Jungle of Snakes, 178; and Parker, The Gurkhas, 235.
87. For example, during Operation Inland, which was commenced north of Ipoh in March 1954, the Lincoln Bombers of No. 1(B) Squadron Royal Australian Air Force were instructed to conduct bombing and strafing with the intention of driving the enemy into ambush positions. The same principle could be applied to NGS although the capability was not as effective in that regard. AWM, AWM 64 1/8, No. 1(B) Squadron RAAF Operational Log-Malaya, February–July 1954.
88. TNA, ADM 1/25556, Message from Naval Liaison Officer, HQ Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, to Flag officer, Malayan Area, “Report on Naval Bombardment – H.M.S. Newfoundland,” 29 June 1954.
89. Osborne, Getting the Job Done, 12.
90. Tilman, “The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency,” 407.
91. Mackay, The Malayan Emergency, 152–3.
92. See note 72 above.
93. Schindler, “Defeating Balkan Insurgency,” 546–7.
94. See note 35 above.
95. TNA, ADM 1/25556, Unknown author, “Register No. M.267.215.54, Minute Sheet 1,” 29 September 1954.
96. Rabasa et al., Money in the Bank, 11.
97. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 128.
98. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars, 169.
99. Jordan, “‘A Particularly Exacting Operation’,” 107.
100. Ibid., 108.
101. Speller, “Limited War and Crisis Management,” 167–8.
102. AWM, AWM 78, 352/9A, “HMAS Vendetta: Report of Proceedings, January 1970,” 1 February 1970.
103. Pfennigwerth, Missing Pieces, 195.
104. Leach, “DDGs in Vietnam,” 341.
105. Schindler, “Defeating Balkan Insurgency,” 546.
106. See note 72 above.
107. AWM, AWM 78, 292/6, “HMAS Perth: Report of Proceedings, October 1968,” 4 November 1968.
108. AWM, AWM 78, 292/6, “HMAS Perth: Report of Proceedings, December 1968,” 1 January 1969.
109. Bunk, Ghosts of Passion, 31.
110. Black, Avoiding Armageddon, 215; and Álvarez, “The Spanish Foreign Legion,” 210.
111. TNA, ADM 202/817, 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery: Operation Corporate Report (Falklands Conflict), 1 July–31 July 1982.
112. Dutton and Waldhauser, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 10.
113. For more on the conduct of NGS during the assault on the Al Faw Peninsular, see: Ingham, “Naval Gunfire Support for the Assault of the Al Faw Peninsular,” 33–6.
114. Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis, 8.