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Abstract
In assisting states facing insurgencies, few subjects are more vital than understanding the manner in which external aid can be applied in a sustainable manner. Colombia, touted by proponents as a case study for astute application of external reinforcement for democracy, is just as often held up by critics as an illustration of the misplaced priorities of the US. No part of the critique is more prevalent than assertions concerning the nature of US military assistance. American aid to counterinsurgency filled particular capacity gaps and enhanced capabilities that already existed. These were possible due to the Colombian ability to absorb input.
Notes
1. Politica de Defensa y Seguridad Democratica, Republica de Colombia, 2003, 13; available at: https://www.oas.org/csh/spanish/documentos/Colombia.pdf (accessed 1 March 2017).
2. For details in this journal, see Marks, “COLMIL Support for ‘Democratic Security’,”197–220.
3. Notes taken by Major Carlos Berrios, USA, Deputy Army Section Chief, US Military Group-Bogota during discussions between General Ospina and senior US military leaders, August 2003.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. See source in n.2 above.
7. Historically, the best comparison of conditions might be those experienced in the Burma theater by long-range penetration units such as the British Chindits or American Merrill’s Marauders. Disease vulnerability alone was a daunting challenge, with development of advanced treatment protocols an integral part of sustaining the force.
8. Interview by author of COL James Collins, USA, former SOUTHCOM J2, Colombia Team Leader and one of the architects of the Intelligence Integration Program, 16 December 2010.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Interview by Dr Dave Spencer with Mr Pedro Nunez, US Embassy-Colombia, Intelligence Fusion Center Liaison Officer, 18 November 2010.
15. Interview by author with COL James Collins USA.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Information provided by Mr Juan Soto, communications advisor to the COLMIL and CNP since 2001, 18 December, 2010.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. ‘Development of the Colombian Signal Branch,’ draft authored by Mr Juan Soto, communications advisor to the COLMIL and CNP after 2001, and CPT Sigfredo Matos Rodriguez, who served as the J6 for the US Military Group in Colombia for 1.5 years; date unknown.
25. Interview by author with Major (R) Tony Santiago, former SOUTHCOM IO LNO to US MILGP, Colombia from 2002 to 2007, 22 December, 2010.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Information provided by LTC (R) David Diaz, US Military Group Civil Affairs LNO from 2002 to 2009, 17 December 2010.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. Acronym as per Spanish.
36. Acronym as per Spanish.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. COLMIL had long sought to follow security efforts with a robust and unified civilian response on its own without success. It was not until the government organized itself under the auspices of the CCAI that a long-term state presence in areas long held by the FARC became achievable.
44. Ibid.
45. Information provided by LTC (R) David Diaz.
46. Interview by author with USN CAPT Mark Morris, former US Naval Section Chief, US Military Group-Bogota from 2005 to 2010, 21 December 2010.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Interview conducted by Dr David Spencer with COL (R) Kevin Higgins, CNP Junglas advisor after 2001 and former US Military Group Commander, 1999–2001, 9 November 2010.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Former SOUTHCOM CDR, Gen Charles Wilhelm presented General (R) Tapias, COLMIL CDR at the time, with a proposal at the Defense Ministerial in 1998 to create a CD Battalion along the US Army TO&E. The intent was for this battalion to have sufficient firepower to confront FARC. At that time, SOUTHCOM understood clearly that FARC was heavily involved in the all facets of the drug trade and that it had grown substantially in terms of combat power, hence the offer of building the CD battalion using the TO&E of a US Army battalion.
58. Interview conducted by Dr David Spencer with COL (R) Kevin Higgins.
59. CCOPE and CCOES essentially mean the same thing, Joint Special Operations Command. One takes two letters from OPeraciones, and the other takes two letters from ESpeciales. CCOES, as noted in the text, was made more robust and given greater stature, but missions remained unchanged.
60. Interview conducted by Dr David Spencer with LTC Will Griego, US SOF Advisor to COL SOF, US Military Group, 15 November 2010.
61. The idea of having US military personnel serving as PATT with COLMIL tactical units was initially presented to the COLMIL leadership in 2002, but it received a lukewarm reception. At the time COLMIL agreed to create joint mobile training teams to provide training to COLMIL leaders at the tactical unit level in order to enhance their critical warfighting tasks. When General Mora did agree to the idea in response to an offer from SOUTHCOM commander, General Hill, the PATT initiative was received with mixed reaction by some tactical unit leaders. However, the PATT program continued to evolve and proved its benefits to some COLMIL commanders, who valued the operational advice as well as the initiative exercised by some of the PATT to facilitate intelligence information and training.
62. Interview by author with LTC (P) Chris ‘Luke’ Lukasevish, former PATT Chief, US Military Group, Colombia from 2007 to 2008 and later Pol-Mil Planner for Colombia, Joint Staff, J5, Western Hemisphere, 16 December, 2010.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.