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Abstract
In Bolivia, a brilliantly executed insurgency was carried out between 1995 and 2005, so much so that few perceived it as such. Its most important characteristic was its correct evaluation of the relative correlation of forces and application of the right combination of all forms of struggle. This was possible because of its pragmatism. Though not bound by ideological dogmatism, it nonetheless displayed a deep understanding of insurgency and revolutionary theory. This allowed adaptation and evolution in a changing context. The main form of struggle was not military violence, although it was not absent, but rather violent social protest funded by drug trafficking proceeds. The strategy thus neutralized traditional counterinsurgency models, because it made it difficult to apply coercive force as the enemy was not clearly identifiable. Its success in Bolivia means that the emergence of a new model of insurgency, one still built upon the popular mobilization of people’s war but more attuned to new global realities, is a reality.
Notes
1. Transition between the twentieth and the twenty-first century.
2. The seminal source on this subject remains Pike, PAVN.
3. This is not unlike the Chinese concept of ‘political warfare’; see Marks, Counterrevolution in China.
4. See Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia.
5. Lenin, Guerrilla Warfare.
6. Ibid.
7. Composed mostly of Chaco War veterans, therefore combat hardened compared to the regular army conscripts.
8. Mendel, “Counterdrug Strategy – Illusive Victory,” 74–87.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. The variant of coca for the production of cocaine has been bred for this purpose and has a much higher alkaloid content. It cannot be chewed or used to make traditional teas. Thus, the Cocalero argument that it was being grown for traditional reasons, often repeated in the international press, was spurious.
12. Consejo Nacional contra el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas.
13. CICAD, Evaluación de los Compromisos plasmados en el Plan Dignidad.
14. An archaic Spanish term meaning trail blazer or pathfinder.
15. Interview with anonymous source who did his military service in the Ranger Regiment from 1990 to 1992, 23 September 2014.
16. CICAD, Evaluación, 6.
17. Government of the Republic of Bolivia, Memoria, 380.
18. Rodríguez, “Evitar la Confrontación.”
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Lenin, Lessons of the Moscow Uprising.
22. Lenin, A Militant Agreement for the Uprising.
23. Lenin, “The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.”
24. Cocalero sympathizers have often portrayed this slogan as ‘Zero Coca,’ but traditional coca crops and coca uses were protected by Law 1008. Only coca for illicit uses was made illegal.
25. Government of the Republic of Bolivia, Memoria, 375.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibíd., 378.
28. Defensor del Pueblo, Estudio de Violencia Intrafamiliar en Contextos de Violencia Generalizada, 17.
29. Storrs, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), 15.
30. Government of the Republic of Bolivia, op. cit., 378–9.
31. Ibid., 381.
32. Ibid., 380.
33. Navia Gabriel and Pinto Cascán, “Mutilados y olvidados de Chapare.”
34. Ibid.
35. Guísela, “Hay 100 desactivadores de cazabobos.”
36. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitoring Report 2004.
37. Government of the Republic of Bolivia, op. cit., 379.
38. Rodríguez, “Evitar la Confrontración.”
40. Movimiento al Socialismo.
41. See note 38 above.
42. Storrs, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI).
43. See note 17 above.
44. See note 31 above.
45. Shultz and Draper, Desafiando la Globalización.
46. Barrero Cordero, “La Guerra del Agua en Cochabamba,” 94.
47. Daroca Oller, “Protesta y Acción Social en Cochabamba,” 7; also Humberto, “Bolivia,” 48.
48. Daroca Oller, Ibid, 8.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 10–1.
51. Vargas, op. cit., 48–9.
52. Ledebur, Coca y Conflicto en el Chapare, 6; Vargas, op. cit., 49.
53. Ledebur, Ibid, 7.
54. The General Accounting Office, Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles, 21.
55. Camacho Balderrama, La ‘Rebelión’ de Febrero.
56. At this time, only 5% of Bolivians paid taxes.
57. Camacho Balderrama, La ‘Rebelión’ de Febrero.
58. Informe De La Organización De Los Estados Americanos (OEA) Sobre Los Hechos De Febrero Del 2003 En Bolivia.
59. http://boliviaprensa.com/index.php/noticias-bpa/745-bolivia-recuerda-los-hechos-de-febrero-negro.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. OAS.
64. Amnesty International, Bolivia, Crisis y Justicia.
65. OAS.
66. Ibid.
68. Ejército Guerrillero Tupak Katari, a relatively obscure guerrilla group.
69. “Yo Ordene la Emboscada de Warisata.”
70. “Fuego cruzado en Warisata deja 5 muertos y heridos.”
72. Guísela, “Warisata.”
75. ‘The Heights’ in English.
80. See note 22 above.
83. Ibid.
84. See e.g. Marks, “Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016,” 81–118.
85. Refer to contributions by Ospina and Marks in this special issue.