Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War

Abstract

After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious and ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in eastern, western and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant actor, their strategies and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally.

Keywords:

• Fragmentation
• violence
• civil wars
• political orders
• Libya

Notes

1. Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining”; and Willcoxon, “Contention, Violence and Stalemate in Post-War Libya.”

2. Lamont, “Contested Governance.”

3. Lacher, “Libya’s Local Elites.”

4. For descriptions of Libya as an ungoverned space, see Dessì, “A Multilateral Approach to Ungoverned Spaces”; Lynch, “Failed States and Ungoverned Spaces”; and Blunt, “Terrorists are Thriving in Libya’s Lawless Spaces.”

5. Boege et al., “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States.”

6. Risse, “Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood.”

7. Ibid., 6, 7.

8. Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” 247.

9. Tilly, “War Making and State Making.”

10. Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, “State and Non-state Regulation in African Protracted Crises,” 13.

11. Krasner and Risse, “External Actors, State-building, and Service Provision”; and Risse, “Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood.”

12. Arjona, “Wartime Institutions,” 1374.

13. Further studies on rebel-citizen interactions include Wood, “Insurgent Collective Action”; and Mampilly, “Rebel Rulers.”

14. Raleigh, “Political Hierarchies.”

15. Risse, “Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 9.

16. Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED”; Raleigh and De Bruijne, “Where Rebels Dare to Tread”; and Snyder, “Scaling Down.”

17. Boone, “Political Topographies of the African State.”

18. Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and Vlassenroot, “State and Non-state Regulation in African Protracted Crises,” 9.

19. Studies of non-state actor strategies are well-developed in exploring the trajectory of civil conflict and has been shown to influence the onset (Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining”); resolution (Driscoll, “Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars?”; Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders”), modalities and intensities of violence (Boyle, “Explaining Strategic Violence after Wars”; Balcells, “Rivalry and Revenge”; Raleigh, “Violence Against Civilians”) and direction of civil wars (Clayton and Thomson, “Civilianizing Civil Conflict”).

20. Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour, “A Plague of Initials”; Brenner, “Ashes of Co-optation”; and Pearlman and Cunningham, “Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes.”

21. Raleigh, “Pragmatic and Promiscuous.”

22. See Raleigh and Kishi, “Hired Guns.”

23. Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining,” 660.

24. Brenner, “Ashes of Co-optation.”

25. Findley and Rudloff, “Combatant Fragmentation.”

26. Driscoll, “Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars?”

27. Ibid., 12.

28. See Collombier, “Building an Army to Build the State?”; and Constantini, “Conflict Dynamics in Post-2011 Libya.”

29. Ibid., 255.

30. Stacher, “Fragmenting States, New Regimes”; and Collombier, “Building an Army to Build the State?”

31. DeVore, “Exploiting Anarchy,” 464.

32. Constantini, “Conflict Dynamics in Post-2011 Libya.” A critical reading of the failed state discourse is also proposed in Dowd and Raleigh, “Governance and Conflict.”

33. Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED.”

34. Raleigh, “Violence against Civilians.”

35. Dowd, “Actor Proliferation and the Fragmentation of Violent Groups.”

36. Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining.”

37. Western Libya includes the capital Tripoli and the districts of Al Jabal al Gharbi, Al Marqab, An Nuqat al Khams, Az Zawiah, Ghadamis, Gharyan, Jafara, Misratah, Mizdah, Nalut, Sabratah Surman, Surt, Tajura wa an Nawahi al Arba, Tarhunah-Masallatah and Yafran-Jadu. Eastern Libya roughly correspond to the historical administration of Cyrenaica, and is composed of the districts of Ajdabiya, Al Butnan, Al Hizam al Akhdar, Al Jabal al Akhdar, Al Marj, Al Qubbah, Al Wahah and Darnah. Southern Libya, which includes the historical Fezzan region, extends across the districts of Al Jufrah, Al Kufrah, Ash Shati, Ghat, Murzuq, Sabha and Wadi al Hayat.

38. Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders.”

39. Turki and Loschi, “Chantiers de reconstruction politique en comparaison,” 8–10.

40. Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War.”

41. Raleigh et al., “The Spatial Analysis of War.”

42. Rustad et al., “All Conflict is Local.”

43. Examples were cited in Jebnoun, “Beyond the Mayhem”; Jeursen and van der Borgh, “Security Provision after Regime Change”; and Raghavan, “Inside the Brutal but Bizarrely Bureaucratic World.”

44. See Al-Esha, “Country of Small Wars.”

45. Lewis, “After long Benghazi Campaign.”

46. Profazio, “An Explosive Mix.”

47. Collombier, “Building an Army to Build the State?” 232–234.

48. Fisher and Ury, “Getting to Yes.”

49. Reports of these temporary alliances were published in Fornaji, “Local Residents Reported Killed in Garabulli Clashes.”

50. Mason and Krane, “The Political Economy of Death Squads.”

51. Barter, “State Proxy or Security Dilemma?”

52. Human Rights Watch reported that militias from Misrata fired upon peaceful demonstrators outside the militia base in Gharghour, southern Tripoli on 15 November 2013, leaving 43 people killed. Since then, militias and their politician allies have been blamed for cutting fuel and electricity supplies inducing power and water crises in the capital. See Moutaz, “A Miserable Summer in Tripoli.”

53. On Tripoli’s militias, see Pack, “Who are Tripoli’s Most Important Militias?”; and Herald, “Mitiga Airport Closed by Internal Militia Fighting.”

54. Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.”

55. Local challenges in Cyrenaica have not resulted in spill over fighting but careful balancing and mediation between eastern tribes remains tense and fragile with defections of support a possibility. See Maghreb Confidential, “Haftar Tries to Consolidate his Tribal Alliances.”

56. Reports of PFG’s inaction against the LNA were published by Menastream media agency (https://twitter.com/MENASTREAM/status/794534309520670722).

57. The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade originated as a battalion of the 17th February Martyrs Brigade and under Prime Minister Ali Zeidan were integrated into the Libyan Army. Following their split, rumours of frictions between the groups have circulated though no violent confrontations have been observed in the ACLED data-set. They have since been reported fighting alongside Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi against the LNA.

58. Al Jazeera, “Khalifa Haftar Forces Seizes Oil Port Brega in Libya”; and Lewis, “Libya’s NOC to ‘Begin Work Immediately to Restart Exports’ from Seized Ports.”

59. Criminal networks are reported to have flourished in post-revolutionary Libya, sustaining the war efforts of several armed groups. See the final reports of the Panel of Experts on Libya submitted to the United Nations Security Council in 2016 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/209) and 2017 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/466).

60. Murray, “Southern Libya Destabilised.”

61. International Crisis Group, “How Libya’s Fezzan Became Europe’s New Border.”

62. Kaldor, “New and Old Wars”; and Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars.”

63. ‘Letter dated 1 June 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/466).

64. Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders.”

65. Lacher, “Libya’s Local Elites.”

66. Autesserre, “The Trouble with the Congo,” 137.

67. See for example Paul Richards’ response to the ‘New Barbarism’ lens on violent conflict in Sierra Leone. Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone.

68. The definition is from Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia.”

69. Migdal, “State in Society.”

70. Dowd, “Actor Proliferation and the Fragmentation of Violent Groups”, 3.