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Abstract
This article analyses changes and failures in the northern Mali system of security governance, taking into account the period running from the declaration of the Malian Third Republic (1992) to the present. Considering northern Mali as an area of limited statehood, the article develops a comparative diachronic analysis, distinguishing between three phases, namely Militiarisation (1992–2002), Fragmentation (2002–2012) and Multiplication (2013–ongoing). For every phase the focus is on (1) the mechanisms of coordination among actors, (2) the distribution of coercive capacities and ruling power and (3) the forms of authority. Unintended consequences and collective problems are highlighted, in order to understand the current situation of insecurity in the area.
Notes
1. Wing, “Mali.”
2. Marchal, “Military (mis)adventure in Mali.”
3. Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling”; Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region.
4. Ronen, “Libya, the Tuareg and Mali.”
5. De Castelli, “Mali.”
6. Lebovich, “Mali’s Bad Trip”; Lecocq et al., “One Hippopotamus”; Raleigh and Dowd, “Governance and Conflict in Sahel” and Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region.
7. See for example Brachet, Les impacts de l’aide au développement and Van de Walle, Foreing Aid in Dangerous Places.
8. Lecocq et al., “One Hippopotamus” and Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession and Jihad.”
9. Daase and Friesendorf, Rethinking Security Governance, 2.
10. On ALS, see Risse, Governance without the State? and Risse and Lehmkuhl, “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood.”
11. Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia.”
12. Clements et al., “State Building Reconsidered”; Boege et al., “Hybrid Political Orders.”
13. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty.”
14. Draude, How to Capture Non-Western Forms of Governance.
15. Raeymaekers et al., “State and Non-State Regulation in African Protracted Crises,” 9.
16. On ‘ungoverned spaces’, see Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces and Keister, The Illusion of Chaos.
17. Criticisms against a functionalist approach to the study of power and violence have been addressed by Guichaoua, Understanding Collective Political Violence and Klute and Embalò, The Problem of Violence.
18. See Risse, “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood” and above in the article.
19. On the whole, an unintended consequence is the ‘effect of purposive social action which is different from what was wanted at the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of which was a reason for carrying it out’; see Baert, “Unintended Consequences,” 201.
20. On Principal-Agent problems see Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency” and Ostrom et al., Aid, incentives, and sustainability.
21. Della Porta, “Comparative Analysis.”
22. The term is taken from Van Vliet, “The Challenges of Retaking Northern Mali.”
23. Territoriality and border-control represent two of the building characteristics of a consolidated statehood. The two terms are employed following Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territorialities.”
24. Seeley, “A Political Analysis of Decentralization.”
25. Migdal, State in Society.
26. Both the ‘Mediated State’ and the ‘Hybrid Political Orders’ approaches stress the importance of customary actors and traditional sources and forms of authority. ALS on the contrary, focuses its attention on the distinction between state and non-state, or again formal and informal actors.
27. On neopatrimonialism, see Bach and Gazibo, Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond; Bayart, L’Etat en Afrique and Erdmann and Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered.” Concerning patronage politics and warlordism, see Bayart et al., The Criminalization of the State and Reno, Warlord Politics and African States.
28. Risse, “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 3.
29. Risse, Governance without the State?
30. Risse, “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 4–5.
31. Concerning the ‘fragile state’ paradigm see Cammack et al., Donors and the ‘Fragile State’ Agenda and Patrick, Weak Links. On ‘ungoverned spaces’ an interesting and more nuanced theorisation is proposed by Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories.
32. Lascoumes and Le Galès, “Understanding Public Policy Through its Instruments,” 15.
33. Raleigh and Dowd, “Governance and Conflict in the Sahel,” 3.
34. Bates, When Things Fell Apart, 5.
35. Raeymaekers et al., “State and Non-State Regulation in African Protracted Crises,” 12.
36. Chojnacki and Branovic, “New Modes of Security.”
37. North et al., Limited Access Orders in the Developing World.
38. Risse, “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 9.
39. Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics,” 439.
40. Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession and Jihad.”
41. Hall, A History of Race in Muslim West Africa.
42. Lecocq et al., “One Hippopotamus.”
43. Lecocq, Disputed Desert.
44. Ibid.
45. Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh.
46. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region.
47. This point has been stressed by a Malian researcher and consultant, currently working for the UN MINUSMA mission, interviewed in Bamako in October 2015.
48. Siméant, Contester au Mali.
49. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region.
50. Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh; International Crisis Group, Mali: Avoiding Escalation and Lecocq, Disputed Desert.
51. Benjaminsen and Ba, “Farmer–Herder Conflicts.”
52. Keita, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel.”
53. Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations.
54. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region.
55. Van Vliet, “The Challenges of Retaking Northern Mali.”
56. Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling,” 2.
57. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralization,” 499–500.
58. Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling,” 2–3. For other authors – for example Bøås, “Crime, Coping and Resistance” and Bøås and Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali” – decentralization and demilitarization in the 1990s drove to the creation of a new hybrid system of governance. In this work, I maintain that during the decade, customary and non-state leaders were mostly inserted within the network created by central elites.
59. Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling” and Keita, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel.”
60. French diplomat and expert on West Africa, interviewed in Paris in November 2015.
61. Briscoe, Crime after Jihad; Lebovich, “Mali’s Bad Trip.”
62. Most of the experts and civil servants who worked in Mali during ATT’s presidency proposed a similar description of his rule and system of governance during the interviews.
63. Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling” and Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region.
64. Brachet, Les impacts de l’aide au développement.
65. As put by an EU diplomat interviewed in Bamako in October 2015, ‘Economically speaking, northern regions are more an Algerian district than a part of Mali … If you visit the city markets in Timbuktu or Kidal, you will see that everything comes from Algeria….’
66. Bensassi, Algeria-Mali Trade.
67. Chauzal and van Damme, The Roots of Mali’s Conflict.
68. Lecocq and Schrijver, “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust.”
69. Larémont, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.”
70. Nünlist, Kidnapping for Ransom as a Source of Terrorism Funding.
71. Aning and Pokoo, “Understanding the Nature and Threats of Drug Trafficking,” 1.
72. On drug trafficking in the Sahel and the different financial estimates, see Briscoe, Crime After Jihad and Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict.
73. Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession and Jihad,” 254.
74. Freeman, “Revealed: How Saharan Caravans.”
75. Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling,” 355.
76. Chauzal and Van Damme, The Roots of Mali’s Conflict.
77. According to different cables coming from the US embassy in Bamako – revealed by WikiLeaks – central authorities directly negotiated with AQIM’s members and drug traffickers to resolve tensions linked to the redistribution of drug rents or to the Tuareg uprising. Main evidence is presented in Briscoe, Crime After Jihad.
78. Chauzal and Van Damme, The Roots of Mali’s Conflict.
79. Among the most famous, Baba Ould Cheik – drug lord and mayor of Tarkint - Amadou Diallo – chef of the renewed Ganda Koy militia (now known as Ganda Iso) – Ould Bou Lamana – former Tuareg rebel and colonel of the Malian army – and probably, also Ag Gamou. Also in this case, main evidence is presented in Briscoe, Crime After Jihad.
80. Moulaye, La Problématique de la Criminalité Transnationale.
81. For a discussion on mobility and human activities within desert territories lacking consolidated statehood, see McDougall and Scheele, Saharan Frontiers and Walther and Retaillé, Rethinking Borders in a Mobile World.
82. This position is shared, among others, by Lebovich, “Mali’s Bad Trip”; Lecocq et al., “One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts” and Whitehouse, “A Festival of Brigands.”
83. D’Amato, “Terrorists Going Transnational.”
84. Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession and Jihad.”
85. Walther and Retaillé, Rethinking Borders in a Mobile World.
86. Olsen, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy.”
87. Spanish diplomat, interviewed in Bamako in September 2015.
88. Nyirabikali, Mali Peace Accord.
89. Maiga, Armed Groups in Mali.
90. International Crisis Group, Central Mali.
91. Mémier, AQMI et Al-Mourabitou.
92. This informal ‘division of labour’ has been described by different French army official and civil servants, interviewed in Bamako and Paris in October and November 2015.
93. This interaction is not always free from conflicts: in different occasions, the government of Mali has manifested its opposition to international institutions as a way to leverage its own internal consensus.
94. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.
95. For a definition of informational asymmetries, see Ostrom et al., Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability.
96. Buchanan, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma.”
97. Ostrom et al., Aid, Incentives and Sustainability, 31.
98. Albin-Lackey, “The Origins and Meaning of Nigeria’s ‘Godfatherism’.”
99. North et al., Limited Access Orders in the Developing World.