Recognizing Fragmented Authority: Towards a post-Westphalian Security Order in Iraq

Abstract

The rollback of Daesh’s territorial control during 2017 has (re-)established an area of limited statehood in large parts of Iraq that may endure for many years. The government of Iraq projects its authority into a large geographical and political space that it shares with a multitude of other state, non-state and hybrid actors, competing and collaborating to achieve advantageous security and political outcomes. This paper examines the heterarchy of actors in post-Daesh Iraq to develop a typology and start a critical discussion about post-Westphalian alternatives for security governance in Iraq during the coming period of reconstruction and reconciliation.

Keywords:

• Daesh
• Iraq
• Islamic State
• fragmented sovereignty
• hybrid political order
• Kurdistan
• non-state armed groups
• security governance

Acknowledgements

Damian Doyle’s research is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.

Notes

1. Börzel and Risse, “Dysfunctional State Institutions,” 157.

2. The group is variously known as the Islamic State, ISIS, and ISIL. The authors prefer the Iraqi term, Daesh.

3. Podder, “Non-state Armed Groups,” 35.

4. Bierstecker, “State, Sovereignty, and Territory.”

5. Dunning, Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy.

6. Tilly, The Formation of National States.

7. Fawcett, “States and Sovereignty,” 792–795.

8. Bacik, Hybrid Sovereignty, 177.

9. Isakhan, “Shattering the Shia.”

10. Mansour, “Iraq After the Fall of ISIL.”

11. Bacik, Hybrid Sovereignty, 176, 177.

12. Isakhan, “The Iraqi Kurdish Response.”

13. Gunter and Yavuz, “The Continuing Crisis,” 130.

14. ICG, Arming Iraq’s Kurds.

15. House of Commons, UK Government Policy.

16. Jude, “Contesting Borders?” 855.

17. ICG, Arming Iraq’s Kurds, 5.

18. Bacik, Hybrid Sovereignty, 201.

19. Jude, “Contesting Borders?” 849.

20. ICG, “Arming Iraq’s Kurds,” 4.

21. Gunter and Yavuz, “The Continuing Crisis,” 122.

22. Jude, “Contesting Borders?” 857.

23. ICG, “Arming Iraq’s Kurds,” 13.

24. Gazit, “Social Agency.”

25. Davis, “Irregular Armed Forces.”

26. Moazami, State, Religion, and Revolution, 13–15.

27. ICG, “Arming Iraq’s Kurds.”

28. Malejacq, “Warlords, Intervention,” 93.

29. Herring, “Armed Groups.”

30. Boege et al., “On Hybrid Political Orders.”

31. Isakhan, “The Iraqi Kurdish Response,” 440.

32. Mansour and Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces,” 14.

33. Malejacq, “Warlords, Intervention.”

34. Mansour and Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces.”

35. Personal communication, July 2017.

36. Mansour and Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces,” 6, 7.

37. Amnesty International, “Absolute Impunity.”

38. ICG, “Arming Iraq’s Kurds,” 2.

39. Schneckener, Spoilers or Governance Actors?

40. Schuberth, “The Challenge of CBAGs.”

41. Mansour and Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces.”

42. Derzsi-Horváth et al., “Who’s Who.”

43. O’Driscoll and Van Noonen, “The Future of Iraq.”

44. Schneckener, Spoilers or Governance Actors?

45. Schuberth, “The Challenge of CBAGs.”

46. Carey et al., “States, the Security Sector.”

47. Malejacq, “Warlords, Intervention”; and Podder, “Non-state Armed Groups.”

48. Sperling and Webber, “Security Governance in Europe,” 134.

49. Webber, “Security Governance,” 44.

50. Podder, “Non-state Armed Groups,” 27.

51. Ibid., 20.

52. Davis, “Irregular Armed Forces,” 404.

53. Dabashi, Iran without Borders.

54. Gunter and Yavuz, “The Continuing Crisis,” 123.

55. Baylouny, “Authority Outside the State,” 136.

56. Borzel and Risse, “Dysfunctional State Institutions.”

57. Baylouny, “Authority Outside the State.”

58. ICG, “Arming Iraq’s Kurds,” 11.

59. Personal communication, October 2017.