![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Ethnicity and ideology are frequently used to determine whether an armed group is hostile or friendly vis-à-vis the state. By contrast, I argue that the social structure of insurgent movements holds more explanatory power for their respective positions than ethnicity or ideology. To illustrate this, I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a contest between forces of ‘conservation’ and forces of ‘heresy’ to the current Afghanistan war. I demonstrate that the social structure of the Taleban renders them prone to ‘heresy’, while the formerly second biggest insurgent group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party, has rather been an impeded force of ‘conservation.’
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. This even holds true for differentiated quantitative studies that attempt to include cultural and other ‘factors’ from ethnographic research: Geller and Alam, “A Socio-Political and-Cultural Model”. See reifying tribal affiliations to explain the behaviour of the Taleban: Liebl, “Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership“; Johnson and Mason, “Understanding the Taliban”. See for a general critique of the reifying literature Bultmann, “The Social Structure”.
2. See theory section for more details.
3. See, e.g. Bultmann, “The Social Structure”; Bakonyi and Bliesemann de Guevara, “The Mosaic of Violence”.
4. See also the concise conflict research-related summary of Bourdieu’s concepts by Bultmann, “The Social Structure”.
5. Bourdieu, “The Social Space”, 723–5.
6. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 108–9, 112–3, 118, 124–5.
7. Bourdieu, “From the King”s House’.
8. Bourdieu, “The Social Space”, 727–31, quote: 729.
9. Ibid., 726, 730, 737.
10. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, 188–90.
11. Glatzer, “The Pashtun Tribal System,” 280–2; Schetter, Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte, 543; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 257–8; Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 281.
12. Bourdieu, “The Social Space,” 726.
13. Schetter, Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte, 543.
14. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 279.
15. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 278, 281.
16. See, e.g.: Wörmer, The Networks of Kunduz, 12–3; Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser, 46.
17. Schlichte, In the Shadow of Violence, 32.
18. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 93. Edwards, Before Taliban, 131. See on examples: Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 76, 111–2; Edwards, Before Taliban, 132.
19. Roy, Islam and Resistance, 69; Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 76–7; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 66–7; Barfield, Afghanistan, 212–3.
20. Roy, Islam and Resistance, 79–83.
21. Ibid., 69; Barfield, Afghanistan, 212–3; Grevemeyer, ‘Afghanistan,’ 156–7; Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 84–5, 91, 93.
22. Edwards, Before Taliban, 137.
23. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 93–4.
24. Ibid., 93–4, 115.
25. Roy, Islam and Resistance, 71, 74–5; Edwards, Before Taliban, 131, 134, 139.
26. Edwards, Before Taliban, 132.
27. Ibid., 129.
28. Ibid., 155, 157.
29. Ibid., 141.
30. Ibid., 154–6.
31. Ibid., 155.
32. Ibid., 156–8.
33. Barfield, Afghanistan, 225–33; Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 115–9, 180–1.
34. This is one of the results of my field research on local commanders in north-eastern Afghanistan. Gul Zubair, former advisor to commander Aref Khan, personal communication, Kunduz City, 29 November 2012 and brother of Aref Khan, Haji Omar Khan, personal communication, Kunduz City, 26 November 2012; Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures, 48.
35. Roy, Islam and Resistance, 181–2, 220–1; Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 201–35.
36. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 147–9; Roy, Islam and Resistance, 127, 135–7; Barfield, Afghanistan, 236, 239–40.
37. See on the same facts with a different interpretation on their reasons: Edwards, Before Taliban, 178–81; Roy, Islam and Resistance, 122–3, 128, 133–4, 222–3; Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 252–3.
38. Barfield, Afghanistan, 244–5, 248–9.
39. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 271–4.
40. Barfield, Afghanistan, 253; Ruttig, Gulbuddin ante portas, 3.
41. Hikmatyar, Secret Plans Open Faces, 2–6, 31–49, passim, quote: 85.
42. Ruttig, Bomb and Ballot, 7.
43. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 273–4; Barfield, Afghanistan, 263; Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, 5. According to Gopal and Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, 11, 48.97% of the senior Taleban leadership had attended a hujra, 24.14% a Pakistani madrassa and 7.59% an Afghan madrassa. Only three of 105 had studied in India or Saudi Arabia.
44. Grevemeyer, Afghanistan, 68–9.
45. Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, 9.
46. Roy, Islam and Resistance, 150–1; Barfield, Afghanistan, 257–8.
47. Roy, Islam and Resistance, 152; Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, 10; Gopal and Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, 17–20.
48. Nojumi, “The Rise and Fall of the Taliban,” 101; Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, 57–62.
49. See: Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, 70.
50. Nojumi, The Rise and Fall of the Taliban, 105; Barfield, Afghanistan, 258–9.
51. Ruttig, Almost Signed?, 10.
52. Barfield, Afghanistan, 259–60.
53. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 273–4; Barfield, Afghanistan, 256.
54. Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency, 30; Gopal and Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, 42–3. To be sure, ethnicity played a role since most Pashtuns could communicate in the common language of Pashto. Also, political actors tried to determine political proximity by referring to ethnicity as the situation in Kunduz demonstrated. There, Pashtun JIA commanders – among non-Pashtuns – were the first to switch sides to the Taleban as they appeared in the north-east. However, very soon some recognized that they could not improve their position with the Taleban and therefore switched back, again destroying the ethnic consistency of both camps. Wörmer, The Networks of Kunduz, 22–5.
55. Gopal and Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, 22–7; Nojumi, The Rise and Fall of the Taliban, 110.
56. Gopal and Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, 14–5, 24.
57. Ibid., 30–2.
58. Barfield, Afghanistan, 269–70.
59. Dobbins, After the Taliban, 45–6, 70–5.
60. Telephone interview with former UN official dedicated to the Bonn conference, 10 January 2018.
61. Sharan, ‘The Dynamics of Elite Networks,’ 1115.
62. Dam, A Man and a Motor Cycle.
63. Sharan, The Dynamics of Elite Networks, 1121.
64. See below.
65. Gopal, The Battle for Afghanistan, 8. See also on his unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the US in his capacity as Taleban ambassador to Pakistan: Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, 145–6.
66. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 21–6.
67. Ibid., 99.
68. Münch and Ruttig, “Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,” 28–30; Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability, 16.
69. Ruttig, From Mullah Omar to Mansur, 3.
70. Gopal and Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, 35.
71. Münch and Ruttig, “Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,” 30.
72. Gopal and Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, 32–3.
73. Wörmer, Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives, 2.
74. Ruttig, The Ex‐Taleban on the High Peace Council, 7; Münch and Ruttig, ‘Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,’ 32–3.
75. Münch and Ruttig, “Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,” 32.
76. Osman and Gopal, Taliban Views on a Future State, 6–7; Ruttig, The Battle for Afghanistan, 20; Ruttig, The Ex‐Taleban on the High Peace Council, 3–5; Farrell and Semple, “Making Peace with the Taliban,” 80, 97; Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban and the 2014 Presidential Elections,’ 557–9, 568; Semple et al., Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation, 3–4, 10–1.
77. Wörmer, Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives, 1–4; Ruttig, The Battle for Afghanistan, 7–9; Osman, The Murree Process.
78. Osman, The Murree Process, 5; Münch and Ruttig, ”Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,” 36; Farrell and Semple, ‘Making Peace with the Taliban,’ 80; Dobbins and Malkasian, “Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan,” 56–7; Wörmer, Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives, 5.
79. Osman, The Murree Process, 5, 7; Dobbins and Malkasian, “Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan,” 56–7; Wörmer, Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives, 4.
80. Martin, An Intimate War, 112, 251; Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser, 80–6, 105; Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures, 14–5; International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 6–7.
81. Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 51.
82. Farrell and Semple, Making Peace with the Taliban, 95, 98, 100; Giustozzi, The Taliban and the 2014 Presidential Elections, 561, 567, 570; Osman and Gopal, Taliban Views on a Future State, 15–6.
83. Münch and Ruttig, “Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,” 31.
84. Mielke and Miszak, Making Sense of Daesh in Afghanistan, 50–1.
85. Münch and Ruttig, “Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,” 33; Ruttig, The Battle for Afghanistan, 9; Afghan political analyst and president of institute, personal communication, Kabul, 22 March 2011; Afghan political analyst and director of consulting firm, personal communication, Kabul, 22 March 2011.
86. According to Osman, Adding the Ballot to the Bullet?, 5, first attempts could have occurred in 2003.
87. Senior HIA representative of Sabawun faction, personal communication, Kabul, 15 November 2013.
88. Ruttig, Gulbuddin ante portas, 5; former senior HIA commander, personal communication, Kabul, 14 November 2013.
89. Senior HIA representative of Helal faction, personal communication, Kabul, 19 November 2013. See also: Münch and Ruttig, ‘Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,’ 34.
90. International Crisis Group, From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections, 26.
91. Ruttig, The Ex‐Taleban on the High Peace Council, 1; Ruttig, The Battle for Afghanistan, 14; former senior HIA commander, personal communication, Kabul, 14 November 2013.
92. Assistant to senior JIA member, personal communication, Kabul, 2 April 2011.
93. Ruttig, Bomb and Ballot, 6–7; senior HIA representative of Helal faction, personal communication, Kabul, 19 November 2013; former senior HIA commander, personal communication, Kabul, 14 November 2013.
94. Münch and Ruttig, ‘Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,’ 34–5.
95. Ruttig, Gulbuddin ante portas, 4.
96. Ruttig, The Battle for Afghanistan, 8. See also: International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 15.
97. Ruttig, Bomb and Ballot, 5; and Ruttig, Almost Signed?, 3.
98. Wörmer, The Networks of Kunduz, 11.
99. Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures, 34.
100. See e.g.: International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 7.
101. Ruttig, Gulbuddin ante portas, 1.
102. Münch and Ruttig, “Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance,” 31.
103. Senior HIA representative of Helal faction, personal communication, Kabul, 19 November 2013.
104. Osman, Peace with Hekmatyar, 99; and Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, A Knock on the Door, 16.
105. Ruttig, Gulbuddin ante portas, 4; and Ruttig, Bomb and Ballot, 6.
106. Osman, Peace with Hekmatyar, 7.
107. Hikmatyar, Secret Plans Open Faces, 26, 51, 67, 72, 76.
108. Osman, Adding the Ballot to the Bullet? 2, 4; and Ruttig, Bomb and Ballot, 2.
109. Wörmer, Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives in Afghanistan, 2.
110. Ruttig, Gulbuddin ante portas, 4–5.
111. See note 51.