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ABSTRACT
The debate concerning the Nigerian terrorist Boko Haram is typically simplified across two false dichotomies. First, it is treated as either a local conflict in northeast Nigeria with its epicentre in Borno State or part of a broader conflict in Northwest Africa (and beyond), encompassing northern Cameroon, southern Chad, Niger, and reaching into Libya and Mali. The second dichotomy concerns whether it is animated by local material conditions on the ground, or is part of a broader anti-West jihad. The Boko Haram insurgency is not that simple. It is, rather, a multidimensional conflict and can change overtime.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. A better translation might be, ‘Western culture is forbidden by Islam.’ Thurston, Boko Haram, 6.
2. Ibid., 94.
3. 2009 is typically given as when the movement turned deadly. Some Boko Haram violence under Yusuf did, nonetheless, did occur earlier. Yusuf was espousing violence as early as 2006. Walker, Eat the Heart of the Infidel, 148.
4. https//www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/Africa/boko-haram-ranked-ahead-of-isis-for-deadliest-terror-group.html. Accessed 12/21/2017.
5. Walker, Eat the Heart of the Infidel, x. A U.S. Congressional Hearing noted that thousands of young girls have been kindnapped. The U.S. Role in Helping Nigeria Confront Boko Haram and Other Threats in Northern Nigeria. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 114th Congress, 2nd session 11 May 2016, 10.
6. Loimeier, Muslim Africa Societies in Africa, 129.
7. de Montclos, “Boko Haram and Salelistan,” 2; For an excellent history of Borno States see, Hiribarren, A History of Borno. For a brief history see, Searcy, “All Politics is Local.”
8. Loimeier, Muslim Africa Societies in Africa, 10; and Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 132.
9. Iliffe, African, 3.
10. Loimeier, Muslim Africa Societies in Africa, 24.
11. Ibrahim, “The Wave of Jihadist Insurgency in West Africa.”
12. Ibid., 6.
13. Interview: Father John. B. Bakebni, Saint Patrick’s Parish, Maiduguri, Vice President, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN, Borno State). 6 July 2917, Maiduguri.
14. Interview: Chief Iman of Borno, 6 July 2017, Maiduguri; Interview: Retired Chief Justice, Borno. 7 July 2017; See also, Walker, Eat the Heart of the Infidel, x.
15. Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment UNDP, 2017.
16. Loimeier, Muslim Africa Societies in Africa, 129.
17. Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Health, Global Health Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2nd session. June 11 2014, 3.
18. For and analysis of the social cleavages in Nigeria as they relate to competing narratives on Boko Haram see, Olaniyan and Asuelime, ‘Boko Haram.’ In some cases, the social cleavages have nurtured conspiracy theories that as Mustapha argues have shaped the perceptions of “significant proportions of the [Nigerian] population. Mustapha, “Understanding Boko Haram,” 157.
19. See the special issue of Whitehouse and Strazzari, “Rethinking Challenges to State Sovereignty”. and Wehrey and Boukhars, Perilous Desert.
20. Hentz, “Nigeria and a War across States in Northwest Africa.”
21. Thurston, Boko Haram, 43.
22. Issue Report no. 37 September 2017 African Futures: Horizon 2025, 54.
23. Courtin, “Understanding Boko Haram,” 4.
24. Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment UNDP, 2017, 4; and Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances, SWP Research Paper, Berlin, June 2015, 7.
25. NBC News, “Boko Haram Boss Abubuker Shekau Hails Paris Terrorist Attacks.”
26. Audu Bulama Bukarti (analyst in the Co-Existence team of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, stationed in Nigeria listed U.S. policy, along with the Sokoto Empire, and the Iranian Revolution as the most important external influences on Islam in Nigeria). Interview: 2 July 2017, Abjua.
27. ‘Boko Haram Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland’, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, December 2011, 1st session, 1.
28. Thurston, Boko Haram, 160, 169.
29. Searcy, “All Politics is Local,” 7.
30. Corps, Motivations and Empty Promises.
31. Interview: A.J. Umoh, Provost Marshall, Nigerian Immigration Service: 3 July 2017, Abuja.
32. Harnischfeger, “Boko Haram and its Muslim Critics,” 77.
33. Comolli, Boko Haram, 17; and Loimerie, Muslim Societies in Africa, 122.
34. Mustapha, “Understanding Boko Haram,” 173.
35. Falling poverty and rising income inequality in Nigeria http://countryeiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1432272327&Country=Nigeria&topic=Politics..
36. Watts, Silent Violence, 470.
37. Mustapha, “Understanding Boko Haram,” 172.
38. Campbell, “U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram,” 5.
39. See also, Walker, Eat the Heart of the Infidel, 24; Robinson, Muslim Societies, 124; and Thurston, Boko Haram, 89.
40. Botha and Abdile, “Getting Behind the Profiles of Boko Haram Members.”
41. Warner and Matfess, Exploding Stereotypes.
42. Smaldone, Warfare in the Sokoto, 20; and Levtzion, “Islam in the Bilad-al-Sudan,” 85.
43. Loimeier, Islamic Reform, 73.
44. This is the theme of the edited volume, Mustapha, Sects & Social Disorder.
45. Thurston, Boko Haram, 52.
46. Ibid., 51–52.
47. Last, “From Dissent to Dissidence,” 43.
48. For instance, in 1949 the Sultan of Sokoto demolished the mosques in Sokoto.
49. Kukah, Religion Politics, 48.
50. Ibid., 215; and Loimeier, Islamic Reform, 17.
51. Loimeier, Islamic Reform, 155.
52. For a discussion of the parallels between the Maitatsine Movement and Boko Haram see, Aghedo, “Old Wine in a New Bottle.”
53. For instance Izala recognized the Nigerian constitution. Loimeier, Islamic Reform, 229.
54. Thurston, Boko Haram, 25.
55. Thurston does a good job explaining how Sherriff and Yusif formed a temporary partnership. Boko Haram, 201–122. See also, Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Health, Global Health Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2nd session. June 11 2014, Peter Phams’s Statement, 9.
56. “Government White Paper Indicts Prominent Politicians for Creating Boko Haram.” Premium Times 4/28/13. Accessed 27 December 2017. http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/131694-government-white-paper-indicts-prominent-politicians-for-creating-boko-haram.html.
57. Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Health, Global Health Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2nd session. June 11 2014, Peter Pham Statement, 9–10.
58. Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram and the Islamic Insurgency in West Africa, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Trade Sub-Committee, 24 February 2016, 7.
59. Depending on the translation, MUJWA is also know as MUJAO, ‘Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Jihad in West Africa.’ It was established by a former AQIM leader, Mohamed Kheirou in late 2011.
60. Zenn, Barkindo, and Heras, “The Ideological Evolution,” 47.
61. Weeraratne, “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram,” 19.
62. Zenn, Barkindo, Heras, argue that after 2012, Shekau and hundreds of Boko Haram went to Gao and trained with AQIM, MUJWA, and Ansar Dine. Zenn, Barkindo, Heras, “The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram,” 47. Weeraratne makes the same argument. Weeraratne, “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram,” 6. This begs the obvious question: with all three of those groups? How united were the three at the time and how was Boko Haram apportioned among them. Lacher and Steinberg argue that Belmokhtar, once a leader of AQIM, and his Those who sigh in blood aligned with MUJAO, and they split from AQIM. Wolfan lacher and Guido Steinberg, “Spreeding Roots: AQIM and its Offshoots in the Sahara,” 76. Weeraratne also argues that Boko Haram was involved in: an attack on the Algerian Consulate in Gao, trained in Timbuktu, and uses bases in Cameroon. Weeraratne, “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram,” 6. None of these claims are based on primary evidence. The first, cites a Masters’ thesis: Oftedal, “Boko Haram a Transnational Phenomenon?” The second and third cite reports by Jacob Zenn.
63. Weeraratne, “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram,” 6; and citing Zenn, “A Brief Look at Ansaru’s Khalid Al-Barnawi.”
64. Onapajo, Uzodike, and Whetho, “Boko Harm Terrorism in Nigeria,” 342. See also, Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Health, Global Health Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2nd session. June 11 2014, Peter Pham Statement, 19.
65. Weeraratne, “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram.”; Zenn lists such cross-border events. and Zenn, “Boko Haram’s International Connections,”2.
66. Onapajo, Uzodike and Whetho, “Boko Harm Terrorism in Nigeria,”338.
67. Mustapha, “Understanding Boko Haram,” 148. See also, Habila, The Chibok Girls, 27–28.
68. This has been an unfortunate tendency in many studies of Boko Haram.
69. The notion that Nigerian may train or fight with groups outside Nigeria as individuals, not as Boko Hara, was brought to my attention by Chukwuemeka B. Eze, Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuidling. Interview: 3 July 2017, Abuja.
70. Zenn argues that al-Barnawi had close historical, ideological and operational ties to MUJWA, Belmokhtar and AQIM. Zenn, “Nigerians in Gao.” The fact that al Barnawi was at one time said to be aligned with AQIM, and then later with ISIL, again, belies the assertion that there is a united jihad. And that ISIL switched its support from Skekau to al Barnawi makes that claim very difficult to support.
71. Africa Confidential, 7 June 2013 13, 54, 12 (2013), 11.
72. Jacob Zinn, “Boko Hamra’s International Connections,” 6, 1 January 2013.
73. For instance, a report, published in government’s official gazette said Boko Haram evolved from private militias run by key politicians from the northeast state, who sought to outflank opponents ahead of the 2003 elections.” “Government White Paper Indicts Prominent Politicians for Creating Boko Haram.” Premium Times, 4/28/13.
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/131694-government-white-paper-indicts-prominent-politicians-for-creating-boko-haram.html On the ‘White Paper’ see also, Smith, Boko Haram, 84.
74. Ibrahim, “The Wave of Jihadist Insurgency,” 3.
75. Ibid., 3.
76. Whitehouse and Strazzai, “Introduction,” 222.
77. Raineri and Sgtrazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad,” 263.
78. Bøås, “Crime, Coping, and Resistance,” 312.
79. Guido, “Terrorist Sanctuary in the Sahara,” 24.
80. Scheele, Smugglers, 128.
81. Weeraratne, “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram,” 6.
82. Even AQIM is reported to be part of a transnational trafficking network. See Guido, “Terrorist Sanctuary,” 28.
83. Boukhars, “The Paranoid Neighbor,” 90.
84. Lacher, “Organized Crime.”
85. Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad,” 263.
86. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/47201/politique/mali-yero-ould-daha-le-mujao-nous-prot-geait-du-mnla/ Accessed 27 December 2017.
87. Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Health, Global Health Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2nd session. June 11 2014, Emmanuel Ogebe Statement, 33.
88. Anouar Boukhars, “Shifting Landscapes of Militancy in the Sahel Sahara,” APN Briefing Note Number 7, November 2916.
89. The following discussion draws on a long interview with Mukhtari Shitu, Conflcit Program Specialist, Peace and Democratic Govenance Team, USAID, Nigeria, U.S. Embassy, Abuja. 14 July 2017. See also, Jason Warner, “Sub-Saharan Africa’s ‘new’ Islamic State Affiliates,” CTC Sentinel, 23 January 2017.
90. “Boko Haram’s Shekau Group’s New Leader al-Barnawi in War of Words,” Premium Times, 5 August 2016. Accessed 30 December 2017. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/208113-boko-harams-shekau-groups-new-leader-al-barnawi-war-words.html.. “Shekau vs. Barnawi: The Battle for Boko Haram’s Soul.” Daily Trust, 9 December 2017. Accessed 20 December 2017. https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/news/shekau-vs-barnawi-the-battle-for-boko-haram-s-soul/162159.html.
91. “A Message from Nigeria.” Al Risalah Magazine. Accessed 5 January 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35956301.. See also, Campbell, “U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram,” 9. Accessed 19 January 2018. https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/al-risacc84lah-magazine-4.pdf..
92. See English, The Storied City, 147.
93. Not surprising, Zenn argues that Arab versus Black is not an issue. Zenn, “Cooperation or Competition.”
94. Mustapha, “Understanding Boko Haram,” 156.
95. “Boko Haram’s Renewed Attacks Spread Fear in North-East.” Daily Trust, 25 July 2017.
96. A Former Commanding Officer in operations against BH related that he was that logistics to Boko Haram were coming via Lake Chad. Interview: Former Commanding Officer in operations against BH (name withheld), 3 July 2017, Abuja; The Deputy Director, National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, also commented on collaboration within the Lake Chad region. Interview: Abuja 4 July 2017, Abuja; ICG, ‘Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures’, Report No. 246, 8 March 2017. Mustapha argues that arms come to Boko Haram through Chad. Mustapha, “Understanding Boko Haram,” 184.
97. Ibrahim, The Wave, 6.
98. “Magumeri area of Borno killing more than fifty.” The Relegraph, 7 July 2017. Accessed 30 December 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/28/boko-haram-attack-nigeria-oil-team-killed-50/.
99. Hentz, “The Nature of War in Africa.”; Hentz, “Wars across States.”; and Hentz and Blevins, “States, Boundaries.”
100. Trimingham, A History of Islam, 25.
101. Robinson, Muslim Societies, 28.
102. Trimingham, A History of Islam, 2.
103. Levtzion, “Islam in the Bilad-al-Sudan,” 73.
104. Loimeier, Islamic Reform, 289.
105. Thurston, Boko Haram, 60; and de Montclos, “Introduction,” 14.
106. Pieri and Zenn, “The Boko Haram Paradox.”; Thurston, Boko Haram, 21; and Robinson, Muslim Societies, 146.
107. Interview: Professor Shehu Liberty, University of Maiduguri, Head Department of Public Administration. 7 July 2017, Maiduguri.
108. The U.S. Role in Helping Nigeria Confront Boko Haram and Other Threats in Northern Nigeria. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 114th Congress, 2nd session 11 May 2016, 3.
109. “Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram.” ICC Report 244/Africa February, 2017. Accessed 30 December 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/245-niger-and-boko-haram-beyond-counter-insurgency.. This was also broached in an interview. Interview: Dr. Nathaniel D. Danjibo, Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, Abuja, 11 July 2017.
110. Levtzion and Powers, “Patterns of Islamization,” 5.
111. Kaba, “Islamic West Africa,” 203.
112. Robinson, Muslim Societies, 142.
113. Thurston, Boko Haram, 169, 243.
114. Guido, “Terrorist Sanctuary,” 26.
115. In an interview with Lt General TY Buratai, Nigerian Army Chief of Staff, he related the stronger organizational structure of the Barnawi faction. Interview: 10 July 2017, Abuja.
116. Interview: Mukhtari Shitu, Conflict Program Specialist, USAID. 10 July 2017, Abuja.
117. The U.S. Role in Helping Nigeria Confront Boko Haram and Other Threats in Northern Nigeria. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 114th Congress, 2nd session 11 May 2016, 20, Emmanuel Ogebe statement, 20.