End of the cycle: assessing ETA’s strategies of terrorism

ABSTRACT

In May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives.

KEYWORDS:

• Insurgency
• terrorism
• civil war
• repression
• ETA
• Basque
• Spain

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Ormazabal, “ETA to Announce Definitive End in French Basque Country in May”; Rodríguez, “Basque Terrorist Group ETA Plans to Dissolve Fully by the Summer”; Minder, “Basque Group ETA Disbands, After Terrorist Campaign Spanning Generations”; Hedgecoe, “ETA: Basque Group Disbands but Leaves Deep Wounds for Spain.”

2. LaFree et al., “Spatial and Temporal Patterns,” 9.

3. Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win?” 519–556.

4. Findley and Young, “Fighting Fire with Fire,” 380; Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” 112.

5. Carter, “Provocation and the Strategy of Terrorist and Guerrilla Attacks.”

6. Ibid.

7. Sandler, “The Analytic Study of Terrorism,” 257.

8. Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.”

9. Ibid.

10. Pape, Dying to Win.

11. See note 5 above.

12. Kalyvas, “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War,” 97–138.

13. Bloom, “Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” 61–88.

14. Findley and Young, “Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil Wars,” 1115–1128.

15. Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” 42–78.

16. Stephan and Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 7–44.

17. Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win?” 539.

18. Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence,” 259–294; Thomas, “Rewarding Bad Behavior,” 804–818.

19. Mahoney, “More Data, New Problems.”

20. Ibarra Güell, Evolución Estratégica de ETA; Sánchez-Cuenca, ETA Contra el Estado.

21. Letamendia, Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de E.T.A.; Payne, Basque Nationalism; Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism; Mansvelt-Beck, Territory and Terror.

22. Elorza et al., La Historia de ETA; Ibarra Güell, Evolución Estratégica de ETA; Sánchez-Cuenca, ETA Contra el Estado; Whitfield, Endgame for ETA.

23. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database.

24. See note 16 above.

25. Ibid., 9–10.

26. Zirakzadeh, “From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational Fragmentation,” 72.

27. Payne, The Franco Regime, 231.

28. Watson, Nationalism and Political Violence, 186.

29. Fernández, “Between Francoism and Democracy,” 21.

30. Ibarra Güell, Evolución Estratégica de ETA, 65.

31. Watson, Nationalism and Political Violence, 209; Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 35; Fernández, “Between Francoism and Democracy,” 22.

32. Ibarra Güell, Evolución Estratégica de ETA, 65–66.

33. Sánchez-Cuenca, Explaining Temporal Variation, 1.

34. Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, 177; Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 35.

35. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 35.

36. Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 149–150; Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 37.

37. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 221.

38. Blankenship, “When Do States Take the Bait?” 381–409.

39. For more on provocation as a strategy see Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 133–173.

40. Sánchez-Cuenca, ETA Contra el Estado, 60.

41. Ibarra Güell, Evolución Estratégica de ETA, 69–74.

42. Pestana Barros et al., “The Timing of ETA,” 337; Luis de La Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Killing and Voting in the Basque Country,” 96.

43. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 51.

44. Irvin, Militant Nationalism, 74.

45. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 241–242; Mahoney, “Splinters and Schisms.”

46. Ibarra Güell, Evolución Estratégica de ETA, 69.

47. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 50; Llera et al., “ETA: From Secret Army,” 116; Fernández, “Between Francoism and Democracy,” 26–27.

48. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 221.

49. Fernández, “Between Francoism and Democracy,” 26–27.

50. Bakke et al., “A Plague of Initials,” 265–283; Krause, “The Structure of Success,” 72–116.

51. Mahoney, “Splinters and Schisms.”

52. Muro, “ETA During Democracy,” 41.

53. Llera et al., “ETA: From Secret Army,” 119–120.

54. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, 3.

55. Rogelio Alonso, “Pathways Out of Terrorism,” 695–696.

56. Pestana Barros et al., “The Timing of ETA,” 96.

57. Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, 184–185.

58. See note 23 above.

59. Llera et al., “ETA: From Secret Army,” 118–120; Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 186.

60. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, 90–92.

61. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, 103–106; Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 242–250; Reinares and Alonso, “Confronting Ethnonationalist Terrorism,” 121.

62. Llera et al., “ETA: From Secret Army,” 127.

63. Reinares and Alonso, “Confronting Ethnonationalist Terrorism,” 109.

64. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 229.

65. Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 59–66.

66. Sánchez-Cuenca, ETA Contra el Estado, 73–109.

67. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 249.

68. See note 23 above.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Encarnación, “Dirty Wars in Spain,” 951–952; Argomaniz and Vidal-Diaz, “Examining Deterrence and Backlash,” 164.

72. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA, 58–60.

73. Right-wing terrorist organizations affiliated with the state operated in the Basque region prior to the creation of the GAL. Some of these organizations include Batallón Vasco Español and Allianza Apostólica Anticomunista (AAA).

74. Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands, 68.

75. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA, 58.

76. Ibid.

77. Encarnación, “Dirty Wars in Spain,” 953.

78. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA, 74.

79. Sánchez-Cuenca, Explaining Temporal Variation, 6–7.

80. Encarnación, “Dirty Wars in Spain,” 950–972.

81. Ibid., 954.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., 950–972.

84. Alonso and Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights, and Law,” 275.

85. See note 79 above.

86. de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, “La Selección de Víctimas,” 62.

87. Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 34–49.

88. Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 72–76.

89. See note 79 above.

90. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA, 78.

91. Ibid., 74–78.

92. Ibid., 94–95.

93. Alonso, “Pathways Out of Terrorism,” 695–713.

94. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA, 81.

95. Ibid., 79–105.

96. See note 23 above.

97. Argomaniz and Vidal-Diez, “Examining Deterrence and Backlash,” 166.

98. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA, 93.

99. Ibid.

100. Sánchez-Cuenca, “Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism,” 297–298.

101. HB changed its name in 1998 to Euskal Herritarrok (EH) to allow the party to participate in elections. In 2001, EH was renamed simply Batasuna.

102. See note 3 above.

103. Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work.”

104. Regan and Bell, “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?”, 747–759; Chenoweth, “Terrorism and Democracy,” 355–378.

105. Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 18–19.

106. See note 87 above.

107. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, 215.

108. Ibid., 216.