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ABSTRACT
Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. For comments on an earlier and very different version of this paper I thank an anonymous reviewer and Paul Rich. I also thank the interviewees and audiences at Goethe University Frankfurt, Potsdam University, and the 2017 ISA Annual Convention in Baltimore. For research assistance, I thank Hande Abay and Lydia Kögler.
2. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 156–8.
3. Mandel, Security, Strategy and the Quest, 11.
4. Smith, “What Costs Will Democracies Bear?”.
5. Avant and Lebovic, “U.S. Military Attitudes”.
6. Shaw, The New Western Way of War; and Kaempf, Saving Soldiers or Civilians.
7. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, xv. Counterinsurgents may also win through brute force (see Hazelton, “The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Fallacy”). However, practices used by the US in the Philippines or the British in Malaya, or by authoritarian states, are hardly feasible for contemporary democracies. Moreover, some studies suggest that repression makes victory in COIN less likely (Paul et al., Victory Has a Thousand Fathers).
8. U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 47–51.
9. Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs?”
10. See McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 317.
11. Baumann et al., Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia, 133–4.
12. Rearick, “Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment,” 57–9.
13. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: 152–6.
14. Kaldor, New & Old Wars, 130.
15. Shaw, The New Western Way of War, 137–8.
16. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, chapter 8.
17. Jackson, Nowhere to Turn, 6.
18. See, for example, Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?.
19. Hultman, “Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence?”
20. Barber, “The Proportionality Equation,” 481–9.
21. International Committee of the Red Cross: Practice Relating to Rule 23.
22. Trewin et al., “Risk Management and Its Practical Application,” 679–80.
23. Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight.
24. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, 98.
25. Thornton, “Historical Origins,” 31.
26. Caniglia, “US and British Approaches to Force Protection,” 80.
27. On this debate, including criticism of revisionist accounts, see the collection of articles published in Small Wars & Insurgencies in 2012 (volume 23, issue 4–5).
28. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, 182–4.
29. Jackson, Soldier, 147.
30. Thornton, “Historical Origins,” 36.
31. Miller, The British Experience in Northern Ireland, 25.
32. Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 184.
33. Dandeker and Gow, “Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping,” 58.
34. Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army.”
35. Jackson, Soldier, 275.
36. Interview with British Army Lieutenant Colonel, Sarajevo, November 2007.
37. Steele, “Hidden Protectors.”
38. Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, 260–61.
39. Smith, “A GI’s Home Is His Fortress.”
40. Gow, “The ICTY, War Crimes Enforcement and Dayton,” 64, footnote 21.
41. Fitz-Gerald, “Multinational Land Force Interoperability.”
42. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger, 143.
43. United Nations, Resolution 1244, 3.
44. Quoted in: Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, 332.
45. Evans, “Soldier Tells of Kosovo Medal Bravery”; and Borger et al., “NATO Calls for Police.”
46. Quoted in: Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, 333.
47. Evans, “British Soldier Puts a Stop to 200 Looters.”
48. Pringle, “Kosovo Town Calm.”
49. International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo, 51–2.
50. Quoted in: Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect, 46.
51. U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, SFOR Lessons Learned, 12.
52. Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbour’s House, 187–9 and 332.
53. Gow, “The ICTY,” 59–62; and Meernik, “Justice and Peace,” 276.
54. Cited in: Dimbleby, “Catastrophe.”
55. Cited in: Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations, 26.
56. Di Giovanni, “Britons Dig in At Kosovo Flashpoint.”
57. Pringle, “Green Jackets Take on Hate City.”
58. See Ministry of Defence, UK Armed Forces Operational Deaths, 4.
59. The Iraq Inquiry Report.
60. Chin, “Why Did It All Go Wrong,” 131.
61. Wyatt, “UK Combat Operations End in Iraq.”
62. For an account from June 2006, see http://www.royalangliansteelbacks.co.uk/newsfromhq.html (23 May 2018).
63. British Army, Operations in Iraq, 11.
64. Morin, “British Soldiers Stress ‘Soft Posture’.”
65. Wither, “Basra’s Not Belfast,” 626.
66. The Iraq Inquiry, Section 9.8., p. 504; see also: Additional Evidence of the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon: points 14 and 22 (at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123031/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/242426/2015-04-02-statement-hoon.pdf, 24 May 2018).
67. The Economist, “The Chilcot Report.”
68. Sands, “Sir Richard Dannatt.”
69. Morin, “British Soldiers Stress ‘Soft Posture’,”64.
70. International Crisis Group, Where is Iraq Heading?
71. Quoted in: Wither, “Basra’s Not Belfast,” 622–3.
72. Ministry of Defence, UK Armed Forces Operational Deaths, 4.
73. Action on Armed Violence, A Tale of Two Cities, 8–12.
74. Chin, “Why Did It All Go Wrong,” 129.
75. Human Rights Watch, Basra, 3.
76. Ibid., 7–9.
77. Permanent Joint Headquarters, Operation Telic Phase 4.
78. Amnesty International, Killings of Civilians, 2.
79. Iraq Body Count, IBC’s Response to General Sir Mike Jackson.
80. Amnesty International: Killings of Civilians in Basra and al-’Amara.
81. For examples, see The Iraq Fatality Investigations.
82. Amnesty International, Killings of Civilians.
83. The Aitken Report, An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse, 6–9.
84. Cobain, “British Troops Breached Geneva Conventions.”
85. For an example, see Whitehead, “British Troops in Iraq.”
86. Abdul-Ahad, “Welcome to Tehran.”
87. North, “Neither Side Victorious in Basra.”
88. Wither, “Basra’s Not Belfast,” 620.
89. See note 87 above.
90. British Army, Operations in Iraq, 59.
91. Chin, “Why Did It All Go Wrong,” 128.
92. Ibid., 129.
93. See note 70 above.
94. British Army, Operations in Iraq, 4–5.
95. Carroll and Norton-Taylor, “British Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan.”
96. Larsdotter, “Exploring the Utility of Armed Force.”
97. Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis, 83.
98. Farrell, “Improving in War,” 583.
99. Tootal, Danger Close, 47.
100. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 48.
101. Catignani, “Getting COIN at the Tactical Level,” 523.
102. Mumford, Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth, 7.
103. Fergusson, A Million Bullets, 334.
104. Tootal, Danger Close, 284.
105. Ibid., 205–6 and 226.
106. The Telegraph, “Soldier Who Led Afghanistan Bayonet Charge.”
107. Beattie, Task Force Helmand, 257.
108. Tootal, Danger Close,, 168.
109. King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign,” 327.
110. BBC, “UK Military Deaths in Afghanistan.” Patrols were a main cause of death for ISAF as a whole (briefing by Major General Mart de Kruif, ISAF Commander Regional Command South, Kandahar Airfield, 30 September 2009, attended by the author).
111. Briefing by a senior British Army officer, ISAF headquarters, Kabul, 27 September 2009, attended by the author.
112. For examples, see Tootal, Danger Close, 66, 70, 74, and 244.
113. Pritchard and Smith, “Thompson in Helmand,” 72.
114. Gall, “British Criticize Air Attacks.”
115. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 367.
116. Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 79.
117. Brady, “MoD Paid £3,000 Compensation.”
118. The Sunday Times, “Rogue SAS Unit.”
119. Fergusson, A Million Bullets, 348–54.
120. Tootal, Danger Close, 155.
121. Farrell, “Improving in War,” 580.
122. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Executive Summary.
123. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Annual Report, 29.
124. Open Society Foundations, The Trust Deficit, 4 and 19.
125. British Army, Field Manual, 4–7.
126. Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 185.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Cornelius Friesendorf
Cornelius Friesendorf is Head of the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). His current research focuses on security sector reform, the OSCE, and post-Soviet states. Publications include “How Western Soldiers Fight: Organizational Routines in Multinational Missions (Cambridge University Press, 2018).