Reluctant guerrillas in early nineteenth century China: the White Lotus insurgents and their suppressors

ABSTRACT

At the turn of the nineteenth century, China’s Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was hit by a sectarian rebellion. Commonly considered a breakpoint marking the end of the dynasty’s golden age spanning most of the eighteenth century, the war to suppress the rebels, referred to as the White Lotus War (1796–1804) in this article (‘White Lotus’ was the umbrella name used by both the authorities and some sectarians for their teaching), exposed many structural drawbacks of the Qing political and military systems and depleted the dynasty’s financial resources, which had never been recovered. Reluctant in embracing guerrilla warfare in the beginning, the insurgents quickly turned themselves into master guerrillas. Shuttling in two massive mountain ranges in central China, they managed to prolong their rebellion and fought some successful battles against their suppressors. Superior in manpower, weaponry, and logistical support, the government forces had to adapt to guerrilla warfare, albeit passively and ineptly. This article gives a brief introduction to this little-known episode of guerrilla war at the turn of the nineteenth century in Qing China, expounds the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, and sheds light on the roots of the war’s long duration and the grim consequences to the Qing state.

KEYWORDS:

• Guerrilla warfare
• White Lotus War
• insurgency
• counter-insurgency
• Qing dynasty (1644–1912)

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. On the sectarian movement in late imperial China, see Overmyer, Folk Buddhist Religion; Seiwert, in collaboration with Ma Xisha, Popular Religious Movement; and Heterodox Sects and Ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings.

2. For the sectarian uprisings in the Qing times, see Naquin, Shantung Rebellion, and Millenarian Rebellion in China.

3. The Hunyuan sect was founded in 1774 in southeastern Henan. ‘Hunyun’ literally means ‘origin in chaos.’ Although it was cracked down by the government more than once, it survived and expanded to several provinces in eastern and central China. For its origins and evolution, see Gaustad, “Religious Sectarianism and the State in Mid-Qing China.”

4. His name is Liu Zhixie. From Anhui province in east China, Liu was a dealer of cotton, and became involved in sectarian activities in the 1770s. Liu played a key role in reviving the Hunyuan sect after a crackdown. Liu was arrested in 1800 and subsequently executed. On Liu’s role in the rebellion, see Xu and Lin, “Liu Zhixie zai Chuan Chu Shaan nongmin daqiyi zhong zuoyong de kaocha” and Dai, The White Lotus War, 40–2, 220–1.

5. Only one uprising was near Wuchang, the provincial capital, but all other uprisings occurred in either northwestern or southwestern Hubei.

6. On the siege of Dangyang, see parts of Peng Yanqing, “Dangyang binanji”;Chen Deben’s and others’ confessions, Qing zhongqi wusheng Bailianjiao qiyi ziliao (BLJZL thereafter), Vol. 5, 28–31.

7. In a mountaintop stronghold in southwestern Hubei, an epidemic claimed thousands of lives. Zhang Zhengmo’s confession, BLJZL, Vol. 5, 36.

8. This method was used in putting down the uprising in Laifeng, Hubei, and several uprisings in Xing’an prefecture, Shaanxi.

9. The other rebel band was from Changyang, southwest Hubei. They always found a new mountaintop to hole up after they failed to hold their old stronghold until their demise at their last stronghold in the spring of 1798. Dai, The White Lotus War, 54–8, 110–2.

10. During the thirteenth century, the Mongol forces had besieged the twin cities, Xiangyang and Fancheng, for three years, while the armies of China’s Southern Song dynasty strenuously defended them. After the Xiangyang was lost to the Mongols in the spring of 1273 (Fancheng fell shortly before), the Mongols quickly swept the Yangzi River valleys and took the capital city of the Southern Song in 1276. In the late Ming times, rebel leader Li Zicheng captured Xiangyang late in 1642, and held it until the late summer, 1643. Another rebel chief, Zhang Xianzhong, took Xiangyang in the spring of 1641, but did not stay. Parsons, Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty, 79–80,106–13.

11. On the uprising in Xiangyang and the rebels’ trek to Sichuan, see Dai, The White Lotus War, 61–8, 90–6.

12. On the Xiangyang rebels’ return to Hubei and the transformation of the war in Sichuan, see Dai, The White Lotus War, 96–101.

13. On the Red Fourth Army’s trek to northern Sichuan, see Zhang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928–1938, 295–317. On the Red Army’s base area on the border region of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui, see Rowe, Crimson Rain, 286–919.

14. According to Zhang Guotao, his army went from 16,000 strong men to fewer than 9,000. But Xu Xiangqian, the commander-in-chief of the army, recalled that the number decreased from 19,000 when they left their base to 14,400 after they crossed the Han River. Xu, Lishi de huigu, 228, 232.

15. For the Red Army’s experience in northern Sichuan, see Zhang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928–1938, 317–65. In the spring of 1935, the Red Fourth Army abandoned its base in northern Sichuan, moved to western Sichuan, and met with the Red First Army led by Mao Zedong and others in the middle of the Long March – the meeting actually inaugurated a fierce power struggle between Mao and Zhang Guotao, which marks the beginning of Zhang’s demise in the communist revolution.

16. Zhuang, Zhenkongjiaxiang – Qingdai minjian mimi zongjiaoshi yanjiu, 202–07.

17. On Sichuan’s abundance of outlaws, see Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, 216–25.

18. The Bizika people had lived since ancient times in the border area astride Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan. They are labelled as the Tujia nationality in today’s China.

19. On the rebellions in the late Ming times, see Parsons, Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty.

20. For example, this happened when the Xiangyang insurgents reached Shaanxi province’s southeastern corner, a sectarian enclave, in the spring of 1797. Dai, The White Lotus War, 93.

21. Xu, “Lun Chuan Chu Shaan nongmin qiyijun de liangge gaoshi,” 192.

22. Some of the titles were the same as used in sectarian uprisings in the past, e.g., Wang Lun’s uprising in Shandong in 1774. Naquin, Shantung Rebellion, 111–4.

23. This occurred mainly in the last stage of the conflict, 1801–1803. After some devastating defeats and losing most of their key leaders, some remaining leaders called surviving rebels to go to Hubei’s western corner to regroup. Zhang Shihu’s confession, BLJZL, Vol. 5, 154–5.

24. In 1799, rebels from a band led by Zhang Hanchao were found asleep in civilians’ houses after drinking in Shaanxi. Qinding jiaoping sansheng xiefei fanglüe (XFFL thereafter), 116/10a-b.

25. The village was Shanggaochuan (Upper-High-Valley) in Xixiang county. XFFL, 130/3b, 130/8a-b.

26. According to a proclamation issued by a rebel band in 1797, those who did not bring back any booty would be beaten with wood plank forty times. Xu, “Lun Chuan Chu Shaan nongmin qiyijun de liangge gaoshi,” 192.

27. For instance, Lebao, the campaign’s commander-in-chief in 1798–1799, had complained about the rebels’ guerrilla tactics more than once. XFFL, 59/30b-31a, 89/5a-10b. Starting from the early eighteenth century, local civil officials were usually responsibl for Qing armies’ wartime logistical needs. They set up ad hoc logistical bureaus to manage war funds and hired civilians to transport foodstuffs and matériel. Military labor forces often outnumbered troops deployed and their compensation was one of the most expensive expenditures in wars. See Dai, “Military Finance in the High Qing Period,” 306–12; and Dai, The White Lotus War, 384–90.

28. In the past scholarship, mountaintop fortification had been considered a key factor for the Qing dynasty to defeat the rebels. I dispute against this view in The White Lotus War, 327–39.

29. XFFL, 144/9a-b.

30. Zhou Shihong’s confession, BLJZL, Vol. 5, 161.

31. The suppressors habitually slaughtered captives after battles, often in the hundreds. For rebel chiefs, they executed them in the method of ‘death by a thousand cuts’ (lingchi) by cutting off all the flesh of the executed piece by piece until only the skeleton left. Perhaps originating from Inner Asia, this practice might have started during the Song times (960–1279). During the Ming and Qing dynasties, plotting rebellion was subject to this penalty. See Brook, et al., Death by a Thousand Cuts.

32. For the Xiangyang band’s experience after it left Sichuan, see Dai, The White Lotus War, 112–9.

33. The county was Xingshan, which did not have city walls. The insurgents soon abandoned it and went north.

34. XFFL, 48/19b-23b, 50/4a-9b.

35. Huilun was from an eminent Manchu aristocratic family. He inherited the highest noble rank, duke (gong) of the first grade, from his uncle, Mingšui, after the latter’s death in the Myanmar war in 1768 in the capacity of commander-in-chief of the Qing forces. Recalling Mingšui’s death sentimentally and lamenting another loss in the decorated family, Qianlong granted generous favors for Huilun’s funeral and his family. XFFL, 50/18a-b.

36. While Yao died instantly, Wang was fatally injured, but confirmed her identity before killed by her captors. The Qing troops sliced Yao and Wang’s corpses after cutting off their heads for display in the war zone and Beijing. BLJZL, Vol. 1, 323–7. XFFL, 67/9a-15b, 175/12b-13a. More about Wang Conger and her death, see McCaffrey, “Living through Rebellion,” 202–12.

37. There were eight such ‘marshals’ in total. On Zhang’s background, see Xu, “Lun Chuan Chu Shaan nongmin qiyijun de liangge gaoshi,” 223–4, 229–34.

38. XFFL, 68/22a-23b. On Zhang Hanchao’s guerrilla war in 1798–1799, see Dai, The White Lotus War, 120–2, 152–6, 158–9.

39. XFFL, 74/26b-29a, 75/8a-11a, 75/13a-15a.

40. XFFL, 83/12a.

41. The governor was Yongbao, a Manchu aristocrat, who had been the first commander-in-chief in the White Lotus War, but was dismissed and prosecuted at the end of 1796 owing to his poor performance.

42. XFFL, 127/4a-10b, 128/3b-8b, 131/13b-14a; Li Chao’s confession, BLJZL, Vol. 5, 79–80.

43. Initially, the band was called Gao Family Regime (Gaojiaying), because it was led by Gao Junde. After Gao was captured in late 1799, the band was co-led by Gao Tiansheng and Ma Chaoli.

44. On the band’s campaigns in Gansu, see Dai, The White Lotus War, 209–13.

45. XFFL, 174/6a-11a.

46. XFFL, 192/17b-20b, 204/10b.

47. After this battle, the Gao-Ma band continued moving eastward along the Han River. Late in 1800, it crossed the river to the north and entered the Qinling Mountains. Due to food shortages, it went to the south of the Han River early in 1801, and was annihilated in Shaanxi’s southwestern corner soon after. See Dai, The White Lotus War, 255–6.

48. The most brilliant battle by Ran occurred on the east bank of the Jialing River in Cangxi county, Sichuan. During the fight, both sides focused on taking control of two heights. Ran first sent a dispatch to attack the Qing logistical corps, which distracted his enemy. Then Ran captured one of the heights held by the Qing troops. From the height’s top, the insurgents punched and routed their opponents. The white-hot battle lasted all night. When Ran led away his men in the early dawn, he had left dead more than 300 Qing soldiers and militiamen as well as thirteen officers. XFFL, 137/16b-20a.

49. That day was the Lantern Festival, the full-moon day of the first lunar month, which marked the end of celebration of the Chinese New Year. Rebel scouts swam to the other shore, killed ferrymen, and seized boats. A few militiamen on the west bank attending a lantern party instantly scattered. For three days, thousands of insurgents and the coerced people crossed the river, by boat or on horseback. Ran Tianyuan’s confession, BLJZL, Vol. 5, 90; Wang Ying’s confession, ibid., 91. Zhang Zicong’s confession, ibid., 110. XFFL, 152/16a-17a, 177/12a-14a.

50. On the rebel coalition’s expedition to western Sichuan in 1800, which lasted for nearly three months and was the only time the rebels went west of the Jialing River in Sichuan, see Dai, The White Lotus War, 191–8, 201–5.

51. In Shaanxi, Ran Xuesheng was pressed to the south of the Han River, and move eastward. After having lost all his horses and mules and had only hundreds of people left in his band, Ran went into hiding in the Daba Mountains. He was captured in the autumn of 1801. Dai, The White Lotus War, 257–8, 261; Ran Xuesheng’s confession, BLJZL, Vol. 5, 129–31.

52. On Gou Wenming’s last fight in the Qinling Mountains, see Dai, The White Lotus War, 266–70, 273; Gou Chaojiu’s confession, BLJZL, Vol. 5, 163–4.

53. In the last phase of the war, conflicts occurred in two areas: the border area astride Shaanxi, Hubei, and Sichuan, and north of the Three Gorges in Hubei. Both areas were mountainous and sparsely populated. On the war’s last phase, see Dai, The White Lotus War, Chapter 5, ‘Finale, 1801–1805.’

54. On the Qianlong emperor’s ‘retirement,’ see Elliott, Emperor Qianlong, 160–1. On his reign and its significance in Qing history, see Woodside, “The Ch’ien-lung reign.”

55. For instance, Qianlong said so when he heard of the news of two uprisings were started in northeastern Sichuan late in 1796. XFFL, 20/19a.

56. XFFL, 18/22a-24b. After this, the Qing throne sent bannermen from Manchuria to the war four times between 1797 and 1800. Altogether, 9,500 bannermen were deployed from outside of the war zone. But most of them stayed in war for only a couple of years.

57. XFFL, 51/13a-b.

58. XFFL, 52/20a-23a, 52/29a-30b; QSLJQ, 23/3a-6a.

59. XFFL, 41/30b.

60. For example, in 1800, Delengtai quashed the rebel coalition in west Sichuan in only weeks, expelling its remainder back to the east bank of the Jialing River. Then in 1801, with high pressure from the emperor, commanders eliminated several main rebel bands and killed or caught their leaders in a relatively fast pace.

61. I have detailed the Qing state’s failure in controlling the unfolding and fallout of this campaign in The White Lotus War, especially Chapters 2–5.

62. When the rebellion started, there were nearly 70 million taels of silver in the central government’s treasury in Beijing. In 1797, the reserves were down to 27.9 million taels. By 1801, the sixth year of the war, only 16.9 million taels left. On the financial aspect of the war, see Dai, The White Lotus War, Chapter 7, ‘Cost,’ and 442–9.

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Yingcong Dai

Yingcong Dai is professor of history at William Paterson University of New Jersey specializing in the military institutions and empire building of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). She is the author of The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing and The White Lotus War: Rebellion and Suppression in Late Imperial China.