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ABSTRACT
The uprising led by Arminius in 9 CE, otherwise known as the clades Variana, resulted in the destruction of three crack Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest and changed Roman foreign policy beyond the Rhine. The event demonstrates the maximum res Arminult an insurgency can accomplish with few resources. Even in an age of limited communications, without explosives or modern weapons, an insurgent group could still have a dramatic effect on a world power. Now that archaeologists have excavated the actual battle site, we are in a position to see how Arminius executed one of the most successful insurgencies in the ancient world.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank readers including Jeffrey Aubert and Alan Baragona for improving this manuscript immensely.
Disclosure statement
There are no conflicts of interest in publishing this material.
Notes
1. Quoted in Campbell, “Power without Limit,” 167.
2. Lendering, “Four Mispreresentations,” 9 tries to play down the importance of the battle by relying on Velleius Paterculus, who calls it simply a “set- back.” It is Florus who sees the battle as decisive, and no less an historian than Tacitus calls Arminius “without any doubt the liberator of Germany” (Annals 2.88). The fact that no Roman forts have been identified between the Weser and the Elbe tells the story. See the comments of Crawford, “Hollow Victories,” 80; and Bordewich, “The Ambush that Changed History,” 74–81.
3. On Roman foreign policy: Wells, The German Policy of Augustus; Earlier works: Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 5 who attempt to separate the romanticizing about Varus’s deeds from a serious discussion of the effects of his actions on Roman foreign policy. Cf. Wolters, Die Römer in Germanien; On Arminius in ancient literature and in German scholarship, and also Winkler, Arminius the Liberator, 25–53.
4. On the Hermannschlacht and German nationalism: Winkler, Arminius the Liberator,127–58. Crossland, Der Spiegel Online International. For an excellent treatment of how the Arminius story has been used through history, see Winkler, Arminius the Liberator. For the argument that it was not a turning point in history, see Wolters, Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald, 125–49.
5. Wells, The Battle that Stopped Rome; and Murdoch, Rome’s Greatest Defeat.
6. The archaeological finds have a huge literature, most of it in German. To mention just a few: Rost and Wilbers-Rost, “Weapons at the Battlefield of Kalkriese”; and Harnecker, Arminius, Varus und das Schlachtfeld von Kalkriese. The 2,000th anniversary of the Battle in 2009 brought the publication of Baltrusch et al., 2000 Jahre Varusschlacht.
7. For the exception, see Sheldon, “Slaughter in the Forest,” 1–38; and Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome, 175–98.
8. Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 373.
9. On Rome’s internal security apparatus, see Sheldon, Kill Caesar! ch. 3 “The Augustan System.”
10. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.18.1; and Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 95.
11. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.18.1.
12. Florus, Epitome of Roman History, 2.30.29. Florus is the only author who suggests Augustus wished to conquer all of Germany. The degree and speed of Romanization in Germany beyond the Rhine has generated a great deal of debate. A warning against assuming too great a degree of Romanization, especially in the form of provincial organization, is given by Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus. For the older view that saw Germany as completely subdued by Augustus up to the Elbe, see Oldfather’s discussion on pp. 9–16 of the works of Garthausen, Mommsen, Seeck and other German scholars. He also cautions about the unreliability of the ancient sources that were more interested in rhetorical effect than accuracy (p. 17).
Or as von Clausewitz wrote: “the principle of resistance exists everywhere.” Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader, 33.
13. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.117.2 characterizes him as “somewhat slow of mind as he was in body” and “more accustomed to the leisure of the camp than to actual service in war.” Still he had received two important military commands, one in North Africa and one in Syria. On his proconsulship in Africa, see Thomasson, “Verscheidenes zu den Proconsules Africae,” 175–6.
14. Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 374. Cf. Dyson, “Native Revolts,” 254–5.
15. Even by the time of von Clausewitz he noted the “…scattered sites of the dwellings of the country people” and that the roads were bad and not numerous. Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader, 33.
16. Tacitus, Annals 2.10. For a discussion of how service in the Roman army aided the social and political position of native chieftains, see S. Dyson, “Native Revolts in the Roman Empire, Historia 20 (1971), 253–7 citing: G. Kossak, “I Germani,” 336–7 (unavailable at press time). On Arminius, see H. von Petrikovits, “Arminius,” 175–93. Varus’s tribal name is lost to history.
17. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.118.2.
18. Dyson, “Native Revolts,” 255; On the background of Arminius and his Romanisation, see Sander, “Zur Arminius-Biographie,” 83–98. For a more skeptical view, see Hohl, Um Arminius, Biographie oder Legende? and Dean, “Road to Destiny.”
19. Tacitus, Annals, 2.45, tells us in later campaigns he arranged his army in Roman military fashion. Wolfgang Schlüter is quoted as saying: “In all likelihood Hermann commanded a force of men who knew and used Roman military tactics and technology. They had learned them while serving as mercenaries and auxiliary troops, recruited among Germanic tribes during the various rebellions and uprisings against Roman rule in Pannonia.” In: Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 31.
20. Tacitus, Annals, 1.55.
21. Fuller, “The Battle of the Teutoburger Wald in A.D. 9,” 248. There is no evidence for this being true of Arminius or Hannibal. See Canter, “The Character of Hannibal,” 564–77, who dispels this myth about Hannibal as a literary creation of Livy.
22. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.105.1.
23. See note 20 above.
24. Tacitus, Annals, 2.9. Of course, this critique of Roman occupation was put in his mouth by Tacitus is not much different from the Calgacus speech saying Rome “created a wasteland and called it peace.” (Agricola 38).
25. Tacitus, Annals, 2.88. See Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 32–4.
26. On the altar of the Ubii, see Tacitus, Annals, 1.39.
27. Tacitus, Annals, 1.60.1. Inguiomarus later joined against Arminius. Tacitus, Annals, 2.45, Moore and Jackson trans., 308.
28. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.19.
29. Ibid., 56.19.3; and Tacitus, Annals, 1.55 gives us the details: “Segestes had repeatedly given warning of projected risings, especially at the last great banquet which preceded the appeal to arms; [sic]when he urged Varus to arrest Arminius, himself, and the other chieftains, on the ground that, with their leaders out of the way, the mass of people would venture nothing, while he would have time enough later to discriminate between guilt and innocence.” Moore and Jackson trans.
30. On the number of troops and their identity, see Rüger, “Germany,” 527. Keppie, “The Army and the Navy,” 381. On the location of the camp we know nothing. Minden on the Weser is the best guess. In 2008 the press reported finds of an army camp at Porta Westfalica. http://www.logistik-des-varus.de/?p=119. See Wells, The German Policy of Augustus, 240, with bibliography. Susanne Wilbers-Rost wrote to me in the summer of 1999: “Minden [for the location of the summer camp] is as good a guess as any and would not make the Kalkriese route any less likely. For a previous discussion on Minden with bibliography, although obsolete in view of recent discoveries, see Timpe, “Die Frage der Sommerfeldzüge,” 90–93.
31. Florus, Epitome of Roman History, 2.30.
32. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.105.3, gives the only example of a Roman army wintering in Germany. On Rome’s attempts to take the territory up to the Elbe, see Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 358–81, esp. 361. Wells, The German Policy of Augustus, 244–5 argued that Augustus had no intention of making even the Elbe the final frontier.
33. Haltern is about 54 kms from Vetera on the north bank of the Lippe River at a point where it is joined by the Stever and where the valley narrows between the hills of the Hohe Mark and the Borkenberg to the north and Haard to the south. The Romans had an important base here just west of the modern town, which has encroached upon the Roman site. The argument for identifying Aliso with Haltern is an old one and was proposed by Schuchhardt who rightly point out that all references to Aliso imply that it was not very far from the Rhine. Schuchhardt, “Dar Römercastell bei Haltern an der Lippe,” 303–16. Wells, Germany Policy of Augustus, 153 says that no other suggestion deserves serious consideration. If Haltern is not Aliso, then we simply have no idea where Aliso is. On the background of the site, see: https://www.livius.org/articles/place/haltern/. See also Campbell, “Secrets from the Soil,” 24.
34. On Vetera near Xanthen, see Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 361; and Campbell, “Secrets from the Soil,” 19–20. The Roman camp at Vetera was created around 15 BCE on the Fürstenberg near modern-day Birten. It was intended as a base for campaigns into Germania until its destruction during the Revolt of the Batavi in 70 CE. It was occupied by 8,000 to 10,000 legionaries and was the main base of the Classis germanica. After the destruction of Vetera, a second camp became established at the Bislicher Insel, named Castra Vetera II, which became the base camp of Legio VI Victrix.
35. On the numbers see Schlüter, “The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 125; Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 26; and Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 35.
36. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.20.5 says Varus did not keep his legions together as was proper in a hostile country, “but [they] were mixed in helter-skelter with the wagons and the unarmed, and so being unable to form readily anywhere in a body, and being fewer at every point than their assailants, they suffered greatly and could offer no resistance at all.” Murdoch, “Arminius’s Masterstroke,” 55. On the length of the Roman marching line, see Bar-Kochva’s estimation (following Kroymayer and Veith, Heerwesen, 287–8. He calculates 5,000 foot soldiers marching six abreast. Each legionary and cavalryman occupied a length of three feet in the march so that a legion extended over 900 meters. Add to this the cavalry, the baggage and several meters between contingents, and consider that there were three legions marching in Germany, and there could have easily been more than 20 kilometers. Bar-Kochva, “Sēron and Cestius Gallus at Beith Horon,” 18, n. 21. See also the chart and the calculations in Gichon, “Aspects of a Roman Army in War,” 288, 305–7; and Delbrück, “Battle of the Teutoburger Forest,” v. 2, 75, who estimates 9–12 miles.
37. This was suggested by Czech, “Rome’s German Nightmare,” 27. Cf. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.19.
38. As, for example, Bordewich, “The Ambush that Changed History,” 74–81.
39. The 190-foot statue was erected in 1875 on a hill above the city of Detmold on the southern edge of the Teutoburg Forest. It was built over the ruins of a seventh-century German fortress. From its inauguration, the monument served as a memorial for the war against and victory over France. At the same time, Prussia and Germany were in the middle of Kulturkampf, a fight against the power of the Roman Catholic Church; thus Arminius became a convenient symbol of another victory over Rome.
40. Schlüter and his colleagues explored some 250 acres of farm and woodland between the villages of Engter and Schwagstorf on the northern edge of the Teutoburg Forest. This is ten miles north of Osnabrück and some 60 miles northwest of the Hermannsdenkmal at Detmold.
41. Mommsen, Gesammelte Schriften, 4, 200–46, identified this region as the likely site of the battle. Wells, The German Policy of Augustus, 240, agreed. Cf. Tonnies, “Die Ausgrabungen in Kalkriese,” 461–5. Koestermann, “Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14-16 n. Chr.” 441–3. For examples of those getting it completely wrong: Gabriel and Boose, following Fuller and Creasy, a case of the blind leading the blind. The army was not marching south from Minden to Aliso, but West to the Rhine. Similarly, Leise, Wo Arminius die Römer Schlug. For recent doubters, see Wolters, Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald, ch. 7, 150–73, who believes the site is at Detmold, and Oppitz, Das Geheimnis der Varusschlacht, who believes it was at Paderborn.
42. Tacitus, Annals, 1.64, says that the Cherusci were “experienced at fen-fighting.”
43. For a complete discussion of the geography of the area, see Schlüter, “Die archaeologischen Untersuchungen in der Kalkriese-Niewedder Senke,” 13–51; and Wilbers-Rost, “Geschichte und Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen in Kalkriese,” 13–51.
44. See Schlüter, “Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 128.
45. Traces of settlements from the early Stone Age to the Roman Empire have been found. On the analyses of the vegetation, see Dieckmann and Pott, “Archäobotanische Undersuchungen in der Kalkrieser-Niewedder Senke,” 81–105; and Dieckmann, e. al., “Kulturpflanzenfunde aus dem Fundgut der archäologischen,” 73–94.
46. In Tacitus, Annals, 1.63, the Romans are “pushed toward swampy ground, familiar to the conquerors but fatal to strangers.” Moore and Jackson trans. Cf. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.119 (forests and marshes). In a later battle against the Germans described in Annals 1.68, the Romans attack the Germans on open, solid ground and taunt them by yelling: “Here were no trees … no swamps, but a fair field and an impartial heaven.” Moore and Jackson trans.
47. A map of the highways in northwestern Germany until 1650 cited by Schlüter reconstructs these roads on the basis of descriptions of travelers and maps drawn up during the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century. See Schlüter, “Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 138–9. These two passable areas are on average about 200 meters wide. Both routes could have been used by the Romans since they join at Bramsche.
48. Excavator Klaus Fehrs found the ramparts – an unnatural 300-foot-long mound at the base of Kalkrieser hill that turned out to be an eroded sod and soil rampart measuring fifteen feet wide at the base, seven feet high, and 600–700 feet long. It had been reinforced on the outside with wooden stakes. On the inside was a narrow ditch presumably used for drainage purposes. Carbon 14 tests date the ditch in the first half of the first century CE. See Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 31.
49. Quoted in: Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 30.
50. Virtually all the metal artifacts – more than 3,000 objects and fragments thus far, were found in front of the ramparts where Varus’s forces were presumably attacked. See Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 31. Wells, The Battle that Stopped Rome, 50–51. Schlüter does not believe these ramparts were part of the Roman marching camp: “to have camped here on this narrow passageway between the hill and the moor would not have made sense. Nor would there have been enough room for a large contingent. An army of three legions would have required a defensive rampart enclosure measuring 2,000 × 3,000 feet.” Schlüter quoted in Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 32. Virtually all of the metallic objects – 300 objects and artifacts – were found in front of the ramparts where Varus’s forces were attacked; nothing was found behind the rampart.
51. Although Roman in style, the bulwark appears to have been built by the Germans. In 1993, only one rampart had been detected, although excavators originally thought there were two. Carbon-14 testing places the ditch in the first half of the first century CE. More recent work has been done using OSL (optically stimulated luminescence) dating to supplement the carbon-14 results. On the rampart, see Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 31. During the 2018 excavations, under the direction of Dr. Salvatore Ortisi, another rampart-ditch fortification was found on the northern side of the museum’s park. Ongoing work has been dedicated to comparing this find with the “wall” on the opposite side. Excavators are still hoping to find the remains of a Roman camp. https://www.kalkriese-varusschlacht.de/en/research/aktuelles-aus-kalkriese/.
52. Tacitus, Annals, 1.61, describes in great detail: “[the] … bleaching bones, scattered or in little heaps, as the men had fallen, fleeing or standing fast. Hard by lay splintered spears and limbs of horses, while human skulls were nailed prominently on the tree-trunks. In the neighboring groves stood the savage altars at which they had slaughtered the tribunes and chief centurions.” 1.62: “And so, six years after the fatal field, a Roman army, present on the ground, buried the bones of the three legions; and no man knew whether he consigned to earth the remains of a stranger or a kinsman, but all thought of all as friends and members of one family, and, with anger rising against the enemy, mourned at once and hated.” Tacitus, Annals, 1.61. C.H. Moore and J. Jackson trans. On the bone finds at Kalkriese, see Schlüter, “The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 13–136, which cites the extensive publications up to 1994 by Susanne Wilbers-Rost, to which should be added: Wilbers-Rost, “Die Ausgrabungen auf dem »Oberesch« in Kalkriese,” 61–72, 81–89; Wilbers-Rost, “Die Grabungen auf dem “Oberesch” im Jahr 2000”; and “Neue Forschungsergebnisse auf dem “Oberesch”.”
53. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.119.4. See comments on the actions of Numonius Vala, and sources in n. 72.
54. Parts from offensive weapons showed projectile missiles (pila (lances), etc., sling shot and lead bullets, bows and arrows, and javelins, plus close- range weapons like gladii and daggers. A major research initiative has been taken up by the Kalkriese Museum to identify a metallurgical fingerprint that will allow them to identify the military units that fell there. See http://www.kalkriese-varusschlacht.de/en/research/project-research-in-the-museum/.
55. The Germans would have removed their dead and buried them in their armor, thereby removing many German relics. Many of the German soldiers were deserters and would have been dressed in Roman armor, which would have shown up as “Roman” in the subsequent archaeological digs.
56. The engraved latch reads: M. Aii I. Fab, or M. Aius I Fabrici: Property of Marcus Aius of the first cohort (legion unknown) and the century under the command of Fabricius. Schlüter, “The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 14, mentions an iron spur with a small spiked wheel which he identifies as “Elbe-Germanic provenance” and interprets this as a clear indication of the presence of German cavalry. He does point out, however, that speculation remains as to whether they fought for the Germans or the Romans.
57. On the Roman military equipment, see Schlüter, “The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 136–45; on the everyday objects, see ibid., 145–9.
58. It was a British army officer and amateur archaeologist, Captain Tony Clunn, who stumbled upon a cache of 162 denarii in March of 1987 on the Barenau estate that sparked the excavations at Kalkriese. Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 30. Berger, Kalkriese 1. Die römischen Fundmünzen; Kehne and Berger, “Hat Varus seine Spuren hinterlasen?” 120ff.
59. The only ancient accounts of the battle that have come down to us are Cassius Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.18–23; Velleius, The Roman History, 2.117–20; Florus, Epitome of Roman History, 2.30.21–39; and Tacitus, Annals, 1.60–62. On the contradictions and biases of each of the sources, see Lendering, “Four Mispreresentations,” 9.
60. Tacitus, Annals, 1.58. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.118.4 says that after the first warning there was no time for a second. He should not have needed a second warning if he had taken the first one seriously. He had a reliable source within the family of the insurgent leader; he ignored it. The argument that he had “no time to react” will, therefore, not hold water. Lendering, “Four Misrepresentations,” 8.
61. The route can be deduced from the swath of archaeological finds in and around the pass. See the discussion of Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 26–33.
62. The narrative has to be pieced together from Velleius, The Roman History, 2.119; and Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.19–20–21 and the archaeological evidence.
63. Although Schlüter suggested aerial photos taken in 1992 had located the camp, (See Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 32), this turned out not to be so. The camp has yet to be found, and it is not entirely clear how big this open stretch would have had to be to accommodate a camp. Personal communications, S. Wilbers-Rost. Tacitus describes the camp that Germanicus later found, Annals, 1.61.
64. Murdoch, “Arminius’s Masterstroke,” 55, does not believe the Germans would attack a Roman camp directly. Without siege equipment, this would not be effective.
65. Murdoch, “Arminius’s Masterstroke,” 55, believes they planned to head to the river and “pick up” a transport.
66. The identity of Aliso has been a notorious problem for archaeologists. Mommsen believed there was a fort at Elsen near Paderborn, and he identified it with Aliso based on the etymological evidence. Later excavation at Elsen revealed no Romans remains, only a German settlement dating to the first century CE. See Wells, The German Policy of Augustus, 152–3.
67. Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 36: “This contest, therefore, waged under such circumstances, could not have been in any sense a real test of the military strength of the contending forces.
68. See the comments of Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 50.
69. See the comments of Thompson, “Early Germanic Warfare,” 7.
70. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.21.3. E. Cary trans. On weather contributing to the success of a surprise attack, see Johann von Ewald, Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg (Kassel, 1790) quoted in Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader, 22–23.
71. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.20.3–5.
72. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.119.4. Although the identification of the ruins with this account have been doubted. See Murdoch, “Arminius’s Masterstroke,” 57. It is impossible to know for sure whether Vala’s actions were cowardice or an attempt to establish an escape route.
73. Florus, Epitome of Roman History, 2.30.38.
74. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.18 on the suicides. Tacitus, Annals, 1.61: “Survivors of the disaster, who had escaped the battle or their chains, told how here the legates fell, there the eagles were taken, where the first wound was dealt upon Varus, and where he found death by the suicidal stroke of his own unhappy hand.” Moore and Jackson trans.
75. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.119.4. On Ceionius and L. Eggius, see Syme, “Die Zahl der praefecti castrorum im Heere des Varus,” 109–11.
76. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.119.2. F.W. Shipley trans.
77. The extent to which this defeat haunted the Romans is graphically portrayed in Tacitus’s Annals, 1.65, where Caecina Alienus, the general who found the remains of the battlefield, is haunted at night by a dream where Varus rises from the marshes and comes toward him with an extended arm as if to try to grab him like some B-movie mummy.
78. Suetonius, Augustus, 23.2; and Orosius, 6.21.27.
79. Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 376.
80. Ibid.
81. See note 78 above.
82. Dyson, “Native Revolts,” 250–3 and 256.
83. Tacitus, Germania, 33.2. See Tacitus, Annals, 2.26.3–4.
84. Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 376 who suggests that the Frisii and the Chauci remained loyal.
85. Tacitus, Annals, 1.39; 1.57.2. Dyson has noted that in Gaul, and very likely in Britain, this use of native assemblies may have given the natives a sense of unity that had never been intended to be used against Rome. He suggests the same thing may have happened in Germany. Dyson, “Native Revolts,” 256. See also Gruen, “The Expansion of the Empire Under Augustus,” 182.
86. Tacitus, Annals, 1.61.5–6; and Velleius, The Roman History, 1.120.5, both describe these sacrifices. Schlüter would have liked to find the burial mound and monument erected at the site in 15 CE by Germanicus Caesar. Finding burial pits, however, is a huge undertaking, and there is a danger of hitting ground water in this area. Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 32.
87. See Tacitus, Germania 9.1–2; and Caesar, BG, 6.21.1–2, who both suggest that the Germans did not show much interest in sacrifices. Tacitus, Annals, 13.57.3, describes an instance of mass sacrifice as the result of a communal vow taken before a battle between the Chatti and the Hermunduri.
88. Tacitus, Annals, 2.88.
89. Ibid. Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 375. See Lehmann, “Überliferung der Varus-Katastrophe 9 n. Chr.” 43–164. Dornberg, “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest,” 26, calls it, incorrectly, “the beginning of national consciousness for the Germans.” This is an anachronism that mistakes what the later Germans made of the incident with what went on at the time. Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 374–5 warns about overestimating Arminius’s historical importance. “He was only the leader of a faction even among his own tribesmen, not a champion of the German nation, for no such thing existed (375).
90. See the comments of Dyson, “Native Revolts,” 255–7.
91. Schlüter, “The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest,” 125. On Roman intentions in Germany in the first place, see Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 18–19. See Lehman, “Herrschaft über das ‘westelbische’ Germanien,” 79–96; and Lehmann, “Zum problem des römischen Verzichts auf die Okkupation Germaniens,” 244–5.
92. Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.22.22–24, who tells the story of the only garrison to resist but without names. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.120.4 on L. Caecidius, praefectus castrorum, at Aliso referring to the incident. Syme, “Die Zahl der praefecti castrorum im Heere des Varus,” 109–11.
93. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.120.3; and Dio, Dio’s Roman History, 56.23.1, 24.1.
94. Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 38–52 marshalled ever possible statistic to show the superiority of Roman forces. But the question remains, what effect would it have had on the rest of the empire had all of this been thrown against Germany, nor was there any scholarly agreement on why Rome chose not to do so (76).
95. Wolters, Die Schlacht in Teutoburger Wald, 125–49 suggests that this was neither an uprising nor a mutiny. If one uses those terms to describe all Germans participating, then he is correct.
96. Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises, 1.
97. Ibid., 2–3.
98. Syme, “The Northern Frontiers,” 374, on the policy of accommodation. On their lack of geographical intelligence, Brunt points out that even Agrippa, Augustus’ closest advisor, “had no notion of the size of the land-mass east of the Rhine,” in his review of Meyer, “Die Aussenpolitik des Augustus und die Augusteische Dichtung,” 175.
99. Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises, 2.
100. Tacitus, Annals, 2.46. C.H. Moore and J. Jackson trans.
101. See note 99 above.
102. Velleius, The Roman History, 2.118. F.W. Shipley trans.
103. Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises, 2–3.
104. Koestermann, “Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14-16 n. Chr.” believed that Germanicus’s judgement was sound and supposed that he had been appointed by Augustus to recover the lost province, a policy which Tiberius did not like but acquiesced to for a year or two in order not to break with Augustus’ wishes.
105. castellum Lupiae fulimini aspositum. Tacitus, Annals, 2.7.1, 7.5.
106. Wells, German Policy, 240.
107. Tacitus, Annals, 2.56.1.
108. Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 94. There has been a movement amongst scholars recently to reinterpret Rome’s actions and say it was the formation of the limes that ended Roman expansion, not the battle. Lendering, “Four Mispreresentations,” 9, argues that the “Rhine was a more practical boundary.” Surely this is to mistake cause and effect. Had Arminius not defeated them, they would have moved to the Elbe. Nor is there any such thing as a permanent and secure frontier. See Brunt’s review of Meyer’s, “Die Aussenpolitik des Augustus,” 173.
109. Neither Oldfather and Canter, The German Frontier Policy of Augustus, 36 nor Mommsen, History of Rome, 5.61, believed that the loss of three legions could have, in itself, reversed the policy of Rome.
110. See Lehmann, “Zur historisch-literarischen Überliferung der Varus-Katastrophe 9 n. Chr.” 163–4.
111. Tacitus, Annals, 2.12.
112. Ibid., 2.20.
113. Crawford, “Hollow Victories,” 88; and Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 78. On insurgency in the ancient world in general, see the special issue: Powers, “Irregular Warfare in the Ancient World.”
114. Crawford, “Hollow Victories,” 80–92, on the Tacfarinas Revolt in Africa.
115. Ibid., 96.
116. Ibid.
117. Von Ewald knew the measure of cunning, skill, speed and secrecy that it took to launch a surprise attack. See Johann von Ewald, Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg (Kassell, 1790) quoted in Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader, 21.
118. On this disaster beginning the “effective ossification” of the frontiers, see: Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, 162.
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Notes on contributors
Rose Mary Sheldon
Dr. Rose Mary Sheldon is Professor Emerita of History at the Virginia Military Institute where she held the Burgwyn Chair in Military History. She is the author of many scholarly articles and seven books on different facets of ancient intelligence history. Her latest book, Kill Caesar! (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018) is a study of Roman internal security and assassination attempts on the Julio-Claudian emperors. She has served on the editorial boards of several journals including the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Journal of Military History, and Small Wars and Insurgencies. Dr. Sheldon is a Fellow of the American Academy in Rome.