Counterinsurgency in South Africa: the Afrikaner Rebellion, 1914–1915

ABSTRACT

The entry of the Union of South Africa into the First World War, as well as the subsequent invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA), served as a trigger to the Afrikaner Rebellion. In September 1914 the Union Defence Force (UDF) suffered a major reverse at the Battle of Sandfontein. However, in addition to the German threat, South Africa faced a second, more serious internal threat. The socio-economic realities of early-twentieth-century South Africa, felt most keenly among rural Afrikaners, magnified the rift between the competing interests of Afrikaner nationalists and the Union government loyal to the Crown. The Union’s entry into the war was a step too far for many Nationalist Afrikaners and ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the rebellion. As a result, the operational focus of the UDF shifted to the internal military threat posed by Afrikaner rebel forces. The Afrikaner Rebellion brought about the first counterinsurgency operation of the UDF within the borders of South Africa. By harnessing its operational and tactical mobility, and operating from the central position and along internal lines of communication, the UDF swiftly dealt with the rebel revolt. This article evaluates the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the UDF in suppressing the Afrikaner Rebellion.

KEYWORDS:

• South Africa
• First World War
• Union Defence Force
• Afrikaner Rebellion
• insurgency
• counterinsurgency

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank the reviewers for the valuable comments put forward during the review process, as well the editor Paul Rich for his key insight and comments in finalising the article. We also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Marlies Woudstra in finalising the article for publication.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. For detail on the first internal deployment of the UDF, which was to quash a labour strike and industrial unrest, see Geyer, “The Union Defence Force,” 136–151.

2. Van der Waag, A Military History, 89–94.

3. Ibid., 72–75.

4. Strachan, The First World War, 61–65.

5. Van der Waag, “The Battle of Sandfontein,” 147–152.

6. Swart. “The ‘Five Shilling Rebellion’,” 90.

7. Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 10.

8. See for instance: Van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History.

9. Strachan, The First World War, 552.

10. Swart, “Men of Influence,” 6–7.

11. Ibid., 1–3.

12. See note 11 above.

13. Ibid., 5–6.

14. Swart, “Men of Influence,” 13, 21. Further detail on the role of women in the Rebellion is put forward in Swart’s article.

15. The Union of South Africa’s legitimacy as a Dominion was not widely accepted, and this is an area that requires further research. For examples of existing research see, Duyvesteyn, “Rebels and Legitimacy,” 669–685.

16. See for instance: Couzens, The Great Silence; Sampson, World War I; Delport, “Boks and Bullets, Coffins and Crutches”; Garcia, “General Louis Botha”; Garcia, The First Campaign Victory; Garcia, “Manoeuvre Warfare”; Harmse, “The Cape Corps”; Kleynhans, “A critical analysis,” 29–53; and Nasson, WW1 and the People.

17. Davenport, “The South African rebellion,” 73–94; Grundlingh and Swart, Radelose Rebellie; Swart, “The rebels of 1914”; and Fedorowich, “Sleeping with the lion?” 71–95.

18. The authors acknowledge that it is certainly viable to use the term ‘counterinsurgency’ historically to describe a form of low level warfare. While the term ‘counterinsurgency’ indeed first emerged in US military discourse during the Eisenhower era of the late 1950’s, it is worth noting that neither Botha and Smuts, nor the Union Defence Force as a whole, for that matter, would have been entirely unfamiliar with this concept of warfare. This was largely due to the then recent experiences of the South African War, and in particular Kitchener’s specific approach to deal with the elusive Boer forces during the guerrilla phase of the war. While Kitchener’s heavy-handed approach received stern criticism, his scorched earth policy and concentration camp system proved very effective in dealing with the Boer guerrilla forces and bringing the war to an end. In this regard, see for instance Hyslop, “The Invention of the Concentration Camp,” 251–276. The counterinsurgency experience of the South African War therefore served as the pillar from which an evolving set of South African counterinsurgency practises would develop in the years to come. Thus, the counterinsurgency experience obtained by the South African forces during the Afrikaner Rebellion, along with the various deployments to quash internal unrest within the Union, would help along the development of a unique South African approach to counterinsurgency. A formal South African counterinsurgency doctrine would, however, only appear much later, and occurred against the backdrop of the growing SWAPO insurgency in Namibia during the 1950s/1960s.

19. See for instance: Maritz, My Lewe; Kemp, Vir Vryheid; and Kemp, Die Pad.

20. See for instance: Scholtz, Die Rebellie, 1914–1915; Bothma, Rebelspoor; Spies, “The rebellion in South Africa”; Fox, A Bullet in the Back; and Langner and Raath, Die Afrikanerrebellie.

21. See for instance: General Staff, The Union of South Africa; and Collyer, The Campaign.

22. The US military were forced to reconsider concepts of irregular warfare following the events of 9/11, which led to refocussing US military training to suit the requirements of counterinsurgency as well as a retrospective of lessons learned in the Vietnam War. See Editor’s Note in B. Fall, ‘The Theory and Practice,’ 40–48. In explaining the study of counterinsurgency, General Petraeus remarked, ‘the new doctrine explains, the conduct of counterinsurgency operations is a “graduate level” endeavor, full of paradoxes and challenges and different in many ways from conventional military combat. It is important, then, that leaders develop a solid appreciation of the nature of irregular warfare and an understanding of the types of operations the U.S. military is conducting in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere’. See preface to US Army Combined Arms Center, ‘Special edition – counterinsurgency reader.’

23. Angstrom, “Towards a Typology,” 105–108.

24. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 13.

25. See for instance: Garcia, The First Campaign Victory, 90–91; O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 17.

26. Du Plessis and Hough, “Civil War,” 100.

27. Garcia, The First Campaign Victory, 91; and Du Plessis and Hough, “Civil War,” 105.

28. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 18; Garcia, The First Campaign Victory, 90–91. Sandra Swart writes that ‘nostalgic republicanism was used as a mobilising device, as a balm for wounded identity; contradictions were masked, the myths reinforced.’ See Swart, ‘A Boer and his Gun,’ 751.

29. British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 1–5.

30. For a British approach to counterinsurgency see: Callwell, Small Wars; Townshend, “Policing Insurgency,” 22–41; Denning, “Modern Problems,” 347–354; Gwynn, Imperial Policing; East Africa Command, Handbook; War Office, Keeping the Peace. For a modern take on the British approach to counterinsurgency see British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency. American thought on counterinsurgency has also evolved and takes shape in various modern publications such as US Army Special Command, Assessing Revolutionary: Volume 1; US Army Special Command, Assessing Revolutionary: Volume II; US Army, FM 3–24: Insurgencies. Also see NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine; NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum.

31. For historical case studies see: Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection; US Army Special Command, Assessing Revolutionary: Volume 1; US Army Special Command, Assessing Revolutionary: Volume II.

32. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 193–194; NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum, 37. For a detailed discussion on intelligence in counterinsurgency operations see: Rid and Heaney, Understanding Counterinsurgency.

33. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 63. This ratio was put forward by French officer David Galula, a veteran of the Second World War and various irregular campaigns. The ration is still referenced in current doctrinal publications such as British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 3–2.

34. US Army, FM, 3–24: Insurgencies, 3–1; and British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 3–5

35. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 54; and Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 194; Also see: NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum, 13–14; Springer, “Stabilizing the Debate”; NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine, 4–3.

36. US Army, FM 3–24: Insurgencies, 1–12; and Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 194.

37. British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 3–11

38. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 56; Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 195. Also see NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum, 57–58; Springer, “Stabilizing the Debate”; US Army Special Command, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Vol I; US Army, FM 3–24: Insurgencies, 13–4 to 13–6.

39. British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 3–8; NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum; US Army, FM 3–24: Insurgencies, 1–21; and NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine, 1–9.

40. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 195; and NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum, 74–75. For a discussion on safe havens British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 2–2 to 2–4.

41. British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 3–9. The elimination of extremists can also allow for an efficient reintegration process. See: US Army, FM 3–24: Insurgencies, 10–9 and 10–10.

42. US Army, FM 3–24: Insurgencies, 10–10 and 10–11; and Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 196.

43. British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 6–5 and 6–6; and Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 195.

44. See note 37 above.

45. Fedorowich, “Sleeping with the Lion?” 83; South African Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), Diverse Group 1, Box 1, File: A 103, Rebellion, 1914–1915.

46. Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 239; and Fedorowich, “Sleeping with the Lion?” 80. Also see Ritchie, With Botha; and Trew, Botha Treks.

47. DOD Archives, Adjutant General (AG) 1914–1921, Box 8, File: Rebellion. Report by post office official at Millvale, 25 October 1914; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s operations against the Rebels. Telegram to Defence Headquarters, 27 October 1914; Ritchie, With Botha, 4–5; Trew, Botha Treks, 29–30; General Staff, The Union of South Africa, 16, 23; Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 241.

48. DOD Archives, DG 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s Operations against the Rebels. Telegram from Quartermaster General to Defence Headquarters, 12 November 1914; Ritchie, With Botha, 6–8; DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 166. Report on Afrikaner Rebellion casualties to the High Commissioner for South Africa, 8 December 1914; DOD Archives, DG 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s Operations Against the Rebels. Telegram Botha to Smuts, 13 November 1914; Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 242; Trew, Botha Treks, 29–31.

49. DOD Archives, Secretary for Defence (DC) Group 2, Box 252. Telegram from Zuidcom to General Smuts, 4 January 1915; DOD Archives, DC Group 2, Box 252. Telegram from Van Deventer to Smuts, 27 December 1914; DOD Archives, DC Group 2, Box 252. Telegram from Colonel Van Deventer to General Smuts, 20 January 1915.

50. See for instance: Garcia, ‘Louis Botha and Relative Deprivation’; Garcia, The First Campaign Victory, 69–92.

51. See for instance: Swart, “The ‘Five Shilling Rebellion’”; Grundlingh and Swart, Radelose Rebellie; and Swart, “A Boer and his Gun.”

52. See for instance: Grundlingh, Die Hendsoppers en Joiners.

53. Garcia, The First Campaign Victory, 92.

54. Van der Waag, A Military History, 94.

55. Krüger, The Age of the Generals, 102.

56. See for instance: Fedorowich, “Sleeping with the Lion?”; and Garcia, The First Campaign Victory, 92.

57. Engelenburg, General Louis Botha, 128; and Garcia, “General Louis Botha.”

58. Krüger, The Age of the Generals, 83.

59. Strachan, The First World War, 552; Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 239; and Fedorowich, “Sleeping with the Lion?” 80.

60. See for instance: Swart, “The rebels of 1914”; and Swart, “The ‘Five Shilling Rebellion’.”

61. Hancock and Van der Poel, Smuts Papers, 220. Leniency was put forward in the Indemnity Act of 1915 which allowed for full partial and minimum amnesties: DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 1. Disposal of Maritz Rebels, 28 August 1915. The Union forces mobilised approximately 33,308 mounted troops for the GSWA campaign, and many of these troops were used during operations against the rebels. The total number of UDF troops deployed during the rebellion equates to some 48,704 men: DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 150, File: Strengths. List of all Union Defence Forces on active duty, 23 November 1914.

62. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 1, File: Treason trials. Rebels captured and surrendered. Note these statistics exclude the Battle of Upington.

63. DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 8, File: Commander-in-Chief. Government notice for the next issue of the Union Gazette, 18 October 1914.

64. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by L. Botha, 968, 29 June 1916.

65. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by B.G.L. Enslin, 400, 401, 17 April 1916.

66. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by P. de Wet, 218, 28 March 1916; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by A.E. Trigger, 3, 4, 15 February 1916.

67. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by B.G.L. Enslin, 403, 17 April 1916; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s operations against the Rebels. Order from Defence Headquarters, 21 October 1914.

68. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by B.D. Bouwer, 117–119, 2 March 1916.

69. L’Ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 57–58.

70. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by B.G.L. Enslin, 404, 17 April 1916; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by P. de Wet, 219, 220, 28 March 1916.

71. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by C.J. Brits, 143, 15 March 1916; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by B.G.L. Enslin, 404, 17 April 1916.

72. Anon, Judicial Commission of Inquiry, 135 (Annexure N). The reasons for the high concentrations of rebels in the Free State related to the poverty of sharecroppers and bywoners and their alienation from the modernising Union: Swart, ‘Men of Influence,’ 1. These predisposing factors were mobilised by their leaders: Garcia, The First Campaign Victory, 90. There existed also a historical rivalry between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Many Afrikaners in the Orange Free State did not identify with the Botha government’s link to the British Empire, and longed for the idea of republic. This became a central thrust in the National Party’s narrative.

73. DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 8, File: Rebellion. Report by post office official at Millvale, 25 October 1914; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s operations against the Rebels. Telegram to Defence Headquarters, 27 October 1914; Ritchie, With Botha, 4–5; and Trew, Botha Treks, 29–30.

74. Davenport, “The South African rebellion,” 89–90.

75. Hancock and Van der Poel, Smuts Papers, 214; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s operations against the Rebels. Telegram Smuts to Botha, 11 November 1914.

76. Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 46.

77. See for instance: Van der Waag, “Re-thinking South Africa’s Military Past.”

78. DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 8, File: Armoured Trains. Alberts report to Smuts after the action at Treurfontein, 19 October 1914.

79. Map drawn by the authors.

80. See note 76 above.

81. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s operations against the Rebels. Telegram from Quartermaster General to Defence Headquarters, 12 November 1914; Ritchie, With Botha, 6–8.

82. DOD Archives, AG 14–21, Box 166. Report on Afrikaner Rebellion casualties to the High Commissioner for South Africa, 8 December 1914; DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s operations against the Rebels. Telegram Botha to Smuts, 13 November 1914; Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 242; Trew, Botha Treks, 29–31.

83. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 57, File: General Botha’s operations against the Rebels. Telegram to Defence Headquarters, 17 November 1914.

84. Ritchie, With Botha, 10–13.

85. L’Ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 69; and General Staff, The Union of South Africa, 22.

86. Sampson, The Capture of de Wet, 220.

87. Swart, “Men of Influence,” 19.

88. Herbert Baker was a prominent English architect whose designs have shaped the South African urban landscape, creating a great number of official buildings. In addition to his influence on South African architecture he also played a key role in India, where he designed various official buildings in New Delhi as the new capital of the Raj. Baker was the quintessential British imperial architect stressing classical grandeur linked to a Victorian ideal of imperial power. Acknowledgment to the editor Paul Rich for his insight on this point.

89. The Union capitals became a point of contention in the formation of the Dominion, and as a compromise parliament was established in the Cape, the judiciary capital was in Bloemfontein, and the communications capital in Pietermaritzburg.

90. DOD Archives, AG, Box 13, File: Rebellion. Rebelle saam met Jopie Fourie gevang te Nooitgedacht 16 December 1914; Trew, Botha Treks, 44–48; Ritchie, With Botha, 16–19.

91. Van der Waag, A Military History, 100.

92. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by B.D. Bouwer, 121, 2 March 1916.

93. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by P.A Vermaas, 1011, 30 June 1916.

94. DOD Archives, DC Group 2, Box 252. Telegram from Zuidcom to General Smuts, 4 January 1915; DOD Archives, DC Group 2, Box 252. Telegram from Van Deventer to Smuts, 27 December 1914; DOD Archives, DC Group 2, Box 252. Telegram from Colonel Van Deventer to General Smuts, 20 January 1915.

95. DOD Archives, Diverse Group 1, Box 2, File: Rebellion Commission of Enquiry Volume 1. Testimony by P De Wet, 223, 28 March 1916.

96. L’Ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 79–80; and Dane, British Campaigns, 44–45.

97. DOD Archives, DC Group 2, Box 252. Telegram from Smuts to Van Deventer, 26 January 1915.

98. See note 9 above.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Antonio Garcia

Antonio Garcia is a research fellow affiliated with the Department of Military History of the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University. A former visiting scholar at New York University Centre on International Cooperation, Antonio has worked in international peace and security, education, and public diplomacy. He served as a senior officer in the South African National Defence Force, holds a PhD in military history, and has recently published the book, The First Campaign Victory of the Great War.

Evert Kleynhans

Evert Kleynhans [MMil, PhD (Mil) (Stell)], is a senior lecturer in the Department of Military History of the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University. He is also an Assistant Director of the Southern Africa Chapter of the Second World War Research Group, as well as the co-editor of Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies. His primary research interests include the South African participation in both world wars.