Playing chess with the Dragon: Chinese-U.S. competition in the era of irregular warfare

ABSTRACT

Having engaged in some two decades of irregular war, the United States now finds itself confronted by a resurgent China, determined to utilize asymmetric approaches to both strengthen its grip on power at home and reshape the international environment in its favor. Despite the parameters of Beijing’s strategy having been clearly laid out, Washington has failed to respond in coherent fashion. This reality should be altered by constructing a revitalized approach upon the foundation already put in place through the country’s long, extensive experience in irregular warfare.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• gray zone
• hybrid war
• political warfare
• strategy

Disclosure statement

This article represents the private views of the author and not those of the U.S. government or any of its components.

Notes

1. Miller and Erfourth, “SOF in Competition: Establishing the Foundation of Strategy (v1.3).”

2. Klare, “The US Military Is Preparing for a New War.”

3. Clausewitz, On War, 88.

4. US doctrine defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.” See Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0, 9.

5. Henry Kissinger’s On China is a useful entry point to the literature and introduces ancient and modern Chinese history, as well as offering unique insight into the country’s brand of diplomacy. For background on the area of contention, Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, provides a comprehensive history of the area and of the current power struggle.

6. Qui Liang and Wang Xiansui, Unrestricted Warfare, is a useful look at how China views the contemporary battlefield. The authors argue that the Persian Gulf War in 1991 forever changed warfare and that the utility of traditional military approaches to victory has been diminished. Since war itself still endures, the result is an increase in ‘political, economic and technological violence,’ in which the new principles of war include ‘using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.’ The book provides a playbook of Chinese irregular warfare options, outlining 26 different types of coercion that can be applied in numerous combinations to compel a nation’s will on an enemy.

7. For a comprehensive view of the strategic value of the South China Sea, particularly as it interfaces with Chinese and American strategic goals, see Scobell, “The South China Sea and U.S.-China Rivalry: The U.S.-China Rivalry.“ For a comprehensive review of China’s use of economic statecraft, despite repeated denials, Lai, “Acting One Way and Talking Another: China’s Coercive Diplomacy in East Asia and Beyond.“ The Hoover Institution recently released an important report covering China’s foreign influence activities. In its annex, it lays out the extensive organizational structure of the CCP devoted to influencing foreign public opinion. See Diamond and Schell, “Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States.”

8. Lake, “Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States.”

9. Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos, China and the International Order.

10. Schreer, “Towards Contested “Spheres of Influence” in the Western Pacific: Rising China, Classical Geopolitics, and Asia-Pacific Stability,” 6.

11. What China calls its ‘Near Seas’ is referred to as the first island chain in Western strategic parlance. This area includes the Kuril Islands, the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and the Malay Peninsula. See Schreer, 6–7.

12. Schreer, 6.

13. O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, 2–3.

14. Suisheng Zhao, “Are China and Taiwan Heading Towards Conflict?”

15. Ibid.

16. Eno, “Destined for Change: China, Taiwan, and the Future of the Cross Strait Status Quo,” 9.

17. Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos, 16.

18. See Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” 4. and Jennings, “Despite China’s Fast-Growing Wealth, Millions Still Remain Poor.”

19. The Evolving Role of China in Africa and Latin America.

20. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” 1.

21. “U.S.-China Trade War Raises Risks of Military Conflict.”

22. Ho, “Understanding Chinese Exceptionalism: China’s Rise, Its Goodness, and Greatness.”

23. Schreer, “Towards Contested “Spheres of Influence” in the Western Pacific,” 513.

24. Mayer, “China’s Historical Statecraft and the Return of History.” China, therefore, joins the select group of aspiring ‘civilizational states.’ See Coker, The Rise of the Civilizational State.

25. Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants.”

26. Ho, “Understanding Chinese Exceptionalism,” 167; Mayer, “China’s Historical Statecraft and the Return of History,” 1. For an older but still relevant discussion of the Chinese perspective, see Marks, “Sino-Thai Relations.”

27. Ho, “Understanding Chinese Exceptionalism,” 167.

28. Kauffman, “The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narratives.”

29. Kauffman, 1–3.

30. Hickey, “The Roots of Chinese Xenophobia.”

31. This study adopts Ikenberry’s definition of international order as “governing arrangements between states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions.” See Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, 23.

32. Feng Huiyun, “Is China a Revisionist Power?”, 2.

33. Kauffman, “The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narratives,” 6–7.

34. Suzuki, “The Importance of “Othering” in China’s National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts,” 33.

35. Ibid., 34.

36. Zhao Suisheng, “The Ideological Campaign in Xi’s China,” 1192.

37. See note 34 above.

38. “Hu: China in Cultural War.”

39. See: “China Defends Hong Kong Police, Blames Western Forces for Unrest,” and Zhao Suisheng, “The Ideological Campaign in Xis China.”

40. “Making “Chinese Dream” a Reality.”

41. Sørensen, “The Significance of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” for Chinese Foreign Policy: From “Tao Guang Yang Hui” to “Fen Fa You Wei”,” 28.

42. Kauffman, “The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narratives,” 4.

43. See note 32 above. 4.

44. Ibid., 7.

45. See note 41 above. 57.

46. Shi-Kupfer et al., “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future,” 18.

47. “How the West Got China’s Social Credit System Wrong.”

48. Shi-Kupfer et al.

49. Ibid., 12.

50. Ibid., 13.

51. Gilman, “China, Capitalism, and the New Cold War.”

52. Shi-Kupfer et al., 13.

53. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 6–7.

54. Lee, “China’s “Three Warfares”: Origins, Applications, and Organizations.”

55. The indirect approach enjoys prominence in China’s strategic tradition and is encapsulated in the works of Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong (see O’Dowd in this SWI issue); also, Ota, “Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy.”

56. “Interview: Liu Mingfu: China Dreams of Overtaking U.S. in 30 Years: The Asahi Shimbun.”

57. ChinaFile. “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation.”

58. Stoker and Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War – Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking.”

59. There has been increasing scholarly focus on how the CCP actively tailors its economic and informational tools based on its objectives and factors unique to the nation in which it is operating. For more, see Custer et al, “Influencing the Narrative.”

60. This paper utilizes the term contradiction as analogous to fissures that are exposed due to a difference between expectations and action. Marxist foundational concepts hold that a contradiction is both the “unity and struggle of opposites.” It is used to highlight the innate struggles between opposing forces that animate both life and warfare. Mao’s 1957 speech, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,’ lays out his views on the role of contradictions in ideological discourse, including both internal and external contradictions. See also Shi-Kupfer et al., “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future.” On protracted struggle, political mobilization, and ideology, see Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War.”

61. Adie, Chinese Strategic Thinking under Mao Tse-Tung. For background, Marks, Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang.

62. Mao Tse-tung, “On Guerrilla Warfare (1937).”

63. Lovell, “Maoism Marches on: The Revolutionary Idea That Still Shapes the World.” Also, Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam.

64. U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy.

65. Decade of War, Volume 1. Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, 11.

66. Ibid., 9–11.

67. “Abu Ghraib Torture Survivors Finally Get Their Day in Court.”

68. Jackson, “American Military Superiority and the Pacific-Primacy Myth,” 110.

69. Peters, “The Chinese Dream: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

70. Armstrong, “No, We Do Not Need to Revive the U.S. Information Agency.”

71. Decade of War, Volume 1. Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, 8–9, 25–27.

72. Julia Ioffe, ““They Really Want to Blow This Place Up”: Scenes from Trump’s State Department.”

73. William J. Burns, “The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy.”

74. The US Information Agency was responsible for U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War. It was dissolved in 1997, and several of its functions were absorbed by the State Department. U.S. public diplomacy has been in a semi-state of crisis since, and many are calling for a return to the USIA model to better handle the threat from Russian and Chinese information operations. See Zwiebel, “Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA.”

75. Decade of War, Volume 1. Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, 30–34.

76. Suzuki, “The Importance of “Othering” in China’s National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts.”

77. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 8.

78. Adam Taylor, “Analysis | Why U.S. Allies Aren’t Rushing to Back Trump’s China Trade War.”

79. In 2018, UN Ambassador Nikki Haley announced the US would cut $285 million from the UN operating budget, declaring the US will “no longer let the generosity of the American people be taken advantage of.” See “United States Announces $285 M Cut in U.N. 2018 Operating Budget.” US News & World Report.

80. The White House, “Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.”

81. “United States Announces $285 M Cut in U.N. 2018 Operating Budget.”

82. Jorge Benitez, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” 182.

83. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkell, after whirlwind meetings with President Trump in 2017, commented that Europe “really must take matters into our own hands.” More recently, in November 2019, French President Emannuel Macron commented: “Really, we have to adjust to this new American posture. We have to take care of our security by ourselves.” See “Macron Says NATO Is Experiencing “brain Death.” What’s the Future of the Alliance?”

84. March, “Trump Ramps up Rhetoric on Media, Calls Press “the Enemy of the People”.”

85. Kyle, “How the Long-Term Effect of Trump’s Recent War Crimes Actions Could Play Out.”

86. Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” 7–9.

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Cary Mittelmark

Lieutenant Colonel Cary Mittelmark is a career Air Force Special Operations pilot and the Chief, Force Assessments Branch for the Joint Staff J8.