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ABSTRACT
This article provides a new perspective on the logic of violence of the JNIM in the context of the Malian civil war. After a critical review of the literature on the Malian conflict, this article will apply Benjamin Lessing’s model on the logic of violence in criminal wars to JNIM. Through the adoption of Lessing’s model, this article will demonstrate how JNIM’s insurgency can be considered as a case of violent corruption in the context of a war of constraint. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper will show firstly, how the Malian civil war should be conceived as a war of constraint rather than a war of conquest; secondly, how JNIM is using violence in order to restrict the implementation of the rule of law in some regions which are strategic also for its financing activities. By adopting this new framework, it will be possible to overcome some conundrums characterising the debate on the Malian insurgency and to highlight some relevant topics for future research.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown and Dr. Nadia al-Dayel Anfinson for their heir suggestions on the development of this research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Number of Deaths in Mali 2012–2019.
2. World Bank, Internally Displaced Persons.
3. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Mapping Armed Groups.
4. Ibid.
5. Sangare, 2019 Famine Spreads in Central Mali Amid Ongoing Islamist Violence.
6. Benjaminsen and Ba, “Why Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadists Groups?”
7. Le Monde, “Au Mali, le nombre de cas de paludisme a plus que doublé dans le nord du pays.”
8. Shaw, “Fallout in the Sahel.”
9. Boeke and Schuurman, “Operation ‘Serval’.”
10. Mali achieved independence from France in June 1960. In September of the same year, country took the name Republic of Mali. The first Tuareg revolt (Alfellaga) dates back to 1963.
11. Emerson, “Desert Insurgency.”
12. For an historical account of the Tuareg revolts in Mali see. Lecoq, Disputed Desert. For an analysis of the previous reconciliation strategies see Baldaro, “A Dangerous Method.”
13. Desgrais, Guaichoua and Lebovich, “Unity is the Exception.”
14. Filiu, “Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.”
15. International Crisis Group, Speaking with the Bad Guys.
16. Lessing. “Logics of Violence in Criminal War.”
17. Ibid.
18. Graham, “Abduction, Kidnappings and Killings in the Sahel.”
19. Lessing “Logics of Violence in Criminal War,” Ibid.
20. Lacher, Challenging the Myth.
21. Peter Pham, “The Dangerous ‘Pragmatism’ of Al-Qaeda.”
22. Boeke, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.”
23. Lyammuri, AQIM never really abandoned Timbuctu.
24. Baché, “Mali.”
25. See Lecoq, Disputed Desert, 200–209.
26. Ramos da Cruz and, “Ucko Beyond the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora.”
27. Richani, “State Capacity in Post conflict Settings.”
28. Goodhand. “From Holy War to Opium War.”
29. See Associated Press, “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook.”
30. See al-Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for the Work of Jihad.”
31. See Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel, 62.
32. al-Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for the Work of Jihad,” 55.
33. Ibid., 54.
34. Malejacq and Sandor, “Sahelistan?”
35. Déclaration de Laurent Fabius, Ministre des affaires étrangères, à l’Assemblée nationale le. Octobre 3, 2012. https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/186,005-declaration-de-m-laurent-fabius-ministre-des-affaires-etrangeres-en-r.
36. Laurent, Sahelistan.
37. Heisbourg, “A Surprising Little War”, see also Hussein, “Mali.”
38. Malejacq and Sandor, “Sahelistan?”
39. Dowd and Raleigh, “The myth of Global Islamic Terrorism” see also Gutelius, “Islam in Northern Mali.”
40. See note 38 above.
41. Boeke, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.”
42. Desgrais, Guaichoua and Lebovich, “Unity is the Exception.”
43. Ibid.
44. Boeke, “AQIM.”
45. Peter Pham Ibidem for more recent studies see Thurston, Jihadist of North Africa and the Sahel, 123 and 169.
46. Mullins, “Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism.”
47. Baldaro, “A Dangerous Method.”
48. Craven-Matthews and Englebert, “A Potemkin State in the Sahel?”
49. Bleck and Michelitch, “The 2012 Crisis in Mali.”
50. Baldaro, “A Dangerous Method.”
51. Bleck and Michelitch, “The 2012 Crisis in Mali.”
52. Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, “Lethal Violence in Civil War.”
53. Shurkin, “France’s War in the Sahel.”
54. Bencherif, Campana, and Stockemer, “Lethal Violence in Civil War.”
55. Shurkin, “France’s War in the Sahel.”
56. Ibid.
57. For a description of al-Qaeda’s long-term strategy see Associated Press, “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” “Ibidem and also al-Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for the Work of Jihad.”
58. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanation of War.”
59. Graham, “Abduction,” Ibid.
60. Bunker, “Introduction.”
61. Blattman and Edward, “Civil War.”
62. Bøås and Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali.”
63. Mullins, “Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism.”
64. Philips, “Terrorist Tactics by Criminal Organizations.”
65. Bunker, “Introduction.”
66. Ibid.
67. Lessing, “Logics of Violence in Criminal War.”
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Baldaro and Diall, “The End of the Sahelian Exception.”
85. Nsaibia and Weiss, “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly.”
86. Al-Jazeera, “France ‘To Reduce Troop Presence’.”
87. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). “Founding Statement.”
88. Ibid.
89. Thurston, Jihadist of North Africa and the Sahel, 105.
90. Nsaibia and Weiss, “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly.”
91. Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise, 83.
92. Altuna Galan, JNIM.
93. See Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel, 57–60. According to the author the GSPC (the forerunner organization which took the name of AQIM in 2007) decided to adopt a more flexible posture on the issues of takfir and creed to avoid the alienation of popular support during the Algerian civil war of the 1990s.
94. Associated Press, “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook.”
95. Ibid.
96. Vand der Heide and Coleman, The Last Frontier.
97. Baldaro and Diall, “The End of the Sahelian Exception.”
98. Bøas, “Guns Money and Prayers.”
99. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara, 180.
100. Bøas and Strazzari, “Governance, Fragility and Insurgency in the Sahel.”
101. See note 95 above.
102. Fanunsie and Entz, AQIM Financial Assessment.
103. Skretting, “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib’s Expansion.”
104. Fanunsie and Entz, AQIM Financial Assessment.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Zimmerer, “Terror in West Africa.”
108. In October 2020 JNIM has successfully accomplished a prisoner swap with Malian authorities. According to some estimates, JNIM has earned 30 million euros from the release of its hostages see Daniel, Otages au Mali.
109. 2019 Global Perceptions Index Transparency International.
110. 2019 Global Perceptions Index, Ibid.
111. 2019 Global Corruption Barometer Transparency International.
112. 2019 Global Corruption Barometer, Ibid.
113. World Bank, Control of Corruption.
114. World Bank, Rule of Law.
115. Gberie, Crime, Violence, and Politics.
116. Daniel, Les Mafias du Mali.
117. Sahel Memo, Mali – Sahel: March 2017 Violent Incidents Related to AQIM.
118. Sahel Memo, Mali – Sahel: April 2017 Violent Incidents Related to AQIM.
119. Sahel Memo, Mali – Sahel: May 2017 Violent Incidents Related to JNIM.
120. Sahel Memo, Mali – Sahel: June 2017 Violent Incidents Related to Al-Qaeda Affiliate.
121. Sahel Memo, Mali – Sahel: August 2017 – April 2018 Chronology of Violent Incidents by Al-Qaeda Affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).
122. Sahel Memo, Mali – Sahel: May 2018 Violent incidents by Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).
123. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Global Terrorism Database”.
124. Mattfess, JNIM.
125. Sahel Memo, Mali – Sahel: August 2017 – April 2018, Ibid.
126. Briscoe, Crime after Jihad.
127. International Crisis Group, Drug Trafficking Violence see also World Bank, Trafficking and Fragility in West Africa.
128. GITOC, Drug Trafficking in Northern Mali.
129. Ibid.
130. UNODC, West African Epidemiology Network on Drug Use Statistics and Trends on Illicit Drug use and Supply 2014–2017.
131. Micallef, Farrah, Bish and Tanner, After the Storm.
132. RHIPTO (Norwegian Center for Global Analyses), INTERPOL and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) World Atlas of Illicit Flows (2018).
133. Micallef et al., After the Storm.
134. International Crisis Group, “Tracking Conflict Worldwide.”
135. Mattfess, JNIM.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. To see the methodology applied by ACLED in data collection see the general guide available at https://acleddata.com/resources/general-guides/#1603120929112-8ecf0356-6cf0.
139. ACLED, State Atrocities in the Sahel.
140. See Le Point, Mali: le dialogue avec djihadistes interrogé; and France 24, Mali: On ne peut pas installer le pays dans une guerre infinite, selon l’imam Mahmoud Dicko.
141. Financial Times, West African governments consider talking to regional Islamists.
142. See MaliActu, “Mali,”; and Dubois, “Mali.”
143. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), “Statement”.
144. Thurston, Jihadist of North Africa and the Sahel, 131.
145. In the so-called Timbuktu letters, AQIM’s leader Droukdel writes: ‘Not every concession to the enemy is forbidden or means accepting kufr and evil. (.) the reason is that you should gain the most by giving the least concessions’ See Associated Press, “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook.”
146. MaliActu, “Mali.”
147. Thurston, State fragility in Mali.
148. International Crisis Group, “Tracking Conflict Worldwide.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Luciano Pollichieni
Luciano Pollichieni is Vice Chancellor’s Scholarship PhD candidate in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK. His thesis on Islamist Mafias analyses the links between terrorism, organized crime, and corruption in Afghanistan and Mali. He is an affiliated researcher to the University of Nottingham’s Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism. (CST) and a member of the Urban Violence Research Network (UVRN).