Mercenaries in the Congo and Biafra, 1960-1970: Africa’s weapon of choice?

ABSTRACT

Often maligned by academics and international organisations alike, mercenaries are perceived as being a contributory factor to the worsening of conflict and as a threat to democracy. This chapter demonstrates that this reputation is not wholly deserved, and that in certain cases mercenaries have made a valuable contribution to creating stability in highly unstable contexts. Also, this chapter questions certain interpretations relating to the role and identity of mercenaries. Far from being cold-blooded avaricious killers, we show that there is a range of different reasons why someone becomes a mercenary and argue that the aforementioned categorisation has been used as a political tool.

KEYWORDS:

• Mercenarism
• mercenaries
• colonialism
• neo-colonialism
• insurgency
• counterinsurgency

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. See the OAU’s AHG Res.49(IV), 1967; ECM/Res.17(VII), 1970; OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Doc. CM/433/ Rev.L, Annex 1(1972); Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism”, International Commission of Inquiry on Mercenaries, in Luanda, Angola, June 1976.

2. Though characterised by the presiding judge at the Luanda Trial as ‘highly dangerous’, American Daniel Gearhart had arrived in Angola just days before and did not take part in any fighting. See, “4 Mercenaries Are Executed in Angola,” New York Times, 11 June 1976.

3. Burchett & Roebuck, The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today.

4. Thobhani, “The Mercenary Menace”.

5. Arnold, Mercenaries: Scourge of the Developing World.

6. Fayemi and Musah (Eds.), Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma.

7. “Why African governments still hire mercenaries,” The Economist, 28 May 2020.

8. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States.

9. Michaela Wrong, “Why are Africa’s Militaries so Disappointingly Bad?”.

10. Griffiths, U.S. Security Cooperation with Africa: Political and Policy Challenges.

11. For further reading on the tenets of the Copenhagen School see, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis.

12. The CONAKAT or Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga was a tribal-based association that declared it represented the wishes of ‘authentic Katangans’.

13. NCO’s of the ANC mutinied over pay and prospects on 5 July 1960. Europeans were attacked forcing thousands over the borders into Congo-Brazzaville, Angola or Northern Rhodesia. Operation Mangrove of July 1960 saw Belgian troops intervene in twenty-three areas of the Congo. Of the 9,400 men that took part in the operation 3,800 were already stationed in the Congo while 5,600 men were flown in from Belgium. Operational bases for Mangrove were Kitona, Kamina and Ruanda-Urundi. See, Van der Meersch, Fin de la Souveraineté Belge au Congo, 484.

14. It can be argued that Katanga’s secession was intrinsically illegal due to its ties to foreign interests. For this reason, a majority of UN members refused to recognise Katangan independence. See, Islam, “Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra, and Bangladesh,” Journal of Peace Research, 213.

15. The rank and file of the Katanganese Gendarmes was composed of some 300 tribesmen of the Bayeke and Bazela tribes, and around 3-4,000 Katanga-based members of the ANC. See, Larmer, “Of Local Identities and Transnational Conflict: the Katangese Gendarmes and Central-Southern Africa’s Forty-year war, 1960-1999,” in Arielli and Collins (eds.), Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era,164. The Katanganese Gendarmes were officered by former members of the Belgian Congo’s armed forces, the Force Publique. Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Marie Crèvecoeur was given overall command of the Gendarmes.

16. For more on attacks carried out by the Balaubakat see Sonck, “Forces de l’ordre et Sûreté Katanga 1960-1961, ” 21; “Livre blanc du Gouvernement katangais sur les activités des hors-la-loi dans certains territoires baluba”; 27-29; Célestin Kabuya Lumuna Sando, Nord-Katanga 1960-1964. De la Sécession à la guerre civile. Le meurtre des chefs, 74.

17. “Congo Troops Fly to Kasai to Stop Secession Effort,” New York Times, 24 August 1960.

18. “US Mission at the United Nations Cable,” Nos. 560 and “US Mission at the United Nations Cable,” Nos. 560. 69.

19. “Mr. Kalonji Flees and Declares war on Mr. Lumumba,” The Times, 28 August 1960.

20. “Congo-Zaïre: l’empire du crime permanent: le massacre de Bakwanga,” Le Phare, 23 July 2013, and Kalonji Mulopwe, Dossier du massacre des Baluba à Bakwanga de 1960, 8.

21. Peter Scholl-Latour, Mort sur le grand fleuve. Du Congo au Zaïre, chronique d’une indépendance (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1988), 200.

22. At different times during his premiership, Lumumba was described as being ‘ crazy’, having a ‘particularly violent character’, and being ‘Africa’s Castro’. ‘National Security Council Meeting’ Washington, 25 July 1960; and Tim Weiner, Legacy of the Ashes: The History of the CIA (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 162.

23. This was a governmental body tasked with providing Tshombe institutional structures such as a banking and communications systems. Luc De Vos, Emmanuel Gérard, Jules Gérard-Libois, and Philippe Raxhorn, Les secrets de l’affaire Lumumba (Bruxelles: Editions Racine, 2005), 62.

24. Pasteger, Le Visage des affreux mercenaires Katangais, 11-13.

25. The Avikat was created in August 1960. As well as Belgians such as Victor Volant, Joseph Delin or José Magain, there were Polish, South African, American and Australian pilots. Poles Witold Lanowski and Jan Zumbach. Zumbach was a World War Two fighter pilot who had flown with the 303rd Polish Fighter Squadron of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Later, Zumbach’s career in aviation would continue as a member of the Biafran Air Force (BAF), see, Jowett, Modern African Wars: The Nigerian-Biafran War, 67. As for US participation, this came through Hubert Fauntleroy Julian. Known as the ‘Black Eagle of Harlem’, Fauntleroy Julian acquired this sobriquet after he had flown over a meeting of the Negro Improvement Association headed by Marcus Garvey. The ‘Black Eagle’ had flown aircraft for Haile Selassie, had taken part in operations against Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, and had flown for Batista’s forces against Fidel Castro. See, Shaftel, ‘The Black Eagle of Harlem’.

26. Gérard-Libois and Verhaegen, Congo 1960, 173-174, as quoted in Clark, “The Congo Mercenary: A History and Analysis,” 25. For this reason, mercenaries operating around the Kongolo region and commanded by Belgian expat Jean Schramme or Frenchman Bob Denard became known as Les Affreux. This name is believed to have been given to mercenaries at the end of September 1960. Colonel Crevecoeur, then chief of the Katanganese Gendarmes was reportedly looking over the CV’s of those soldiers of fortune being sent to him. On seeing that many had criminal records and/or held sympathies with Nazi Germany, Crevecoeur stated that these were not soldiers, they were ‘frightening’. See, Pasteger, Le Visage des affreux mercenaires Katangais, 25.

27. Trinquier was a veteran of three wars and later authored manuals dealing with counterinsurgencies. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. First published by Editions de la Table Ronde, Paris in 1961 under the title La Guerre Moderne. Faulques had completed two tours of duty in Indochina before serving as an intelligence officer in Algeria.

28. The two groups were transported into Katanga from South Africa aboard regular flights operated by Sabena Airlines. Interview with Nigel Osborn, a member of the Compagnie Internationale, 15 September 2015.

29. Hoare, Congo Mercenary.

30. Hoare, The Road to Kalamata.

31. Government troops were sent to the area to track down Mulele, and if it was suspected that that a village had harboured him, or that villagers had joined the maquis, the troops would torture and maim the village’s inhabitants. Arms and legs were broken, breasts and ears were cut off, and any clothes, money, or cattle was either stolen, destroyed or killed. Instead of turning the rural population against Mulele and making them divulge his whereabouts, the resolve of villagers hardened, made them hate the ANC even more, and provided them with more reasons to become maquisards. Bula-Bula, Pierre Mulele et le maquis du Kwilu en R.D. Congo.

32. Led by United States Army officer Colonel M.J.L. Greene, from July 1962 a Special Military Advisory Team recommended that the Congo’s armed forces should be modernised and receive training under the authority of the UN.

33. A Lingala word referring to something that possesses great strength.

34. By mid-1962 the CIA was looking at the ways it could best use Cuban exiles with the experience and knowledge to carry out covert operations on foreign soil. One idea was to create a so-called Emergency Response Team (ERT) that could be used anywhere in the world and that could be deployed rapidly if needed, and using Roberto Medell as an intermediary for recruitment, those selected for the ERT underwent training at the Embry-Riddle School of Aviation in Miami. Employed by a CIA front company named Caribbean Aeromarine Corporation (Caramar), those recruited had been pilots with a number of different services ranging from the Cuban Air Force and the Cuban Naval Aviation, to commercial pilots with Cubana Airlines or Aeropostal. Many were veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion. See, Villafaña, Cold War in the Congo: The Confrontation of Cuban Military Forces, 1960-1967, p.37. The ground attack aircraft were North American T-28 Trojans (models B and C), while the bombers were B-26Ks. For a full list of aircraft used by the Makasi as well as their arrival in the Congo, see Rookes, For God and the CIA, 30-32.

35. See, TNA, FO 1100/9, “Mercenaries Operating in the Congo,” Cypher/OTP To: Foreign Office, 30 July 1964; “Letter from: British Embassy, Leopoldville, To: British Embassy, Pretoria, 30 July 1964”; “FPSFA, AA, Portefeuille Nr 14795, Lias Nr 1631”; “Letter from: Consul Generaal van België, Johannesburg, To: Vice-Eerste Minister en Minister van Buitelandse Zaken, Brussels, Michael Hoare en de Huurlingen voor Congo,” as quoted in Passemiers, “South Africa and the ‘Congo Crisis’,” 108.

36. According to British Foreign Office Records, one recruit estimated that 90% of South African mercenaries in 5 Commando possessed some kind of previous military experience. TNA, FO 371/176716, “Letter from: British High Commission, Salisbury, To: Commonwealth Relations Office,” London, 9 September 1964, in Passemiers, 110. Additionally, one diplomat was led to remark that”French mercenaries enjoy uncontested authority and professional superiority due to their knowledge and use of the long-standing and singular strategies used in Indochina or in Algeria”. See, “Note sur mon séjour à Elisabethville du 4 au 10 novembre 1961”. When John Peters took command of 5 Commando in December 1965 recruitments requirements became even more rigorous: the enlistment age limit was set at 35 and recruits had to demonstrate a high level of physical fitness as more patrols were carried out on foot. See, ”Tougher Congo mercenaries are Wanted,” The Star, 2 February 1966, in Passemiers, 118). Hoare states that ‘undesirables’ were forcefully sent back. See, Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 66. Also see, British FO records stating Hoare had decided to reject 20-30 men from the mercenary base in Kamina. TNA, FO 1100/10, “Visit to ANC Base Kamina – 7 October 1964, 12 October 1964” in Passemiers,115.

37. Though mercenaries are frequently described as being unaccountable to any authority or law and that they are unregulated, in Congo Mercenary, 132-133 Hoare describes an episode when a former Rhodesian police officer accused of murder is tried by a jury composed of mercenaries. Escaping the death sentence, both of his big toes blown off by Hoare using a Colt 45 revolver. Furthermore, members of 5 Commando had to follow a strict code of behaviour. See, Congo Mercenary, 309.

38. “Instructions for Pilots,” document obtained during interviews with Cuban exile pilot in Miami, October 2015. Reproduced in Rookes, For God and the CIA, Cuban Exile Forces in the Congo and Beyond, 1959-1967, annexes.

39. Laurent Baccaria, “Soldats perdus des guerres orphelines,” 103–109.

40. Like Trinquier and Falques mentioned above, many French mercenaries had served in the Foreign Legion and French parachute regiments in Indochina and Algeria. Many, such as Olivier Picot d’Aligny d’Assignies and Christian Lefèvre had also been members of the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS).

41. Examples include Luis Cosme who commanded a B-26 codenamed ‘Linda One’, José Maza, the navigator on ‘Linda Three’, Rafael Garcia, the navigator on ‘Gorilla One’, Nildo Batista, the navigator on ‘Linda One’, Francisco Ginebra Groero was the gunner on a C-54 codenamed ‘Falcon One’, and Raoul Solís was the co-pilot of a C-46 numbered ‘855’.

42. For more on Cuban exile forces see, Rookes, For God and the CIA: Cuban Exile Forces in the Congo and Beyond, 1959-1967, and Rookes, Ripe for Rebellion, Political and Military Insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964. See also, Rookes, “From the Bay of Pigs to Lake Tanganyika: Non-State Armed Actors in the Congo Crisis”.

43. A naval force comprising members of 5 Commando was created in March 1965. However, it lacked the experience of hit-and-run missions and was limited to ferrying troops and equipment around Lake Tanganyika or along the River Congo.

44. As third-nation nationals, the Cuban exiles were used by the CIA to provide plausible deniability of involvement in the Congo.

45. For more on US relations with Mobutu, see Schaztberg, Mobutu or Chaos?: The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990.

46. Saideman, The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict, 46.

47. Messmer, Les Blancs s’en vont, 167.

48. Johnson, “The Presidents’ Man,” London Book Review. De Gaulle’s intentions were to set up government in Elisabethville. See, Christopher Othen, Katanga 1960-63: Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that Waged War on the World, 63.

49. Members of the Binza Group included future Minister of the Interior, Victor Nendaka, and future Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko.

50. Bat, La Fabrique des ‘Barbouzes’: Histoire des Réseaux Foccart en Afrique, 437.

51. Although France’s political influence was diminished in Southern Africa, its weapons industry benefitted enormously through the establishment of ties to countries supporting Tshombe. By 1965, France’s aviation sector was another beneficiary: Sud-Aviation, Nord-Aviation, SNECMA, and Dassault Aviation all supplied engines or fighter aircraft and helicopters (Mirage III E and III R, Mystère 20, Alouette III) while Matra supplied R 530 Missiles. See, “Report of the Military Attaché in Pretoria, Annexe K, Imports from France from 1 January to 30 September 1965”.

52. Records contained in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry show that 16 Alouette helicopters, 12 T-6 G fighter aircraft and 2 B-26 bombers were delivered to Biafra after its declaration of independence. “Report of the Military Attaché in Pretoria, Annexe K, Imports from France from 1 January to 30 September 1965”.

53. French mercenaries were funded by a French oil company named the Société anonyme française de recherche et d’exploitation du pétrole (SAFRAP).

54. Christian Lefèvre, another French veteran of the Biafran conflict, notes that the PIDE facilitated the transport of French mercenaries through Lisbon. The role played by the PIDE is confirmed in Michel Loiseau, Mémoires inédits de Bosco.

55. In July 1967, a French advisor to Gabon’s president, Omar Bongo, named Philippe Letteron set up a front company called SOGEXI. See, Fonds Letteron, 90 AJ 76-79, and Captain Armand, Biafra vaincra, 137. Rhodesian-born South African pilot, Jack Malloch was one of those employed for these transfers. See, Peter Baxter, Biafra: The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970, 37.

56. “Ojukwu Claims Mercenaries are Fighting with Nigerians at Enugu,” Reuters News Conference”.

57. See example given in footnote 41 of this study.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Stephen Rookes

Stephen Rookes is a research fellow at the French Air Force's Centre de Recherche de l'Ecole de l'Air (CRéA) in Salon-de-Provence, France. Providing lectures on the history of French military aviation, his main fields of study are mercenaries in colonial and post-colonial conflicts, France's military and political role in these conflicts as well as Cuban exile operations in Latin America and Central Africa. His main publications are Ripe for Rebellion: Political and Military Insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964 (Warwick: Helion, 2020); For God and the CIA: Cuban Exile Forces in the Congo and Beyond, 1959-1967 (Warwick: Helion, 2020); and CIA and British Mercenaries in Angola, 1975-1976: From Operation IA/FEATURE to Massacre at Maquela (Warwick: Helion, 2021). His most recent publication is „L'évolution de l'utilisation des hélicoptères dans les conflits en Algérie, en Angola et en Rhodésie, 1954-1979“, Vortex. Etudes sur la puissance aérienne et spatiale, Centre d'études stratégiques aérospatiales (CESA), 2021. He is a member of the editorial board of this revue and also that of Nacelles. Passé et présent de l'aéronautique et spatial.

Walter Bruyère-Ostells

Walter Bruyere-Ostells is Professor of Modern History of War at Sciences Po Aix-en- Provence in France. He is the Scientific director of the French Historic Service of Defense Ministry. He is also co-director of the Research Centre MESOPOLHIS (UMR 7064 Sciences Po Aix-CNRS-AMU) and co-director of the PhD Program Defense and Home security of Aix-Marseille University. His main field of research are the history of mercenaries, armed volunteers or foreign fighters in Africa in the post-decolonization era and Cold War. Another main field of his research is the military history in Europe and South America from the French Revolution to 1870. His main publications are Histoire des mercenaires de 1789 à nos jours (Tallandier: Paris, 2011; translated in Brazil in 2012); Dans l’ombre de Bob Denard: les mercenaires français de 1960 à 1989 (Nouveau Monde edition: Paris, 2014); French mercenaries, violence and systems of domination in Sub-Saharan Africa (1960-1989), (The Edwin Mellen Press: New-York), 2016. He recently published « Treatment of the bodies of those killed in French mercenary operations between 1960 and 1989 », Human Remains and violence. An Interdisciplinary Journal, vol. 5, 2019-2, pp 3-16.