https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4491-087X
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ABSTRACT
Following their victory in the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese Communists initiated a nationwide counterinsurgency. In Guangxi, a mountainous province at the China-Vietnam border, anti-communist rebels waged an insurgency from 1949 to 1952, hoping that foreign support and Cold War rivalries could eventually restore the ancien régime. This research investigates the counterinsurgency in Guangxi, one of the more mutinous provinces in post-Civil War China. By situating the Guangxi counterinsurgency in the global context, this article aims to contribute to the discussion of Chinese counterinsurgency strategy, experience and how the People’s Republic’s triumphed over the armed resistance.
Disclosure statement
The author reported no potential conflict of interest.
Notes
1. In January 1950, large parts of the Southwest, Northwest, Xinjiang, Hainan and many areas in southern China were out of communist control. The whole of Tibet, then a de facto independent state, was not under PRC control.
2. Jeans, The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War, 29–32, 44–47, 145–147; and Holober, Raiders of the China Coast.
3. History of the People’s Liberation Army Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi, vol. 4, 148.
4. Ibid.
5. Shichor, “Crackdown: Insurgency, Potential Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern China,” 106–107.
6. The CCP was not the only party that practiced this delegitimization tactic. The British, Soviets and Kuomintang all used ‘bandit suppression’ or something similar as substitutes for „counterinsurgency„.
7. Novo, “Birth of the Cold War,” 52.
8. Miroiu, “Wiping Out “The Bandits”,” 667, 691.
9. Byman, “Death Solves All Problems,” 67–68.
10. Ibid., 73–76.
11. Ucko, “The People Are Revolting,” 34, 49–55.
12. An example of this research trend would be Odgaard and Nielsen, “China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang.”
13. Tan, Xinguixi zhengquan yanjiu, 255. The ethnic Zhuang who constitutes one-third of Guangxi’s population today was not officially recognized an independent nationality during the ROC era. Thus, there were no precise counts of Zhuang population in provincial censuses.
14. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931–1939, 41, 52.
15. Li, “Guangxi Jianshe Gangling.”
16. Lary, Region and Nation, 175–179.
17. Ibid., 188–192.
18. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931–1939, 65, 71–73.
19. Ibid., 73–82, 118–120, 166.
20. Ibid., 60–64.
21. Liu, “Jiefang Qianxi Guilin Suijing Gongshu de Fandong Cuoshi,” vol. 3, 270. Memoir author Liu Weikai was the deputy chief-of-staff of the Guilin Pacification Command. In December 1949, Liu surrendered to the PRC government.
22. Mo, “Jiefang Qianxi Xinguixi Zai Guangxi de Fandong Cuoshi Pianduan Huiyi,” vol. 3, 278–279. Memoir author Mo Shujie was the head of both Guangxi Provincial Security Command and Western Guangxi Military-Political Region. In January 1950, Mo surrendered to the PRC government.
23. Liu, “Jiefang Qianxi Guilin Suijing Gongshu de Fandong Cuoshi,” 272.
24. Mo, “Jiefang Qianxi Xinguixi Zai Guangxi de Fandong Cuoshi Pianduan Huiyi,” 279. Amid the ROC collapse, the US government saw Bai Chongxi’s Guangxi as a potential area to organize resistance against the communists, see Jeans, The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War, 7–8, 17.
25. Mo, “Jiefang Qianxi Xinguixi Zai Guangxi de Fandong Cuoshi Pianduan Huiyi,” 279.
26. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Records Compilation Commission, Guangxi tongzhi junshizhi, 529–530.
27. History of the People’s Liberation Army Writing Group, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi, 110–111.
28. Ibid., 116–121.
29. Ibid., 121–122.
30. Elleman, Taiwan’s Offshore Islands, 8–12.
31. Chen, “Projecting Poseidon’s Trident: America’s East Asia and the Shifting Contours of 1950s Post-War Naval Policy,” 5.
32. Mao, Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Junshi Wengao, vol. 1, 193.
33. Li, Building Ho’s Army, 40–41.
34. Ibid., 45.
35. Ibid., 41, 46.
36. Ibid., 42.
37. Ibid., 44, 46, 48.
38. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Records Compilation Commission, Guangxi Tongzhi Dashiji, 267.
39. Li, Building Ho’s Army, 56.
40. Ibid., 65, 68, 70.
41. History of the People’s Liberation Army Writing Group, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi, 131.
42. Guangxi Military District Political Department and Guangxi Regional Party Archive Office, eds., Guangxi Jiaofei, 2. Note: Guangxi Jiaofei is a compilation of CCP and PLA documents relating to counterinsurgency in Guangxi from 1949 to 1953. The volume also includes participant memoirs and news reports from the time. Hereafter GXJF.
43. History of the People’s Liberation Army Writing Group, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi, 133.
44. Fu, “Mao Zedong Yu Jianguo Chunian de Jiaofei Gongzuo,” 41.
45. Ibid., 40.
46. History of the People’s Liberation Army Writing Group, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi, 132.
47. Guangxi Military District Political Department and Guangxi Regional Party Archive Office, GXJF, 2–3.
48. Ibid., 742.
49. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Records Compilation Commission, Guangxi Tongzhi Dashiji, 267. PLA numbers in Guangxi declined overtime as troops were transferred to campaigns elsewhere. By April 1950, the total number dropped to 130,000. By end of 1951, there were 110,000 PLA personnel in the province. Not all participated in counterinsurgency missions. See Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Records Compilation Commission, Guangxi tongzhi junshizhi, 234.
50. Guangxi Provincial Party Committee and Guangxi Military District, “Guangyu Jiaofei Gongzuo Zhishi,” GXJF, 117–120.
51. Ibid., 119.
52. Ibid., 118–119.
53. Ibid., 118.
54. Ibid.
55. Guangxi Military District Political Department and Guangxi Regional Party Archive Office, GXJF, 6.
56. Ibid.
57. Li, “Guanyu Jiaofei Yu Fadong Qunzhong Gongzuo de Fayan Tigang – Li Tianyou Zai Shengwei Diyici Gaogan Huiyi Shang de Jianghua,” GXJF, 133–138.
58. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region CCP Committee Party History Research Office, ed., Guangxi Jiaofei Shi, 58–59.
59. Ibid., 52–58.
60. Guangxi Provincial Party Committee, “Guanyu Dongji Jiaofei Zhishi (Jielu),” GXJF, 210–212.
61. Mao, Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Junshi Wengao, 193.
62. Tao, “Zhengqu Zai Banniannei Xiaomie Guangxi Quansheng de Tufei Tao Zhu Zai Shengwei Disanci Gaogan Huiyi Shang de Jianghua,” GXJF, 293.
63. Ibid., 295.
64. Ibid., 298.
65. Ye, “Ye Jianying Zai Shengwei Disanci Gaogan Huiyi Shang de Jianghua,” GXJF, 301.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 308–311.
68. Guangxi People’s Government, Guangxi Military District Headquarters and Guangxi Military District Political Department, “Jiaofei Shixiang Fagui,” GXJF, 317–318.
69. Guangxi Provincial Party Committee, “Wei Wancheng 1951 Nian 4 Yuedi Suqing Quansheng Gufei Ji Xunsu Guangfan Fadong Qunzhong de Zhishi,” GXJF, 323–324.
70. Ibid., 324.
71. Ibid., 326.
72. Ibid., 326–327.
73. Li, “Guanyu Jiaofei Yu Fadong Qunzhong Gongzuo de Fayan Tigang – Li Tianyou Zai Shengwei Diyici Gaogan Huiyi Shang de Jianghua,” 250.
74. Ibid., 325. The CCP built many militias in Guangxi during the war against Japan. Those irregulars later assisted the PLA during the Guangxi Campaign and subsequent counterinsurgency. See Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Records Compilation Commission, Guangxi tongzhi junshizhi, 193.
75. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Records Compilation Commission, Guangxi Tongzhi Dashiji, 278.
76. Guangxi Provincial Party Committee, “Dui gedi chuli feifu de zhishi,” GXJF, 429.
77. Ibid., 430.
78. Guangxi Provincial Party Committee, “Wei Wancheng 1951 Nian 4 Yuedi Suqing Quansheng Gufei Ji Xunsu Guangfan Fadong Qunzhong de Zhishi,” 328.
79. Li, “Qingzhu Jiaofei Shengli Gonggu Jiaofei Shengli – Li Tianyou “Wuyi” Guangboci,” GXJF, 445.
80. Ibid. Among those annihilated were 520 insurgent commanders at the division-level and above. Also, 310,741 long guns and handguns as well as 2,883 light and heavy machine guns were captured.
81. Li, “Guangxi Junqu Silingbu Guanyu 1952 Nian Qingfei Zhian Gongzuo Zongjie Baogao (Jielu),” GXJF, 510.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 510–512.
84. Guangxi Provincial Party Committee and Guangxi Military District Party Committee, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun guangxi junqu mingling (jielu),” Dayaoshan jiaofei jishi, 20. Note: Dayaoshan jiaofei jishi is a compilation of CCP and PLA documents relating to the Yao Mountains Campaign. The volume also includes participant memoirs and news reports from the time. Hereafter DYSJFJS.
85. Jinxiu Yao Autonomous County Chinese Communist Party Committee Party History Office, ed., DYSJFJS, 70.
86. Ibid., 77.
87. Guangxi Military District, “Yaoshan huijiao zongjie,” DYSJFJS, 62–66.
88. Liuzhou Military Sub-District Headquarters, “Yaoshan zhongdian jiaofei jige zhuyao zhanshu jingyan,” DYSJFJS, 55–59.
89. Li, Yaoshan de Chuntian, 58–59.
90. Ibid., 60–61.
91. Ibid., 62–63.
92. “Women He Yaobao de Guanxi Gaohao Le,” Guangxi Daily, February 18, 1951.
93. Guangxi Provincial Party Committee and Guangxi Military District Party Committee, “Yaomin gongzuo zhishi,” DYSJFJS, 26–28.
94. Liuzhou Military Sub-District Work Committee and Liuzhou Military Sub-District Front Command Committee, “Dui yaoshanqu gongzuo zhishi,” DYSJFJS, 29–32.
95. Li, Yaoshan de Chuntian, 84.
96. “Qunzhong Bufei Yundong Rehuo Chaotian,” Guangxi Daily, February 16, 1951.
97. Jinxiu Yao Autonomous County Chinese Communist Party Committee Party History Office, DYSJFJS, 71.
98. Ibid.
99. “Qunzhong Bufei Yundong Rehuo Chaotian.”
100. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War, 113–114.
101. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, 73–74.
102. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960, 100–107; and Yao, The Malayan Emergency, 109–112.
103. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, 94–95.
104. Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands, 232.
105. Ibid., 146.
106. Ibid., 177.
107. Ibid., 285–286.
108. Ibid., 207.
109. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 414, 448–454.
110. Ibid., 464.
111. Ibid., 466.
112. Dillon, Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest, 59–76.
113. According to Li, “By the end of 1960,” Chinese foreign aid totaled $6.7 billion. One-third of China’s total foreign aid of $1.9 billion went to Vietnam … . Between 1955 and 1963, Chinese military aid to North Vietnam totaled $320 million, while its economic aid totaled $1.1 billion from 1955 to 1958 alone. See Li, Building Ho’s Army, 161.
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Zi Yang
Zi Yang is a PhD candidate in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). His research focuses on civil-military relations, China’s security issues, and Chinese intelligence history. Mr. Yang’s recent publications include an Asia Policy article ‘Opening Up While Closing Up: Balancing China’s State Secrecy Needs and Military-Civil Fusion’ (2021), a Center for Strategic and International Studies report with Jeff Benson titled ‘Party on the Bridge: Political Commissars in the Chinese Navy’ (2020) and a Routledge Handbook chapter ‘Character Assassination and the Contemporary Anti-Corruption Campaign in the Chinese Military’ (2019).