Whose proxy war? The competition among Iranian foreign policy elites in Iraq

ABSTRACT

How do state sponsors of proxy groups in civil wars balance their support of non-state militias with the need for political transition towards stability? This article explores the inconsistencies in Iran’s priorities and proxy strategy that at times limited Iranian influence, and complicated Iraq’s transition from war to peace. It expands on current theories on proxy warfare by focusing on the impact of diverging interests among foreign policy elites in a sponsor state. Three policy dilemmas illustrate the difference among on the one side the Revolutionary Guard and on the other side the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Intelligence. First, whether the pro-Iranian proxies should maintain their influence after the war or Iran should strengthen its link to the representatives of the formal state. Second, whether repression by Shia militias or political reconciliation should prevent Sunni Arabs from (re)joining Islamic State. Third, whether Iraq should be part of a sectarian, transnational alliance or an inclusive state that might become an arbiter to deescalate regional tension. The study contributes to the literature on Iranian proxy warfare in the Middle East and proxy warfare literature in general, by considering the consequences of differences among foreign policy elites.

KEYWORDS:

• Proxy warfare
• Iran
• Iraq
• Quds Force

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express their gratitude to Professor Amin Saikal for valuable comments on the manuscript and to the anonymous reviewers for their many constructive comments

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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2. Hudson and Day, Foreign Policy Analysis, 106ff.

3. According to the Iranian constitution, SNSC consists of twelve permanent members, ten of those must hold military, political, or ministerial positions, while the last two members must be representatives of the Supreme Leader. See Caves, Supreme National Security Council of Iran.

4. Brown, Purposes and Pitfalls of War by Proxy.

5. Groh, Proxy War, 29.

6. Brown, Purposes and Pitfalls of War by Proxy; Groh, Proxy War; Hazelton, The Client Gets a Vote; Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front; Berman and Lake, Proxy Wars; Krishnan, Controlling Partners and Proxies in Pro-Insurgency Paramilitary Operations.

7. Gaston and Ollivant, U.S.-Iran Proxy Competition in Iraq, 31–36.

8. Mumford, Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict; Lee, Subversive Statecraft; Hughes, Syria and the Perils of Proxy Warfare; Rauta, Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict.

9. Ahmadian and Mohseni, Iran’s Syria Strategy; Eisenstadt 2021; Krieg and Rickli, Surrogate Warfare; Seliktar and Rezaei, Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars.

10. Saikal, Iran Rising, 258.

11. Leenders & Giustozzi, Foreign Sponsorship of Pro-Government Militias Fighting Syria’s Insurgency, 20–22.

12. Rauta, Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict: Take Two, 43–44.

13. Groh, Proxy War: The Least Bad Option, 106.

14. Alden & Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis, 53ff.

15. Saikal, Iran Rising, 70ff.

16. Phillips and Valbjørn, ‘What Is in a Name? 423; Ostovar, The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients, 180; Ahmadian and Mohseni, Iran’s Syria Strategy, 247–249.

17. Ibid.

18. See above 13, 203.

19. Alden & Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis, 51.

20. Hudson & Day, Foreign Policy Analysis, 76ff.

21. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, 26.

22. Seliktar and Rezaei, Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars, 160–162.

23. Reed, Gezari, and Hodge, The Story Behind the Iranian Cables.

24. We have not been able to include sources in Farsi. They would have made the triangulation more valid, but sources from Iran also carry additional methodological difficulties, due to the highly controlled information flow.

25. Seliktar and Rezaei, Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars, 148–150.

26. Al-Nidawi, The Growing Economic and Political Role of Iraq’s PMF.

27. Worth, Inside the Iraqi Kleptocracy.

28. Mansour, More Than Militias.

29. Rose Dury-Agri, Kassim, and Martin, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces, 28–29.

30. Al-Khafaji, Internal Divisions within the Popular Mobilisation Forces.

31. Al-Salhy, Iraqi Shia leader Sistani moves to break Iran’s grip over militia movement.

32. Alaca, Sistani versus Khamenei on Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi.

33. Malik, The Still-Growing Threat of Iran’s Chosen Proxy in Iraq.

34. Gaston and Ollivant, U.S.-Iran Proxy Competition in Iraq, 13–14; Mansour, Networks of Power, 6–7.

35. Hunter, What Did Rouhani Really Get From His Iraq Visit?

36. The Iran Primer, Rouhani Deepens Ties with Iraq.

37. See above 35.

38. Najmuddine, Abbas Combat Division, an Example of Iran-Independent Faction.

39. Dawood and Geranmayeh, When Iran Goes to Iraq, 2–3.

40. Younis, The Gulf between Them, 15–16.

41. Badawi, Kadhimi’s Push Against Iran-Supported Paramilitaries.

42. Azizi, Challenges to Iran’s Role in Iraq in the Post-Soleimani Era, 5–6.

43. Tehran Times, Zarif Holds Talks with Iraqi Political, Religious Leaders.

44. Gaston and Ollivant, U.S.-Iran Proxy Competition in Iraq, 10–11.

45. Jones, War by Proxy, 10–12.

46. Rudolf, The Sunnis of Iraq’s ‘Shia’ Paramilitary Powerhouse.

47. Behravesh, Iran’s Unconventional Alliance Network in the Middle East and Beyond, 6–7.

48. Piscatori and Saikal, Islam beyond Borders, 74.

49. Yarbakhsh, Green Martyrdom and the Iranian State, 77–78.

50. Ostovar, The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients, 165–66.

51. European Asylum Support Office, EASO Country of Origin Information Report, 183–184.

52. Knights et al, Honored, Not Contained, ix.

53. Ibid, 150.

54. Ibid, 117.

55. Aman, Iran’s Uneasy Relationship with Its Sunni Minority.

56. Ibid.

57. Jalilvand et al., Radicalization During the Rouhani Years, 24–26.

58. Hussain, Iran’s Shadow War on ISIS.

59. Ibid.

60. Arango et al., The Iran Cables.

61. Hussain, Portrait of a General.

62. Gaston and Ollivant, U.S.-Iran Proxy Competition in Iraq, 21–22.

63. Knights et al, Honored, Not Contained, 39.

64. Jones, War by Proxy, 3–4.

65. Hammargren, Iraq Moves Closer to Iran, 14–16.

66. Tehran Times, Zarif Holds Talks with Iraqi Political, Religious Leaders.

67. See above 1.

68. Saikal and Vestenskov, Iran’s National Security and Operational Capability, 21; Yossef, Upgrading Iran’s Military Doctrine; Czulda, The Defensive Dimension of Iran’s Military Doctrine, 104; Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power, 41.

69. Jalilvand et al., Radicalization During the Rouhani Years, 29–30.

70. Shanahan, Iranian Foreign Policy under Rouhani, 2–3.

71. Winter, Iran′s President Visits Iraq to Strengthen Ties amid US Pressure.

72. Nader, The Revolutionary Guards.

73. Dawood and Geranmayeh, When Iran Goes to Iraq, 1–2.

74. Ibid, 3–4.

75. Katzman, McInnis, and Thomas, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, 10–12.

76. Shanahan, Iranian Foreign Policy under Rouhan, 3–4i.

77. Azizi, Challenges to Iran’s Role in Iraq in the Post-Soleimani Era, 6–7.

78. Ibid.

79. Motamedi, Leaked Javad Zarif Recording Stirs Hot Political Debate in Iran.

80. See above 77, 7.

81. Katzman, McInnis, and Thomas, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, 30–31.

82. Elias, Iran: Navigating Regional Influence and a Potential U.S. Policy Reset, 3.

83. Ostovar, Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy, 7–9.

84. See above 72.

85. Cafiero, Saudi-Iran Dialogue Should Carry on Regardless of the JCPOA’s Fate; Sengupta, The Reason Qassem Soleimani Was in Baghdad.

86. Younis, The Gulf between Them, 15–17.

87. See above 31.

88. Aarabi, Beyond Borders, 33–35.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christian Høj Hansen

Christian Høj Hansen (b. 1990) is Head of Section at the Centre for Stabilization located at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is responsible for the coordination and implementation of various projects that seeks to capacity build Iraqi security institutions and is furthermore providing guidance on Security Sector Reforms. These projects are part of the Danish led NATO mission in Iraq, in which he has published various articles on the Iraqi security system and its power dynamics. He has a master’s in history that focused on the relationship between Iran and the US.

Troels Burchall Henningsen

Troels Burchall Henningsen (b. 1978) is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College, where he teaches military strategy, stability operations, and civil wars. His is the author of the book Western Intervention and Informal Politics: Simulated Statebuilding and Failed Reforms (Routledge 2022), and has published in journals such as Contemporary Security Policy, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, and Defence Studies on civil wars, regime survival, Special Operations Forces, and stability operations in the Middle East and the Sahel region.