Non-state actors and modern technology

ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on how technology impacts on irregular conflicts, i.e. conflicts fought by non-state actors. The ability to inflict destruction and produce casualties is no longer directly related to the ability to organize large numbers of people and manage vast stores of resources that has been typical of large, organized state armies, and consequently smaller groups can now inflict more serious and extensive damage than their predecessors. It follows that the relationship between irregular fighters and technology is one of the most crucial elements in understanding contemporary conflicts. The paper is divided into five sections. The first is a brief paragraph focused on the definition problem, explaining why and how we use the term ‘irregular fighters’, and the second is a historical overview on how the relationship between ‘irregular fighters’ and technology has changed in the last two centuries. The third section is a study of current trends in the relationship between modern technology and current irregular warfare. The fourth section is intended to study current impacts of technology on irregular warfare, looking at ISIS’s operations in 2016–2017 and its use of drones. Finally, the conclusions section presents both lessons learned and findings.

KEYWORDS:

• Irregular fighters
• ISIS
• technology
• warfare

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. I thank the anonymous reviewer for the supportive comments and insightful suggestions.

2. Creveld, Technology and War; Rosen, Winning the Next War; Singer, Wired for War.

3. For instance, see contrasting views of Gilli and Gilli, The Spread of Military Innovations; Horowitz, Nonstate Actors. See also Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race; Gilpin, War and Change; Lewis, Precision Terror.

4. Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan.

5. On the definition problem, see Smith, ‘Strategy in the Age of “Low Intensity” Warfare’.

6. Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33.

7. Buzan, Strategic Studiesm, chapter 2; Murray and Millet, Military Innovation, Introduction.

8. Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovations; Jackson, Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups, 2001; Kettle and Mumford, Terrorist Learning; Wilkinson, Technology and Terrorism.

9. Katagiri, Adapting to Win, 35.

10. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare; Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone.

11. Callwell, Small Wars, 24.

12. Bianco, Manuale pratico, 183; on Bianco’s strategic ideas, see Beccaro, “Carlo Bianco and Guerra per bande”.

13. Bianco, Manuale pratico, 188.

14. Ibid., 203.

15. Grob-Fitzgibbon, From the Dagger to the Bomb.

16. All quotes are from Bessner and Stauch, Karl Heinzen.

17. It is fair to say, however, that nitroglycerine, the most important element of dynamite, was invented by Italian chemist Ascanio Sobrero in 1846 at the University of Turin.

18. More than 15 years after Heinzen’s writings.

19. Jensen, Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite.

20. Cited in Laqueur, Guerrilla, 147.

21. Laqueur and Alexander, The Terrorism Reader, 107.

22. Ibid., 104–105.

23. Cronin, Power to the People, chapter 6.

24. Ibid.

25. Small Arms Survey 2015, 17–21.

26. Petraeus et. al., Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 7.

27. Brun, While You’re Busy.

28. Raska, The Sixth RMA Wave.

29. Cronin, Power to the People, 2.

30. On the Robotic revolution see Singer, Wired for War.

31. For a full discussion on these topics see Sheldon, “The Rise of Cyberpower”, 297–298. See also Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar.

32. Robb, “The Opens-Source War”; Robb, Brave New War.

33. See Cronin, Power to the People, chapter 7.

34. Bunker, Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

35. Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes, 79.

36. Ibid., 79–80.

37. Schachtman, “Iraq Militants Brag: We’ve Got Robotic Weapons, Too”, https://www.wired.com/2011/10/militants-got-robots/.

38. Bunker and Keshavarz, Terrorist and Insurgent; Plaw and Santoro, Reaping the Whirlwind.

39. Mitzer and Oliemans, “The Militiamen’s UCAV: Mohajer-6s In Iraq”, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/08/the-militiamens-ucav-mohajer-6s-in-iraq.html.

40. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century.

41. Beccaro, Modern Irregular Warfare.

42. Ashour, How ISIS Fights, 42.

43. Levy, Soldiers of End-Times.

44. On the Mosul battle see: Fox, Amos C. The Mosul Study Group.

45. Ashour, How ISIS Fights, 60. For a study on how ISIS used drones see Rassler, The Islamic States and Drones. For a broader analysis on how irregular fighters have used drone in the Middle East see: Haugstvedt and Jacobsen, Taking Fourth-Generation Warfare to the Skies?

46. Ashour, How ISIS Fights, 61.

47. Gen. Raymond Thomas, speaking during a Special Operations Forces Industry Conference: Larter, “SOCOM Commander: Armed ISIS Drones were 2016ʹs ‘Most Daunting Problem”, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/sofic/2017/05/16/socom-commander-armed-isis-drones-were-2016s-most-daunting-problem/.

48. Ashour, How ISIS Fights, 61.

49. Ibid.

50. Ashour, How ISIS Fights, 105.

51. Archambault, Veilleux-Lepage, Drone imagery in Islamic State propaganda.

52. Ashour, How ISIS Fights, 103.

53. Maurer, ISIS’s Warfare Functions.

54. Reid, “A Swarm of Armed Drones Attacked a Russian Military Base in Syria”.

55. To analyse the different theatres of operations of ISIS, see Ashour, How ISIS Fights.

56. Petraeus et. al., Counterinsurgency Field Manual, lii.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrea Beccaro

Andrea Beccaro, Professor of Security Studies and of Strategic Studies at the University of Turin, Italy; Professor of War Studies at the University of Milan, Italy