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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between prior conflict experience and the impact of foreign fighters on armed groups. This paper addresses the findings in existing research that describes foreign fighters as both assets and liabilities by disaggregating foreign fighters into first-conflict foreign fighters and veteran foreign fighters. While prior experience determines the potential impact of foreign fighters, I introduce the concept of foreign fighter integration to understand how this experience is utilized or leveraged by armed groups. The theory-building framework helps explain why we see certain groups leverage foreign fighters in ways that shape their repertoires of violence, tactics, or even ideology, while, in other instances, the influence of foreign fighters appears to be limited – with any consequent effects restricted to the small factions into which foreign fighters have been assigned. Using this theoretical framework of experience and integration, I re-examine in the cases Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to demonstrate how and where foreign fighters impact armed groups.
Acknowledgement
The author thanks Dr Joseph MacKay (Australian National University) for their comments and continued support of this project.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. “La Pasionaria – Farewell Speech to the International Brigades.”
2. Hochschild, Spain in Our Hearts, 79–82, 103.
3. Bacon and Muibu, “The Domestication of Al-Shabaab,” 280–81; Bakke, “Help Wanted?”; Shinn, “Al Shabaab”s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 203, 210.
4. de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, “Returning Western Foreign Fighters,” 2; Levitt, “Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact,” 19; Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends,” 195.
5. Malet defines foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts.” Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions,” 9.
6. For example, see Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “It Takes Two”; Levitt, “Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact”; Doctor and Willingham, “Foreign Fighters, Rebel Command Structure, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War.”
7. Daymon, de Roy van Zuijdewijn, and Malet, “Career Foreign Fighters,” 2–3.
8. Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions,” 108.
9. Arielli, “Getting There”; Duyvesteyn and Peeters, “Fickle Foreign Fighters?”; Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”; Malet, “Framing to Win: The Transnational Recruitment of Foreign Insurgents”; Speckhard and Ellenberg, “ISIS in Their Own Words.”
10. Braithwaite and Chu, “Civil Conflicts Abroad, Foreign Fighters, and Terrorism at Home”; Byman and Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria”; de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, “Returning Western Foreign Fighters”; Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”.
11. Malet notes that his findings surrounding the disproportionate success of armed groups that contain foreign fighters is not causal. Instead, it could be the reflection that groups that are able to absorb foreign fighters are stronger in the first instance. Malet, “Foreign Fighters,” 68.
12. Chu and Braithwaite, “The Impact of Foreign Fighters on Civil Conflict Outcomes,” 5.
13. Arielli, From Byron to Bin Laden, 153–54; Mapping Militant Organizations, “MMP.”
14. Bacon and Muibu, “The Domestication of Al-Shabaab,” 280–81; Shinn, “Al Shabaab”s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 203, 210.
15. Bakke, “Help Wanted?,” 167.
16. Mironova, From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists, 136.
17. Bacon and Muibu, “The Domestication of Al-Shabaab,” 294.
18. Levitt, “Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact,” 19.
19. de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, “Returning Western Foreign Fighters,” 2–3.
20. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida”s Jihad in Europe, 21–22.
21. Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends,” 195.
22. Hafez, “Jihad after Iraq.”
23. Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends.”
24. Arielli, “When Are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel”s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-Examined.”
25. See note 7 above.
26. Doctor, “A Motion of No Confidence.”
27. Hoover Green, “The Commander”s Dilemma,” 622.
28. Storr, The Human Face of War.
29. Abuza, “Learning by Doing”; Hayden, “Innovation and Learning in Terrorist Organizations”; Press, “Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology.”
30. Storr, The Human Face of War, 161.
31. See note 21 above.
32. Moore, “When Do Ties Bind?,” March 2019.
33. It should be noted that there is currently no systematic research on armed group”s efforts to remove foreign fighters from conflicts. The only instance found in the course of research is the expulsion and killing of foreign members of Al-Shabaab. For example, see Bacon and Muibu, “The Domestication of Al-Shabaab.”
34. See Doctor and Willingham, “Foreign Fighters, Rebel Command Structure, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War”; Moore, “When Do Ties Bind?,” March 2019.
35. Tønnessen, “Training on a Battlefield,” 545.
36. Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context,” 463.
37. Hafez says estimates of 3000–4000 are generous but Hegghammer puts estimates at 5,000–20,000. Hafez, “Jihad after Iraq,” 86; Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” 61.
38. It should be noted that Arielli”s work does find that embedded veteran foreign fighters in the IDF dramatically improved the capacity of its airforce, where as first-conflict foreign fighters were often used as cannon fodder. Arielli, “When Are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel”s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-Examined.”
39. Jones, Liepman, and Chandler, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia, 11; Shinn, “Al Shabaab”s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 206–7.
40. Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” 6; Mugisha, “The Way Forward in Somalia,” 29; Taarnby and Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab,” 11.
41. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012, 135..
42. Agbiboa, “Terrorism without Borders,” 28; Taarnby and Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab,” 26; Shinn, “Al Shabaab”s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 205; “AFGP-2002-800,597”; “AFGP-2002-600,104.”
43. Bruton, “In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More,” 82; Taarnby and Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab,” 27.
44. Mapping Militant Organizations, {“citationID”:”bDFPlnR4.
45. Bacon and Muibu, “The Domestication of Al-Shabaab”; Taarnby and Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab,” 29.
46. Raghavan, “Foreign Fighters Gain Influence in Somalia”s Islamist al-Shabab Militia.”
47. Taarnby and Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab,” 32–33; Shinn, “Al Shabaab”s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 205.
48. Voice of America News, “Al-Shabab Asks Foreign Fighters to Come to Somalia.”
49. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 41.
50. Shinn, “Al Shabaab”s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 210.
51. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 74–75.
52. Kruber and Carver, “Insurgent Group Cohesion and the Malleability of “Foreignness,”“ 7.
53. Bacon and Muibu, “The Domestication of Al-Shabaab”; Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 8.
54. Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 8; Anderson and McKnight, “Kenya at War,” 2.
55. for example, in Canada see Joosse, Bucerius, and Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives.”
56. Taarnby and Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab,” 30.
57. ibid, 30.
58. See note 17 above.
59. Taarnby and Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab,” 31.
60. See note 57 above.
61. Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door.”
62. Mastors and Siers, “Omar Al-Hammami.”
63. Levy and Yusuf, “How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money?,” 7.
64. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 135–36; Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 10; Levy and Yusuf, “How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money?,” 7.
65. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 135–36.
66. Mustapha, “The Mujahideen in Bosnia,” 747.
67. International Crisis Group, “Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism,” 11; Mustapha, “The Mujahideen in Bosnia.”
68. ICTY, “Order for the Formation of the Majudehin Detachment.”
69. Li, The Universal Enemy, 66–67.
70. Ghanem, “Dancing with Arab Mujahedeen in the Hills of Bosnia”; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida”s Jihad in Europe.
71. Moore, “When Do Ties Bind?,” 2019, 249.
72. ICTY, “Transcript of Conversation Between Andrew Hogg (Journalist) and Abdel Adiz.”
73. ICTY, “Information About Activities of Foreigners from Afro-Asian Countries,” 2.
74. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida”s Jihad in Europe, 19.
75. European Court of Human Rights, “Case of Al Husin v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Application No. 3727/08),” 54.
76. ICTY, “judgment: Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić,” 55; Schwampe, “Muslim Foreign Fighters in Armed Conflicts.”
77. Li, The Universal Enemy, 87.
78. ICTY, “Information Report on the Activities and Developments in the El Mujahedin Detachment, No. 03/1-174-130-1, Dated 21 June 1995,” 4.
79. Li, The Universal Enemy, 45, 47.
80. El Mundo, 2005 in Moore, “When Do Ties Bind?,” 2019, 249; Li, The Universal Enemy, 46–47.
81. Post and Breslau, “Help from the Holy Warriors.”
82. Ghanem, “Dancing with Arab Mujahedeen in the Hills of Bosnia.”
83. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida”s Jihad in Europe, 85–87, 130.
84. Li, The Universal Enemy, 50; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida”s Jihad in Europe, 85–87; ICTY, “Transcript: judgment Rasim Delic.”
85. Three acts of violence committed by foreign fighters committed at Maline/Bikošim Livade and Kamenica Camp (July-August 1995), and Kersten and Kamenica Camp (September 1995) were referred to the ICTY. Rasmin Delic, Commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia, and Herzegovina (ABiH) faced charges for the actions of his subordinates. Delić was sentenced to three years for failing to prevent these crimes. ICTY, “Transcript: judgment Rasim Delic.”
86. “ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {“citationID”:”0AVEe.
87. Malet, ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {“citationID”:”p8cmvC7v”.
88. Arielli, “Lessons from History on What to Do with Foreign Fighters Returning from Syria”; Byman and Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria”; de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, “Returning Western Foreign Fighters”; Holmer and Shtuni, “Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative”; Ratelle, “North Caucasian Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.”
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Nicola Mathieson
Nicola Mathieson is a PhD Candidate in the Department of International Relations at the Coral Bell School. Nicola specializes in the dynamics of civil war and insurgencies. Nicola’s work explores the role of foreign fighters and how prior conflict experience shapes their impact on conflicts. Her doctoral research traces the movement of foreign fighters from the Soviet-Afghan War and examines their consequences for global security.