The evolution of resistance and counterinsurgency in the South African state, 1899-1948

KEYWORDS:

• South Africa
• Namibia
• resistance
• insurgency
• counterinsurgency
• irregular warfare

The idea of counterinsurgency, and for that matter irregular warfare, along with its accompanying terminology, occupies a contested space in South African history. This is the argument put forward by Deane-Peter Baker and Mark O’Neil, who posit that the people of South Africa suffered at the hands of counterinsurgent forces throughout the colonial period and well into the twentieth century.¹ This is framed in the political context of fighting for change, where various cultural groups in South Africa successfully utilised irregular or guerrilla tactics in their protracted resistance against colonial encroachment and subjugation.² Some major examples, among others, in this regard include: the Khoikhoi–Dutch Wars (1659–1677),³ the British operations against the Xhosa during the Cape Frontier Wars (1779–1879),⁴ the subjugation of the South African interior following the Great Trek (1836-c.1876),⁵ the Anglo-Zulu War (1879),⁶ the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881),⁷ the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902),⁸ and the broader liberation struggle in South Africa that occurred throughout most of the twentieth century up until the advent of democracy in 1994.⁹

The negative connotations associated with counterinsurgent forces in South Africa, who found themselves on the wrong side of history, are directly associated with colonialism and their oppression and subjugation of the people.¹⁰ This perhaps helps to explain the evident gap in the South African historiography in research related to this contested topic.

In general, interest in South African counterinsurgency directly correlates with the duration of the so-called Border War (1966–1989) in Namibia. During this period, the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) counterinsurgency operations were primarily directed against the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The SADF also gradually became involved in several cross-border operations into Angola to offset any support and prevent PLAN infiltrations into Namibia.¹¹ Abel Esterhuyse correctly points out that there is a gap in the South African historiography dealing with counterinsurgency during this period.¹² In fact, one could take it a step further, and argue that South Africa is lagging behind international historiographical trends, where the academic study of irregular warfare remains both popular and highly relevant. Nevertheless, there are some notable exceptions.¹³ This gap in the historiography further extends to works dealing with the insurgencies fought by the African National Congress (ANC), and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), along with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and its armed wing the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), against the South African apartheid state.¹⁴

In the case of SADF counterinsurgency, this gap in the historiography persists despite a wealth of archival material related to this topic that is preserved in South Africa and further afield. For instance, the vast majority of the archival holdings of the Department of Defence (DOD) Archive in Pretoria, South Africa, covers the period 1966-1989 – thus spanning the Border War in its entirety. The DOD Archive should thus serve as the first port of call for researchers of South African military history interested in this period in general, and counterinsurgency specifically. However, as Evert Kleynhans and Will Gordon argue, in practice, access to classified archival material in the DOD Archive remains fraught with difficulties, despite national and departmental legislation which should facilitate research instead of inhibiting it. These problems are not insurmountable, but, the vast amount of classified material, a difficult declassification process, along with a lengthy administrative period, most likely dissuades researchers from in-depth archival research.¹⁵ Moreover, archival material detailing the MK and APLA insurgencies is available, but it remains scattered across South Africa from the Mayibuye Archives at the University of the Western Cape to the Liberation Movement Archives at the University of Fort Hare.¹⁶ Access to some of these sources may at times prove problematic and fraught with difficulties, especially when permission to gain access is needed from the ANC or PAC. If these problems persist, and remain unchallenged by academics, then future research related to insurgency and counterinsurgency in South Africa will remain limited.

Examining the past

Considering the above, a strong argument could be made that the evolution of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in the South African context has to date not received adequate academic attention. Moreover, to get to grips with counterinsurgency in the South African state during the twentieth century, or even simply the broad genesis of the armed struggle, it is necessary to adopt an evolutionary approach, and trace its regional historical evolution.

Irregular warfare played an important role in shaping the political landscape of the South African state during the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, the challenges to the state were numerous. In some cases, the conflicts represented the unanswered interests and aspirations of marginalised groups. In other instances, they were political and economic expressions of discontent. Nevertheless, these threats emanated from several divergent sectors such as syndicalised labour, nationalist and cultural groups, and even nascent liberation movements. In response to these perceived threats, both the British government and the Union government, which followed suit after unification in 1910, had to establish structures and develop several accompanying strategies to deal with these perceived threats to the security and legitimacy of the state. Historically, the defence plans for South Africa considered three possible scenarios: seaborne attack, landward invasion, and the threat of internal unrest. However, throughout the period under consideration, the threat of internal unrest remained constant, and presented the biggest threat and challenge to the legitimacy of the nascent Union of South Africa and its predecessors.¹⁷

Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, the South African nation found itself in both a formative and fragile state of existence. To hold onto power, the Union Defence Force (UDF) and South African Police (SAP), established in 1912 and 1913 respectively, were regularly deployed to quell internal unrest. Lacking the appropriate doctrine, force design and institutional expertise to counter the increasing number of threats to the state, the Union government employed a practical approach allowing its counterinsurgency model to evolve organically. This included the indiscriminate use of force, intelligence-driven operations, engaging in asymmetric warfare, and even the use of propaganda and internment. As such, there are common themes and historical continuities in the conduct of small wars and insurgencies in the South African state.

Fortunately for scholars and historians, sources dealing with this period of South African history are plentiful and can be found scattered across several archival repositories and libraries in South Africa, Namibia and further afield. Moreover, several secondary sources also exist, which, when combined with primary archival material, offer unique insights into the evolution of resistance and counterinsurgency in South Africa. Arguably, the most important can be found at the DOD Archive in Pretoria, South Africa, which is the custodian of all military documents generated since the inception of the department in 1912.¹⁸

This special issue critically considers the evolution of resistance and counterinsurgency in South Africa. The period in question spans the turn of the nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, approximately 1899–1948. Taking a broad thematic focus, the special issue explores several different elements of revolution, rebellion, insurgency and uprisings in the former Boer republics, the British colonies, South Africa, and Namibia, along with the counterinsurgency measures taken to suppress them. The aim of the special issue is to re-evaluate the notion of small wars and insurgencies in the South African context, thereby allowing for new insights to come to the fore through the study, analysis, and re-appraisal of several important case studies. In doing so, the articles in this special issue, through significant primary research, provide a reassessment of several historical small wars in the region – for instance, the Second Anglo Boer War, the 1914 Industrial Strike, the 1917 Ovamboland Expedition, the 1922 Rand Revolt, the 1922 Bondelswarts Rebellion, and the instances of internal conflict on the South African home front during the Second World War. The special issue thus offers a fresh examination of a contentious historical period, and concurrently addresses several crucial gaps in the historiography related to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in South Africa.

While the articles in this special issue address a broad range of small wars in the region, we do not claim to exhaustively cover every South African and Namibian uprising, insurgency, and counterinsurgency operation during this period. Instead, a capita selecta was chosen, with the hope that in a future edition or in a different format, we can cover additional areas still demanding further historical attention – such as the 1914 East Griqualand Rebellion, the 1921 Israelite Rebellion, the 1925 Rehoboth Rebellion, and the 1932 Ovamboland Expedition.

The articles in this special issue are purposefully arranged in a chronological order, which helps to demonstrate the historical evolution of irregular warfare in the South African state between 1899–1948. In doing so, readers can evaluate the development of both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies during the period concerned, and thus gain a better understanding of a tragic and tumultuous part of South African history.

André Wessels, from the University of the Free State, provides an historical overview of Boer guerrilla and British counterinsurgency operations during the Second Anglo-Boer War. He argues that by 1901, there was a marked upsurge in Boer guerrilla operations during the war, which naturally necessitated the British to develop and introduce a concomitant counterinsurgency strategy – especially because of the recent failed peace negotiations held at Middelburg in the then Transvaal. Nearly 120 years later, and with the benefit of historical hindsight, Wessels revisits this episode of South African history in his article. In doing so, he provides a nuanced overview of both the Boer guerrilla and British counterinsurgency operations during the war. He also discusses events that unfolded in the Cape Colony, where the conflict held grave implications for the local population, regardless of race or culture, that were caught up between the British and Boer forces, and where in certain areas of the war zone, a civil war was fought. Wessels also pays specific attention to the reactions and views of Lord Kitchener, the British Commander-in-Chief in South Africa at the time. Kitchener receives specific attention since he tried to bring the war to an end as soon as possible, but in the process laid waste to large areas of the war zone, thanks in part to the scorched-earth policy implemented by the British Army in South Africa.

René Geyer, from the University of Pretoria, investigates the first internal deployment of the UDF during the 1914 Industrial Strike. In fact, this has proved to be one of the first deployments of the defence force without the support of imperial troops since its inception in 1912. By January 1914, on the eve of the unrest, the UDF was still largely inexperienced, and still found itself in a formative phase where the primary focus was on the assimilation of various British and Boer military traditions into one homogenous force. Moreover, the Permanent Force was not yet sufficiently organised to quell the strike on its own. Geyer thus shows that the commandos of the Citizen Force reserve were deployed to bolster the strength of the Permanent Force. In practical terms this meant that the traditional commando system of the former Boer republics, and the later Transvaal Colony, was briefly revived to subdue the strike, which occurred against the backdrop of the unstable and complex South African socio-economic environment at the time. However, this operation too marked the end of the Boer commando system in its established, historical format. In fact, the commando system soon formed part of a vanishing military culture that was destined to be replaced by more modern formations as the UDF modernised throughout the early part of the early twentieth century. A reincarnated version of the commandos saw service in the First World War in German South West and East Africa. Geyer thus considers both the customary and changing nature of military service for the long-established commandos, while also exploring the conditions, abilities, and experiences of the ‘burghers’ that participated in the crushing of the strike from a social-military history perspective.

Andries Fokkens, from Stellenbosch University, explores the deposing of King Mandume Ya Ndemufayo of the Ovakuanyama during the so-called Ovamboland Expedition of 1917. Mandume – the last king of the Ovakuanyama – actively resisted the subjugation of his people by various colonial powers in Namibia and Angola. Fokkens shows that to the Portuguese, Germans, and South Africans, Mandume was considered as a recalcitrant, bloodthirsty and murderous despot. However, to the people of Namibia and Angola, he was, and still is, a hero. In fact, he is one of nine national heroes permanently remembered at the Namibian Heroes’ Acre in Windhoek, and the Universidade Mandume Ya Ndemufayo, along with a host of street names, monuments, and memorials that commemorate his acts of resistance against colonial rule in Lubango, Angola. Fokkens argues that Mandume’s demise at the hands of the Ovamboland Expeditionary Force on 6 February 1917 fits the archetypal story of the colonial period in Africa, and even elsewhere – where opposition to colonial rule was not tolerated and subdued, violently if required. European interests, along with superior firepower, facilitated the subjugation of many indigenous populations, and, as Fokkens contends, this was no different in Ovamboland where the Ovakuanyama fiercely resisted colonialism.

Evert Kleynhans and Anri Delport, from Stellenbosch University, assess the urban counterinsurgency operations conducted by the UDF to suppress the 1922 Rand Revolt. In early 1922, and in the wake of a global depression, along with rapidly deteriorating labour and economic conditions in South Africa, several thousand white mine workers on the Witwatersrand went on strike. These miners subsequently armed and organised themselves into commandos and took to the streets, whereafter these paramilitary units clashed with the South African Police during the opening phases of the unrest. By the beginning of March 1922, the strikes transformed into a violent insurrection after negotiations between the mine workers, mine owners, and the government failed, and new militant leadership assumed command of the strikers. Kleynhans and Delport show that as chaos and disorder engulfed large tracts of the Witwatersrand, and levels of violence assumed new drastic proportions, the state’s security and legitimacy increasingly came under threat. In response, martial law was declared, and elements of the UDF were deployed in force to quell the so-called 1922 Rand Revolt. Historically unaccustomed to urban warfare and without an appropriate doctrine, force design or institutional expertise, the defence force became involved in several high-intensity urban counterinsurgency operations against the strike commandos. By drawing from a variety of archival material, Kleynhans and Delport provide a fresh perspective on the combat operations undertaken by the UDF to suppress the 1922 Rand Revolt.

Evert Kleynhans and Antonio Garcia, from Stellenbosch University, reconsider the suppression of the Bondelswarts Rebellion by the South African authorities in 1922. They argue that the UDF had been deployed to suppress several internal disturbances since the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. These conflicts varied in terms of their scale, intensity, and geographic location, and represented dissatisfied and disenfranchised peoples in South Africa and Namibia. These uprisings naturally tested the organisation, force structure and strategies of the defence force in dealing with internal unrest. As such, Kleynhans and Garcia utilise the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922 as a historical lens through which to investigate one of the first large scale rural counterinsurgency operations conducted by South African forces after the end of the First World War – which occurred mere months after the quelling of the 1922 Rand Revolt on the Witwatersrand. They show that the reputation of the Bondelswarts as guerrilla fighters, and the fear of further unrest breaking out across the territory, prompted the South African authorities to seek a rapid resolution to the simmering unrest in the desolate terrain of southern Namibia. However, the result of this brief, brutal and violent conflict also held far reaching political consequences for the South African authorities. Kleynhans and Garcia thus provide a detailed discussion on the uprising and rural counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the South African authorities in suppressing the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922.

Fankie Monama, from Stellenbosch University, pays specific attention to the proverbial ‘enemy within the gates’ when he investigates militarism, sabotage, subversion, and counter subversion in South Africa during the Second World War. In September 1939, when the Union of South Africa became an active participant in the war, the country was confronted with widespread political dissent and anti-war resistance which threatened both internal security and stability. Numerous incidents of violence, sabotage, riots, bomb explosions, cutting of telecommunication lines and constant militarism designed to thwart the country’s war effort were reported. These incidents were perpetuated by the disaffected radical Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the Union’s war policy, particularly the militant Ossewabrandwag led by Dr Johannes Frederik Janse (Hans) van Rensburg, in collaboration with German agents. The government of Jan Smuts implemented multi-faceted security arrangements, which included passing the War Measures Act, unleashing the security services, and adopting an internment policy to subdue the militants and preserve internal security within South Africa. Monama examines the development of anti-war resistance and militarism in the Union and reflects on the counter-subversive efforts by the Smuts government to preserve internal security during the Second World War. Ultimately, given the magnitude of the anti-war destabilisation campaign, Monama’s analysis illustrates how and why the Smuts government ultimately survived the war on two fronts while concurrently sustaining the overall war effort.

The case studies in this special issue provide insight into several critical small wars, which emphasises the immense desire for independence, liberation, and social and political equality. These articles explore the persistent harsh and violent responses to uprisings in the South African context – a phenomenon that some may argue became a norm, a frame of reference in the consciousness, and a model for later suppression in South Africa and Namibia in the twentieth century. While the mainstay of the articles marshal counterinsurgency theory and terminology, along with operational concepts, to examine their specific case studies, some articles do, however, also provide a flavour of the socio-cultural elements underpinning resistance. Nevertheless, these rebellions, uprisings, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies have left an indelible mark on this history of South Africa and Namibia.

At a time where the South African state is facing numerous challenges to its security and legitimacy, this special issue is very topical. In fact, it would appear as if the South African government in general, and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in particular, have disregarded the notion of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency for far too long after the advent of democracy in 1994. However, it is no secret that the recent deployments of the SANDF, often in support of the South African Police Service, have been to suppress internal unrest, curb rampant xenophobic violence, conduct peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and, most recently, deploy in a counterinsurgency role against an Islamist insurgency in northern Mozambique. We hope that this special issue can contribute to the discussion and offer at least in part a nuanced appreciation of the drivers of internal unrest, as well as the historical evolution and outcomes of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in South Africa during the early twentieth century.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Antonio Garcia

Antonio Garcia is a research fellow affiliated with the Department of Military History of the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University. He has worked in international peace and security, education, and public diplomacy; served as a senior officer in the South African National Defence Force, and has published the book, The First Campaign Victory of the Great War (Helion, 2019).

Evert Kleynhans

Evert Kleynhans [MMil, PhD (Mil) (Stell)], is a senior lecturer in the Department of Military History at the Faculty of Military Science of Stellenbosch University. He is the editor of Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies. His primary research interests include the South African participation in both world wars, as well as low-intensity conflict in Southern Africa. His most recent works include Hitler’s Spies: Secret Agents and the Intelligence War in South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2021) and The Naval War in South African Waters, 1939-1945 (African Sun Media, 2022).

Notes

1. Baker and O’Neil, ‘Introduction: Contemporary South Africa,” 1–2.

2. Potgieter, “Counterinsurgency in Africa,” 68.

3. See Scott “The changing impact.”

4. See Laband, The Land Wars.

5. See Laband, Zulu Warriors.

6. See David, Zulu; Knight, the Zulu War.

7. See Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion.

8. See Pakenham, The Boer War.

9. See Simpson, Umkhonto We Sizwe; Jeffrey, People”s War.

10. See note 1 above.

11. For more on the so-called Border War, see Scholtz, The SADF in the Border War; Scholtz, The SADF and Cuito Cuanavale.

12. Esterhuyse, “South African Counterinsurgency,” 347.

13. See for instance, Esterhuyse and Jordaan, “The South African Defence,” 104–124; Larsdotter, “Fighting Transnational Insurgents,” 1024–1038; Gossmann, “Lost in Transition,” 541–572; Gossmann, “Lost COIN,” 136–151; Gossmann, “Eating soup with a knife,”; Dale, “Melding war and politics,” 7–24; Eloff de Visser, “Winning hearts and minds,” 85–100; Rich, “Insurgency, Terrorism and the Apartheid System,” 68–85; Scholtz, “Lessons from the Southern African wars,” 193–215; Van der Waag and Visser, “ War, Popular Memory,” 113–140; Esterhuyse, “The Strategic Contours,” 16–35; Heitman, “The Other Edge,” 1–15; Scholtz, “The Namibian Border War,” 19–48.

14. See for instance Ramuhala, “Guerrilla warfare,” 125–135; Simpson, Umkhonto We Sizwe; Jeffrey, People”s War; Douek, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

15. Kleynhans and Gordon, “Legislative Disconnect,” 97–114.

16. See Stapleton, “An overview of,” 413–422.

17. See Van der Waag, A Military History, 60–63.

18. See note above 15.