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ABSTRACT
The fascination with special forces could be ascribed to the prominence of their use in contemporary conflicts across the globe. There is, however, a paradox of employing such a highly lethal force in order to pursuit peace. With peacekeeping evolving parallel with the strategic environment, especially in Africa, the trend towards more robust interventions has become prevalent since the end of the Cold War. As such, the requirement for accurate and timely intelligence in peace missions has become crucial. Admittedly, special forces would not necessarily be the soldiers expected to wear blue berets and participate in peace missions. It may come as a surprise to the uninformed, though, to learn that special forces have indeed participated, and are still involved, in peace missions across the globe. Drawing from a case study where special forces have been involved in peace missions under the umbrella of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this article investigates the utilization of special forces and the role they could play in peace missions in Africa.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. Pettersson and Ben-Ari, ‘Kill and Tell’: The Cultural Resonance and Reverberation of Creative Nonfiction on Special Operations Forces, 232.
2. Kiras, ‘Current Irregular Warfare’, 366.
3. Burduja, Use of Special Operations Forces in United Nations Missions: A Method to Resolve Complexity, i.
4. Van der Lijn, ‘United Nations’, 40.
5. Cammaert, ‘Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons for the Future’, 11, 25.
6. Alvarez, Nalepa, Wyant, Zimmerman (eds). Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, I-1.
7. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, South African Defence Review, 0–2.
8. Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflict, 3.
9. Van der Lijn, United Nations, 18.
10. Van Vuuren, ‘The Changing Nature of Warfare: Implications for Africa’, 54–55.
11. Engel and Porto, “Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: An Introduction, 1.
12. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, 251–252.
13. Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994. 8.
14. Williams, ‘Peacekeeping in Africa after the Cold War: Trends and Challenges’, 74–75.
15. Ibid, 66.
16. Jones and Cherif, Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses, 1.
17. Adebajo and Landsberg, Back to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 161–162, 175.
18. Peter, ‘UN Peace Operations: Adapting to a New Global Order?’, 2–3.
19. Van der Lijn, United Nations, 40.
20. Jennings, Midnight in Some Burning Town: British Special Forces Operations from Belgrade to Baghdad. 23.
21. Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. 22.
22. Rose, Fighting for Peace. 57.
23. Spence, All Necessary Measures. 9.
24. Parker, SBS: The Inside Story of the Special Boat Service. 345.
25. Curtis, Close Quarter Battle: The Explosive True Story of 15 Years Under Fire. 330.
26. Spence, All Necessary Measures. 140.
27. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. 89.
28. Ibid, 90, 121.
29. Cammaert, Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations, 11, 25.
30. Jennings, Midnight in Some Burning Town, 33.
31. Dunderdale, ‘South Africa’s Peacekeeping Activities in Africa (Part 2)’. 3.
32. Kabemba, ‘The Democratic Republic of Congo: The Quest for sustainable Peace’, 28.
33. Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 69.
34. Ishizuka, The History of Robust Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in the DRC: The Limitations of the Pursuit of Negative Peace, 2.
35. Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 70.
36. Khadiagala, ‘South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’, 68.
37. Matthee, ‘Central African Military Interventions in the 1990s: The Case of the DRC’, 255.
38. Tull, ‘The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo’. 172.
39. Malan and Porto, ‘Introduction’, 2.
40. Kabemba, “The Democratic Republic of Congo: The Quest for sustainable Peace, 29–30.
41. Tull, The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement, 172.
42. Khadiagala, “South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 71.
43. Mabaya (ed), Soldiers of Peace and Development: A Look at SANDF External Deployments 1994–2012. 43.
44. Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 83.
45. Cammaert, ‘Ongoing UN Operations and New Challenges in Peacekeeping’, 50–51.
46. Ishizuka, ‘The History of Robust Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in the DRC’, 11–12.
47. Karlsrud, ‘The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’. 44.
48. Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 94, 96.
49. Tull, ‘The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement’, 173–174.
50. Peter, ‘Peacekeeping: Resilience of an Idea?’ 37.
51. United Nations. United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO): The Statement of Unit Requirement for Force Intervention Brigade Special Forces Company, 1–2.
52. Ibid, 3.
53. Operational Order: OP MISTRAL: NO 12/2013, South African Special Forces Brigade, 1.
54. Letter drafted by Reconnaissance Platoon Commander on request of 6 South African Infantry Battalion Commander concerning the capabilities of the Reconnaissance Platoon, 5–6.
55. Award Citation compiled for Heavy Weapons specialist of Reconnaissance Platoon for the iProthiyaye Siliva Decoration (Silver Protea) for meritorious service during combat operations in 2013/14 in the DRC.
56. Telephonic interview with Reconnaissance Platoon Heavy Weapons specialist.
57. Intelligence Report 05/13 OP MISTRAL, drafted by Reconnaissance Platoon Intelligence Officer.
58. Debrief of FIB and FARDC attack on Kibati: 27 to 30 August 2013, drafted by Reconnaissance Platoon Commander 4–5, 7.
59. Forward Air Controller Logbook for Heavy Weapons specialist of Reconnaissance Platoon.
60. Unpublished recollections of Reconnaissance Platoon Heavy Weapons specialist’s experiences during the first South African Special Forces rotation under the FIB in the DRC 2013–2014, 30.
61. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 11 May to 31 August 2014, compiled by Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, 2.
62. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 01 September to 30 November 2014, compiled by Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, 2–3.
63. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 01 December 2014 to 28 February 2015, compiled by Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, 2.
64. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, 6.
65. Breede, ‘Special (peace) Operations: Optimizing SOF for UN Missions’. 222–223.
66. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, 6.
67. Breede, Special (peace) Operations: Optimizing SOF for UN Missions, 239.
68. South African National Defence Force. Joint Operations Division, Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 106 Part 2, Peace Support Operations, 5–23–5–24.
69. South African National Defence Force. Joint Operational Division, Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 105 Part 5: Special Forces Operations, 5-5 – 5-6.
70. Ibid, 5-5 – 5-6.
71. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, 18.
72. South African National Defence Force. Joint Operational Division, Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 105 Part 5: Special Forces Operations, 5-6 – 5-7.
73. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, 21.
74. Operational Order: OP MISTRAL: NO 12/2013, South African Special Forces Brigade, 18.
75. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 01 March to 15 May 2015, compiled by Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, 4.
76. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 01 September to 30 November 2014, 7.
77. South African Special Forces Support to OP MISTRAL (Force Intervention Brigade), dated May 2013, compiled by Senior Officer at Special Forces Headquarters, 1.
78. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 01 December 2014 to 28 February 2015, 2.
79. Intelligence Report 05/13 OP MISTRAL.
80. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 01 September to 30 November 2014, 2.
81. Debrief of FIB and FARDC Attack on Kibati: 27 to 30 August 2013, 4–5, 7.
82. Award Citation compiled for Reconnaissance Platoon Heavy Weapons Specialist for the iProthiyaye Siliva Decoration (Silver Protea).
83. Reconnaissance Platoon Operational Debrief: 01 March to 15 May 2015, 1.
84. Tull, The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement, 175.
85. Karlsrud, ‘Towards UN Counter-terrorism Operations?’. 1225.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Louis Bester
Louis Bester [MMil (Stell)] is a serving member in the South African National Defence Force. His research interests include the role of special forces in conflicts, as well as trends in contemporary counterinsurgency. He is currently a prospective doctoral candidate researching the history of the South African Special Forces post-1994.