Unholy alignment and boomerang civil conflicts: Examining how conflicts beget conflicts through external states support for rebels

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on external state support for rebel movements by developing an analytical tool to explain how external support for rebels leads to civil conflict onset and intensification in the target state and how conflict reverses to the sponsoring state, engendering conflict diffusion and continuation. I present a two-fold argument that a cooperative relationship between external states and rebels triggers the remote causes of civil conflict, translating latent grievances into manifest conflict in the target state. Further, the resulting conflict has a boomerang effect. It has the potential to reverse to the sponsoring state. I do this by using a case studies method – cooperative relationships of governments of Sudan and Chad with each other’s rebels vis-à-vis Sudan Civil War (2000–2005) and Chad Civil War (2005–2010) – to provide a detailed explanation of the framework and its hypotheses. The explanations I offer here may help us understand some African conflict dynamics for us to take some recent developments, for example, in the Great Lakes, more seriously.

KEYWORDS:

• unholy alignment
• civil war and conflict
• insurgency and counterinsurgency
• Sudan and Chad
• sub-Saharan Africa
• weak states
• state-rebel cooperation
• rebel sponsorship

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Notes.

Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 4–27; Welz, ‘Omnibalancing and international interventions’, 387.

2. Cilliers, ‘Violence in Africa’, 3–11.

3. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.

4. Ibid., 13.

5. Arowolo, ‘Dancing on a Knife-edge’, 6–8.

6. Wegenast and Schneider, ‘Ownership Matters’, 110–18.

7. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 3.

8. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 782–94.

9. Ibid.

10. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; San-Akca, States in Disguise, 38–41; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 783; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.

11. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 5–13.

12. International Crisis Group (ICG), Averting proxy wars, 1–3.

13. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 3–5.

14. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 709–44.

15. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1360–389; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 21–24, 34–38; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.

16. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 243.

17. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 248–252; van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246; Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361; Terpstra, “Rebel Governance, 1143–1173.

18. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246.

19. Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361.

20. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 222, 233–237.

21. Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed, ‘The Role of External Support’, 1175–1178.

22. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two’, 580–81.

23. Ibid., 571–72.

24. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 790–92; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.

25. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 712–15.

26. Ibid., 709–44.

27. Carter, ‘A Blessing or a Curse?’, 130.

28. Klabbers, International Law, 70–73.

29. Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 73–90.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 74–83, 95.

32. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 367–84; Lucas, Appel and Prorok, ‘Not Too Distant’, 497–523.

35. Abdullah and Rashid, ‘Rebel Movements’, 169–93; Beevers, Peacebuilding and natural resource, 67–76.

36. Agbu, West Africa’s Trouble Spots, 21–28.

37. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377–80.

38. Strüver, ‘China’s Partnership Diplomacy’, 35–37; Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, Not “Alliance”’, 59–62.

39. Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, Not “Alliance”’, 53–76.

40. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377–80; Walter, ‘Why Bad Governance’, 1243–49; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War, 58–90, 94–116.

41. Walsh et al., ‘Funding Rebellion’, 699–707.

42. Ibid.; Beevers, Peacebuilding and natural resource, 67–76, 125–132.

43. Abdullah and Rashid, ‘Rebel Movements’, 180–89.

44. Ibid., 188.

45. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.

46. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 4–15.

47. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 21–46.

48. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 246–47.

49. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 3.

50. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.

51. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 81–107.

52. Glawion and Le Noan, ‘Rebel governance or governance in rebel territory’, 24–51.

53. Ibid., 25, 37–41.

54. Hyyppä, “Council in war, 52–80.

55. Ibid., 53, 60–65.

56. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1375.

57. Loyle et al., ‘New Directions in Rebel Governance’, 6; Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 25.

58. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 25.

59. Waterman, ‘The shadow of “the boys”’, 279–304.

60. Ibid., 280, 286–295.

61. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 24–5.

62. Ibid., 25.

63. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 25.

64. Gerring, Case Study Research, 65.

65. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.

66. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 635–36.

67. Walsh et al., ‘Funding Rebellion’, 699–707.

68. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 785–86.

69. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 105–106.

70. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 636.

71. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two’, 572–74.

72. Ghatak, ‘The Role of Political Exclusion’, 87–89; Hendrix, ‘Measuring State Capacity’, 273–74.

73. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 638.

74. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 786.

75. Ibid., 790–92; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.

76. Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 507.

77. Hendrix, ‘Measuring State Capacity’, 273.

78. Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency’, 80.

79. Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’, 9–10; Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 505–506; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 641.

80. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 224.

81. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 13–15.

82. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 638.

83. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 712.

84. Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’, 2–4; Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 505–507.

85. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 23.

86. Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 92.

87. Ibid.

88. Ayers, ‘Sudan’s Uncivil War’, 161.

89. Natsios, ‘Beyond Darfur’, 82.

90. Ayers, ‘Sudan’s Uncivil War’, 166–67.

91. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 133.

92. Ibid., 132–34; Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 91.

93. Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 92–93; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 138.

94. Ibid., 104–105; Ibid., 133.

95. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 31–36.

96. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14–20.

97. Ibid., 26–31; Tubiana and Gramizzi, Tubu Trouble, 19.

98. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 132–34; Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 12.

99. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 17–29; Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14–20.

100. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2.

101. Tubiana and Gramizzi, Tubu Trouble, 23.

102. Ibid., 19.

103. Natsios, ‘Beyond Darfur’, 83.

104. Debos, Living by the Gun, 2–44.

105. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.

106. Debos, Living by the Gun, 27.

107. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 25–27; Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.

108. Yorbana, ‘Representations of Oil’, 65–83; Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390–91.

109. Ibid., 76–78; Ibid., 391.

110. Yorbana, ‘Representations of Oil’, 70–71.

111. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 1–2.

112. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 391.

113. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 28.

114. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.

115. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2.

116. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14.

117. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2, 44–47.

118. Gain, ‘Shifting Sentiments’, paragraphs 1–20.

119. Arieff et al., Russia’s Wagner Group, 1.

120. Ibid.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey

Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey is an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Diplomacy, and Security. His research interest is interdisciplinary, spanning international relations, security, civil conflicts and wars, human security, state-building, domestic governance institutions of developing countries, China-African public relations, and sports politics. He is a current member of the following professional societies: ISA, IPSA, ASAA, and ACPS. His recent publications appeared journals, including World Affairs, Journal of International Studies, Africa Review, National Interest, Global Policy, and Insight on Africa.