Al-Qaeda as a spatial orientated movement: interactions between transnational and local jihadism

ABSTRACT

This article argues that al-Qaeda exists as a spatially orientated movement, a movement that considers local dynamics, both national and sub-national drivers, as part of its ideological formation. With that in mind, al-Qaeda exhibits a duality of ideologies, at once, illustrating elements of a wider global ideology at the organisational level, as well locally rooted, contextually relevant, ideological elements at the affiliate level. However, rather than a tension that exists within the movement as is sometimes argued, it is argued here that this heterogeneity is a conscious, although imperfect, strategic choice. This not only develops our understanding of al-Qaeda as a movement seeks to balance transnational goals with local appeal but also has implications for practitioners as it is argued that through this consideration al-Qaeda has been able to enhance survivability in disparate and diverse contexts.

KEYWORDS:

• Al-Qaeda
• transnational networks
• insurgency
• localization
• diffusion
• legitimacy

Introduction

Understanding how to define a jihadist organisation has always been a challenging task. In an attempt to address this problem jihadists have been characterised on a number of observable political and operational preferences, such as declared enemy hierarchies, over-arching goals, geographical focuses, and targeting preferences. For instance, how a jihadist actor engages with the concept of takfir, which refers to the act of declaring a Muslim an infidel to justify their killing, is seen as a defining characteristic. Groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI, and its subsequent manifestation the Islamic State, IS, and the Armed Islamic Group, GIA, are often seen as ideologically distinct jihadist organisations due to their severe interpretation of this notion.¹

The most basic category, however, is the geographic scope of a movement’s activism and violence. Using this metric, typologies have often distinguished between nationally focused movements that prioritise the ‘near enemy’ (respective national regimes) and transnational organisations that prioritise the ‘far enemy’ (the global superpowers that prop local regimes up). Within this typology, al-Qaeda, as a movement that prioritises attacks against Western countries, recruits globally, operates across multiple theatres, is seen as a global actor.

However, the extent to which this accurately characterises al-Qaeda as a movement, particularly in the contemporary context, is unclear. Indeed, according to Mendelejis, following the adoption of al-Qaeda’s franchising structure in the post-9/11 period, the wider al-Qaeda organisation includes actors that fall into both global and national categories.² This disjointedness is often pointed to as a weakness of the al-Qaeda organisation, as an example of the inability of the movement’s central leadership, al-Qaeda Core, AQC, to ensure preference convergence between itself and its affiliates.³ Instead this article argues that this ambiguity is a feature of al-Qaeda, one that has been cultivated by the movement’s leadership, shura, council through an encouraged process of localisation which has seen its affiliates embed themselves into the micro-level contextual dynamics of their respective environments. While previous research has described the local embeddedness of individual al-Qaeda affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,⁴ and Jahbat al-Nusra,⁵ this article develops this line of reasoning by arguing that this concern for the local should be seen as a feature of contemporary al-Qaeda as a whole and not simply that of individual affiliates.

With this in mind, this article defines al-Qaeda as an ‘spatially orientated movement’.⁶ Contemporary al-Qaeda is an organisation that embraces the duality, and at times the tension, between its affiliate’s local embeddedness and its own desire to pursue a grander ideology. This article will outline the heterogeneity of the al-Qaeda movement as the movement’s affiliates have directed their attention inwards, utilising local culture, channelling local concerns and grievances, and revolting against local power structures, in an attempt to build local support. However, this article will likewise outline how this should not take away from the fact that affiliates have, at the same time, sought to incorporate various notions and concepts developed by the Core. Albeit to varying degree, there are noticeable instances in the affiliates respective histories of activities that reflect the worldview as defined by the Core. This indicates that although imperfect affiliates do adopt a certain degree of al-Qaedaism, at times translating belief into action.

This article has implications for our understanding of transnational jihadist actors and will help highlight the contentious nature of ideology development. In particular, this article builds on the existing literature that explores how social movements can be specific products of their environment and the importance of understanding local factors as drivers of behaviour.⁷ Al-Qaeda’s history features too many ebbs and flows in affiliates support for the movement’s declaratory ideology for the various actors that make up the organisation to be driven by the Core’s ideology. Instead, al-Qaeda’s affiliates feature elements of Lefèvre’s localism-based typology.⁸ Lefèvre developed a typology that outlines how the ‘local’ can shape social movements, which includes Neighborhood Islamism which channels solidarities and practices to mobilse the community against external transgressors. Subaltern Islamism which infuses local grievances with Islamism as a protest ideology and a critique of how elites exploit the poor. Vernacular Islamism constructs mobilising ideologies around local pride and history. Islamo-gangsterism on the other hand employs religious rhetoric to take advantage of local economies and illicit networks.⁹ This, however, does not define the totality of the affiliate’s ideological development, with affiliates embracing a level of al-Qaedaism. Moreover, as the Core has developed a strategy that actively encourages this internal variation to help build affiliate success, it should be seen as a conscious strategic choice rather than an overt organisational weakness, and as such presents a potential model for transnational jihadist movements to adopt. This, in turn, builds our understanding of al-Qaeda as an adaptable movement, highlights the importance of considering how the local can impact a movement’s ideological formation, and has implication for a transnational jihadist movements survivability.

Methodology

In order to investigate the central questions posed in this article, the factors that influence the al-Qaeda’s ideological development, and how the ideological dynamics of the Core interact with that of its affiliates, this article will compare the Core’s and affiliates messaging output. While the messaging output of a movement does not entirely explain what motivates an organisation, it does represent its articulated worldview and encompasses its presented image to the world. With that in mind, it represents an important domain for the drivers of a movement’s behaviour.

This article first begins by outlying the narrative elements central to the Core’s identity. In order to do so, this article will use the concepts of collective action framing literature to conceptualise identified narrative elements. Collective action framing literature breaks a movement’s messaging down into two component categories: diagnostic frames which outline the problem in need of solving and prognostic frames which provide solutions to the identified issue.¹⁰ Through this process, the Core’s worldview will be conceptualised and coded.

Following this, this article will examine the extent to which affiliates have adopted these narrative elements into their own collective action frames. This will be done through a qualitative thematic analysis of affiliates’ own publications, whether that be official statements, declarations from the movement’s leader or notable affiliated individuals, or longer form media outputs such as magazines. These publications will be coded using collective action framing literature and will be subsequently compared to the diagnostic and prognostic frames of the Core. From this, this article will demonstrate that narrative convergence and variation that simultaneously exists as part of the al-Qaeda network.

To make sense of the variations noted at the affiliate level, this article will further borrow from social movement theory, specifically the literature which examines how space impacts the nature of contentious politics. This article draws from the ‘spatial turn’ in social movement theory and how this subset of the literature points to how the political and economic characteristics of social movements unfold in uneven ways guided by the specific contextual environments. Lefebvre, for instance, argued that human beings not only produce social relations but in doing so also produce social spaces that reflect these social identities. Through this, Lefebvre emphasised that the spatiality of politics and pointed to space, and the social identities it contained, as a factor that impacted mobilisation.¹¹ In this article, this concept will be used in order to understand the variations in al-Qaedaism that exist across the al-Qaeda network at the affiliate level. It is argued that as each affiliate has sought success at the local level, they had to navigate, and attempt to exploit, local identities, grievances, antagonism, and solidarities, which has at times necessitate the reconceptualisation of the Core’s narrative structures.

However, certain limitations should be mentioned. For one, language limitations introduce a number of constraints to this article. That is to say, this article will be concerned with publications have been published in English, or that have been subsequently translated after publication. While this does limit analysis to a certain degree, this limitation is mitigated by the fact that as al-Qaeda and its affiliates have sought to mobilise an international audience, they have published their worldview in English, alongside other languages. Where possible this article has attempted to rely on these English publications produced or translated by the movement itself so that an accurate account of their worldview is captured. However, this was not always possible and at times this article has had to relied on publications translated by other parties.

Second, while al-Qaeda has had six official affiliates during its lifecycle, due to spacing limitations this article will only examine the level of narrative adoption of two, the movement’s Yemeni branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, and its Maghreb branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM. These two affiliates were chosen due to the fact that discounting al-Qaeda in Iraq, an actor who split from al-Qaeda to establish the Islamic State in 2014, AQAP and AQIM are al-Qaeda’s two oldest affiliates who have remained a part of the al-Qaeda network since their incorporation. Moreover, by examining two affiliates in different contexts, this article will be able to highlight whether the Core has differing relationships to each affiliate as well as whether the local environment of each affiliates impacts the relationship and nature and level of narrative adoption.

The Core’s worldview

During its inception al-Qaeda developed a worldview that both rested and expanded upon the dominant jihadist thinking of the time. In terms of its diagnostic framing, like its contemporaries, al-Qaeda’s narrative agenda was one that outlined a wider Muslim community that superseded individual nationality, the ummah, and one that painted this community as victims of suffering and under threat.¹²

However, though these actors were not themselves blameless in al-Qaeda’s reasoning; for al-Qaeda the primary culpability for this suffering was not local regime deemed to be apostates but instead was their Western supporters, primarily the U.S.¹³

Just as al-Qaeda’s diagnostic framing adopted a globalist agenda, so too did its proposed solution. Although fellow jihadist movements would similarly prescribe violence as a solution, al-Qaeda’s prognostic framing looked towards its global adversaries and established an argument of reciprocity that internally allowed for the targeting of Western civilians due to their perceived responsibility in the outlined campaign of Muslim suffering.¹⁴ Taken together, these are the elements of al-Qaeda’s collective action frame, and are the narrative discussion points that have continued to feature in the movement’s media output throughout its lifecycle, albeit not without variation in emphasis.¹⁵

However, how much the Core has been able to diffuse these narrative elements across the wider al-Qaeda network, the level of narrative adoption at the affiliate level, and what this tells us about the nature of the organisation has yet to be fully explored.

AQAP

Yemen was al-Qaeda’s most active branch for most of the two decades following 9/11. AQAP as we understand it today primarily emerged after an infamous 2006 jailbreak in which escaped jihadist gave the group a new lease of life and the 2009 merger of its Saudi and Yemeni branches. Since then, the group has been characterised as AQC’s most reliable affiliate, a notion rooted in the fact that AQAP has exhibited the highest levels of a Western focus in its targeting. These range from attacks inspired from AQAP publications and rhetoric, such as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and 2013 Boston marathon bombing, to plots that directly involved AQAP such as the ‘underwear bomber’ who attempted to blow up an airliner over Detroit in 2009.

However, in more recent years AQAP’s global ambitions have seemingly been sidelined by a local emphasis. This has especially been the case since Yemen’s descent in civil war and the associated schisms this has allowed AQAP to exploit.

Inspire and the movement’s global ambitions

Throughout its history AQAP has published a number of media outputs, perhaps most notably the English-language magazine Inspire. First published in 2010 and continuing until issue 17 published in 2017, the tone, emphasis, and content, combined with the fact that the magazine was initially only printed in English, makes it clear that Inspire had a particular audience in mind: the Western world. This necessitated the adoption of a global focus as a Western audience is unlikely to possess an interest for Yemeni local micro-politics. While this may skew analysis, the fact that this is a long-standing AQAP media output, even following the death of one of its original editors, Anwar al-Awlaki, demonstrates the importance of this magazine publication for the movement.

At the broadest level, Inspire, covers a range of issues, both local and global, with specific themes varying in pervasiveness across issues, reflecting observations by Skillicorn that Inspire ‘seems to have difficulty staying “on message”.’¹⁶ However, while this remains true, particularly for the earlier issues of the magazine, when the corpus of Inspire’s contents are examined specific themes and foci are established; namely, anti-Western narratives, highly didactic justifications on appropriate approaches to violence, at both that strategic and tactical level, religious themes, and local narratives.¹⁷ In particular, as is the case in bin Laden’s writing, Inspire seeks to develop a diagnostic framing that posits an ongoing global struggle between Muslims and the Crusader alliance. Specifically, identified opponents in Inspire’s messaging include those similar to bin Laden’s identified opponents such as the West, local regimes noted as ‘puppet states’ of the West, and Muslims unwilling to use violence.

However, anti-Western themes are the most pervasive and consistent thematic messaging construct within Inspire’s corpus, with themes related to Western aggression, oppression, occupation, and weakness maintaining a significant presence within the magazine. Importantly, when examining this thematic structure, Inspire’s commentary on global events are largely reflective of the diagnostic and prognostic frames as developed by bin Laden. AQAP, as bin Laden had done when establishing the movement’s foundational diagnostic framework, spends a substantial amount of time expanding and adding to the rich tapestry of perceived ills conducted by the West against the ummah. For example, in a featured Q&A piece in Issue 13, when asked the question ‘Why do we fight and resist you?’ The author states, notably, that ‘The answer to the first question is simple. We fight you because you attacked us and continue to do so’. The author continues:

You attacked us in Somalia, support the Russian and Indian aggression against us in Chechnya and Kashmir, and supported the aggression of the Jews against us in Lebanon … . These tragedies and catastrophes are but some examples of your aggression towards us. In as much as it is recognised by both law and logic that the victim has the right to retaliate against his attackers, thus you should expect of us nothing less than more Jihâd, resistance, and retribution. Is it logical that America attacks us for more than 50 years and we let it live in security and peace?!…Thus, it is the American people who are funding the aggression, since they monitor and direct, through their elected representatives, how their tax dollars are spent. And it is American men and women who serve in the American armed forces that are attacking us. For these reasons, it is not possible that the American people are innocent of all the crimes which the Americans and Jews have committed against us.¹⁸

What is clear here is that the author is resting on both the al-Qaeda diagnostic and prognostic master frames. Much like bin Laden, when establishing the original rationale for the inception of al-Qaeda, the author argues that it is American action that necessitates an al-Qaeda response, whose only appropriate solution is violence given America’s constant and repeated instances of aggression. Likewise, the author relies on bin Laden’s arguments that do not distinguish between civilians and combatants when targeting America using the notions of collective culpability via the payment of taxes and the voting of officials as well as the notion of reciprocity where the killing of civilians is legitimate when attacking a country that ‘kills our civilians’.¹⁹

Furthermore, the magazine often includes quotations, if not entire communiqués, from prominent al-Qaeda members that further reinforce the above-mentioned frames. Issue 13, for example, likewise features a section entitled ‘Words of Wisdom’ with quotations from notable al-Qaeda members such as the then emir of AQAP, Abu Baseer al-Wuhayshi, the then emir of al-Shabaab, Mukhtar Abu Zubeir, and al-Zawahiri. These quotations all highlight a similar point, one that is reflective of al-Qaeda’s master frame outlying the rationale for fighting and the need to use violence in response to Western aggression. For instance, in this section bin Laden is quoted as stating ‘the fact is the oppression befalling you and us altogether comes from your politicians’.²⁰

A second and consistent theme in Inspire’s overall narrative are ‘calls to arms’ that provide motivational and instructional segments designed to promote acts of violence, often at the individual level.²¹ Broadly speaking, Inspire has dedicated whole issues to externally-oriented attacks against Western targets, either conducted by AQAP itself, or by the wider al-Qaeda organisation. For instance, Issue 3 was concerned with ‘Operation Hemorrhage’, a series of mail bombs that targeted FedEx and UPS cargo planes designed to cause ‘maximum losses to the American economy’;²² Issue 7 was dedicated to the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks; and Issue 14 was concerned with the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the Boston Marathon bombings. Apart from the veneration of particular attacks and individuals involved in such attacks, Inspire sought to provide operational know-how to would be jihadists. Importantly, Inspire fully embraces individualised jihad as outlined by Abu Mus`ab al-Suri,²³ seeking to predominately motivate individuals living within Western countries to conduct lone-wolf terror attacks. With that in mind, Inspire reflects a do-it-yourself ethos promoting attacks at home, rather than the comparably risker proposition of travelling abroad. As an example, issue 15, while extolling the obligatory nature of individual jihad, argues that ‘Lone Jihad to be practised in Nations that are at war with Islam … mainly the Western countries which have clearly declared war on Islam and its people’.²⁴

The nature of this messaging construct, which offers detailed and step-by-step instructions, is often accompanied with images for increased user-friendliness designed to provide motivation as well as skill-acquisition. The importance of this thematic narrative for the authors of Inspire is evident in the fact that the first issue of the magazine features a section entitled ‘Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mum’, which outlines the steps necessary in to order to construct a homemade explosive device.²⁵ Further issues provide overviews of weapons maintenance and care, a hit-list initially offered in Issue 1 and updated in Issue 10, instructions on how to create forest fires, de-rail trains, conduct assassinations, and subsequent issues would expand on the types of bombs introduced into the repertoires of adherents to include car-bombs in Issue 12 and a so-called ‘hidden bomb’ purportedly designed to bypass security in Issue 13.²⁶ While, Zekulin argues that ‘on the surface, it does not appear that the “how-to” sections led to attacks in any meaningful timeframe’,²⁷ this narrative theme is emphasised in a majority of Inspire’s issues demonstrating its importance for magazine.

Coupled with this, the magazine also provides treatises on the legitimacy of the tactic of violence. For instance, the permissibility of targeting Western civilians features heavily in various issues. It is striking that in Inspire the question concerning the permissibility of targeting civilians have always been directed towards Western populations. As an example, Issue 17 includes two separate articles; one which argues for targeting Western civilians because of the various benefits it provides,²⁸ and one which cautions against jihadist infighting and unchecked takfirism, a particular concern of al-Zawahiri in the post-2011 environment,²⁹ using the example of Algeria in the 1990s and contemporary Iraq and al-Sham, a reference to IS.³⁰ Likewise, a section in Issue 15 explicitly notes ‘we do not target nor support the targeting of Muslim civilians in Islamic countries or in populated areas’.³¹ While earlier issues did not include calls for violence against fellow Muslims, the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim civilians became a much more pervasive thematic inclusion in Inspire’s later editions, concurrent with the notion of becoming a major element of al-Zawahiri’s post-2011 messaging and a major point of contestation between al-Qaeda and IS.

That is not to say, however, that Inspire’s focus is entirely international with localised issues appearing periodically in the magazine. In particular, a focus on more local issues can be seen in the immediate post-Arab Spring environment, with the magazine more regularly publishing material on ‘local apostate regimes’ during this period.³² However, within the thematic landscape of Inspire domestic opponents are painted as part of, instead of separate to, the movement’s transnational ambitions. For instance, hostilities with Houthis is framed as a response to their purported relationships with the U.S. with an author in Issue 15 arguing that the U.S. is ‘secretly negotiating with the Houthis in Yemen to fight the Sunni’.³³ In an another AQAP publication, Madad, AQAP constructs links between domestic events and its globalist project, with headlines such as ‘Ali Salih kills 13 revolutionaries, and America supports that’.³⁴ Likewise, where Saudi Arabia is mentioned, Inspire’s grievances against the state is constructed as a response to its perceived status as a puppet regime of the U.S. In particular, the permission provided by the Saudi state for the establishment of U.S. military bases in the 1990s, bin Laden’s initial criticism of the regime, is oft-cited in Inspire’s condemnation with the US. For instance an author in Issue 15 argued that is to say, even when local or regional elements are discussed in Inspire there are still placed firmly within a globalised narrative.

Split narratives

However, outside the context of Inspire, AQAP has devoted a substantial amount of time and attention to producing narratives that seek to appeal to and mobilise a local audience. For example, launched in 2016 a newspaper, al-Masra, offered and celebrated local news and successes. The newspaper especially sought to promote community development projects that either were supported or undertaken by the movement following their takeover of the city of Mukalla in 2015. During this period, AQAP sought to highlight the range of benefits it could provide to the local population with articles potently headlined as, ‘How Do Areas under Ansar al-Shari‘ah Control Compare with the Rest of Yemen’s Cities?³⁵ Moreover, an ongoing film series, the ‘Eye on the Event’ would engage in a similar process.³⁶ Unlike the more international focused narrative of Inspire, here AQAP is specifically trying to engender itself into micro-politics by drawing attention to local communities works.

AQAP has also used cultural traditions, in particular both written and verbal poetry, in an attempt at building local narrative appeal, with poetry holding substantial cultural significance in the Arab world.³⁷ This is especially the case in the Arabian Peninsula. Kendall for instance has demonstrated the contemporary cultural importance poetry has among modern-day tribal societies in Yemen, showing that the overwhelming majority of Yemeni tribes people regard poetry either as important or very important in their daily lives.³⁸ Poetry is particularly important in societies where internet access, or photocopying and printing facilities are sparse or prohibitively expensive or where literacy rates may be low, as is the case in Yemen.³⁹ AQAP exploits these elements to promote its martyrologies, exploiting pre-Islamic traditions ‘when tribal heroes were celebrated through the poetry of ritha’ (lament), madh (praise) and hija’ (lampooning the enemy)’.⁴⁰ More sophisticated publications not only seek to exploit local pride by linking martyred individuals with impressive landscapes and text and video that praises various tribes, but also seek to tap into local grievances. Martyrologies often juxtapose disastrous contemporary living conditions with country’s impressive oil infrastructure in an attempt to motivate frustrated youths to ‘Join the Convoy’.

The fact that al-Masra and Inspire have at times outlined the same topic or event in two different lights exemplifies how they have sought to appeal to two different audiences and may indicate a certain level of inconsistency in AQAP’s messaging. However, communication between key AQC and AQAP leaders indicate that this is part of a coherent strategy encouraged by AQC. In the wake of the Arab Spring, key AQC members advised that AQAP adopt a cautious approach to the events. Rather than seeking to establish a premature Islamic Emirate, members of AQC instead advised that AQAP should undertake an ‘awareness’ campaign designed to ‘spread our important ideologies that influence the people’.⁴¹ As part of this campaign, AQAP is additionally encouraged to empower and build support amongst the Yemeni tribes, an influential social class in Yemeni societal makeup.⁴² In other words, AQAP is instructed to build popular support for the movement by integrating global narratives and locally sentiments. A letter from AQC would write:

… our statements must be compatible with the people’s statements. We must not carry out any operations except to defend ourselves. We must proclaim that we care about the stability of Yemen and want to put an end to the oppression against the Ummah in general, against our people in Palestine, and against Muslims in Yemen.⁴³

While AQAP did not heed the Core’s advice during this time period and ultimately overextended itself,⁴⁴ the fact that this strategy was encouraged by the Core is telling. Rooted in the failures of its Iraq branch, which alienated local actors with its excessive and locally incompatible behavior,⁴⁵ the Core realised that a localisation strategy was needed to ensure a greater chance of affiliate success, and subsequently sought to encourage one. The publication of al-Masra’s and other locally focused media outputs, as well as AQAP’s changed behavior during their second attempt at governance in 2015⁴⁶ would indicate that they eventually followed this advice. While AQC’s role in this strategic adoption cannot be said to be conclusive, it likewise cannot be entirely discounted as inconsequential.

Moreover, even within this locally focused publication, a degree of narrative diffusion can be pointed to. Berlin, Biasi, and Parker highlight the ways in which al-Masra’s coverage exhibits temporal variance.⁴⁷ According to Berlin, Biasi, and Parker, al-Masra’s U.S. coverage greatly increased after 2017, with a mix of articles that were concerned with both the U.S. participation in counter-insurgency operations in Yemen and Syria, and U.S. domestic policies. This latter point was especially prevalent during the Trump presidency with ‘al-Masra [leveraging] Trump’s discourse to prove that Al-Qaeda was correct in arguing that the United States was at war with Muslims’.⁴⁸

Additionally, outside of the rubric of al-Masra, AQAP’s preoccupation with the U.S. as an adversary has flourished in recent years despite, or perhaps because of, its domestic marginalisation. For example, the movement has started to more consistently translate its globally focused messaging into English, and at times French, and although Inspire fell dormant in 2017 new Inspire-brand messaging has begun to emerge.⁴⁹ Most notably, AQAP has resurfaced its Inspire guides, urging Muslims to attack Americans anywhere, but preferable on American soil.⁵⁰ Despite the fact that the transnational threat posed by AQAP has been degraded, its attempts to further motivate attacks against the West and continue the narratives developed in Inspire, which are largely reflective of the overall al-Qaeda messaging constructs, indicate a certain degree of adoption at this level.

Put differently, the continued focus on the far enemy in Inspire branded publications, but also more locally rooted publications such as al-Masra, demonstrates that significant level of narrative diffusion from AQC and the extent to which AQAP adopted al-Qaeda’s master frames centered around the U.S. At the same time, the dual nature of al-Masra, as well as other locally focused publications, highlights the fact that the movement, at both the affiliate and Core level, is cognisant of the fact that simply producing globally focused messaging will not motivate local audiences, who are the necessary mobilisation base for AQAP’s continued survival. Herein, as the movement has sought to both adopt al-Qaeda’s master narratives and ensure its own survivability and coherence to its local Yemeni theatre it has developed multiple messaging structures. This in turn highlights the ways in which even in cases of high level of narrative diffusion between the Core and an affiliate, the messaging needs to be adaptable which requires a flexing, and reorganisation of al-Qaeda’s master frames at the local level.

AQIM

AQIM was established after the bayah to AQC provided by the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat)⁵¹ itself a successor organisation to the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armee).⁵² However, the jihadist presence in Algeria was established long before the emergence of AQIM. Sparked by the decision to cancel the second round of the parliamentary elections to prevent the Islamist party, FIS (Front Islamique du Salut)⁵³ from gaining power, Algerian civil war witnessed instances of extreme violence and civilian massacres following the GIA’s 1997 declaration of takfir on the Algerian population. As a result, the GIA eroded much of the popular support the movement enjoyed during the early years of the conflict, and in 1998 GIA’s dissents split off from the movement establishing the GSPC, rejected GIA’s takfir and attacks on civilians, and vowed to target security forces only. Rooted in a combination of the history of GIA atrocities and association of this history to a Salafist agenda on the part of the Algerian population as well as continued Algerian CT pressure and amnesty programs, the GSPC suffered from continued marginalisation in the Algerian theatre and would eventually transform into AQIM in 2007.

After its formation, AQIM retained its emphasis and presence in northern Alegria, where its leadership was based and where it periodically carried out attacks, including bombing an United Nations building in December 2007. However, the group’s real opportunity for political momentum was in the Sahara, with the fulcrum of the movement eventually shifting from Algeria to the Sahel, ultimately morphing into its latest iteration JNIM (Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimeen)⁵⁴ in 2017. While AQIM and JNIM are not completely interchangeable as different names for the same organisation, JNIM is a local organisation placed firmly in the regional and global al-Qaeda hierarchy. JNIM was founded by four groups: Ansar Dine, al-Murabitoun, Katiba (Battalion) Macina, and the regional AQIM Katiba Sahara.⁵⁵ While the four founding groups agreed that a local Malian, Iyad ag Ghali, was to lead with Amadou Koufa, another local Malian, as his deputy, the movement would be placed within the larger al-Qaeda network through ag Ghali’s pledge of allegiance to the then emir of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel, who was later killed in a 2020 French CT operation.⁵⁶ In other words, although the veneer of JNIM is local AQIM’s, and by extensions al-Qaeda’s, supremacy over JNIM is evident.

Narrative structure

AQIM’s adoption of al-Qaeda master frames is an interesting, albeit uneven, case. On one hand, as noted by Soriano, following the establishment of AQIM from the GSPC, the movement adopted both a greater emphasis on a communicative strategy as well as an expanded worldview.⁵⁷ That is to say, to a certain extent AQIM did implement a globalist agenda coherent with the frames as developed by bin Laden. For example, references to America as the ‘head of infidelity, the essence of evil, the source of depravity, the height of wickedness, and the location of oppression and the symbol of savagery’⁵⁸ make periodic appearances in AQIM’s messaging when the movement comments on more global affairs, such as the death of bin Laden or the Arab Spring. For instance, in a statement commenting on the Libyan protest movement in the wake of the Arab Spring, an AQIM official criticised the ‘Crusader NATO alliance’ more generally and would write:

The crusader West moves by its interests which are driven by the hidden crusade hatred on Islam and Moslems or where was the international justice and pity on the oppressed all these years during the rule of the tyrant and his sons to Libya. Where is it from the killing of women sheikhs and children in Palestine Iraq Afghanistan and other lands of the Moslems. Where is it from the tyrant of Syria who reaps every day the souls of the innocents.⁵⁹

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to classify the messaging output of the movement as global in orientation or emphasis. While the movement does comment and reflect on events abroad, particularly those in its near-abroad, it has maintained a focus on events where it operates, namely Algeria and the Sahel, with its more internationally geared narratives often having been directed at France. This trend is particularly evident when one examines the media output of JNIM. JNIM’s messaging are ‘clinical’ in nature, focusing much more heavily on providing short concise messages that more often than not simply outline violent activities of the movement. Specifically, JNIM messaging emphasises raids on local Sahelian forces and their French allies and very rarely engage in polemics designed to weigh in on large religious or political debates in the jihadist world. This is a carry-over from AQIM which rarely provides opinions on religious matters.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that these JNIM raids and attacks are not completely divorced from the global al-Qaeda agenda and are often framed as part of the parent organisation’s global ambitions. For example, in a statement about an attack against a G5 base in Mali, JNIM would write that ‘the raid comes in response to the heinous crimes committed by the forces of the formal Bamako government, and the militiamen that supports it, against our Fulani people, and amidst the shameful silence of the region and the world, and complicit with the French occupation forces and their Crusader allies’.⁶⁰ Furthermore, in a statement outlining a desire to enter into negotiations with the Malian government, JNIM regards French withdrawal from the region a prerequisite of any negotiations, a requirement not dissimilar to American negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Until this requirement is met, the statement reads that JNIM will continue to ‘forge [its] path towards liberating the land of Muslim Mali … and cleanse it from the filth of the Crusader French occupation’.⁶¹

Moreover, at times, JNIM statements do refer to and link together their own activities with those of other al-Qaeda members. In 2022, a JNIM message would link its attacks against the Chadian government to activities undertaken by al-Shabaab, noting that all these actions have been under the rubric of targeting governments who have, or are at least attempting to, normalise relations with Israel.⁶² Additionally, both AQC and other al-Qaeda affiliates have praised JNIM attacks against French targets. For example, in response to a 2020 JNIM raid against French soldiers an AQC statement would both congratulate JNIM, while reaffirming the perceived immorality of France as part of the global crusader alliance. The statement would read ‘rest assure that if liberal, hedonist [and] animalistic France attains control over your lands and resources, it will spread great corruption in the land … You must realize that you are the sword of Allah that will make the French and their allies taste bitterness in the world’.⁶³

Finally, while the precise perpetrator in AQIM diagnostic framing has been shifted from the U.S. to France, certain narrative conventions in JNIM’s messaging are reminiscent of those found in the messaging output from AQC. For instance, in a similar diagnostic frame to that of bin Laden’s criticism of the U.S., a 2020 JNIM statement would note French ‘occupation’ of the African region as generational and inherently antagonistic, designed around a policy of ‘occupying, plundering from, and blackmailing’ the region. Moreover, the JNIM statement would likewise highlight the perceived weakness of the French state by noting the cost inflicted upon it due to their involvement in the region and more specifically their inability to defeat the mujahideen. This narrative framework is strikingly similar to the motivational frames developed by the Core in relation to U.S. activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁶⁴

In toto, the extent to which AQIM has adopted al-Qaeda’s master frame presents a somewhat paradoxical case study. AQIM has not adopted AQC’s master frame to the same extent as AQAP; the movement has not produced anything that bears resemblance to AQAP’s Inspire magazine for instance. This, in turn, can be seen as a failure of effective al-Qaeda frame diffusion and an inability of AQIM to shed its parochial GSPC focus. On the other hand, however, internal communication between the Core and AQIM would indicate an alternative interpretation. As was the case with AQAP, AQC members encouraged localisation by advising AQIM to translate its messaging into ‘French and local languages’⁶⁵ while acknowledging that France can serve as an appropriate secondary target where targeting the U.S. is unattainable. As a letter provided advice to Droukdel would note:

Concerning the brothers in the Islamic Maghreb and Somalia specifically, any efforts that cannot be directed against Americans should at this point be against France - currently the head of Europe. The brothers should target [French] embassies, ambassadors, and commercial interests in non-Islamic African countries, to avoid Muslim casualties. The brothers should also be careful not to injure non-targeted Crusaders and idolaters, even when they are totally sure they can carry out well controlled operations with no chance of Muslim casualties, such as kidnappings or gun attacks far from the public. It is all right if they use this way to target French interests in the Islamic countries of Africa, but you must stress to them the importance of thorough planning, absolute secrecy, and every factor that will help make their effort successful.⁶⁶

In other words, AQC recognised the necessity of allowing its affiliates to adapt its developed narrative structures to appeal to a local audience more readily, as was the case with AQAP’s split message strategy. In this case, AQC members encouraged AQIM to target, and by extension, shift the movement’s diagnostic framing, to France instead of the U.S. In this light, AQIM’s use of France to link its activities to the al-Qaeda globalist agenda highlights two dynamics. First, this element becomes a feature of both the movement’s wider flexibility, with the Core demonstrating an understanding of localisation, and the need to allow adjustments at the affiliate level to allow for a greater potential of success. Second, this notion likewise features AQIM’s desire to ensure compatibility between its own need to ensure relevance in an environment where the hostile attitudes towards U.S. may not motivate in the same way as in other theatres and its desire to adhere to an AQC agenda. While these elements are not unique to al-Qaeda since all terroristic organisations need to develop an antagonistic outgroup and attempt mobilisation by highlighting the apparent weakness of that outgroup, the tone of AQIM’s attempt to achieve this is reminiscent of the narrative style developed by bin Laden. As had been attempted by bin Laden, AQIM’s messaging output attempts to establish France as part of a generational spanning cabal whose goals are designed to ensure Muslim subjugation and exploitation. Moreover, the movement’s motivational frames, as one that illustrates oppositional weakness by highlighting its inability to defeat the mujahideen, is reflective of that developed by AQC in the post 9/11 period.

AQIM’s split narrative structure

Outside of its globally-focused narratives, AQIM-aligned actors have adopted a similar split narrative messaging strategy. This can most notably be seen in the case of Katiba Macina, and its leader, Amadou Koufa. As mentioned previously, Katiba Macina is part of the wider jihadist coalition organisation, JNIM, and is a central Malian movement that has embraced a strategy of ‘localisation from below’. That is to say, Katiba Macina has attempted to exploit local tensions, and grievances as well as internal fault lines in the Fulani caste system to recruit and gain support from Fulani ‘have nots’.

In particular, Koufa has embraced a non-elite, perhaps even anti-elite, sentiment, which has found purchase in the system of ongoing structures of dependence, and subservience that continue to dominate Peul society. Marked by surnames and geographical homelands, Peul society is hierarchically, and professionally organised. These economic ladders and class distinctions shape access to land, with recurring talk of ‘rackets’ and oligarchies often restricting access to grazing land based on a system of privilege.⁶⁷ Peul elites, who control key offices and administrative positions at various level, often use these positions to advance and entrench their control over resources, at the expense of ordinary Peuls. In particular, jowro’s (pasture managers) regularly impose fees for access to grazing areas, a practices have especially alienated and routinely impacted pastoral herders who are often denied access in favour of more settled Fulani.⁶⁸ Moreover, as the Peul community has been subjected to escalating regional violence, including from intercommunal violence and Malian state crackdowns which have targeted the Peul, Kouffa has positioned him as a defender of his ethnic community. For those who have experienced arbitrary abuses by state actors, this narrative has proven appealing and has acted as a strong rallying cry for Katiba Macina’s recruitment drive.⁶⁹

Importantly, however (as was the case with AQAP) Koufa has routinely produced narriatives that focus on local grievances. These have nonetheless been counched in a Islamic context as well as a wider narrative demonising the West, and in particular France’s colonial history. For instance, in a 2018 JNIM video, Kouffa argued

O Peul! You have seen from the outset of our jihad to this day what the unbelievers have done to Peul – massacres and extermination, as France, the UN and the Arabs looked on. The French incite others against the Peul because we raised the flag of Islam and wanted to resubmit ourselves to God’s judgment.

(may He be exalted)

He adds,

My [Peul] brothers, wherever you are, remember these words, ‘Come support your religion’.⁷⁰

As is the case with bin Laden’s own messaging, rather than just focusing on the local Malian regime, Koufa’s narrative outlines the responsibility of both regional, G5, and international actors in the perceived atrocities against the Peul community. Specifically, according to Koufa, France is an existential threat to Fulani community, as well as a primary reason for jihad in the first instance, a continuation of bin Laden’s reciprocity narrative. In a 2018 speech, Koufa would state:

In your understanding even if our struggle is not for the Fulani cause, we are Fulani – Fulani rebels against France […]. If France succeeds in separating our community, France alone will get rid of it. Failing to do so [to meet this objective], France will get rid of the entire community without distinction so that God’s will does not apply. You leaders of the Fulani community, you know this. We are the same community – France cannot distinguish between us Fulani. […] The day that France started the war against us, no Fulani or anyone else was practicing Jihad. You all know that previously we were destitute, insignificant; that we were nothing, had nothing, knew nothing. It is the intervention by France that has motivated us and that we have committed ourselves to go against. The coalition formed by MINUSMA, the European countries, Africa, Asia-America [sic] and Mali, which reinforced its military capabilities and recruitments – planes, other hyper-sophisticated means – came into action against us. After all of this, we embarked on Jihad.⁷¹

Taken together, a similar picture to AQAP’s own trajectory is outlined when the narrative development of AQIM and its affiliated actors is analysed. A degree of narrative adaption by AQIM is clear, with the movement embracing certain messaging structures and focuses as developed by bin Laden. However, AQIM has at the same time developed messaging output that have attempted to exploit local micro-level tensions and cleavages. These messages, however, have not been entirely divorced from a global agenda, and instead attempted the blending of the local and the global, but is simultaneously a clear reorganisation of Core principles with a primary concern for local identities.

Conclusion

Any unidimensional account of the ideological formation of the wider al-Qaeda movement is bound to be incomplete. It is clear that the ideological underpinning of the various actors within the al-Qaeda movement is deeply heterogeneous. On one hand, both AQAP and AQIM highlights the significant impact the ‘local’ has had on their ideological development, with both organisations demonstrating elements of Lefèvre localism-based typology. In particular, AQAP’s use of poetry as a means of ideological dissemination, and exploitation of important tribal mythologies are reminiscent of Lefèvre’s ‘Vernacular Islamism’ typology. Here, AQAP has sought to mix its narrative, and that of the wider al-Qaeda ideology, with the local cultural framework enabling its agenda to resonate and helped it to recruit locally. Likewise, Katiba Macina’s narrative development embodied the ‘Subaltern Islamism’ typology, as it has attempted to mobilise along historical local grievances held by the Peul community, and revolt against local power structures. ⁷² Importantly, both cases similarly demonstrate attempted mobilisation along specific subnational as opposed to national concerns, narratives directed at the Peul community in the case of AQIM and those seeking to build support in specific cities, such as Mukalla in 2015, in the case of AQAP. This highlights how movements can seek to embed themselves in specific subnational spaces, and how typologies should not consider only the extent of the national versus international focus of an organisation but can also consider the subnational versus national emphasis of a movement.

On the other hand, as actors within the wider al-Qaeda organisation, AQAP’s and AQIM’s narrative formation cannot be divorced from the Core’s wider goals. Specifically, although to differing extents, both movements exhibited a level of narrative coherence with the emphasises and prioritises of the Core. Moreover, these local narratives were often intertwined with global ambitions, although not without variations and recontextualisation to better fit local sentiments and attitudes. Importantly, although this variation is often touted as evidence for al-Qaeda disjointed and fractured nature, the incorporation and encouragement of a localisation strategy from the perspective of the Core indicates that this wide spectrum of ideological commitment to al-Qaedism at the affiliate level is part of the movement's organisational strategy to ensure longevity and influence and presents one potential model of transnational jihadist franchising.

Not every instance of disjointedness in al-Qaeda’s franchising history can be explained through this lens. For example, the friction and eventual fracturing of the relationship between AQC and its Iraqi affiliate in many respects stands apart. However, this understanding of al-Qaeda does help explain instances of supposed ideological incompatibility and contradiction between AQC and its affiliates. For instance, Ramirez and Robbins find ‘that the majority of Al Qaeda’s network is parochial. Few affiliates can be classified as global affiliates, and of the parochial affiliates that do attack the West, many have returned to parochial goals even though Western targets remain available’.⁷³ Likewise, for Mendelsohn and Clarke, ‘the majority of al-Qaeda members have been recruited by its branches, not by the central leadership. The new generation is focused on parochial grievances and the promotion of their particular branch’s local interests and has had limited, and in many cases zero, interaction with members of other branches’.⁷⁴ With an understanding of al-Qaeda as a spatial orientated movement in mind, the parochial focus of the affiliates noted by these authors becomes a function of the movement’s strategic decision making rather than a result of internal fault lines. However, this should not be mistaken for an argument that this strategy has been implemented without failures or consequences for al-Qaeda. Most notably, the potential drawbacks of such a strategy can be seen in the case of Jabhat al-Nusra’s official splintering from the al-Qaeda organisation, and the subsequent hostilities between al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra’s members in Syria, as the local sentiments were incompatible with a globalised agenda.⁷⁵ Overall, this point should not be overstated as perfect strategic choice by the movement, but it should simultaneously not be discounted.

This article has two contributions. First, it develops our understanding of al-Qaeda as a specific movement and outlines how the ideological heterogeneity in the movement is a cultivated strategic choice by the movement. AQC has sought to allow and encourage its affiliates to readjust the movement’s framing principles as required by their particular contextual environment. This presents al-Qaeda as a highly adaptable and locally conscious movement. Relatedly, as a strategic choice pursued by al-Qaeda this forms a potential model for transnational jihadists to adopt.

This understanding of al-Qaeda, as a movement that blends transnational, national, and sub-national priorities as part of its ideological formation, has important implications for the wider literature examining the relationship between ideology and conflict behaviour. Two points noted by Maynard in particular are of relevance here. First, Maynard notes how ideology can drive behaviour. Second, Maynard demonstrates that ideological formation is not static, but rather a result of continuous heterogenous confrontation.⁷⁶ This article builds on these theories and demonstrates how the local and specific sub-national identities, grievances, antagonism, and solidarities can play an important part in this contested process of initial ideological formation and subsequent ideological evolution that in in turn drive actor behaviour. While beyond the scope of the present article, future research in this area can build on these assumptions and explore how interactions between elements of transnationalism and the local interact to establish distinct forms of behaviour, and highlight the nature of this specific interactive process.

As a second contribution, while not successful in every single instance, al-Qaeda’s affiliate explicit engagement with local grievances and/or identities has been noted as a factor that has increased their recruitment appeal in a variety of contexts. This would indicate that movements that consider the importance of space have greater staying power due to greater local buy-in, as the movement is able to appeal to less ideologically committed constituencies. How locally attuned a movement is can impact how potentially successful the movement is in ensuring continued and sustained mobilisation across various contexts and communities. In turn, this is an important metric for practitioners to consider. Indeed, the strict implementation of a mother strategy has proven to be a constraint of IS’s expansion to countries such as Yemen⁷⁷ and Bangladesh⁷⁸ as that mother strategy has been incompatible with the local context.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

James Paterson

James Paterson holds a PhD from Monash University, School of Social Sciences. His research focuses on political violence, insurgency, movement adaptability, and insurgent legitimacy.

Notes

1. Stenersen, ‘Jihadism after the “Caliphate”’, 781–86

2. Mendelejis, ‘Toward a New Typology of Sunni Jihad’, 1078–1079.

3. Mendelsohn, ‘The Al-Qaeda Franchise’, Mendelsohn and Clarke, ‘Al-Qaeda Is Being Hollowed to Its Core’, Ramirez and Robbins, ‘Targets and Tactics’ 575.

4. Bencherif, ‘Unpacking “Glocal” Jihad’; Filiu, ‘The Local and Globa’; Marret, ‘Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb’.

5. Adraoui, ‘The Case of Jabhat Al-Nusra’.

6. This is a concept borrowed from Raphaël Lefèvre, see: Lefèvre, ‘Jihad in the Ciyt’, 6.

7. Ibid.; Tankel, ‘Universal Soldiers or Parochial Actors’, 315–316

8. Lefèvre, ‘Jihad in the City’.

9. Ibid, 17.

10. Benford and. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’ 614–617.

11. Lefebvre, ‘The Production of Space’; See also; Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto, ‘The Spatialities of Contentious Politics’; Miller, Nicholls, Miller, ‘Spaces of Contention’; Bishara, ‘The Generative Power of Protest’

12. Holbrook, ‘The Al-Qaeda Doctrine’ 51–76.

13. Ibid, 77–104.; A. Gerges, ‘The Far Enemy’

14. Paterson, ‘Maintaining Course or Righting the Ship?’, 8; Zehr, ‘The War against Al-Qaeda Religion’ 55; Holbrook, ‘The Al-Qaeda Doctrine’, 86–89.

15. Paterson, ‘Maintaining Course or Righting the Ship?’. 17–18

16. Skillicorn and Reid, ‘Language Use in the Jihadist Magazines’ 5.

17. Droogan and Peattie, ‘Reading Jihad’, 708–712.

18. AQAP, ‘Inspire Neurotmesis Cutting the Nerves & Isolating the Head’, 12–13.

19. Ibid., 13.

20. AQAP, ‘Inspire’, 10–11.

21. Zekulin, ‘From Inspire to Rumiyah’, 123–128; Lemieux et al., ‘Inspire Magazine’, 357; Ingram, ‘An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq’, 366.

22. AQAP, ‘Inspire’, 8.

23. Lia, ‘Architect of Global Jihad’

24. AQAP, ‘Inspire Professional Assassinations’ 44.

25. AQAP ‘Inspire May Our Souls’.

26. Zekulin, ‘From Inspire to Rumiyah’ 123–28.

27. Ibid.

28. AQAP, ‘Inspire Train Derail Operations’, 22–23.

29. Paterson, ‘Maintaining Course or Righting the Ship?’ 11.

30. AQAP, ‘Inspire Train Derail Operations’, 38–40.

31. AQAP ‘Inspire Professional Assassinations’ 44.

32. Droogan and Peattie, ‘Reading Jihad’, 711–12.

33. AQAP, ‘Inspire Professional Assassinations’ 4.

34. Quoted in: Kendall, ‘Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Yemen’, 94.

35. Ibid., 96.

36. Ibid.

37. Kendall, ‘Jihadist Propaganda’; Fakhro, ‘Tracing the Movement’; Gatt, ‘Poetry as a Communicative Vehicle’.

38. Kendall, ‘Yemen’s Al-Qa’ida’.

39. Kendall ‘Yemen’s Al-Qa’ida’, 248.

40. Kendall ‘Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Yemen’, 99; ‘Yemen’s Al-Qa’ida’ 261.

41. ‘Give the tribes more than they can handle’.

42. ‘Letter from Atiyah to Abu Basir’ ibid.

43. ‘Give the tribes more than they can handle’ ibid.

44. Cigar, ‘Building an Islamic State’ Horton, ‘Fighting the Long War’ 18–19.

45. International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq after the Surge’; Lynch, ‘Explaining the Awakening’ 43–45; Fishman, ‘Dysfunction and Decline’, 1–10; Phillips, ‘How Al-Qaeda Lost Iraq’, 75–79.

46. Zimmerman, ‘Al-Qaeda after the Arab Spring’; Horton, ‘AQAP in Southern Yemen’.

47. Berlin, Biasi, and Parker, ‘Jihadist Journalism’, 23.

48. Ibid, 29.

49. Kendall, ‘Twenty Years after 9/11’ 69.

50. Ibid, 70.

51. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

52. Armed Islamic Group of Algeria.

53. Islamic Salvation Front.

54. Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims.

55. Henningsen, ‘The Crafting of Alliance Cohesion among Insurgents’, 379.

56. Ibid.

57. Soriano, ‘The Road to Media Jihad’ 81–84; Soriano ‘The Evolution of the Discourse of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’

58. Al-Qaedah Organization in the Lands of the Islamic Maghrib, ‘The Head of Infidelity’ 1.

59. Abu Al-Hassan Rashid Al-Bulaydi, ‘An Open Letter to the Moslems in Libya’, ibid.

60. Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimeen, ‘A Sweeping Attack on the G5 Forces’.

61. Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimeen, ‘Statement on the Tarknit Raid in Mali’.

62. Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimeen, ‘Targetting Minusma and Bamako Forces’.

63. Weiss, ‘AQAP Congratulates JNIM for Attacks on French Soldiers’.

64. Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimeen, ‘Colonial France Returns to the Policy of Genocide’.

65. ‘Gist of conversation Oct 1’ 1.

66. ‘Dear Brother Shaykh Mahmud’; ibid., 6.

67. Thurston, ‘Jihadists of North Africa’ 163–164.

68. Thurston, ‘Jihadists of North Africa’, 164; See also; Cline, ‘Jihadist Movements in the Sahel’

69. Cold-Ravnkilde and Ba, ‘Jihadist Ideological Conflict’ 5; Benjaminsen and Ba, ‘Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups?’.

70. Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimeen ‘Light or Heavy, March to Battle’ Quoted in; International Crisis Group, “Speaking with the ‘Bad Guys’: 7.

71. Koufa speech quoted in: Cold-Ravnkilde and Ba, ‘Jihadist Ideological Conflict’ 6.

72. Lefèvre, ‘Jihad in the City’.

73. Ramirez and Robbins, ‘Targets and Tactics’ 573.

74. Mendelsohn and Clarke, ‘Al-Qaeda Is Being Hollowed to Its Core’.

75. Lister, ‘How Al-Qa`Ida Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate’, 4–8; Carenzi, ‘A Downward Scale Shift?’, 94–95.

76. Maynard, ‘Ideology and Armed Conflict’ 639–645.

77. Kendall, ‘Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Yemen’, 107–108.

78. Barr, ‘Diverging Trajectories in Bangladesh’.