Fighting together: emotionality, fusion, and psychological kinship in the Syrian civil war

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the motivations and affiliations of Syrian fighters within the Third Corp, emphasizing the role of emotionality, identity transformation, and fusion in shaping fighter behavior and decision-making. Through qualitative analysis of interviews with fighters, the study explores how episodic memories, rituals, and shared dysphoric experiences contribute to a complex sense of belonging and solidarity, challenging traditional notions of identity in conflict settings. By employing the concept of identity fusion, the research highlights the construction of psychological kinship and the profound impact of shared emotional dynamics on group cohesion. This study provides insights into the genesis, evolution, and potential resolutions of conflicts, offering a nuanced understanding of fighters’ motivations and the implications for peace processes in Syria and beyond.

KEYWORDS:

• Emotions
• dysphoric memories
• identity fusion
• Syrian civil war
• armed groups

Introduction

How do episodic memories influence individuals’ decisions to join and persist in combat? What is the impact of emotional experiences, perceived family bonds, and collective memories on maintaining fighters’ allegiance to their factions? In what ways does engagement in combat operations alter fighters’ self-identities, loyalties, and outlooks on their future? What compels these individuals to make life-threatening sacrifices when they enter battle or engage in asymmetrical warfare? In recent years, the field of studies focusing on emotions as a variable in understanding violent behaviour has witnessed a notable evolution. Most of this research has focused on the emotional motivations of fighters and developed a theoretical framework known as the ‘devoted-actor’, including the process of ‘identity fusion’. This theory stands as one of the foremost emerging theories in interpreting the emotional motivations of individuals. In an attempt to enhance our comprehension of the psychological and behavioral mechanisms that underlie these questions,¹ I examine the evidence for prominent, competing arguments in the context of the Syrian civil war, drawing on a unique dataset that documents the attitudes and behavior of a group of Third Corp factions in the Syrian National Army. By taking the Third Corp, one of the largest amalgamations of armed groups controlling northern Syria as a case study, this article tests whether the applicability of identity fusion theory on the Syrian case has merit. In setting out my conceptual framework, I test the hypotheses developed Harvey Whitehouse and Jonathan A. Lanman study on fusion, ritual and emotions.²

While scholars have largely overlooked the pivotal role of emotions, ritualistic memorization during combat, and identity transformations, favoring instead an in-depth analysis of the material benefits to actors within the Syrian conflict,³ drawing insights from the broader combat motivation literature, emphasizes a tripartite analytical approach. It examines existing literature on internal conflicts and revolutions, adapting it to the Syrian milieu. The study integrates theories that frame fighters’ emotional motivations from disparate geographic contexts, introducing additional variables tailored to the Syrian context. This approach facilitates a nuanced comprehension of the motives at the individual level – that is, the fighters themselves. It involves grasping shared perceptions, both actual and imagined kinship ties, collective memories, and the acute emotional experiences they endure, particularly during combat. The theoretical underpinnings of identity fusion are utilized to scrutinize the data accrued from in-depth interviews with fighters associated with the Third Corp.

The scholarly examination at the micro-level of fighters as a primary sample has been conspicuously absent from the academic landscape, leading to a potential oversimplification of their roles and reducing their significance to mere political variables in the discourse on Syria’s future.⁴ This lacuna in scholarly inquiry is likely attributable to the inherent challenges associated with securing reliable primary data and undertaking fieldwork within the region. Prevailing studies often adopt either a predominantly descriptive or quantitative methodology, lacking the depth and nuance necessary to fully understand the complex dynamics at play.⁵ In contrast, this study distinguishes itself through its innovative approach, prioritizing firsthand narratives of the fighters by integrating them into comprehensive interviews conducted with military commanders and administrators affiliated with the Third Corp. This methodological choice enriches the research with authentic insights and perspectives, thereby contributing a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter to the body of academic work.

In this article, I examine the psychological constructs of kinship and cohesion as developed by Whitehouse et al. Suny’s contributions further elucidate the role of emotions in human behavior, asserting their fundamental influence on motivation, self-identification, and group formation.⁶ The framework suggests that these constructs evolve from intense emotional experiences, including the recollection of dysphoric episodes and participation in rituals, which collectively contribute to fusion of the self and group. In this regard, Robert Solomon has significantly contributed to the conceptualization of emotions as a complex and multifaceted process of self-understanding.⁷ He further highlights that emotional reactions are fundamentally based in the brain and central nervous system. This cognitive approach of emotions has been enhanced by understanding emotions through phenomenology and ‘situationalism’, where emotions are seen as constructed by specific experiences, suggesting that our emotions are more often determined by situations.⁸ This approach requires effort to describe one’s experience rather than the objective world, highlighting the importance of language and its development through discussions about publicly observable objects and events, rather than inner feelings. This notion emphasizes the need for a specialized effort to articulate the subjective experience of emotions, acknowledging the limitations and variations across different languages in capturing the nuances of emotional experiences to which it entails ‘emotional integrity’.⁹

As such, in this article, I define dysphoric memories as characterized by their association with negative emotions. Unlike neutral or positive memories, these recollections bring about feelings of discomfort, distress, or sadness when recalled. dysphoric memories are linked to traumatic events or experiences, such as violence, loss, or severe hardship. These events leave a lasting imprint on the individual’s memory. My findings suggest that dysphoric memories play a crucial role in shaping individuals’ identities and behaviors, particularly in conflict settings. These memories contribute to a person’s sense of self and can influence their motivations and actions. In the context of the Syrian Civil War, dysphoric memories are often revisited and reinforced through rituals and collective activities, such as commemorative practices and revolutionary songs. This repetition solidifies the memories and their associated emotions within the group.

The study presents a dual-layered analysis to provide a comprehensive understanding of the bonding phenomena and identity transformation among fighters and their ties to their respective groups. To offer a nuanced conceptualization of the identity transformation process experienced by these fighters within the Syrian civil war context, the analysis commences with an assessment of the fighters’ reasons for joining combat, focusing on their emotional narratives. During interviews, fighters frequently recounted dysphoric experiences emotively. The subsequent layer explores the role of rituals in fostering familial bonding and psychological kinship. The Syrian case presents an opportunity to explore the micro-level intersections among fighters, illustrating how emotions and personal experiences can profoundly influence motivations for conflict engagement. Moreover, I analyze the evidence supporting various arguments found in the literature on internal conflicts and civil wars. I do this by using a distinctive dataset that documents the beliefs and actions of a group of Syrian fighters affiliated with the Third Corp. Understanding the motivations of those involved in combat can provide valuable insights into the causes, developments, and consequences of conflicts. It can also aid in the evaluation of strategies for conflict resolution and reconstruction.

In what follows, I first give a short introduction to the emergence of armed factions in Syria and the formation of Syrian National Army. Then, I describe major approaches to understanding the role of emotions and fusion in driving individuals to join and stay in combat. More particularly, in this section I present my conceptual framework by synthesizing previous findings and hypotheses in relevant literature, while contextualizing the specificity of the Syrian case. I then demonstrate the methodological approach and data. Next, I discuss the emotional and fusion paths my data reveal, demonstrating how the emotion approach to the mobilization of fighters within the Third Corp contributes to our understanding of drivers of violent behaviour at the micro-level.

Brief background of SNA formations and Third Corp sub-group factions

The Syrian Conflict, which began with hundreds of rival rebel groups have gradually narrowed to include only a few major factions, with the role of the largest cohesive groups being occupied by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as one major group controlling Idlib, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that control north east Syria, and Syrian National Army (SNA) backed by Turkey controlling northern Syria. Since 2017, SNA groups have witnessed significant restructuring of their internal military organization and changes at the level of leaders’ shifts in roles and the formation of three Corps. The formation of the Third Corp, announced on 18 October 2021, marked a significant development with Muhammad Diri succeeding Hossam Yassin as the commander.¹⁰ This coalition encompasses a diverse array of factions, including Al-Jabha Al-Shamiya, Army of Islam, Al-Salam Brigade, King Shah Division, the 51st Division, Suqur al-Sham, and the Glory Legion.¹¹ Located centrally in the Azaz region and its surroundings, with deployments across Al-Bab, Marea, Al-Rai, and Jarabulus, extending northward to Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain. This distribution underscores the Corp’s pivotal deployment strategies across northern Syria,¹² resulting in controlling key frontlines against both the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces. The importance of these contextual factors reflects the intricate military restructuring influenced significantly by Turkey.¹³ As such, the base of the Third Corp has undergone structural changes at both internal and external levels, causing shifts in military lines.¹⁴ Historically, the factions within the Third Corp have engaged in significant battles against the Syrian regime, demonstrating their strategic importance on various fronts. In this context, this history of conflict underscores the Corps’ foundational role in the ongoing struggle within Syria.¹⁵ For instance, Al-Shamiya’s objection to sending its base to fight abroad reinforced the fighters’ loyalty to the Corp, yet put them under pressure from the Turkish side through cutting financial aid to weaken the Corp’s ability to maintain control over its areas.¹⁶ This has caused many infightings and conflict within SNA factions.¹⁷ Notably, the Turkish actor serves as another significant determinant shaping the Third Corp’s structure, future directions, and the fate of other units.¹⁸

Despite that the Third Corp has consolidated control over key frontlines against the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces, excluding the Idlib region. It boasts approximately 12,000 fighters, with 8,000 fighters from Al-Jabha Al-Shamiya. In terms of the Corp’s social fabric, it is characterized by a mix of regional backgrounds,¹⁹ drawing members from diverse origins such as Eastern Ghouta, western Aleppo, and southern Idlib, each bringing unique ideological perspectives to the Corps, now one of the largest in the National Army. It is necessary to highlight key events associated with the Corp’s military growth and decline.²⁰ These events had a direct impact on strengthening loyalty at the micro level, aligning with the fighters’ perceptions, their ‘revolutionary project’ and the Corp’s leadership.²¹ The significance of the timeframe in which this study was conducted lies in the fact that it corresponds to a period marked by military stalemates on various fronts. During this period, there were limited spoils available to distribute among the fighters.²² Additionally, a financial fund within the Ministry of Defense accumulates profits, revenues, and any ‘material’ spoils that could be distributed.²³ However, as will be shown later in the article, the fighters’ shared experiences and ideological commitment, amidst limited resources and military stalemates, illustrate the profound sense of solidarity and loyalty within the Corp. This period, characterized by operational challenges, emphasizes the fighters’ alignment with the Corp’s revolutionary ethos and leadership,²⁴ despite the complex interplay of class and social differences pre-war.²⁵

The tenacity of emotions in civil conflicts: a case study of the Syrian war

The Syrian conflict, a tableau of power politics, has been characterized by the emergence of intense negative emotions such as anger and despair. The international community’s inaction and the Arab states’ normalization initiatives with the Assad regime have imbued significant segments of the Syrian populace with political apathy and what Lisa Wedeen describes as ‘ambivalence’.²⁶ This atmosphere of political uncertainty compels an inquiry into fighters’ perceptions of the regional quagmire,²⁷ the protracted nature of the Syrian conflict, and the international community’s shortcomings in enforcing Resolution 2254. It is apparent that profound sentiments of uncertainty prevail. This study initially seeks to elucidate how fighters articulate their perceptions, attitudes, emotions, and decision to stay in combat, particularly, how they reconcile their political frustration with their allegiance to the Third Corp. These persistent uncertainties, amplified by political deadlock, defy explanation without considering the emotional dimension.

Accounting for what Sinisa Malesevic terms the ‘slippery nature’ of violence,²⁸ which often arises from a mélange of economic, ethnic, sectarian, and interpersonal factors, Shesterinina posits civil wars as ‘social processes’ intimately tied to complex identity trajectories.²⁹ These dynamics, spanning the pre-war to post-war phases, involve negotiated interactions among diverse actors and indelibly shape identity formations borne out of conflict. In the Syrian context, understanding these identity formations and transformations is integral to the analysis, pivoting to a theoretical lens that foregrounds emotions. Emerging literature in this domain endeavors to deconstruct mobilization strategies by underscoring the centrality of emotions.³⁰ This scholarship challenges reductive materialistic models of conflict and mobilization, reviving academic inquiry into the multifaceted motivations of fighters and emphasizing the profound influence of emotions on behavior. Emotions are conceptualized as the residual effects of an event, either past or anticipated, which substantially alter an individual’s emotional and perceptual state.³¹ They linger beyond the occurrence of an experience, shaping subsequent conflict dynamics. As such, in this context, emotions are not merely remnants; they are cognitive agents and inclinations that influence action formulation and belief systems. Petersen delineates three determinants impacting fighters’ decisions to engage in combat: exposure to violence, experiences of stigma and prejudice, and the reversal of stigma.³² Solomon further contends that anger and shame are not always negative emotions and people should not be conceived as ‘passive victims’ of their emotions but ‘quite active in cultivating and constituting them’.³³ These emotions should not be conceptualized as ‘sudden bursts of emotion’, but those of long-term living memories that define self-perception, behaviour, attitudes and future outlooks.³⁴ In this context, emotions of anger becomes a ‘cognitively and value-rich phenomenon, not just a momentary state or event but a complex process that proceeds through time and can last a very long time’.³⁵

The evolution of studies on emotions as a variable in violent behavior has been significant, particularly highlighted by the study ‘For Cause and Comrades’ which casts light on the devoted-actor framework and the process of identity fusion.³⁶ This framework, diligently advanced by scholars at ARTIS, seeks to deepen our understanding of the psychological and behavioral mechanisms prompting individuals to make life-threatening sacrifices in combat.³⁷

The framework encompasses a dual research approach: one stream employs cognitive theory to elucidate the role of sacred values in combat participation, while the other investigates identity fusion within protracted political struggles. As such, the pervasive emotions resulting from the loss of group members and violent encounters become central highlighting the salience of episodic memories. This perspective aligns with scholarly discourse accentuating the need to comprehend mobilization strategies and their interplay with material incentives, dissecting the emotional drives that propel fighters to persist in combat.³⁸ Petersen’s work, especially his examination of the Balkans, underlines the centrality of anger and resentment in comprehending the motivations for hostilities. His findings draw parallels with the narratives of Syrian fighters, suggesting that the emotional landscapes in conflict transcend geographic and political boundaries resulting in a formation of imagined psychological kinship.³⁹

To evaluate the validity of the theoretical framework developed by identity fusion scholars, I test the intricate mechanisms that underlie identity fusion and its propensity to motivate costly altruistic actions, as proposed by Whitehouse and Lanman.⁴⁰ They hypothesize that two pivotal psychological processes are instrumental: firstly, the construction of self-concepts through episodic memory, and secondly, kin detection through phenotypic matching.⁴¹ According to Whitehouse and Lanman, episodic memories are fundamental to the formation and essential constitution of individual self-concepts. These memories, along with the specific elements they encompass – such as identities, persons, and objects – can become integral, defining aspects of an individual’s personal identity. Furthermore, they argue that the perception of these essential elements of one’s personal self-concept in another individual activates our evolved, albeit fallible, kin recognition systems. This activation, in turn, does not merely identify group members as cooperators but elevates them to the status of psychological kin in the perception of a fused individual.⁴² My research aims to empirically test these hypotheses, examining the extent to which episodic memory construction and phenotypic matching contribute to the phenomenon of identity fusion and its resulting impact on the manifestation of altruistic behaviors within the context of combat groups in the Syrian civil war.

This theoretical approach dissects the complex emotional motivations underlying individuals’ decisions to engage in conflicts. Within this framework, I’ve identified two main pathways to understand the determinants of individuals’ motivations to engage in combat and connected these determinants with the emotional experiences that shape the relationship between an individual’s identity and the group. In the first pathway, I argue that individuals who go through transformative emotional experiences with fellow group members, especially those involving adversity, can significantly shape their personal and collective/social identities. These shared experiences become an integral part of an individual’s personal life history resulting in fusion.⁴³ Some of these intense emotional experiences take the form of collective rituals, which are organized and culturally accepted, such as sacrificing oneself to defend land and family.⁴⁴

The second pathway focuses on the determinants of fusion dynamics between the individual and members of the group. It assumes that there is common kinship, emotional, or regional characteristics among individuals. This leads to the fusion of the group, often referred to as ‘local fusion’, driven by socially transmitted behavioral practices.⁴⁵ This is evidenced by the emphasis on family ties, where group members are addressed as ‘brothers’, highlighting collective interdependence based on shared perceptions of common identity. Local fusion is strongly associated with the willingness to fight and even die when the group is under attack. Within the Third Corp, it manifests as a sense of ‘brotherhood’ that goes beyond biological relationships and embodies psychological ties built on shared destiny, survival, and mutual suffering. In this context, understanding the influence of emotional adversity and grievances on the fighters’ motivation to participate in combat invites the question on the role rituals practiced within small fighting groups and their role in constructing a collective memory.

It is important to note that these hypotheses will be empirically tested by aligning my research questions with the experiences of the fighters. This will involve identifying the triggering events that elicited strong emotions, followed by an examination of how these experiences are stored in episodic memory. I will also explore the ways in which these memories are subsequently recollected and reconstructed in the fighters’ imaginations, serving as a motivation for survival. This approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of the psychological processes underpinning identity fusion and altruistic actions within conflict scenarios.These memories are often associated with traumatic events that have affected the fighter, his family, clan, region, or even close friends and acquaintances. These incidents are recalled in the fighter’s imagination and symbolically perpetuated, becoming integral representations that contribute to shaping the core of their narrative self. These shared emotional experiences within the group are further reinforced through collective rituals that involve listening to revolutionary songs that express common concerns, generate a shared essence, and lead to a sense of fusion with the group. In this context, ‘revolutionary’ [thawriyya] rituals are perceived as a challenge not only to an established institution but also maintaining social ‘continuity’.⁴⁶ This includes repeated commemorative acts and culturally specific bodily practices. These acts not only signify societal continuity but also serve as reminders of past injustices, prompting action to rectify them.⁴⁷ In the process of exploring how these shared rituals contribute to building a sense of fusion among fighters, an investigation into the songs they listen to was conducted, delving into their meanings and connotations. It was discovered that these shared emotional connections, facilitated by these rituals, play a significant role in shaping the emotional identity of the fighter and fostering their fusion with the group. While the interviews primarily involved 10 fighters, these rituals are shared among larger groups of fighters, suggesting symbolic and emotional commonalities that extend beyond individual contexts.

Positionality, methodology and sample selection

Being a Syrian researcher conducting fieldwork on Syrian armed groups, my academic perspective and my deep awareness of the culture and complexities of the Syrian conflict enables me to provide a firsthand view on the motivations of Syrian fighters. Despite that I have always had significant concerns about the process of arming the Syrian uprising and the choice to engage in military actions, during my interactions with fighters, I discovered instances of emotional bonding and shared encounters, especially in our mutual comprehension of the regime’s systemic political violence.⁴⁸ This was apparent in the accounts provided by the fighters regarding their original motivations for participating in combat and the deep sense of emotions they expressed. It became evident that people from different backgrounds and orientations had experienced a political and social exclusion, resulting in similar or comparable experiences. This revelation motivated me to portray the military experiences of these individuals in a more human and relatable manner. In order to ensure the safety and privacy of the interviewees, the interviews were carefully coded based on sample classifications.

The crucial fieldwork was carried out in northern Syria and southern Turkey. This endeavor entailed over 20 journeys to southern Turkey and entailed conducting more than 100 hours of interviews with Syrian fighters, shedding light on the complexities of their experiences and the cognitive mechanisms that drive their decision-making. This collaborative effort guarantees a comprehensive analysis of the aspects that influence individuals’ decision-making processes while selecting between violence and peace in the Syrian conflict. This research has been ethically approved by Kings’ College.

As such, this research relies on interviews (26 in total) conducted with members of six armed groups of the ‘al-Jabha al-Shamiyya’, ‘Jaish al-Islam’, ‘Failaq al-Majd’, Firqah 51,“‘Sultan Malak Shah’, and ‘Liwaa al-Salam’, as well as extensive in-depth interviews with three key central commanders (CC), seven administrative military commanders (Q), Minister of Defense of the Syrian Interim Government, and 15 current fighters (F). The 15 current fighters from these groups, aged 25 to 60, with diverse educational backgrounds.⁴⁹ Establishing trust and rapport with the participants was a time-intensive process. The sample selection strategy involved engaging with a key intermediary, or ‘gate keeper’. For this limited-group case study, participants were identified and recruited through a ‘snowball’ sampling approach. The initial data collection was done through deep, open, and semi-structured interviews, which provided the opportunity to ask predetermined questions and follow-up questions. I presented the main objectives of the research to the participants and obtain their consent to transcribe the interviews. This study uses qualitative content analysis to interpret the data. To gain insight into identity socialization processes, I use the long interview method where each interview began by asking the participants about their personal backgrounds, familial ties, and upbringing. The interviews then moved on to more detailed questions about various aspects of socialization, including recollections of the onset of protests in Syria, political inclinations and activities, interactions with peers and media, their initial involvement in protests, and the pivotal moment they committed to military action. This method is recognized as one of the most powerful methods in qualitative research that gives us the opportunity to see and experience the world from the participant’s perspective.⁵⁰

I presented the main objectives of the research to the participants and obtained their consent to transcribe the interviews

Table

al-Jabha al-Shamiyya	Jaish al-Islam	Failaq al-Majd	Firqah 51	Sultan Malak Shah	Liwaa al-Salam
F1; F2; F3	F4; F5; F6	F7; F8; F9	F10; F11;	F12; F13	F14; F15

Analysis

The subsequent sections are instrumental in elucidating the complexity of psychological tie formation among fighters at the micro-level. This examination necessitates an in-depth analysis of shared perceptions among individuals, which span both explicit and inferred kinship connections, collective memories, and the profound emotional experiences encountered, particularly during the exigencies of combat. Grounded in empirical research, this discourse delineates two principal pathways experienced by fighters: (1) the pathway of identity transformation, and (2) the pathway of identity fusion.

The discussion on the first pathway articulates that shifts in identity are profoundly linked to the systemic violence inflicted upon the Syrian populace across various regions. This pervasive violence has significantly influenced fighters’ perceptions of their identity construction and self-narratives, underscoring the intricate interplay between external conflict and internal identity recalibration. The identity transformation pathway is initiated by fighters’ introspection on their dysphoric experiences prior to and during combat, followed by the recall of episodic memory with their comrades through rituals, resulting in fusion. The second pathway is characterized by the manifestation of altruistic behavior and a pronounced willingness to engage in self-sacrifice. Individuals who are fused demonstrate a readiness to sacrifice themselves for their comrades, albeit not necessarily with allegiance to their armed faction. This phenomenon is evidenced by the occurrences of defections, affiliations, and re-affiliations with rival groups while preserving a sense of solidarity at the micro-level. The fusion borne out of combat experience and a shared belief in the ‘revolutionary’ cause among all fighters suggests that this solidarity transcends specific group affiliations, leading to the establishment of psychological kinship across divergent armed factions.

The pathway of identity transformation

The onset of civil protests in 2011 signifies the initial phase of identity transformation. As the intensification of violence continued, the emergence of identity shifts became increasingly pronounced across various segments of Syrian society. These shifts in identity were precipitated by the profound dysphoric experiences encountered by individuals during this period.

In the scholarly discourse on identity transformation amidst armed conflicts and civil strife, a consensus emerges among academics regarding the interplay between the weakness of national identity and the rise of sub-state identities. This fragmentation often manifests across ethnic, sectarian, territorial, or tribal lines, engendering a rich academic debate on the correlation between the erosion of national identity and the emergence of internal conflicts and civil wars. Such discussions illuminate the nuanced perspectives surrounding identity transformation, underlining the profound impact of conflict intensity on individuals’ social environments and their conceptualization of identity. Raymond Hinnebusch, for instance, contends that conflict invariably magnifies ethnic or sectarian cleavages, thus undermining the collective sense of national identity.⁵¹ Within the Syrian context, the rigid imposition of Ba’athist ideology has precipitated exclusion and discrimination, privileging ‘homogeneity’ over a broader conception of citizenship or legal belonging to the state, ultimately attenuating national solidarity.⁵²

At the micro-level, the emotional underpinnings influencing individuals’ participation in armed conflict highlight the crucial role of these dysphoric experiences, including the grief associated with the loss of group members. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty tracks the evolution of emotions as a mental one by which the transformations from passions to emotions and sentiments serve as markers of broader mental changes.⁵³ While these transformations can be initially perceived as responses to external provocations or injustices, emotions evolve into manifestations of the mind’s own operations. In this transformed state, they emerge as legitimate motivators and, together with desires, lay the groundwork for action. Concurrently, emotions transitioned from being viewed simply as chaotic disturbances to encompassing sentiments. These sentiments represent ways of experiencing pleasure and pain through evaluative lenses, thereby becoming reliable navigators for action, including the cultivation of a ‘sense of justice’.⁵⁴ It is by this transformational process where rationality of emotions become independent and not only ‘motivators’, but have ‘priviliged status’.⁵⁵

Beyond the specificity of the Syrian case, these intense emotional episodes were experienced across diverse geographical contexts, positing emotions as indispensable to human motivation, identity formation/reformation (‘us’ versus ‘them’), and the catalysts for action and social cohesion. In line with scholars like Petersen, Suny, and Whitehouse, these dysphoric experiences were echoed in the interviews with fighters, where their accounts highlight a sense of grievance, stemming from personal or collective experiences endured by Syrians.⁵⁶ The motivations for joining combat varied among them, driven by a profound sense of injustice and political persecution inflicted by the Assad regime and its ascent to power. One fighter articulated this sentiment, stating, ‘We felt injustice [ẓulm], and we know our history very well and how Assads came to power. We wanted to overthrow this oppressive regime’.⁵⁷ Another fighter expressed a similar sentiment, saying, ‘Anyone living in this country understands the nature of the regime; it’s oppressive! When we saw what happened in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, we believed that the regime was also about to disappear. It seemed impossible for the status quo to persist. Something new had to occur in people’s lives; they needed to break free from this dynastic rule. Change was an imperative’.⁵⁸

Another fighter supported this perspective and highlighted sectarian discrimination, saying, ‘Of course, I live in Syria, not on Juipiter. I witness firsthand the injustice, persecution, and tyranny of the regime’s security apparatus. I have personally experienced multiple instances while serving in the army. There’s a clear sectarian [ṭā’ifī] bias between us and the group to which the regime belongs, and this has left a significant impact on me. We were treated as if we were second-class citizens or from a different caste. I endured several abusive situations, and when I complained to my superior officer about it, he would mock me and subject me to punishment’.⁵⁹ One of the fighters personally experienced the oppression of the Assad regime, having been arrested for political reasons prior to the movement in 2011. He recounted, ‘I was a former political prisoner of the regime. I spent three years in Sednaya prison simply because I held a political opinion’.⁶⁰ Additionally, the restriction of religious freedoms, especially in Aleppo, contributed to the sense of grievance. The fighter remarked, ‘I know many people who were either sentenced in political cases or detained due to their political views. My two brothers were even arrested briefly just for praying in one of the army’s administrative facilities’.⁶¹ The Assad regime’s violent approach towards demonstrators included the arrest of children, and one of the fighters recounted being arrested as a child, saying, ‘I was still in the secondary school, and I took part in the protests, and the regime apprehended me’.⁶² The account emphasized the atrocities committed against the rebellious areas, stating, ‘There were numerous massacres against our people in Daraa’.⁶³ Another fighter affirmed that his arrest was a consequence of his participation in demonstrations, recounting, ‘I took part in the early protests of the revolution and was arrested on two occasions, first in September 2011 and then again in March 2012. I was initially detained in the Military Security prison in Aleppo, and later transferred to Damascus, where I witnessed, saw, and fully comprehended the extent of the injustice being perpetrated’.⁶⁴

At a personal level, there were a stark illustration of the profound dysphoric experiences that motivated the fighters to participate in the armed protests and revolution. One of the interviewees, for instance, tragically lost a substantial number of his family members and relatives, lamenting, ‘Within our family, I lost my cousins, and I can estimate that we’ve had about a hundred martyrs among my family and relatives’.⁶⁵ Another fighter recounted, ‘I lost one of my brothers and a niece due to the bombing of Mouadameiha. In addition to that, my cousins, aunts, and other relatives were martyred in the chemical strike on Ghouta. In total, my family has lost 52 victims’.⁶⁶ Yet another fighter shared the experiences of his family members, saying, ‘I have an older brother who was wounded in shelling, resulting in the removal of one of his kidneys and part of his intestines. I also have a younger brother who was injured in an airstrike in the city of Idlib, which led to the loss of part of his shoulder and damage to his hand, rendering it virtually unusable. Furthermore, my younger brother suffered injuries as well’.⁶⁷

These dysphoric experiences among the fighters was further reinforced by systematic displacement in northern Syria. These feelings stem from their sense of ‘honor’ and the humiliation suffered by women perceived as related to them. It is important to note that there is no interview that did not include the notion of ‘honor’ as an expressive emotion where men perceived their cause to join and continue fighting as a manifestation of their stereotypical social and cultural role as protectors.⁶⁸ In this context, ‘honor’ denotes a socio-cultural denominator more than a mere Islamist one as most of the fighters expressed their modesty by confirming their refusal to join Jihadist and terrorist groups such as HTS. However, their expression of ‘protecting their women’ or even what two of the fighters expressed that they moved from certain areas because female relatives were treated badly at checkpoints reveals how the response of these emotions entails active relocation and not just violent behaviour. There is also a gendered element that should be taken into the analysis that the social background of fighters conveys conservative views of women and men roles. In this context and the specific Syria case in particular, as I argued in my book Romanticizing Masculinity that gender in Baathist Syria is about legalizing social power.⁶⁹ However, in a warfare defending ‘honor’ becomes an instrument to ‘securing access’ to power and status.⁷⁰ It bolstered the fighters’ commitment to the initial cause of the Syrian movement and intensified their motivation to continue fighting. One of the fighters explained his determination to keep fighting, expressing concern for his wife and daughter: ‘I’m concerned about the safety of my wife and daughter. We, along with others, are fighting and sacrificing our lives to secure a better life for them’.⁷¹ This fighter’s motivation extended beyond the immediate protection of their own family.⁷² He expressed a strong sense of humanitarian responsibility towards detainees, victims, and displaced individuals, driven by deep sympathy for their plight. He stated: ‘This is a righteous cause [qaḍiyyah ʿādilah]. I am fighting for my displaced family, for the detainees and prisoners, the memory of the million martyrs, and the women who were raped’.⁷³ The justifications that fighters gave in their narratives spanned a spectrum from emotional hardships and direct grievances that they personally experienced, compelling them to take up arms for self-defense, to material losses. One fighter articulated his journey saying: ‘At the start of the revolution, I wasn’t in Syria. I returned to participate in the early protests, but as we started being targeted and attacked with weapons, we had no choice but to bear arms. We were compelled to fight and defend ourselves’.⁷⁴ Another fighter described his reason for joining the revolution as the only means of survival, stating, ‘To be honest, we have nothing more to lose; we have lost everything’.⁷⁵ Yet another fighter remarked, ‘Our homes and lands in Saraqib are all gone’.⁷⁶

The narratives collected underscore the pivotal role of dysphoric experiences in reshaping the self-perception and identities of the fighters, influencing their decision to stay in combat. These transformative identity shifts emerged prominently throughout my interviews, wherein fighters uniformly identified themselves with the term ‘revolutionary’ [ṯuwwār], which took precedence over other descriptors like ‘fighter’, ‘mujāhid’, (one who performs jihad) or even ‘soldier’. This unanimous self-identification as revolutionaries underscores a profound alignment with the principles of resistance and opposition to perceived injustices, rather than mere participation in armed conflict. For instance, one fighter articulated, ‘I describe myself as a revolutionary’ [ṯāʾir],⁷⁷ encapsulating a self-view that transcends the traditional fighter archetype. Further elaboration by another participant, ‘I am a rebelious revolutionary, a rebel [mutamarrid] against injustice. Everyone here is rebelling against injustice’,⁷⁸ illuminates the collective ethos among these individuals, highlighting a shared commitment to challenging injustice, which serves as the cornerstone of their collective identity and motivation.

One fighter offered a personal perspective, stating, ‘Personally I’m rebelling against the regime. Religiously, I consider this jihad, and I’m hoping for reward in the next world. I didn’t join this fight to establish an Islamic state. My primary goal is to combat injustice. Ultimately, I seek a just state. Even if I end up under an unjust Muslim ruler, what would I gain? His Islam wouldn’t justify his injustice towards me; he would be no different from the regime’.⁷⁹ On the other hand, I observed that devout revolutionaries made a spontaneous effort to distinguish between the concept of ‘jihad’ as it appears in extremist discourse and ‘fighting for the sake of God’. One of them explained, ‘I’m a revolutionary. I’m rebelling against tyranny, against Assad, and against terrorist organizations. There’s no need to say I’m a mujahid’.⁸⁰ Another fighter emphasized the attempt to redefine the phrase ‘for the sake of God’ to make it more contextually specific within the Syrian context, stating, ‘Allah told us to fight for a righteous cause as if it is fighting to raise his just word over the whole world’.⁸¹

Notably, none of these fighters delved into detailed interpretations of what ‘rebelling against injustice’ involves. It is possible that their collective understanding of injustice, inflicted indiscriminately on Syrians by the regime, overlapped with the personal grievances they had experienced. Furthermore, the interviewees did not touch upon the establishment of civilian or democratic institutions, nor did they explore how military action might contribute to the creation of a civil and pluralistic society. This did not mean that we could draw definitive conclusions about the fighters’ preferences for the future form of the state. More importantly, it suggests a strong identification with the idea of being a ‘revolutionary’, which serves as an important shared value among fighters even if they are affiliated with other corp or faction. This brings me to the striking difference between group identification and identity fusion. Given the current case, the fighters showed solidarity and a sense of cohesion with other fighters even if affiliated with rival groups. The ultimate shared value ‘fighting against Assad’ was espoused and entrenched with the dysphoric experiences lived across these fighters from different groups. As such, the fighters’ identity transformations were highly conditional on the fall of the Syrian regime, specifically on the end of injustice. These attitudes played a central role in the formation of identities, the construction of memory and the emotional bonds perpetuated through rituals and socialization. In other words, identity transformation cannot be considered a fixed template without considering the influence of these dysphoric experiences the fighter, the social rituals they engage in, and the shared symbolism of the revolution that unites them. The continued consensus on the term ‘revolutionary’ as a self-description is indicative of this process.

The identity fusion process then becomes activated by the way in which these dysphoric experiences are ritualized and socialized. As such, this process of ritualizing war symbolism and the construction of collective ‘memories’ further underlines how conflict shapes a fighter’s identity.⁸² The battlefield’s victory and defeat influence identity, which is also molded by shared experiences and emotional bonds, beyond just the political or territorial. Literature from various conflict zones echoes the significance of ‘fighting together’ for group cohesion, as seen in Whitehouse and Lanman’s work on Libyan fighters.⁸³ The ‘fusion’ with the group through battle experiences and self-sacrifice fosters a unity transcending traditional kinship bonds, forming sense of solidarity among the fighters. The responses of the ‘Third Corp’ fighters did not exhibit exceptional specificity when it came to recalling incidents that forged common emotional bonds among them. This ‘fighting together’ hypothesis serves as a significant motivator for individuals to continue their involvement. Harvey Whitehouse and Jonathan Lanman argue that battle experiences are foundational for the social cohesion of a group. They posit that ‘fighting may have promoted fusion with the group’, and that the extreme rituals endured by fighters during battles generate a strong sense of unity that transcends racial and ethnic boundaries.⁸⁴

These bonds are exemplified by stories of sacrifice, like a fighter recounting an ambush survival: ‘My relationship with him changed. It became stronger and closer’,⁸⁵ or narratives of intense battles where fighters risk their lives for each other, embodying the solidarity that has formed.⁸⁶ Such acts of solidarity have transformed pre-war tribal disputes into alliances against a common enemy, as one fighter recalled: ‘In one of the battles… I found myself in a situation where I needed to survive, and he bravely covered the fire to help me escape’.⁸⁷ The phrase ‘common path’ has come to signify the solidarity and bonds among them, strengthening their mobilization.⁸⁸ The shared destiny evident among the fighters reinforces every aspect of their lives, shaping even their interactions with the youth and their conduct in battle. ‘During battle… We must protect our comrades from death; it’s either death or victory’ [mawt ʾaw naṣr] one fighter declared.⁸⁹

Collective memory construction through shared battlefield experiences forms a critical part of the fighters’ identity fusion with the group. The sense of ‘family’ among them, often stronger than blood ties, drives their willingness for self-sacrifice, contributing to our understanding of military engagement behavior. It is crucial to underscore the structural differences among the military corps to comprehend the nuanced manner in which fighters associated with the Third Corp exhibit a heightened degree of fusion with their comrades, as opposed to mere group identification. This enhanced solidarity is particularly pronounced within the Third Corp, attributed to its unique implementation of a systematic socialization process for new recruits. A leader from the Third Corp illuminated this aspect by sharing insights into the motivations driving young individuals to enlist, despite the Corp’s financial constraints. He noted, ‘Many young people come to join us, and I often ask them why they want to join, especially given our challenging financial situation. The majority of them respond with a simple yet profound answer: it’s enough that the Corp stands for a revolutionary cause’.⁹⁰ This statement underscores the ideological commitment that underpins the recruitment process within the Third Corp. Upon joining, new members are inducted through a comprehensive training regimen, which not only encompasses military preparedness but also imparts moral and ethical guidance.⁹¹ This multifaceted training approach is indicative of the Corp’s commitment to fostering a cohesive and ideologically aligned fighting force.

Additionally, all fighters participate in regular camps held within the ‘Martyr Abdul Qadir Al-Saleh School“. These monthly training camps involve approximately 500 fighters in each session. In total, more than 3,000 fighters are trained annually within this academy. This training routine is an integral part of their operational system and is directly supervised by the Corp leadership”.⁹² The training camps are not limited to the ones mentioned above. Each brigade and central unit have its own specific training camps tailored to its members. The central units, in particular, have their dedicated training camps, whether for training their fighters or new recruits’.⁹³ These training exercises have a dual purpose: to enhance the physical fitness and military skills of the fighters and to foster a sense of camaraderie and cohesion among them. One fighter shared his experience, saying, ‘I have attended three training camps, with the last one lasting for 15 days. It was quite intense, covering military training, tactical lessons, and weapon training, all complemented by moral and legal guidance sessions’.⁹⁴

Fighters’ testimonies provide a lens through which to understand the intricate interplay between socialization, combat experience, and the role of rituals in shaping the identities of fighters, as articulated by Kate Anderson in her insightful Chapter ‘Becoming the Warrior’. Anderson posits that a fighter’s identity oscillates between constructivism and functionalism, influenced significantly by the symbolic rituals they partake in.⁹⁵ In this context, the fighters collectively acknowledge the pivotal role of certain songs, which they regard as integral rituals, performed with regularity – ranging from weekly to daily sessions. These songs, including ‘The Third Corps is a Symbol of Heroes’ by Saeb Basah Al-Nazzal, ‘Ya Idlib Judi and Nadi’ by Abdul Basit Sarout, and others, encapsulate the essence of their struggle and the revolutionary spirit. Notably, one fighter remarked on the transformative power of these songs, stating, ‘Before the revolution, I didn’t listen to songs, but today I listen to Sarout’, highlighting a personal evolution catalyzed by the revolutionary fervor.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the practice of singing songs that emerged at the dawn of the revolution, such as ‘Syria Does Not Bow’ by Ahmed Al-Saadi, during weekly gatherings underscores the ritualistic reinforcement of their collective identity and purpose.

This communal engagement in singing not only serves as a mechanism for reinforcing solidarity among the fighters but also significantly contributes to the construction of a unified perception of warfare, conflict, and the revolution itself. The symbolism imbued in these rituals transcends the mere act of singing together; it extends to the shared lived experiences of combat and the realities of war, where the stakes are life itself.⁹⁷ Through these practices, fighters solidify their collective memory and identity, drawing strength from the communal narrative of struggle and resistance. In this context, the revolutionary songs and the act of singing collectively emerge as powerful rituals that bind the fighters together, offering a sense of continuity and shared destiny amidst the chaos of conflict. These practices not only exemplify the fighters’ commitment to the revolutionary cause but also highlight the role of cultural expressions in sustaining morale and unity within the ranks. The rituals of singing revolutionary songs thus play a crucial role in the socialization process of fighters, embedding within them the values, aspirations, and collective memories that define the essence of their struggle. Through this exploration, it becomes evident that the intersection of socialization, combat experience, and ritual practices is pivotal in shaping the identities of fighters within the Third Corp and beyond. The adherence to and reverence for these symbolic rituals underscore the depth of the fighters’ engagement with the revolutionary cause, revealing the complex layers of identity formation and transformation within the context of armed conflict.

The pathway of identity fusion

Identity fusion is a psychological phenomenon where an individual’s social identity becomes deeply integrated into their personal self-concept, leading to several significant behavioral outcomes. When a group member faces a threat, individuals who have experienced identity fusion react as if they themselves or their close kin are under attack, demonstrating defensive responses akin to those triggered by personal threats. Crucially, such individuals show a profound willingness to sacrifice themselves for the group, reflecting a form of cohesion akin to what Durkheim described as ‘mechanical solidarity’.⁹⁸ This concept aligns with modern psychological understandings, offering a testable framework that helps explain why individuals might sacrifice themselves for ‘imagined communities’. This fused identity, constructed through the experience of battle, also defines the boundaries of the imagined ‘other’.

It is important to note that the images of sacrifice that occupy the fighter’s mind while experiencing battle serve as tools for creating an episodic memory. While this memory may be militarized in nature, it cannot be ignored and forms the basis of their self-perception.

The common experiences shared by the fighters during the years of the Syrian war, particularly in armed combat, have given rise to a new set of emotions that did not exist before their involvement in warfare. One fighter, when discussing the impact of the war on his relationship with fellow fighters, cited verses of poetry by Imam Shafi’. The Imam expresses his gratitude to the hardship and sadness which he endured, because they often serve as a crucible, revealing the true nature of individuals and their relationships. In times of difficulty, one can distinguish between true friends and hidden enemies.⁹⁹ Another fighter shared his experience: ‘One of the brothers and I fell into an ambush, and we lost our vehicles. Miraculously, we survived. I remember that we crawled out of the area, warning each other, until we escaped. After this incident, my relationship with him changed. It became stronger and closer, and our trust in each other increased significantly’.¹⁰⁰

The process of ‘fusion’ with the group is intricately linked to the constructivism of war symbolism, as argued by Svend Eric Larsen in his study on the construction of war symbolism.¹⁰¹ Larsen contends that the meaning of conflict becomes encapsulated within the confines of the battlefield. He highlights how the symbolism of war, as reflected on the battlefield in terms of victory and defeat, has the power to influence the course of the conflict. Larsen suggests that these boundaries established during battles also define and adopt the fighter’s identity. In other words, there exists a spatial-identity relationship that is delineated through the experience of combat.¹⁰² These assumptions about the symbolism of war and the resulting ‘mentality’ and ‘behavior’ are fundamental elements in the formation of a fighter’s identity and their fusion with the group’s identity. In this context, Ulf Hedetoft coined this interaction of symbolism and behaviour during war as a ‘war mentality’. Hedetoft argues that war is a process of creating collective ‘memories’ that frame identities within unchanging frameworks, with behavioral shifts that may take individuals back to their pre-war selves.¹⁰³

This manufactured identity, constructed through the experience of battle, also defines the boundaries of the imagined ‘nation’. According to Benedict Anderson, these conclusions are not confined to modern warfare,¹⁰⁴ as Ernest Renan had already highlighted the relationship between the war industry and identity in his 1882 lecture ‘What is a Nation?’. Renan argued that sacrifice, suffering, and death are essential elements in shaping a national identity. When an individual is willing to confront their fears and face potential death for the sake of a ‘great solidarity’, it is sufficient to create an entire nation.¹⁰⁵ It is important to note that the images of sacrifice that occupy the fighter’s mind while experiencing battle serve as tools for creating a memory. While this memory may be militarized in nature, it cannot be ignored and forms the basis of their self-perception.

The argument further differentiates between the effects of identity fusion and mere group identification on behavior. While increased group identification alone does not predict extreme self-sacrifice or a heightened willingness to fight and die for one’s group, identity fusion does. This suggests that identity fusion and group identification are distinct, potentially arising from different evolutionary backgrounds, and have different implications for understanding group behavior and allegiance. The interviews revealed a sense of solidarity that was forged through shared experiences and linked to the survival of their comrades as a cohesive unit. Sacrificing for one’s fellow comrades became a profound aspect of their relationships, often associated with incidents where fighters put their lives on the line to save each other. One narrative highlighted this sentiment: ‘Once we were trapped, and my comrades and I realized that we were facing death with no way out. We didn’t want to communicate with our friends and tell them we were going to die, to prevent them from doing anything that might harm them. However, they sensed our situation and didn’t abandon us. They confronted death together with us. Unfortunately, we lost two of them that day’.¹⁰⁶ In another account, a fighter recounted how he was injured in battle, and his fellow comrades risked their lives to provide covering fire and rescue him along with a young man. Their swift actions saved them from a potential deadly situation.¹⁰⁷

It is remarkable that many of the incidents mentioned in the interviews focused on fighters risking their lives and sacrificing themselves to save others. Sometimes, these acts of solidarity extended to strangers, and at other times, to neighbors. This relationship of solidarity and altruistic behaviour transcended even the differences that existed before the revolution. One story illustrates this transformation:

In one of the battles I participated in, the commander of the battalion I was fighting alongside was a young man from a clan different from ours. Before the revolution, 15 individuals had died because of the conflict between our clan and theirs. There was a history of bloodshed between us. Yet, in that battle, I found myself in a situation where I needed to survive, and he bravely covered the fire to help me escape, even though he got shot in the process. During that battle, I forgot all about revenge [intiqām]; everything changed. We had a common purpose [hadaf mushtarak] and a shared enemy, and our past tribal dispute no longer mattered.¹⁰⁸

The phrase ‘common path’ has been reiterated by the fighters to rationalize the solidarity and bonds that have been established among them, bolstering the mobilization process. As one of them expressed it: ‘The path we all tread is what unites us’.¹⁰⁹ Another fighter stated: ‘Many claim that the Syrian revolution is over, but we persist with hope, and we will persevere on this journey, even if it means giving our lives to achieve our goal’.¹¹⁰

The shared destiny that is evident among the fighters strengthens their connections, influencing every aspect of their lives, even their relationships with the youth. As one fighter explained, ‘Young people communicate, agree, and meet with each other. They come together to eat at our headquarters or at designated meeting points, often eating very little at home’.¹¹¹ These strong bonds endure despite the challenging conditions faced by the fighters and remain intact on the battlefield. Another fighter emphasized the interconnectedness of individual victory and survival with the collective, stating, ‘During battle, when the enemies are in front of us, our thoughts are focused on one thing: advancing and achieving victory. We must protect our comrades from death; it’s either death or victory, with no other option’.¹¹²

The earlier quotes from the group of fighters demonstrate a consensus that the process of ‘remembering’ the battles in which they were in danger of dying or witnessing one of their comrades die is a transformative and pivotal moment in the construction of a collective memory. This process perpetuates the fusion of the fighter’s identity with that of the group. Whether fusion with the group encourages individuals to engage in combat, or whether fighting itself reinforces fusion, or both, the results highlight a key point: When ordinary individuals become part of a group (most of them were not previously part of regular military formations, as they joined military activities after the 2011 revolution),¹¹³ their relationships with their fellow fighters take on familial characteristics. These bonds may even extend beyond blood kinship, creating a sense of family. Once this concept of ‘family’ is established in the fighter’s mind, it motivates them to make significant sacrifices for their group, including self-sacrifice. These findings contribute to the development of theoretical frameworks for understanding the ‘behavior’ that results from engaging in military action.

This sense of transcendent solidarity manifested in willingness to sacrifice or intense altruistic behaviour among fighters was prevalent in their testimonies. To better elucidate the boundaries of fusion within the Syrian case, sacrifice or altruistic behaviour was tested through asking fighters about ‘Who is the enemy?’ There was a consensus among the fighters, and their answers consistently pointed to ‘The primary enemy as Bashar al-Assad and his regime, Russia, and Iran, while others are considered lackeys of the enemy’.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, one fighter spontaneously identified Bashar al-Assad and whoever represents him as the enemy, excluding ordinary soldiers. He said, ‘The soldiers within the ranks of the regime’s army are not the enemy because they may be compelled to be in that position. My ultimate enemy is Bashar al-Assad, and anyone who represents or defends him is my enemy’.¹¹⁵ This answer was repeated for several times,¹¹⁶ and is consistent with the statements of commanders and leaders regarding fighters in the regime’s army. The consensus is that enmity is not directed toward those who are compelled to serve but rather against Bashar al-Assad: ‘My enemy is Bashar, in one word, and without him, the other enemies would not have emerged’.¹¹⁷

This solidarity is inherently ingrained in fighters’ perception of what is the revolutionary path [al-ṭarīq al-ṯawrī] and those who share this perception with them. The consecutive responses from the fighters regarding their understanding of the ‘revolutionary concept’ and who the ‘enemy’ is remained consistent with their personal perspectives on why they were drawn to the Front. Some fighters expressed their belief that the Front is on the right path, stating: ‘The Corp is heading in the right direction, and they have remained steadfast in their goals. I am fully convinced that their path aligns with the ideals of the revolution. Wherever I am, I will support the right cause’.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, some fighters viewed the Corp as a vehicle [wasīlah] rather than the goal in achieving the objectives for which they joined the revolutionary movement in 2011. They said, ‘My commitment is not to any specific faction. My commitment is to the broader revolution, even if I am not affiliated with any particular faction’.¹¹⁹ Some of the fighters held a revolutionary perspective closely tied to the use of force, and they believed that the Third Corp was the faction that best upheld this perspective. One fighter explained, ‘I remained within the Third Corp because of their unwavering commitment to the cause. Since its inception, it has consistently directed its efforts against the regime and its supporters, such as the PKK party, which encroached upon our territories’.¹²⁰

This revolutionary concept also held a rejection of internal conflicts that could divert attention from the primary goal of overthrowing the regime. According to the fighters, the Corp’s ideological propaganda does not aim to eliminate other factions entirely, even when they engaged in infighting. Instead, their goal is to resolve disputes without eliminating the other faction.¹²¹ In this context, it can be argued that when fusion becomes salient, group identification or allegiance with the faction organizational structure recedes, as such had little impact due to the sense of solidarity and cohesion that has been nurtured among the fighters. However, given that the Third Corp’s social structure includes recruits from heterogenous ethnic, tribal and territorial backgrounds, one cannot but wonder whether the development of the Third Corp in northern Syria, pertains to regional affiliation and its potential impact on weakening emotional bonds among fighters, has led to decreased cohesion and collective solidarity. It is important to note that the largest group of fighters within the Third Corp hails from different regions. Fighters themselves acknowledged this fact, with one stating, ‘I want to emphasize that the majority of the fighters are from rural Aleppo, others from eastern Syria, while others from rural Damascus. Over time, we were joined by fighters from other Syrian regions, and the revolution brought us together’.¹²²

Numerous studies on fighter motivation and deployment strategies highlight ethnic, regional, or religious affiliations as important factors in mobilization and intensification of conflict violence.¹²³ These studies identify ethnicity, tribal affiliations, and religious identity as primary determinants of solidarity, providing motivations for collective connection and offering economic, moral, or strategic benefits. However, such analyses often succumb to generalization and reductionism, portraying identity affiliation as static and oversimplifying the nuanced dynamics of identity and loyalty among fighters. A notable theoretical gap in these studies is their failure to account for the emotional bonds and interpersonal connections that develop among fighters in the crucible of warfare, which frequently surpass traditional primordial identity constructs.

The emotional and narrative processes that contribute to an individual fighter’s sense of identity and belonging, as well as the impact of demographic shifts and forced displacement on ethnic and regional mobilization dynamics, are often neglected. These factors can lead to evolving identities and the construction of transcendent solidarity among fighters, suggesting a need for a more nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between identity, emotion, and conflict. The interviews revealed that the fighters transcended their regional affiliations emphasizing the importance of survival. One fighter stated, ‘They cannot eliminate us (Third Corp) because our elimination would mean the end of the revolution. We are the last remaining revolutionary faction, and we have our own decision-making and independence, encompassing people from various regions, including Damascus, Homs, Idlib, Deir ez-Zur, and all regions’.¹²⁴ This shift in perspective reduced the emphasis on regional ties and fostered a sense of unity among the fighters, regardless of whether they were originally from the region or forcibly displaced to it. As one fighter put it, ‘What binds us now is Syria. We share the same goal and an inevitable destiny[maṣīr], which is the liberation of all of Syria, regardless of where we come from’.¹²⁵

This is particularly evident in the unique context of Syria, especially in the northwest where there are more than 2.8 million internally displaced persons who have sought refuge in these areas from various towns and governorates. Additionally, some theorists argue against the intrinsic importance of regional affiliation, highlighting its relatively recent construction. In discussions with fighters about their regional affiliations, it became clear that the notion of belonging is complex and deeply entwined with the emotional dynamics forged through a decade of war, displacement, and loss. These insights challenge the conventional belief that sub-affiliations harden during conflict and crisis. Instead, the sense of belonging among the fighters is nuanced, influenced by shared emotions and solidarity in the face of combat and the imminent threat of death. The participants highlighted that ‘territorial affiliation’ diminishes in significance in the face of mortal danger. Fighters describe their relationships with comrades in terms akin to family [ā’ilah], using terms such as like parents to me”,¹²⁶… ‘‘Better than my relationship with my own family,“¹²⁷ ‘blood brothers’ [iḫwat dam],¹²⁸ ‘brotherly relationship’ [ʿalāqah ʾuḫūwiyyah],¹²⁹ ‘we are brothers’ [iḫwah],¹³⁰ “‘they are like brothers, and our bond is stronger than family ties’ [rawābiṭ ʿā’ilīyah],¹³¹ ‘they are like brothers to me, I would give up everything for them, even stronger than my relationship with my own parents’,¹³² ‘brothers’ [iḫwah],¹³³ ‘our relationship is incredibly strong’.¹³⁴ Another fighter added, ‘My relationship with my fellow fighters is stronger than my connection with my biological brothers and sisters [aḫ wa ʾuḫt biyūlūjiyyīn]. It’s so strong that I’ve saved some of their names in my phone as “my brother so-and-so”, and I don’t exaggerate when I say that I would sacrifice everything for them’.¹³⁵

This challenges the notion that sub-affiliations become more rigid during conflicts, suggesting instead that belonging is nuanced, shaped by shared emotions and solidarity amidst combat and the prospect of death. As such, the notion of ‘territorial affiliation’ loses its significance in the face of mortal danger. These descriptions highlight the emergence of a shared psychological kinship where the emotional connection of fighters surpasses regional ties.¹³⁶ On rejecting primordial ties, one fighter stated,

Belonging is not determined by ancestry or blood. It’s about the emotions [mašāʿir], we share, the sense of unity [waḥdah] that comes from the experiences, whether joyful or sorrowful, that we’ve gone through together. My fellow comrades in arms are the ones who have supported me through every achievement in my life, even before my family members.¹³⁷

The internal organizational structure of the fighters’ groups and the emotional bonds influence their commitment to continue fighting. Fighters liken their factions to familial arrangements, underscoring a belief in the importance of this solidarity against the Syrian regime’s threats. Expressions of trans-regional solidarity are evident, with fighters asserting a unified identity against external threats, regardless of their specific affiliations. One fighter highlights the unique bonds formed through bearing arms, explaining, ‘The camaraderie and bonds among fellow fighters are entirely distinct from those of ordinary companions and neighbors. Brotherhood in arms [iḫwat silāḥ] is on a whole different level. During combat, each of us faces the possibility of death, and someone may have to carry me’.¹³⁸ This affirms that these familial bonds were solidified through the shared combat experience. As one fighter described it, ‘We’re in the same trench, and when I get wounded in any battle, it’s my comrade who will also shield me. It’s a blood relationship, a brotherhood’.¹³⁹

This familial construction, as expressed by the sample, is closely tied to their belief in the importance of persevering it, even in the face of the Syrian regime’s superior power. One fighter emphasizes a trans-regional solidarity: ‘We are all offspring of one revolution, standing united. If the regime were to reach these areas, it wouldn’t differentiate between the “Sham Front”, “Sultan Murad”, or the “Hamzah Division”, among others’.¹⁴⁰ Another fighter conveys his confidence in their survival: ‘They can’t eliminate us, because we are the sons of this country. If they want to wipe us out, they’d have to eradicate our families and children, and it would result in a river of blood’.¹⁴¹ One of the fighters affirmed the presence of these concepts, which sustain the diverse affiliations among the fighters of the Third Corp, and the symbolic kinship forged during the war. He stated that ‘the fighters come from various segments of Syrian society. There is no Islamic extremism among us. What I mean is that every soldier, whether from Damascus, Daraa, Deir ez-Zur, or elsewhere, has his voice heard, and his opinion is considered when it’s valid, just like that of the commander. There is a sense of benevolence in our internal interactions’.¹⁴²

Interviews revealed that class and social differences prevalent in Syrian society before the war have been transcended, fostering a strong sense of solidarity and social cohesion. Fighters from diverse backgrounds emphasize their loyalty to the Front, supported by a culture of inclusivity and mutual respect. This analysis underscores the transformation of social identity among fighters, driven by the war’s shared experiences and the construction of symbolic kinship, challenging traditional notions of belonging and identity in the context of armed conflict.

Conclusion

This article has placed significant emphasis on exploring the underlying reasons for fighters’ affiliations with the Third Corp, uncovering a complex tapestry of shared motives and aspirations. The identification of these motivations is pivotal for comprehending the genesis, evolution, and ramifications of conflicts. Moreover, understanding fighter motivations is instrumental in formulating conflict resolution and reconstruction strategies, assessing the potential roles these individuals may play in future peace processes within Syria and beyond. The research findings reveal that the concept of belonging among fighters is multifaceted, shaped significantly by emotional dynamics that have been cemented through a decade of war, displacement, and loss. This challenges the prevailing academic notion that sub-affiliations harden during times of conflict and crisis, instead suggesting that these affiliations are fluid and complex, influenced by shared experiences of adversity and collective identity.

Employing the concept of identity fusion, this study delves into the micro-level motivations of fighters, highlighting the construction of shared emotions and identity transformation that contribute to a profound sense of unity and solidarity. This emotional fusion fosters a familial bond among fighters, underpinning group cohesion and sustained loyalty. The narratives collected from fighters resonate with experiences of dysphoric events – marked by personal and collective dysphoric experiences – that catalyze their engagement in combat. These testimonies not only underscore a collective struggle against the Assad regime’s oppression but also illustrate the transformative effect of such experiences on fighters’ identities and their conceptualizations of kinship and solidarity.

During the initial phases of identity transformation, fighters rationalize their engagement through the lens of dysphoric experiences, which, when recounted, strengthen group cohesion and enhance solidarity. Notably, the onset of their involvement corresponds with a period when military factions appeared to be making significant gains against the regime, aligning with a broader ideological cause. This sequence – from dysphoric experiences to identity transformation and the encoding of these experiences into episodic memory – highlights a critical pathway in the psychological evolution of fighters. The process of revisiting dysphoric memories through ritualistic practices catalyzes the transition toward identity fusion, underscoring the impact of combat and shared episodic memories on group identity. Hence, dysphoric memories serve as powerful motivators for individuals to engage in and continue fighting. The shared sense of injustice, loss, and emotional pain have driven Syrian fighters to seek retribution or justice, through continued participation in conflict.

The study further explores the impact of willingness to self-sacrifice on group cohesion, a dimension previously overlooked in the literature. Aligning with Whitehouse’s findings, the experiences of the Third Corp fighters support the hypothesis that combat experiences and readiness for self-sacrifice forge emotional bonds that transcend familial and blood ties, engendering a shared sense of destiny and identity within the group. However, it is important to note that due to the multifaceted nature of such groups, the changes that take place during conflict following external states interventions, and the resulting shifts in internal structure and identity, the motivations of fighters are unlikely to remain constant and can be influenced by various factors, including the role of external actors and their financial support, illicit economies, and internal conflicts within these groups, either due to ideological competition or utilitarian gains. As such, a more precise conceptual framework is needed to understand drivers of violent behaviour and fighters’ motivations.

Despite these structural challenges, this study contributes to the academic discourse by offering a sophisticated analysis of the mechanisms through which psychological ties and solidarity are constructed among fighters. The metamorphosis of these individuals from victims to fighters, achieved by reshaping their complex emotions and recollections, presents a valuable viewpoint for others enduring the aftermath of conflict and persecution. It sheds light on the journey to overcome traumatic experiences and reclaim a zest for life, recognizing oneself as a proactive participant in one’s existence. By examining the processes of identity transformation and fusion within the fraught context of armed conflict, the research provides a comprehensive framework for interpreting the social and psychological underpinnings of fighter behavior and decision-making, thus enriching our understanding of conflict dynamics and the potential pathways toward resolution and peacebuilding.

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Notes on contributors

Rahaf Aldoughli

Rahaf Aldoughli, a Lecturer in Middle East and North African studies at Lancaster University. Prestigious organizations, including Women in International Security (WIIS) in Washington, DC, the Kroc Institute Fellowship, XCEPT, and the Arab Center for Graduate Studies, have recognized my contributions to the field with awards and grants, affirming my standing as a leading scholar in Middle Eastern studies.

My research interests span nationalism, sectarianism, and political attitudes within authoritarian contexts, adopting an interdisciplinary approach. My book, “Romanticizing Masculinity in Baathist Syria: Gender, Ideology, and Identity,” with Manchester University Press, investigates gender and identity formation under Baathist rule. Additionally, I am finalizing a manuscript on sect(ism) in Syria, scheduled for publication by IB Tauris in 2024, which aims to shed new light on the complexities of identity making/remaking in times of conflict.

My latest project focuses on dissecting the multifaceted drivers of violent behavior in the Syrian Civil War through a micro-level analysis. I aim to capture firsthand narratives from Syrian fighters, seeking to understand their motivations and experiences. This research is not just an academic pursuit; it’s a quest to uncover the layers of political behavior in authoritarian regimes and the nuanced factors that drive conflict in the region.

Notes

1. Atran, Sheikh, and Gomez, ”For Cause and Comrade.”

2. Whitehouse and Lanman, ”The Ties that Bind Us.”

3. Malmvig and Dreyer, ”Immanent Conflict without Imminent War”; Lawson, ”Syria’s Mutating Civil War.”

4. Gade, Hafez, and Gabbay, ”Fratricide in Rebel Movements”; Phillips and Valbjørn, ”What is in a Name?”

5. Collier and Hoeffler, ”Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”

6. Suny, ”Why We Hate You”; Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans; Whitehouse, ”Dying for the Group.”

7. Solomon, True to Our Feelings, 118.

8. Ibid., 123.

9. Ibid., 5.

10. Author interview with Security Commander (anonymized Q2) affiliated with Liwa al-Salam, 3 February 2023, Kilis, Turkey.

11. Author interview with Security Commander (anonymized Q1) affiliated with Firqah 51, 1 February 2023, Gaziantep, Turkey.

12. Ibid.

13. Author interview with Central Military Commander (anonymized CC3) affiliated with Third Corp, 29 March, Gaziantep, Turkey.

14. Author interview with Hasan Hamadeh, Minister of Defense affiliated with Syrian Interim Government, 2 September 2023, Gaziantep, Turkey.

15. Ibid.

16. Q1; Q2.

17. Author interview with Central Military Commander (anonymized CC1) affiliated with Third Corp, 25 March, Gaziantep, Turkey; author interview with Central Military Commander (anonymized CC2) affiliated with Third Corp, 27 March, Gaziantep, Turkey; CC3.

18. CC3; Grinstead, ”Rebel Infighting in Northern Syria.”

19. The Third Corp is composed of only one religious group that is Sunni Islam, yet there are small numbers that belong to other ethnicities such as Turkmans and Kurds. My extensive fieldwork in northern Syria confirms that there are Christians and Alawites among SNA groups, but only in the Second Corp.

20. CC1.

21. CC2.

22. Author interview with Security Commander (anonymized Q7) affiliated with Liwa al-Salam, 3 March 2023, Antakiyya, Turkey.

23. Author interview with Security Commander (anonymized Q5) affiliated with Sultan Malak Shah, 11 March 2023, Syria/Turkey borders.

24. CC2.

25. Q5; Q7.

26. Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination.

27. Wagoner and Hogg, Social Identities and Social Context, 1,4–5.

28. Malešević, Why Humans Fight, 282.

29. Shesterinina, ”Civil War as a Social Process.”

30. Collins, Interaction Ritual Chains.

31. Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans.

32. Ibid.

33. Solomon, True to Our Feelings, 3.

34. Ibid., 5;6.

35. Ibid., 16.

36. Atran, Sheikh, and Gomez, ”For Cause and Comrade.”

37. Payne, ”Obama: U.S. Misjudged the Rise of the Islamic State”; Ignatius and Clapper, “We Underestimated the Islamic State’s ‘Will to Fight.”

38. Atran and Ginges, ”Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict”; Frank, Passions Within Reason; Whitehouse, ”Emotion, Memory, and Religious Rituals.”

39. Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans.

40. Whitehouse and Lanman, ”The Ties that Bind Us.”

41. Ibid., 676–77.

42. Ibid., 679.

43. Kavanagh et al., ”Positive Experiences of High Arousal Martial Arts Rituals”; Jong et al., ”Shared Negative Experiences Lead to Identity Fusion.”

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Connerton, How Societies Remember, 2, 12.

47. Ibid., 13.

48. Aldoughli, ”Missing Gender,” 2023.

49. Two participants with no formal education, six with basic education degrees, four who hold university degree, and three have master’s degrees. Regarding their entry into armed conflict, eight of them joined in 2012, while seven joined in 2013. Geographically, the fighters come from different yet neighboring regions: seven from rural Aleppo, five from Idlib, and three from rural Damascus.

50. Brounéus, ”In-Depth Interviewing,” 130.

51. Hinnebusch, ”Sectarianism and Governance in Syria,” 59.

52. Aldoughli, ”Securitization as a Tool of Regime Survival,” 2021a; Romanticizing Masculinity, 2024; ”Romancing the Nation,” 2022.

53. Rorty, ”From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments,” 159.

54. Ibid., 159–61.

55. Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions, 6.

56. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence; Suny, ”Why We Hate You”; and Whitehouse, ”Dying for the Group.”

57. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Jaish al-Islam (anonymized as F6), 21 June 2023, Gaziantep, Turkey.

58. Author interview with fighter affiliated with al-Jabha al-Shamiyya (anonymized as F1), 4 October 2023, Syria/Turkey borders.

59. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Failaq al-Majid (anonymized as F7), 23 June 2023, Antakiyya, Turkey.

60. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Jaish al-Islam (anonymized as F4), 12 February 2023, Kilis, Turkey.

61. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Jaish al-Islam (anonymized as F5), 24 June 2023, Kilis, Turkey.

62. Author interview with fighter affiliated with al-Jabha al-Shamiyya (anonymized as F2), 3 October 2023, Syria/Turkey borders.

63. Ibid.

64. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Firqah 51 (anonymized as F10), 15 July 2023, Syria/Turkey border.

65. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Firqah 51 (anonymized as F11), 16 July 2023, Syria/Turkey border.

66. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Sultan Malak Shah (anonymized as F13), 19 July 2023, Rihaniyyah, Turkey.

67. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Liwa al-Salam (anonymized as F14), 23 July 2023, Rihaniyyah, Turkey.

68. Aldoughli, ”Romancing the Nation,” 2022.

69. Ibid., 2022.

70. Gilmore, Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean, 4–5.

71. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Liwa al-Salam (anonymized as F15), 24 July 2023, Rihaniyyah, Turkey.

72. Kalyvas and Kocher, ”Ethnic Cleavages and Irregular War.”

73. F2.

74. F4.

75. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Failaq al-Majid (anonymized as F8), 9 July 2023, Antakiyya, Turkey.

76. F2.

77. Author interview with fighter affiliated with al-Jabha al-Shamiyya (anonymized as F3), 5 October 2023, Syria/Turkey borders.

78. F4.

79. F11.

80. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Sultan Malak Shah (anonymized as F12), 18 July 2023, Kilis, Turkey.

81. F2.

82. Larsen, ”Landscape Identity and War,” 470; and Hedetoft, ”National Identity and Mentalities of War,” 282–84.

83. Whitehouse and Lanman, ”The Ties that Bind Us,” 677.

84. Ibid.

85. F7.

86. F8.

87. Author interview with fighter affiliated with al-Jabha al-Shamiyya (anonymized as F1), 4 October 2023, Syria/Turkey borders.

88. F2.

89. F4.

90. CC1.

91. F4; CC2; Q2.

92. Author interview with Security Commander (anonymized Q6) affiliated with Jabha al-Shamiyya, 7 March 2023, Syria/Turkey borders; Q7.

93. CC1; CC2; CC3; Q5.

94. F10.

95. Anderson, ”Becoming the Warrior,” 15–17.

96. F10.

97. Larsen, ”Landscape Identity and War,” 471.

98. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life; F7.

99. F6.

100. F7.

101. Larsen, ”Landscape Identity and War,” 473.

102. Ibid, 474.

103. Hedetoft, ”National Identity and Mentalities of War,” 282–84.

104. Benedict Anderson.

105. Renan.

106. F2.

107. F3.

108. F4.

109. F3.

110. F6.

111. F2.

112. F4.

113. F7.

114. F6.

115. F3.

116. F4; F5; Q1; CC2.

117. F4; F8; author interview with Security Commander (anonymized Q3) affiliated with Failaq al-Majid, 6 February 2023, Kilis, Turkey; author interview with Security Commander (anonymized Q4) affiliated with Jaish al-Islam, 9 March 2023, Syria/Turkey borders.

118. F2.

119. F6.

120. F3.

121. F15; also echoed by F3 and F1.

122. F5.

123. Eck, ”From Armed Conflict to War,” 385; Lindstrom and Moore, ”Deprived, Rational, or Both?.

124. F6.

125. F3.

126. F2.

127. Author interview with fighter affiliated with Failaq al-Majid (anonymized as F9), 10 July 2023, Antakiyya, Turkey.

128. F3.

129. F4.

130. F8.

131. F5.

132. F1.

133. F6.

134. F7.

135. F10.

136. F9.

137. F14.

138. F15.

139. F13.

140. F12.

141. F9.

142. F7.