The nature and extent of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade before and after the regime change (1994–2022): insights from experts

ABSTRACT

This article considers what experts know about the nature and extent of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade from 1994 until 2022. The findings indicate that the Taliban has been consistently involved in the drug trade in various roles and capacities. This involvement, fortified by familial and tribal connections with key drug trade actors, allows the Taliban to establish local legitimacy and strengthen its influence in rural areas. Despite the Taliban’s transition from insurgency to governance in August 2021, factions within the group have remained involved in the drug trade, and some drug traffickers hold official positions in the Taliban-led government. Study findings reveal that the Taliban’s opium ban serves strategic objectives, which include gaining political recognition and increasing opium prices. These findings underscore the importance of independent and comprehensive monitoring of the Taliban’s counternarcotics policies and urge caution in any engagements regarding counternarcotics initiatives with the Taliban-led government.

KEYWORDS:

• Afghanistan opium economy
• crime-terror nexus
• drug trade
• the Taliban
• thematic analysis

Introduction

The convergence of organized crime and terrorism has been an ongoing concern. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2482, adopted in 2019, warned governments about the increasing cooperation between terrorist and organized crime groups worldwide. This crime-terror cooperation occurs in diverse environments and involves groups, with a wide range of motivations, ready to engage in various criminal activities.¹

State weakness, in conflict and post-conflict settings, serves as a catalyst for the emergence of the crime-terror nexus. When states exhibit vulnerability, and the inability to exert territorial control and enforce law, they inadvertently create fertile ground for the proliferation and empowerment of both terrorist entities and organized crime syndicates.²

According to Makarenko’s crime-terror model,³ terrorist and criminal organizations form alliances which can be one-off, a short-term or a long-term relationship. These alliances occur for various reasons, including mutual economic benefits, operational support, and the exchange of knowledge and expertise. Makarenko suggests that terrorist and criminal organizations ultimately converge into a single entity, at the midpoint in the crime-terror continuum. This convergence creates a hybrid entity that exhibits both ideological and economic motivations simultaneously. Examples of such hybrid entities include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Dawood Ibrahim company.⁴

The post-Cold War era, characterized by a decline in state funding for terrorism, presented a pivotal moment in which organized crime emerged as a prominent financial resource for terrorist groups globally.⁵ Western attention towards the issue, particularly the role of the drug trade in funding terrorism in Central and Southeast Asia, increased significantly following the 11 September 2001, attack in the United States.⁶

Western demand for illicit drugs has been robust since the 1970s.⁷ In the 1980s, the European heroin market was supplied partly by heroin produced in the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Thailand) and partly by heroin produced in the Golden Crescent, specifically Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁸ When opium poppy cultivation declined in Thailand and Lao PDR, Afghanistan increased its cultivation to fill the resulting void.⁹ By the early 1990s, Afghanistan became the world’s leading opium producer. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), by 2003, Afghanistan’s contribution to European opiate consumption reached between 80 and 90%.¹⁰ Since then, Afghanistan has consistently produced over 70% of the global illicit opium and heroin supply.¹¹ However, in 2023, Afghanistan reported a 95% reduction in poppy cultivation and opium production¹²; these reductions are attributed to the Taliban’s opium ban.

Over the same timeframe, the 1978 Communist coup, followed by the Soviet Union’s invasion the Mujahideen civil war, and the rise of the Taliban insurgency, Afghanistan became a hotbed of political instability.¹³ Amid the turbulence of the civil war and the absence of a functioning state, the Taliban movement emerged in the autumn of 1994 from Kandahar province. The movement was established by a coalition of religiously trained Mullahs who had taken part in the resistance against the Soviet Union. Soon after the Taliban emerged, it ruled over 90% of Afghanistan until 2001, when it was overthrown by the United States and coalition forces. After nearly two decades of insurgency, on 15 August 2021, Afghanistan returned to Taliban control.¹⁴

When the Taliban emerged in 1994, Afghanistan was supplying over 50%¹⁵ of the global opium supply. Since its emergence, the Taliban has been involved in various stages of the drug trade. While several countries initially funded the Taliban, opium money was a more sustainable funding source and continued to finance the Taliban insurgency.

Using thematic analysis, this article presents the findings of interviews with experts who provided new insights into the nature and extent of the Taliban involvement in the drug trade over the period from 1994 to 2022. Experts’ insights underscore the importance of tribal and familial ties in the Taliban and the drug trade nexus, and further indicate that, despite the Taliban’s transition into a ruling authority, some factions within the group have remained involved in the drug trade. The findings also raise questions about the true intentions behind the Taliban’s decision to counter the illicit drugs produced in Afghanistan.

This article proceeds as follows. First, it offers a historical review of the Taliban’s drug trade nexus in Afghanistan. Second, it presents the current study and its methodology. Third, it provides an analysis of the experts’ views on five research questions pertaining to the nature and extent of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade over the period from 1994 to 2022. And, finally, it concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings.

A historical review of the Taliban’s drug trade nexus in Afghanistan

The cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan predates the establishment of modern Afghanistan by several centuries. Historically, opium was used for medicinal purposes. However, in modern times, until the late 1970s, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan remained relatively restrained, with the country’s share of global cultivation hovering around 20%.¹⁶

In the 1980s, the cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan increased. At the same time, the cultivation decreased in regional countries; for instance, Turkey banned cultivation in 1971, while Iran banned cultivation, a few years after the Islamic revolution. Additionally, the cultivation declined in the Golden Triangle during this period.¹⁷

In Afghanistan, the increase in opium poppy cultivation coincided with the Soviet Union invasion and the formation of the Mujahideen resistance.¹⁸ Opium revenue partly funded the Mujahedeen resistance.¹⁹ Several founding members of the Taliban were part of the Mujahideen resistance in the 1980s.

Over the last two decades, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has risen; consequently, Afghanistan has consistently supplied over 70% of the world’s heroin.²⁰ The Taliban contributed to the sustainability of this supply source and participated in the drug trade in various roles and capacities. In addition to being directly involved in the cultivation and production of the opium poppy, the Taliban imposed taxes, provided protection, and acted as a broker by establishing links with drug trafficking networks.²¹

Several of the Taliban’s leaders have been directly implicated in the drug trade and have been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council²² for their connections with the drug trade. The multiplicity of the Taliban’s role in the drug trade indicates the deep connections between the Taliban and drug trafficking networks in Afghanistan. However, limited consensus exists regarding the true nature and extent of the Taliban’s involvement and profits from the drug trade. Findings from a recent systematic review study²³ suggest that the Taliban has been involved in various stages of the drug trade, including opium poppy cultivation, opiate production, and trafficking. This involvement varies from one province to another. This study indicates that the Taliban’s revenue from the drug trade ranged from US$19 million to US$500 million, with the group generating between 10 to 50% of its income from the drug trade between 2000 and 2020. Azizi and Hughes (2024), however, note variations in the methods and data sources used to estimate the Taliban’s income from the drug trade and raise questions about the transparency of existing estimates. Nonetheless, throughout the two-decade long insurgency, the drug trade has contributed to the Taliban’s finances.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, global concerns about the illicit drug production in Afghanistan increased.²⁴ Despite the Taliban’s ban on opium cultivation, significant amounts of opium remain in storage across Afghanistan from previous years’ cultivations.²⁵ Additionally, methamphetamine production has increased in recent years.²⁶ After the regime change, some factions within the Taliban movement have remained directly involved in the production and trafficking of opiates and methamphetamines and the protection of the drug trade.

Understanding these dynamics is important not only in engaging with the Taliban-led government but also in determining what will happen to the illicit drug production in Afghanistan after the regime change. In a wider context, by understanding Afghanistan’s crime-terror nexus, we can better understand the connection between terrorism and organized crime in other regions where such connections exist, such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in North and West Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighboring countries, and The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and its link with the cocaine trade in Colombia post Peace Agreement.

Current study

To gain deeper insights into the nature and extent of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade in Afghanistan from 1994 to 2022, this study interviewed 12 experts currently considering the links between organized crime and insurgency in Afghanistan. They expressed their views on the following five research questions:

RQ 1:

To what extent and in what capacity was the Taliban involved in the drug trade in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2022, and how has its roles evolved over time?

RQ 2:

How has the regime change and becoming de facto authority affected the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade?

RQ 3:

To what extent has the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade been supported by religious fatwas, and why did the Taliban need to justify its involvement in the drug trade.

RQ 4:

Why would the Taliban want to ban opium poppy cultivation, and what challenges does the Taliban face in implementing and sustaining the ban, post-August 2021?

RQ 5:

How does the Taliban’s organizational structure and internal division affect its involvement in the drug trade, post-August 2021?

Twelve experts (1 woman²⁷ and 11 men) were interviewed between February and June 2022. Each interviewee possessed expertise and experience on the topic. Half were affiliated with governments and international policymaking bodies; a third were independent researchers or consultants, and the remainder (17%) worked in academia. The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured, open-ended questionnaire and took place via Microsoft Teams. Eleven experts consented to have their interviews recorded and transcribed; one did not, so the interviewer took notes instead. Experts were interviewed once; the interviews lasted between 53 and 95 minutes. Ten interviews were conducted in English; two were conducted in Farsi and then translated into English by the author. Ethical approval for the project was obtained from the author’s university ethics committee.

The decision to interview experts was based on the following rationale. First, experts offer in-depth insights and provide firsthand knowledge and an authentic perspective in the areas of their expertise.²⁸ Second, experts possess access to information and are aware of emerging trends and challenges; this information equips them with valuable insights not available otherwise.²⁹ Finally, to the author’s knowledge, no prior academic research has sought expert opinion, regarding the Taliban-drug trade nexus.

The experts were recruited by leveraging the author’s pre-existing professional relationships with some of the identified experts, who then facilitated further connections with additional experts. The experts interviewed possess professional engagement with Afghan affairs at both national and international levels, come from diverse geographical and cultural backgrounds(see Table 1), and represent a broad range of professional perspectives. All experts have extensive fieldwork experience and engagement with key informants in Afghanistan. Five experts were Afghans; each had several years of direct involvement in counternarcotics issues on research, policy, and technical levels. The Afghan experts provided high level policy advice to key counternarcotics leadership of the former Afghan government.

Table 1. Regional geographical representation of the experts.

Region	Percentage of experts interviewed
South Asia	50%
East Asia	8%
North America	8%
Southeast Europe and West Asia	8%
Western Europe	25%

The seven non-Afghan experts were from Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Philippines. These experts had an array of experiences in and regarding Afghanistan. Some had undertaken deployments or research projects in Afghanistan. Others had been involved in counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, while others had profiled major drug traffickers in Afghanistan, authored books that delve into the international community counternarcotics interventions in Afghanistan or worked in southern Afghanistan on issues linked to the Taliban insurgency, organized crime, and the opium trade.

Data analysis

The resulting data was analyzed, in three broad phases, following Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis framework.³⁰ In the first phase, the author familiarized himself with the data while transcribing the interviews. Each interview transcript was then thoroughly reviewed. The second phase involved employing deductive coding using NVivo to establish a predefined set of initial codes aligned with the research questions. These initial codes were then re-reviewed along with the interview transcript, and initial themes emerged. The final phase of the analysis entailed a thorough review of the initial themes. Throughout this process, the data underwent further deconstruction; the identified themes were organized into tables, and key excerpts were taken from the interview transcripts. Themes were further re-examined and refined; finally, the analysis linked to each theme was reviewed once more. This final step ensured that data in the preceding phases were not overlooked and that themes were neither duplicated nor merged.

Results

Inductive thematic analysis revealed seven main themes and seven sub themes:

• Theme 1: Since its emergence, the Taliban has been consistently involved in the drug trade, albeit with varying roles, capacities, and dynamics, across different provinces and timeframes.

  1. The Taliban has forged alliances with drug trafficking networks.

  2. Tribal and familial connections have played a significant role in the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade.

• Theme 2: The Taliban has issued fatwas to justify opium cultivation and drug trafficking as acts of Jihad against the West.

• Theme 3: By permitting poppy cultivation and the drug trade, the Taliban has established local legitimacy and strengthened its influence.

• Theme 4: The regime change, in August 2021, had various effects on the drug market; nonetheless, the Taliban has maintained its involvement in the drug trade.

  1. Local Taliban commanders and rank-and-file remain involved in the drug trade post August 2021.

  2. Major drug traffickers hold official positions within the Taliban regime.

  3. The regime change had varied effects on the dynamics of the drug trade across different regions of Afghanistan.

• Theme 5: The Taliban banned opium cultivation to gain recognition and increase drug prices.

• Theme 6: Sustaining the opium ban would likely create economic and political challenges for the Taliban.

• Theme 7: Internal division within the Taliban has led to competition over resources; these divisions affect the group’s approach towards the drug trade.

  1. Smaller and larger factions within the Taliban, with varying cultural, ideological, and political differences, as well as economic interests, converged to form the Taliban movement.

  2. Internal competition and power rivalry exist among different factions of the Taliban and between senior leadership and local commanders.

The following sections explore these themes. The quotations presented reflect the views of multiple experts and were edited for clarity. The experts are referred to by a number to retain their anonymity. When reporting experts’ views on certain topics, the experts’ divergent opinions on that topic is specified. When details are not provided in the findings, the experts either did not disagree or they did not express a view on the topic.

Viewed collectively, these themes indicate that the Taliban has been involved in the drug trade in various roles and capacities from the mid-1990s until 2022. Despite the change of regime, some factions within the Taliban, particularly the local commanders, remain involved in the drug trade. While the Taliban banned opium cultivation to gain international legitimacy, the ban would likely create governance challenges for the Taliban led government.

Theme 1: since its emergence, the Taliban has been consistently involved in the drug trade, albeit with varying roles, capacities, and dynamics, across different provinces and timeframes

All the experts agreed that, since its emergence in 1994, the Taliban has been involved in the drug trade. In addition to direct involvement in the illicit trade activities, the Taliban has been involved in taxing and protecting the opium trade. For example, in various Afghan villages, where Taliban fighters resided, these fighters cultivated opium poppy, worked in heroin production facilities, protected the poppy fields to prevent crop eradication, or protected heroin production facilities. Expert 3 indicated that:

The Taliban had a number of involvements in the drug trade. They encouraged poppy cultivation and protected the cultivation from government eradication. They [the Taliban] were involved in the transport of opiates and provided protection to drug convoys. They taxed cultivation [of opium poppy] and the trade and trafficking of drugs. They allowed heroin labs to operate, and some of their members worked in those labs.

Expert 6 noted that ‘during the opium lancing season, a significant number of the Taliban fighters were involved in the lancing of opium poppies in the south and southwest of Afghanistan’. Furthermore, some experts described how, in Helmand province, where in the last two decades, over half the opium poppy was cultivated and the Taliban controlled a significant number of districts, the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade was particularly pronounced. For example, Expert 9 noted that:

In Helmand province [the Taliban] collected taxes from the cultivation of opium and trafficking of drugs. There were many opium bazaars where farmers and traders could sell their drugs; the Taliban maintained the security of these bazaars and imposed taxes on farmers and traders. In Kajaki district [Helmand province], several heroin processing labs were either owned by a Taliban member, or some members [of the Taliban] were working in the labs or protected the labs.

Experts agreed that the Taliban was deeply involved in all stages of the drug trade in Helmand, from the cultivation of opium to the production of opiates, to protecting the drug trade. Nonetheless, seven experts stated that the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade fluctuated over different time periods. These experts suggest that, from the time the Taliban emerged in 1994 until it was overthrown in the late 2001, the group was involved in the cultivation and trafficking of opium. It is worth noting that during the 2000–2001 cultivation season, while still in power, the Taliban imposed a nationwide ban on opium poppy cultivation and drug production. This ban led to a sharp decline in opium cultivation, which went from 82,000 hectares in 2000 to less than 8,000 hectares in 2001; in turn, the ban increased the price of opium significantly, with opium prices going from around US$30 per kilogram in 2000 to over US$300 per kilogram in 2001.³¹ Various reasons have been provided for the Taliban’s 2000 opium ban, including increasing opium prices, expanding control over the drug trade, and gaining international legitimacy.³² However, no definitive explanation exists for the 2000 ban as of the writing of this paper.

Nonetheless, from 2001 to 2005, the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade was less pronounced. Gradually, after 2005, the group expanded its influence on most villages and urban areas in the southern and western regions. Expert 10, whose view was representative, stated that ‘in the early years the Taliban only taxed the cultivation and trafficking, and some of their members were also cultivating poppy; later when the Taliban controlled more districts, they were directly involved in cultivation, trafficking, and production’.

The Taliban has forged alliances with drug trafficking networks

According to nine experts, the other experts did not express a view on this point, the Taliban had forged alliances with major drug trafficking networks, including Haji Fatah Ishaqzay, Haji Juma Khan,³³ and Haji Bashar³⁴ Noorzai.³⁵ Expert 8, who had conducted extensive research on the profile of major drug traffickers from South Asia and Latin America, explained that:

Bashar Noorzai was one of the prominent figures during the Soviet occupation. He joined the Mujahideen due to confiscation of his land by the PDPA [People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan] government. Their shared roots and traditional family and tribal ties led him to align with the Taliban when they took control in the mid-1990s. Noorzai’s decision to join the Taliban was both for economic and political interests, in addition to his sympathy with the Taliban ideology. When the Taliban took control in the 1990s, Noorzai was able to regain his land that had been taken away from him by the PDPA government, and later those lands were used for the cultivation of opium poppy to finance the Taliban insurgency.

Haji Bashir Noorzai is a well-known Afghan drug trafficker, who was arrested in 2005 and charged with trafficking heroin into the United States.³⁶ He was released in a United States-Taliban prisoner swap in September 2022.³⁷ Upon his return to Afghanistan, he was warmly welcomed by senior Taliban officials, including the deputy prime minister, Mullah Brader, and defense minister, Mullah Yaqoob. Expert 4, a former senior Afghan government official, also noted that:

Major drug traffickers, like Haji Juma Khan and Haji Bashir Noorzai, were actually important Taliban commanders when the movement was established in the mid-1990s. Their role changed later, and while they continued to provide financial and ideological support to the Taliban, their focus shifted toward engaging more extensively in the drug trade. Their networks regulated the illicit opiate market and prices; and they had close links with regional and international drug trafficking networks. They also had extensive hawala networks [informal value transfer systems] that were involved in money laundering. Basically, the profit they made from the drug trade was mostly used to fund the Taliban movement.

Some experts noted that the major drug traffickers provided significant financial resources as well as in-kind support to the Taliban. This support included weapons and vehicles and covering medical treatment of wounded Taliban fighters. These contributions were intended to strengthen the Taliban movement as well as the relationship between drug trafficking networks and the Taliban, thereby ensuring that traffickers’ interests were protected within the Taliban organization.

Two experts, a former senior Afghan government official and an independent field researcher, mentioned that members of drug trafficking networks fought alongside the Taliban during the republic government’s regime (from 2005 to 2021). These experts underscored that this cooperation occurred particularly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces where over 50%³⁸ of the opium cultivation occurred in Afghanistan for nearly two decades. Expert 10, who had conducted extensive fieldwork in southern and southwestern Afghanistan said that:

Some of the Taliban of different ranks and positions were themselves drug traffickers and drug traders. In late 2020, there was very intense fighting in Helmand province, and there was evidence, according to a foreign intelligence agency, that the drug traffickers, alongside the Taliban, were fighting against the Afghan government forces.

According to two Western experts, who had spent several years in Afghanistan researching the Taliban-organized crime links, the senior leadership of the Taliban collaborated with drug traffickers at the highest levels. The Taliban not only engaged with prominent drug traffickers, like Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Juma Khan, but it also established connections with senior government officials of the Afghan republic government. For example, Expert 2 said that ‘a network linked to Mullah Bradar³⁹ led precursor⁴⁰ trafficking into Afghanistan from early 1990s until 2005. The precursors were particularly trafficked to Helmand and Kandahar’, where several heroin production labs were operating.

Tribal and familial connections have played a significant role in the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade

Ten experts noted the familial and tribal connections between the Taliban and various actors involved in the drug trade; these actors include the poppy growing farmers, local drug traders, major drug traffickers, and heroin lab owners. Expert 5 explained that:

In eastern Afghanistan, a lot of families were involved in opium cultivation and production. For instance, two brothers were cultivating opium poppy, and their two other brothers were members of the Taliban. The two brothers who were members of the Taliban group protected the opium poppy cultivation of the two other brothers and ensured that their brothers could sell their opium yield without any issue.

A Western expert who had spent over a decade (from 1994 to 2005) in Afghanistan explained that the drug trade was closely tied to local tribes and local power and politics in some parts of Afghanistan, especially in regions, like the south. This expert noted that

Hamed Karzai’s [president of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014] family were involved in the drug trade since the 1970s. During Hamed Karzai’s presidential tenure, his brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was in control of one of the largest opiate trafficking networks in Afghanistan⁴¹.

According to two Afghan and Western experts, in some provinces, tribal leaders with ties to the Taliban played a significant role in both the drug trade and revenue collection for the Taliban. These tribal leaders shared the proceeds with the Taliban’s district and provincial shadow governors during the republic government. These proceeds were important in regions where the Taliban’s control was transitory and where frequent shifts occurred in territorial dominance between the Taliban and the former Afghan republic government. Some experts argued that, through these tribal leaders, the Taliban maintained its influence over the local population, an issue further elaborated under Theme 3.

Theme 2: the Taliban has issued fatwas to justify opium cultivation and drug trafficking as acts of Jihad against the West

According to some experts, to encourage opium poppy cultivation among farmers, the Taliban issued fatwas. ⁴² Through these fatwas, the Taliban declared that poppy cultivation and the drug trade were permissible (halal) as Jihad against non-Muslims. Experts disagree as to whether the cultivation and production of illicit drugs are permissible in Islam. While some experts believed it is not permissible to produce illicit drugs in Islam, others felt that if an Islamic scholar or clergy of good standing justifies the cultivation and production of illicit drugs, then it is permissible. Nonetheless, Expert 2, while providing a historical background about the issuance of fatwas within the Taliban movement, noted that:

In the 1980s, when the Mujahideen were fighting against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, a fatwa was issued by two prominent Mujahideen leaders, Mawlawai Ajab Gul from the Helmand clergy council and Mawlawai Akhundzada from the Kunduz clergy council. This fatwa permitted the Mujahideen to use drug money to fund their resistance against the Soviet Union. These clergies later held significant influence within the Taliban after the movement was established. The Taliban have referred to this fatwa to justify their involvement in the drug trade later. [when the group was established]

Expert 9, noting the Taliban’s use of fatwas to justify opium cultivation, underlined that not only ‘religious leaders in Afghanistan, but also the Taliban, often find it easy to issue a fatwa to justify their actions, whether it’s the use of drug money or other matters’.

Expert 10, who had spent over a decade researching opium poppy cultivation in southern and western Afghanistan, stated that:

Many Taliban commanders are not against poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. They see it as a legitimate business and a weapon against the Western powers and the West in general, and against non-Muslims. This is their perception which is not right, but they have these perceptions and mentality.

The Afghan experts were under the impression that, because opium money was a ‘sustainable’ and ‘convenient revenue stream’ for the Taliban, the senior leadership of the group exploited religion to justify its use within the Taliban movement. While some non-Afghan experts agreed that opium money provided a sustainable and convenient revenue stream for the Taliban, they did not express a view on its religious justification. Expert 7 further elaborated:

The justifications that the Taliban have been providing for allowing opium poppy cultivation has been that by producing opiate and trafficking it to Western countries, they [the Western countries] will be addicted, and that is considered like Jihad. This has been injected into the low-ranking Taliban’s mentality, and by being involved in drug trafficking, they consider it a Jihad. Islam doesn’t say something like this.

According to these Afghan experts, the Taliban used a similar tactic to encourage local farmers to cultivate opium poppy, especially with farmers who had not previously cultivated opium poppy or had stopped its cultivation for religious reasons, despite its economic advantages over licit crops. According to UNODC, in 2017, the ‘most common reason named for stopping opium poppy cultivation was that opium poppy cultivation is against Islam’.⁴³

Some experts argued that according to some Taliban’s interpretation of Sharia law, opium production for trafficking outside Afghanistan is not haram, unless it is used by Muslims. For example, Expert 10 explained that during fieldwork in Badghis, a

mullah Imam who was a member of the Taliban, had cultivated poppy inside the mosque. He intended to sell the opium yields to local traders to traffick to outside Afghanistan. He believed it is not haram if opium is exported to Western countries.

Theme 3: by permitting poppy cultivation and the drug trade, the Taliban has established local legitimacy and strengthened its influence

Half the experts underscored that the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade was partially, but not entirely, motivated by financial gains. These experts maintained that, by permitting opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade, and by protecting poppy cultivation from eradication during the insurgency era, the Taliban established local legitimacy and expanded its influence in the rural communities that relied on opium revenue as its primary income source. Furthermore, the alliances made with major drug trafficking networks, such as the Haji Bashir Noorzai network, wielded considerable influence for the Taliban among the Noorzai tribe, one of the major Pashtun tribes in southern and southwestern Afghanistan. These experts further explained that drug lords, like Bashir Noorzai, given their roles as major tribal leaders, not only played a fundamental role in financing the Taliban, but also helped the Taliban gain local legitimacy in the rural areas during the Taliban insurgency.

Another major drug trafficking network was that of Haji Juma Khan.⁴⁴ Haji Juma Khan was a major Baluch tribal leader from Nimroz province. His organization controlled the drug trade in Baramcha, a town situated along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and a major hub for drug production and trade. Haji Juma Khan maintained close ties with the Taliban and helped the group expand its influence among the Baluch ethnic groups in southwestern Afghanistan.⁴⁵

Theme 4: the regime change, in August 2021, had various effects on the drug market; nonetheless, the Taliban has maintained its involvement in the drug trade

Seven experts mentioned that some factions within the Taliban remained involved in the drug trade despite the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency to ruling authority in August 2021. Expert 4, a former senior Afghan government official, noted that ‘the Taliban have continued to collect revenue from the drug trade from southern and southwestern Afghanistan after the regime change’.

Three experts emphasized that, despite the Taliban’s ban on opium poppy cultivation after the regime change, there are no restrictions on production and trafficking of drugs in various parts of Afghanistan. These experts explained that Taliban officials exploit political power and influence to facilitate heroin trafficking to outside Afghanistan.

Three other experts indicated that some factions within the Taliban have maintained close ties with major drug trafficking networks, even after the Taliban transitioned into governing authority. This observation was corroborated in September 2022 when Haji Bashir Noorzai received a warm reception in Kabul from senior Taliban leaders, including the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.⁴⁶

Seven of the experts, other experts did not express a view on this topic, noted that the opium bazaars continued to operate in 2022 (until June) in southern and southwestern Afghanistan and that the Taliban collected taxes from these bazaars. Expert 9’s view was representative:

After the regime change, the drug trade has become easier, and the opium bazaars are everywhere in the country, where local farmers and traders sell and buy drugs. The local Taliban commanders not only know about it, but their fighters protect these bazaars and collect taxes.

Local Taliban commanders and rank-and-file remain involved in the drug trade post August 2021

Half the experts, the other experts did not express a view on this issue, indicated that the Taliban’s local commanders remained involved in the drug trade after the regime change and continued to collect taxes from licit and illicit activities in rural areas. Expert 10, who was involved in data collection from Afghanistan after the regime change, noted that:

The local Taliban commanders are involved in the drug trafficking in their own areas. Family members of several Taliban commanders, holding government positions in Kabul, operate the drug trade in their local villages and districts. Their [Taliban commanders’] current official status grants them greater influence and facilitates their involvement in the drug trade.

However, it remains unclear whether the local Taliban commanders’ involvement in the drug trade was directed by the Taliban leadership in Kabul or Kandahar, or whether the local commanders derived revenue from the drug trade for personal gain. Expert 5’s view was the latter. According to him:

The local Taliban commanders would not obey their leadership and would collect revenue locally from licit and illicit activities. For instance, after the regime change, when the Taliban leadership announced the national forgiveness or public amnesty and ordered their commanders and fighters not to arrest or kill anybody associated with the previous regime, they [local commanders] were killing the Panjshiris [residents of Panjshir province] and the people from the northern region.

Major drug traffickers hold official positions within the Taliban regime

Five experts mentioned that a number of influential drug traffickers held official positions within the Taliban government after the regime change. According to Expert 4, the ‘Taliban’s deputy minister on counternarcotics (from September 2021 to June 2022), under the Ministry of Interior Affairs, was a prominent drug trafficker who had spent several years in prison during the republic government’. Expert 5 also noted that ‘after the regime change, several of the drug traffickers [released from prison after the Taliban takeover] were assigned to official positions as provincial and district governors, police chiefs, and other key positions within the Taliban government’.

The regime change had varied effects on the dynamics of the drug trade across different regions of Afghanistan

Eight experts indicated that the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021 brought various effects on the drug trade in different parts of Afghanistan. Expert 9 mentioned that ‘Nangarhar province saw an increase in drug trafficking due to the release of imprisoned traffickers’. Expert 11 said that ‘Nimroz province [known historically as a major drug trafficking route] witnessed an increase in drug smuggling to Iran’. Three experts indicated that drug trafficking increased in Badakhshan, and every month several drug traffickers from eastern and southern provinces came to Badakhshan to sell and buy drugs.

Theme 5: the Taliban banned opium cultivation to gain recognition and increase drug prices

Ten experts maintained that by imposing the opium ban, the Taliban aimed to secure political recognition and access financial and humanitarian aid from the international community. The two other experts did not comment on this point. Expert 8 noted that:

The Taliban perceives opium as a tool they can leverage, whether for generating revenue or using it as a bargaining chip in negotiations. For instance, during the opium ban in 2001, the Taliban sought foreign aid from the international community. At that time, they had a Taliban official representative in New York, and their aim was to persuade the United Nations and the United States that they should be recognized as legitimate political actors. To demonstrate their good faith, they imposed an opium ban in alignment with global drug control conventions. It appears that history repeats itself.

Five experts were under the impression that another objective of the Taliban’s 2022 opium ban was to raise opium prices, which, in turn, would lead to increased profits for both the Taliban and the major drug traffickers associated with the group. Expert 2, whose view was representative, explained that, in 2001,

the Taliban banned opium because the prices were low. I interviewed a military intelligence officer of the Taliban back then who told me the prices were too low and that is why we banned the cultivation, to increase the prices. This is exactly what is happening this year [2022].

The motivation to increase opium prices is one of several theories used to explain the Taliban’s 2000/2001 opium ban.⁴⁷

Theme 6: sustaining the opium ban would likely create economic and political challenges for the Taliban

Eight experts deemed that sustaining the opium ban, in the absence of alternative livelihood opportunities to the vulnerable population directly impacted by the opium ban, would likely bear socio-economic and political consequences for the Taliban. These experts further described that a long-term ban on opium would not only impact the population highly reliant on the opium economy, but also eliminate a substantial revenue stream for the Taliban’s lower- and middle-ranking commanders. According to these experts, the financial benefits the local Taliban commanders received from the Taliban organization were insufficient; consequently, the commanders needed alternative sources of revenue, such as taxing the drug trade or allowing the file-and-rank to work in the poppy fields. Expert 7’s view was representative:

It is very likely that the field commanders of the Taliban don’t obey orders from their leadership and don’t implement a ban for a long time as they will lose a significant source of revenue. Since the Taliban have taken over Afghanistan, the distance between the leadership and field commanders has increased because the leadership enjoys a luxurious life and wealth and fame; nothing much has changed in the life of their field commanders in the rural areas.

Additionally, three experts were under the impression that, if the opium ban continues, the large landowners and influential drug traffickers, with tribal connections and close ties to the Taliban’s senior leadership, are likely to lobby for the discontinuation of the ban. These experts further explained that the Taliban’s survival throughout the two decades of insurgency can be attributed partly to the support it received from the segments of society that depended on the opium economy: farmers, traffickers, and local commanders with tribal connections. A prolonged ban on opium poppy cultivation, according to these experts, would reduce the income source of these groups. This reduction could create discontentment among local commanders and lower-ranking members of the Taliban, potentially jeopardizing the Taliban regime’s ability to sustain its rule in rural areas.

The ban on opium poppy cultivation and drug prices in 2022 did increase opium prices, which created higher profits for large landowners and farmers who had retained opium stocks, as shown in Mansfield’s recent analysis.⁴⁸ However, in practice, few farmers can retain opium stocks, and large landholdings are uncommon in Afghanistan.⁴⁹ Additionally, many large landowners are influential tribal and village leaders who rely on the local population, including small poppy-growing farmers, to maintain their power and influence. With the continued ban on opium cultivation, these tribal and village leaders/large landowners are under pressure from their followers to lobby for the ban to be lifted, even if doing so results in financial loss for some of them. This situation was observed during the author’s fieldwork in Afghanistan in February 2024 and was reportedly one of the reasons for the May 2024 protests in Argo and Darayim districts in Badakhshan.⁵⁰

Theme 7: internal division within the Taliban has led to competition over resources; these divisions affect the group’s approach towards the drug trade

Half the experts explained that the Taliban’s organizational structure and its internal divisions would likely influence the group’s policy towards the drug trade after the regime change. The other experts did not comment on this topic.

Smaller and larger factions within the Taliban, with varying cultural, ideological, and political differences, as well as economic interests, converged to form the Taliban movement

Nine experts conceded that the Taliban consists of smaller and larger factions with varying cultural, ideological, political, and economic interests. According to these experts, the term Taliban does not refer to a single and unified organization but encompasses multiple conflicting groups and smaller entities within the broader Taliban movement. While these groups shared a common adversary during the insurgency era (2002–2021), they also grappled with internal conflicts, rivalries, and divergent ideological and political viewpoints. Expert 2 noted:

Several members, including senior leaders of the Taliban, were part of different factions of the Mujahideen groups back in the 1980s. The reality of the Taliban is that, while it started as a homogeneous group, it is more a heterogenous group, and this is very important to address and to know how the group works.

Some experts explained that some individuals joined the Taliban for economic and socio-political reasons, for instance, to participate in drug trafficking or to gain local tribal leadership; others joined the group for ideological reasons. Distinguishing between these categories can be challenging. Expert 3 noted that ‘there isn’t any one organization called the Taliban. That’s what it looks like from the West. But there are multiple, different conflicting groups and organizations within the Taliban, and these make up what we would call the Taliban’. Expert 12 raised a number of rhetorical questions:

Who do you mean by the Taliban? Do you mean the Taliban as a monolithic organization, or do you mean the Taliban as a loose bunch of different groups that come together under one umbrella? I would say that the latter is more accurate than the former.

Internal competition and power rivalry exist among different factions of the Taliban and between senior leadership and local commanders

Seven experts noted that internal competition and power rivalry exist among different factions of the Taliban as well as between the senior leadership and the local commanders. According to these experts, various factions within the Taliban frequently disagree on political and ideological issues. Moreover, widespread corruption exists within the Taliban, and local commanders often fiercely compete for access to resources. Expert 11 noted that:

The Taliban lacks a proper chain of command. It is essentially an assembly of diverse tribes and individuals, each seeking economic opportunities and power. This decentralized structure leads to chaos, as many local Taliban commanders in different districts and provinces often disregard the orders of their superiors.

These experts further noted that, before the regime change, Taliban district and provincial commanders competed among themselves to maximize revenue, to advance in the command hierarchy, and to gain proximity to the Quetta and Peshawar Shuras. Some experts explained that internal divisions within the Taliban were widely recognized post August 2021, despite the group’s efforts to conceal them. According to these experts, since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, there has been a growing gap between the leadership and local field commanders on various issues, including women’s rights, the political system, the education system, and the cultivation and production of opium.

Expert 4 pointed out that ‘Taliban factions in eastern Afghanistan support cannabis cultivation, whereas those in the south favor opium cultivation’. Expert 3’s view was that:

There were some [Taliban] field commanders that would compete with others to try and get the prime spots related to opiate trafficking. For example, there was a lot of conflicts between the Baluch Taliban and the Pashtun Taliban over Baramcha and who controls the town; and it swapped sides several times between the two groups, because whoever controlled [Baramcha] could get the money from it.

The expert’s insight suggests that the Taliban consists of three large groups, each of which is further split into smaller factions. The first group includes those associated with the Peshawar Shura, which is less influential than the other two but more diverse in terms of ethnicity. The second group is the Haqqani network, which has gained significant power over the years and in the current Taliban’s regime holds crucial security positions including the ministry of interior. The third group is associated with Quetta Shura and includes the Taliban from southern Afghanistan and those associated with Mullah Bradar faction.

Discussion and conclusion

The experts’ insights into the nature and extent of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade yielded four lessons. First, the Taliban’s involvement in and protection of the drug trade has been consistent since the group emerged in 1994. After 2003, the Taliban played a significant role in the increase of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade was strengthened through familial and tribal ties that the group had with drug trade actors, including poppy growing farmers and drug trafficking networks. The Taliban had close ties with major drug trafficking networks that had significant influence among different ethnic groups in Afghanistan. All these factors, when combined, allowed the Taliban to establish local legitimacy and strengthen its influence in rural areas and eventually expands its territorial control. The Taliban’s relationship with the opium economy has been symbiotic: the Taliban gained the funds it needed to advance its cause while the illicit opium entrepreneurs gained the protection they needed to advance their business interests. This dynamic has transformed over time and can be understood through Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum.⁵¹

In the existing body of research that has examined the Taliban’s relationship with the drug trade in Afghanistan, two issues require more attention. First, the significance of familial and tribal ties between the Taliban and actors directly involved in the drug trade which highlights the complexity of the crime-terror nexus in the context of Afghanistan. Second, the strategic use of the opium economy by the Taliban to build local legitimacy and strengthen its influence in rural areas. Both aspects warrant further investigation to better understand the Taliban and the drug trade dynamics in the post regime-change period.

The second lesson from the experts’ insights pertains to the Taliban’s strategic use of religion to justify involvement in the drug trade. Over the nearly past three decades, the Taliban issued numerous fatwas covering various aspects of life, including opium cultivation and the drug trade. For example, under Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, from 2016 to May 2023, 65 fatwas were issued, out of which 19 were issued during the Taliban insurgency- prior to August 2021- and the rest after the regime change.⁵² Among them, one in April 2022 banned opium poppy cultivation and another in March 2023 banned cannabis cultivation.⁵³

Previous research has not examined the use of religion to justify involvement and revenue generation from the drug trade, particularly in the case of the Taliban. However, the use of religion to justify violence by terrorist groups has been examined. For example, research by Venkatraman⁵⁴ examined the use of the Quran, Hadith, and fatwas by Islamic extremist groups to validate and legitimize their actions. Studies by Witro and colleagues⁵⁵ and Nazlida and Mizerski⁵⁶ examined the characteristics and nature of fatwa in Islam and the dissemination of fatwa rulings among Muslims. Daskin⁵⁷ has discussed the justification of violence by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Further research would be beneficial to understand the use of religion by the Taliban to justify opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade.

The third lesson the experts offered underlines that, despite the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency to ruling authority, various factions within the group continue to be involved in the drug trade. In 2022, opium bazaars, in southern and southwestern Afghanistan, were operating under the Taliban’s control and protection, and drug traffickers held official positions within the Taliban administration. Furthermore, while the 2022–2023 opium ban in Afghanistan resulted in a significant reduction in opium cultivation and production, findings of this research suggest the Taliban’s opium ban was strategic, designed to gain political recognition, access international support, and drive-up opium prices.

The experts’ findings are corroborated with field research in Afghanistan and media reports,⁵⁸ all of which indicate that the Taliban was involved in the drug trade after the regime change in August 2021. The experts’ findings highlight the intricate relationship between the Taliban and drug trafficking networks. The warm welcome Haji Bashir Noorzai received from senior leadership of the Taliban upon his release from prison in September 2022⁵⁹ confirms these findings.

Nonetheless, these findings underscore the need for further empirical research to understand better the nature and extent of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade after the regime change and to assess the impacts of the opium ban. It is particularly crucial to understand how a long-term ban on opium cultivation may impact the Taliban’s local commanders, many of whom may have joined the Taliban movement to access various licit and illicit revenue resources. The local commanders play a crucial role in enforcing the opium ban; without their commitment, senior Taliban leaders in Kabul or Kandahar would struggle to enforce the ban effectively in remote areas, which are under the control of these local commanders. For example, the farmers’ protest in Badakhshan in May 2024⁶⁰ over the Taliban’s poppy eradication indicates that the Taliban may encounter difficulties in maintaining and enforcing the opium ban.

The fourth and last lesson the experts offer sheds light on the differences and power rivalry among various Taliban factions as well as the competition that exists over resources, particularly among local Taliban commanders. Previous research⁶¹ has extensively examined the Taliban’s organizational structure as well as differences among various factions of the Taliban movement. However, little attention has been given to understanding how these factors specifically impact the Taliban’s relationship with the drug trade, after the regime change. This aspect warrants further investigation.

Study limitations

A number of limitations are evident in this study. First, the information from these interviews must be treated with a degree of caution. Some experts, particularly the ex-Afghan republic government officials, may be biased in their judgment. Second, while the findings from these experts’ interviews have provided new insights into the Taliban-drug trade nexus, the sample size and geographical representation of the experts are limited. Future research could expand both the sample size and geographical diversity of the experts.

Policy implications

This study highlights two important policy implications. First, the continued involvement of the Taliban in the drug trade after the regime change calls into question the Taliban’s intentions as well as its capability to serve as a reliable partner for the international community in countering the production and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. This concern underlines the need for independent, transparent, and comprehensive monitoring of the Taliban-led government counternarcotics policies. Furthermore, this concern emphasizes the need to exert caution when engaging with the Taliban on any counternarcotics initiatives.

Second, despite the successful ban on opium cultivation in the 2022–2023 cultivation season in Afghanistan, the country’s growing domestic production of methamphetamine⁶² is alarming. It is worth noting that the scale of methamphetamine production in Afghanistan and the sources of raw materials, whether from domestic ephedra plants or imported synthetic-based materials, are disputed.⁶³ Nonetheless, as noted by the experts and corroborated in recent analysis,⁶⁴ the Taliban ban on opium cultivation resulted in a significant increase in opium prices, ultimately benefiting those holding opium stocks in Afghanistan. Additionally, the persistence of the opium ban is likely to fuel instability in rural areas, as evidenced by the events in Badakhshan⁶⁵ when the Taliban-led government attempted to eradicate poppy fields in the Darayim and Argo districts in May 2024. Instability could potentially spill over into other provinces of Afghanistan, escalate violence, and destabilize the country further if the Taliban continues to enforce the opium ban in the absence of effective alternative livelihood substitutes.

In a broader context, these findings underline the need to examine other groups’ links with the drug trade, such as the role of dissident FARC members in the cocaine trade, following the 2016 Peace Agreement. Like the Taliban, certain fronts of the FARC remained involved in criminal activities post Peace Agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government. Understanding these dynamics is essential for formulating effective policy responses that mitigate the nexus between drugs and terrorism, particularly in a post-conflict context.

Ethics approval

This study was approved by the Flinders University Human Research Ethics Committee under project number 5076.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. R.V. Gunder and Associate Professor Hossein Esmaeili for reviewing an earlier draft of this paper. I also extend my gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. Additionally, I am grateful to Isobel Scavetta for editorial support and to the interviewees who generously shared their time and insights with me.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This research was funded by the Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

Notes on contributors

Hamid Azizi

Hamid Azizi (also known as Hamid Ullah Azizi) is a final year PhD candidate at the College of Business, Government and Law, Flinders university. Previously, he was a researcher with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) based in Afghanistan (2009–2014) and Austria (2014–2022). His primary focus has been on investigating the Afghan opiate trade and its link with insurgency and instability in Afghanistan and the immediate region. Hamid has contributed significantly to the design, implementation, and production of numerous UNODC research products published by the organization (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/aotp.html).

Notes

1. Phillips and Schiele, Dogs and cats living together? 1–17.

2. Makarenko, The Crime-Terror Continuum, 129–45; Makarenko and Mesquita, Categorising the crime-terror nexus, 259–74; Phillips and Kamen, Entering the Black Hole, 39–48; and Omelicheva and Markowitz, Rethinking intersections of crime and terrorism, 1541–65.

3. Makarenko, The Crime-Terror Continuum, 129–45; Makarenko and Mesquita, Categorising the crime-terror nexus, 259–74.

4. Makarenko and Mesquita, Categorising the crime-terror nexus, 259–74.

5. Makarenko, The Crime-Terror Continuum, 129–45; Freeman, The sources of terrorist financing, 461–75; Shelley, Dirty Entanglements, the Globalization of Terrorism; and Omelicheva and Markowitz, Rethinking intersections of crime and terrorism, 1541–65.

6. Björnehed, Narco-terrorism, 305–24.

7. Giommoni et.al, international drug trafficking, 454–572.

8. UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001.

9. UNODC, Trafficking along the Balkan route.

10. Ibid.

11. UNODC, World Drug Report 2023.

12. UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey report 2023.

13. Partaw, Failure of democracy in Afghanistan, 1–20.

14. Andisha, The collapse of state in Afghanistan, 369–82.

15. UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999.

16. UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001.

17. Felbab-Brown, Kicking the opium habit?, 127–49

18. Taylor, The Soviet war in Afghanistan.

19. Felbab-Brown, Kicking the opium habit?, 127–49.

20. UNODC, World Drug Report 2023.

21. Labrousse, The FARC and the Taliban, 169–84; Peters, How opium profits the Taliban; UNODC, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency; UNSMT, Cooperation between organized crime syndicates 2015; Mirdad, Taliban insurgency, 266–77; Felbab-Brown, PIPE DREAMS: the Taliban and Drugs; Mansfield, A taxing narrative; and UNSMT, Twelfth report of Sanctions Team.

22. UNSMT, Cooperation between organized crime syndicates 2015.

23. Azizi and Hughes, A systematic review, 122–55.

24. Byrd, How much opium did Afghans harvest; Tomlinson, How Europe’s heroin markets will survive; UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey report 2023; Felbab-Brown, How the Taliban suppressed opium in Afghanistan; Drug Policy Foundation, Taliban opium ban; and Mansfield, An industry and a population undress stress.

25. Mansfield, Gold Never Gets Old.

26. UNODC, Understanding illegal methamphetamine in Afghanistan.

27. Initially, six women experts were identified; however, four did not respond to the interview invitation, and one expert declined to participate in the study.

28. Chew-Graham et.al, Qualitative research and the problem of judgement, 285–89.

29. Signal et at., Lessons from interviewing policy-makers, 187–94.

30. Braun and Clarke, Using thematic analysis in psychology, 77–101.

31. UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2003.

32. Felbab-Brown, PIPE DREAMS: the Taliban and Drugs.

33. The US District Court for Southern New York, Haji Juma Khan v. United States.

34. Also spelled Bashir.

35. The US Attorney for Southern New York, United States v. Bashir Noorzai.

36. Ibid.

37. Al-Jazeera, US-Taliban prisoner swap.

38. UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2023.

39. The current (July 2024) Deputy Prime Minister of the Taliban regime.

40. Such as acetic anhydride and acetic acid used for heroin manufacturing.

41. Former Afghan republic government officials were involved in the narcotics trade at all levels. However, the experts were not asked to provide their views on this issue.

42. A religious ruling or fatwa has a long history in Islam. The fatwa declaration involves Islamic scholars (ulema) interpreting and adopting Quranic verses and Hadith to address a specific issue in the modern day. The new fatwa is then incorporated into Shariah/Islamic law. The aim of a fatwa is to permit or prohibit certain behaviours and practices among Muslims. An example of a contemporary fatwa is the 1989 fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, the then supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran; this fatwa permitted and called for a death sentence on Salman Rushdie for writing the book The Satanic Verses; Nazlida and Mizerski, and Sources of fatwa rulings on products and behaviours, 37–50.

43. UNODC, Afghanistan opium challenges to sustainable development, p. 57.

44. The US District Court for Southern New York, Haji Juma Khan v. United States.

45. Major drug traffickers, such as Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Juma Khan, had connections with corrupt officials of the former Afghan republic government. However, the experts were not asked to provide their views on this issue.

46. Faiez, US swaps Taliban prisoner; and Fraser and Debusmann, Mark Frerichs: US hostage swapped.

47. Felbab-Brown, Kicking the opium habit?, 127–149; Mansfield, Gold Never Gets Old.

48. Mansfield, Gold Never Gets Old.

49. Ibid.

50. Khan, Taliban face protests over poppy crackdown.

51. Makarenko, The Crime-Terror Continuum, 129–45.

52. Clark, The decrees and edicts of the Taleban supreme leader.

53. Afghanistan Ministry of Justice, List of decrees and orders of Amir ul Momenin.

54. Venkatraman, Religious basis for Islamic terrorism, 229–48.

55. Witro et al., Characteristics and essence of fatwas, 155–74.

56. Nazlida and Mizerski, Sources of fatwa rulings on products and behaviours, 37–50.

57. Daskin, Justification of violence by terrorist organisations, 1–14.

58. Limaye, Inside the Taliban’s war on drugs; and Associated Press, Afghanistan dominates global opium production.

59. Fraser and Debusmann, Mark Frerichs: US hostage swapped; and Al-Jazeera, US-Taliban prisoner swap.

60. Khan, Taliban face protests over poppy crackdown.

61. Ruttig, How tribal are the Taleban; Johnson and DuPee, Analysing the new Taliban Code of Conduct, 77–91; Farrell and Giustozzi, The Taliban at war, 845–71; and Abbas, The return of the Taliban.

62. UNODC, Understanding illegal methamphetamine in Afghanistan.

63. Mansfield, An industry and a population under stress; EMCDDA, Methamphetamine from Afghanistan; and Cormack, The wild, green shrub in Afghanistan.

64. Mansfield, Gold Never Gets Old.

65. Khan, Taliban face protests over poppy crackdown.