https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5028-7458
ABSTRACT
Economic geographers exploring the globalisation of food retailing have argued that retail TNCs might secure a foothold in host markets by deepening their territorial embeddedness in regional logistics and supply networks, consumer markets and cultures, and property markets. Yet, over the past decade in China, hitherto one of the most prominent foci for food retail TNC entry, the market has rapidly morphed in ways that have profoundly challenged the ability of international food retailers to deepen or even maintain their territorial embeddedness, with divestment an increasing reality. This paper argues that the advantages retail TNCs initially enjoyed (e.g., superiority in store format design and planning; marketing and IT infrastructure; favourable host market regulations; and efficient sourcing/logistics networks) have atrophied in the face of a maturing retail market characterised by strengthening domestic retail competition, less favourable host market regulations, the rise of digital platforms and markedly shifting customer expectations. As such, a reformulation is required that identifies how three imperatives – which we term online integration, offline reconfiguration and strategic reinforcement – crosscut the existing dimensions of territorial embeddedness and set the context for the strategic responses of retail TNCs and their highly variable effectiveness. More broadly, the paper exposes the dynamic, multi-agent and temporal nature of the retail embeddedness process, with the retail TNC and their strategic responses set against a host market context of intersecting stakeholders, institutions and regulations that are themselves also in a constant state of flux.
1. Introduction
A key focus of economic geography research on the globalisation of retailing has been in exploring the characteristics of China as a welcoming and promising host market for leading food retail TNCs (Siebers Citation2017; Zhang and Wei Citation2015; Wood, Coe, and Wrigley Citation2016; Hardaker Citation2017). Such research has assessed the approaches employed by transnational food retailers to realise the territorial embeddedness necessary for competitive success (Tacconelli and Wrigley Citation2009). Yet, since the late 2010s, China’s retailing market has been characterised by a significant wave of foreign divestment, including the departures of leading global retailers, Carrefour, Tesco, Auchan and Metro, who have sold their large hypermarket stores to Chinese domestic retail firms (Siebers Citation2019; Zhang and Hardaker Citation2021). Meanwhile, the remaining food retail TNCs have notably struggled, with the world’s largest food retailer, Walmart, growing its Chinese sales by only 3% per year on average between 2013 to 2020 (CCFA Citation2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). This reversal of fortune for food retail TNCs represents a significant tipping point in the Chinese market and contrasts markedly with the overall growth in retail sales in China, which became the world’s largest retail market in 2020, having exhibited an annual growth rate of over 10% since 2012 (Statista Citation2021).
The contrast between Chinese retail market growth and the declining performance of retail TNCs in the host market requires explanation. Industry analysts have highlighted the increasing rental costs of stores, fierce competition from maturing indigenous retailers, rapidly evolving consumer cultures and sophisticated consumer segmentation, along with the rising power of e-commerce as contributory factors (Financial Times, Citation2019). While undoubtedly these factors are significant, a more systematic examination is required to conceptualise the host market and firm-based drivers of such wide-ranging under-performance and divestment. As an important destination for retail FDI, China has been a focus for economic geography and cognate research since the late 1990s, with studies examining market entry and initial embedding processes (e.g., Matusitz and Leanza Citation2009; Siebers Citation2017; Wood, Coe, and Wrigley Citation2016). However, such studies have rarely addressed the phenomena significantly after market entry and in the context of such a rapidly developing host market.
Drawing on evidence from a four-year project encompassing interviews with leading industry executives and a wide range of secondary data analyses, this paper aims to reconceptualize the evolving processes of territorial embeddedness of food retail TNCs in the Chinese retail market, with wider implications for how we understand retail globalisation dynamics. It is now well established that to succeed retail TNCs must become anchored in host markets by embedding into local consumption cultures, real estate markets and regulatory systems, as well as logistical and supply networks (Wrigley, Coe, and Currah Citation2005). Exploring how these aspects of embeddedness morph and adapt in the context of structural and competitive challenges forms the focus of this paper. We argue that the nature of the required territorial embeddedness has rapidly evolved within the past decade, under the pressure of growing competition from indigenous retailers, the rise of disruptive e-commerce and digital platforms, and less favourable host market regulations. Furthermore, the key competencies that had initially propelled retail TNC success – including superiority in store format design and planning, marketing, IT infrastructure, and sourcing/logistics networks – have atrophied within a rapidly developing host market. As such, the study details how the conceptualisation developed by Tacconelli and Wrigley (Citation2009), formulated in the early stages of TNC expansion into China, requires significant updating. More specifically, we profile how three imperatives – which we term online integration, offline reconfiguration, and strategic reinforcement – crosscut the existing dimensions of territorial embeddedness and set the context for the strategic responses of retail TNCs and their highly variable effectiveness.
As such, and more broadly, the paper exposes the dynamic, multi-agent and temporal nature of the retail embeddedness process, detailing how retail TNCs and their strategic responses within a host market context intersect with the actions of stakeholders, institutions, and regulators that are themselves developing apace. While this conceptualisation is derived from, and particularly applicable to, Chinese food retail at the present juncture, the theoretical contribution beyond the case of China is germane. In short, embeddedness processes which in the past might have successfully ‘anchored’ retail TNCs risk rapidly losing their effectiveness without constant renewal, leaving international operators vulnerable and meaning divestment is an increasing reality.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The following section illustrates the ongoing structural transformation of the Chinese food retail sector, detailing the arena within which retail TNCs have had to adapt. This leads us to briefly review the existing conceptualisation of the territorial embeddedness of retail TNCs and identify our contribution in refining the theory, through the identification of three enhanced and crosscutting imperatives, to reflect the current competitive context in China. We then use the existing framework of territorial embeddedness as a lens through which to assess our empirical data concerning the organisational challenges faced by the retail TNCs seeking to anchor themselves in the Chinese market, as well as their strategic responses that have met with limited success. The article concludes by reflecting on the wider resonances of our proposed reframed conceptualisation of territorial embeddedness due to the significant and interrelated transformations of both the host market and retail TNCs during the past decade.
2. Profiling the transformation of Chinese food retailing
The 2010s saw China’s retail economy enter a new stage of evolution, driven by further marketisation, competition, and the emergence of leading-edge digital platforms and e-commerce, developments that collectively had stark implications within the food retail market (Wang and Coe Citation2021). First, China’s retailing sector largely completed its first step of marketisation in the 2000s through ownership structure reform and efforts by the state to attract global retail capital. Since 2010, about 95% of the nation’s retailers are classified as non-state-owned enterprises and an increasing number of large retailers, especially local retail chains, have progressively utilised both foreign and domestic capital markets to finance their rapid development (Siebers and Xun Citation2014). Second, the Chinese government’s intentional cultivation of the domestic consumer market (Woetzel et al. Citation2019) has seen nearly RMB two trillion invested in consumption-related projects such as national transportation, rural infrastructures, tax cuts and incentives to retailing and related industries, as well as subsidies and fiscal support (Drake-Brockman and Ying Citation2017). Third, the rapid development of e-commerce has driven China’s food retailing industry into the digital era. China became the largest e-retailing market in the world in 2013 and, by 2021, was valued at $2 trillion (circa 13.7 trillion RMB), surpassing the combined total of Europe and the United States (The Economist Citation2021). These changes have been supported by digital platform conglomerates, such as Alibaba Group and JD.com, whose rise, until recently, had been facilitated by permissive government oversight (cf. The Economist Citation2022). The effect of these changes has seen the gradual erosion of the traditional store-based food retailing market, forcing established retailing chains to add online operations to their store networks (Wang and Coe Citation2021).
As a result, the structure of China’s food retailing industry has been transformed from a decade ago. ranks the top food retailers in China based on sales. In what follows, we draw from this table and a wide range of other sources to explore the industry developments during the 2010s and their wider implications for food retailing in China.
Table 1. Leading food and general merchandise retail Chains in China, Ranked by Sales, 2019.
2.1. The dominant role of domestic privately-owned retailing enterprises
For decades, China’s private sector had been in a comparatively weak position, operating in the shadow of powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, with the state’s economic reforms deepening and the consumption market burgeoning, privately-owned retailing chains have become increasingly influential during the 2010s. In such a context, the early predictions that indigenous retailers might imitate retail TNCs’ best practices and innovations in IT, marketing, ranging, pricing, and store formats (Coe and Lee Citation2013) have been realised, with domestic retailers increasingly ‘mobilising local institutional knowledge and social/political networks to erode the competitive advantage of retail TNCs’ (Coe and Wrigley Citation2018: 438). Such changes have not only reduced the power of retail TNCs over local suppliers and manufacturers (Matusitz and Leanza Citation2009), but have also cultivated an increasingly discerning and selective consumer base (Shi and Au-Yeung Citation2015).
By 2019, ten of the nation’s top fifteen food and general merchandise retailers were controlled by enterprises from the private sector (see ). They typically entered the market around the same time as retail TNCs and since the 1990s have gradually built up their retail brands and store estates. The national leaders, such as Yonghui and Wumart, have developed strong core competencies. Yonghui Superstore is noted for its sourcing power and efficient supply chain management on fresh products, with an industry-leading profit margin (Lam and Li Citation2017). Since 2010, the firm has been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and increased store numbers almost tenfold from 156 in 2010 to 1440 in 2019, operating in 29 provinces (CCFA, Citation2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020; Citation2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020; Yonghui Citation2021). Meanwhile, Wumart has developed an online platform, Dmall, and offered digital retail solutions to traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers (Wang Citation2018). By 2020, Dmall had collaborated with more than 120 retailing chains covering 13,000 offline stores, and its monthly active users had reached 180 million (Dmall Citation2021). Wumart is also notable for acquiring high-profile foreign retail chains keen to divest out of China, procuring a 70% stake in UK DIY chain, B&Q in 2014, obtaining 21 stores from Korean retailer, Lotte Mart in 2018, and becoming the new owner of Metro China in 2019 (Wang Citation2019).
Table 2. Major domestic non-state-owned players in food and general merchandise retailing (Ranked by sales 2019).
In turn, regional chains commonly originated in lower-tier cities and developed dense store networks in markets that were initially ignored by large retail SOEs and TNCs in the 2000s (Siebers and Xun Citation2014). Progressively through the 2010s, while metropolitan cities and the southern coastal regions became saturated with modern retailing chains, spending power in China’s lower-tier cities and inland areas grew significantly. Having established significant store networks and consumer loyalty in these markets, domestic food retailers realised strong growth, as their first mover advantage in these geographies to some degree insulated them from any subsequent entry of large national or foreign competitors. The maturing Chinese food retail market remains one of fragmentation, with different regions, provinces, and even cities, having their own leading local retailers.
2.2. Declining retail TNC performance and increasing divestment
Following an initial period of aggressive expansion, since 2012, the development of food retail TNCs in China has markedly slowed. Between 2012 and 2019, Metro, Auchan and Carrefour all experienced flat or declining sales, with only Walmart experiencing a sustained increase that was itself disappointing. Meanwhile, so-called ‘second-tier’ regional retail TNCs (Coe and Wrigley Citation2007), including RT-Mart, CP Lotus and Lotte Mart, also encountered significant challenges with expansion stalling before the mid-2010s. Taiwan’s RT-Mart had a comparatively positive performance, with store numbers almost doubling from 219 in 2012 to 414 in 2019, but its annual sales growth rate has been slowing down since 2014, at only 4% or lower, and revenues even decreased in 2019 for the first time. Thailand’s CP Lotus entered a decline after 2012, suffering continuous yearly losses and was forced to delist from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2019 (Yue Citation2019). In terms of South Korea’s Lotte Mart, besides its slow growth, the retailer became embroiled in an international political incident in 2017 and was forced out of the market in 2018 (Kim and Kim Citation2017).
By the end of 2020, of the major incumbent foreign grocery retailers that had entered China during the 1990s to the early 2000s, only Walmart and CP Lotus retained complete control of their Chinese operations, with the latter operating with severe losses. Yet, against such a wave of retreat, two retail TNCs, Aldi Sud and Costco, decided to enter the market via an online-first strategy, establishing small but burgeoning store networks in China in 2019. Such entry contrasted markedly with the predominant trend that saw well-known food retail TNCs either wholly or partially divesting out of China (see ).
Table 3. Major food and general merchandise retail TNCs in China.
Besides the strong indigenous retailer performance and relative decline of retail TNCs, online retailing platforms have also been increasingly influential in food retailing – a trend we turn to next.
2.3. Rising e-commerce players and the new retail format
The disruptive force of e-commerce retailers such as Alibaba and Suning.com has become significant in a short period of time. As suggests, both operators are comfortably placed in the top tier of retailers in China as they leverage their digital network effects to revolutionise the industry. They entered the grocery retailing sector with a freshly coined ‘new retail’ format, which offers a streamlined online-to-offline shopping experience. Consumers simply place orders via the mobile apps, from home, office, or at the platform’s new retail outlets, then receive free delivery of groceries within 30 minutes (Hardaker and Zhang Citation2021). This business model has acted as a key market disruption, raising consumer expectations, especially among urban younger and middle-class consumers.
Since 2015, Alibaba has implemented its ‘new retail’ strategy to expand its online competencies into the store-based grocery retailing industry (Wang and Coe Citation2021). The e-commerce conglomerate has acquired stakes in foreign and domestic store-based food retail chains. By 2020, it had secured an 18% share in Lianhua Supermarket (China’s fifth largest food retailer in ) and controlled 72% of Sun Art Retail Group, which itself controls RT-Mart and Auchan (Mcmorrow Citation2020). Furthermore, it has built its own offline store network, Hema Fresh, which, in less than five years, has become the nation’s sixth-largest food retailer with 250 stores. Alibaba then equipped these physical stores with its online infrastructure, including the nation’s leading online and mobile payment service, Alipay; the largest smart logistics platform, Cainiao; and several online-and-offline integrated retailing solutions offering inventory management, digital payment, and logistics services, such as TaoXianDa and LingShouTong (Wang and Coe Citation2021). By March 2020, its omni-channel retailing system, TaoXianDa, operated in 320 retailing stores in China (Alibaba Citation2020).
Following in Alibaba’s footsteps, other e-commerce giants such as JD.com, Suning.com and a wave of Internet companies have entered the store-based food and grocery retailing sector, driving the industry from store-based to omni-channel. For example, leveraging its strong capacity in logistics and last-mile delivery, JD.com has built a home delivery platform, JD Daojia, to assist store-based retailers in fulfilling online orders. It has also established a proprietary digital delivery and retail platform, Haibo System, to integrate operations relating to marketing, products, users, account reconciliation and order fulfilment, which had been adopted by more than 120 supermarket chains with 4300 stores by 2021 (Dada Group Citation2021). In terms of market share and scale, some of these e-commerce retailers remain modest, but they have undoubtedly accelerated the sector’s digital transformation. By 2020, over half of the top 100 retailing chains had an online operation offering a home delivery service (Citation2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020).
3. Reconceptualising the territorial embeddedness process of retail TNCs
Collectively, the powerful dynamics described in the previous section provide the context for our reformulation of the territorial embeddedness of retail TNCs. Wrigley, Coe, and Currah (Citation2005) first applied and developed the concept of territorial embeddedness to frame how retail TNCs might anchor themselves in new host markets as a basis for competitive success. They drew heavily on Hess's (Citation2004) contribution, from an economic geography perspective, which distilled three intersecting forms of embeddedness – societal, network, and territorial – and adapted them to the context of retail globalisation.
Territorial embeddedness relates to the degree to which an economic actor is ‘anchored’ in particular territories or places. When a firm enters foreign markets, it absorbs, and, in some cases, becomes constrained by, the economic activities and social dynamics that already exist in those places. The nature and extent of the relations formed between the firm and local companies, consumers and regulators are a core feature of territorial embeddedness (Wrigley, Coe, and Currah Citation2005; Burt, Johansson, and Dawson Citation2017). The unusually high levels of territorial embeddedness distinguish retail TNCs from their manufacturing counterparts and many other international service businesses (Wrigley, Coe, and Currah Citation2005) as they must be responsive to both institutional and cultural challenges to obtain organisational legitimacy in host countries, and carefully manage their relationships with local consumers, competitors, suppliers and regulators (Wood and Reynolds Citation2014).
The successful realisation of territorial embeddedness is itself linked closely with two other forms of embeddedness. First, societal embeddedness refers to the importance of the ‘genetic code’ of an economic actor, which is generated from its original cultural, institutional, and historical background and therefore influences its actions (Hess Citation2004). A company develops its own social and cultural attributes within its home context and typically exhibits these traits when expanding into foreign markets. Its foreign subsidiaries are therefore likely to adopt similar beliefs and behaviours as the home-based headquarters regarding issues such as working conditions, labour-management relations, approaches to supplier networks and the management of other extra-firm relationships, for example (Wrigley, Coe, and Currah Citation2005; Burt, Johansson, and Dawson Citation2017).
Second, network embeddedness relates to the construction of the economic actor’s network relations, both formal and informal, which consist of intra-firm networks (relationships between different firm units, including newly joined divisions in the cases of joint venture or merger and acquisition), inter-firm networks (relationships with competitors, partners, suppliers and corporate customers), and extra-firm networks (relationships with non-business agents such as governments, regulators and trade unions). Network embeddedness also comprises features such as network durability and stability, which are important aspects of the ‘architecture’ of the network (Hess Citation2004). The nature of these networks is affected by the firm’s societal embeddedness, while the appropriateness (or not) of these relations for the host market affects the success of the firm’s ‘anchoring’ in the host market.
Building on Wrigley, Coe, and Currah (Citation2005), in a Chinese food retail context, Tacconelli and Wrigley (Citation2009) detailed three key dimensions of territorial embeddedness. First, as consumption is not only an economic interaction but also a sociocultural process, transnational retailers must be sensitive and highly responsive to local cultures of consumption (both at the national and sub-national/regional levels) and localise their market offering to varying degrees. This requires an understanding of customer segmentation according to geodemographic and lifestyle variables to enhance retailers’ understanding of customer needs. Informed by such knowledge, stores should offer appropriate product and services that enhance customer loyalty. Second, when entering a new market, retail TNCs must sink capital into physical assets in local markets to establish store networks along with associated distribution and logistics infrastructures. The former is likely to demand the acquisition or rental of properties in prime locations, which leads them to be deeply networked within host countries’ real estate markets and land-use planning systems. This involves managing partnerships with city planners, property developers, and financial investors to enhance site research capabilities and understand (and seek to influence) host market land use planning regulations. Third, as food retailers necessarily source produce within host countries and their proximate regions for reasons of freshness and local taste, they must achieve network embeddedness with local supply networks and vital logistics infrastructures. At the same time, they will seek to tap into global supply networks for more standardised and non-perishable produce lines. These processes involve significant sunk costs in logistics infrastructure in host markets alongside the investments in store estates mentioned earlier. Further, ensuring ‘private standards’ for the quality and safety of products is deemed important especially where host market food regulations are less stringent.
Tacconelli and Wrigley’s (Citation2009) framework of territorial embeddedness has subsequently been applied by economic geographers studying retail globalisation (e.g. Coe and Lee Citation2013; Wood and Reynolds Citation2014; Zhang and Wei Citation2015). Though it offers a framework, covering essential operational elements of food retail TNC subsidiary host market anchoring in the period from the 1990s until around 2010, the recent experience of international food retailers generally (Burt, Coe, and Davies Citation2018) and especially in China (Zhang and Hardaker Citation2021) suggests a need to reconsider its appropriateness and specificity. The nature of territorial embeddedness is necessarily an ongoing practice of adjustment due to host market organisational and institutional changes (Coe and Lee Citation2013).
The rapid development of the Chinese food retailing market and the limited success of the strategic responses of retail TNCs in that context, however, necessitate a refinement of the prevailing conceptualisation of territorial embeddedness. While we find the three primary dimensions of the theory remain sound, as will be demonstrated empirically in what follows, we identify three new imperatives that crosscut these dimensions, which we term online integration, offline reconfiguration and strategic reinforcement. These distil important aspects of appropriate anchoring in the specific context of the rapidly advancing Chinese food retail market (see for a summary overview).
Table 4. New imperatives of territorial embeddedness in China.
First, being integrated into the host country’s online retailing environment now becomes vital. This includes establishing new online stores, managing online and offline integration, digital marketing, and adding last mile delivery to fulfil online orders. Such requirements have posed challenges for retail TNCs given their relative lack of expertise in these areas in the context of the Chinese market.
Second, the manner in which the Chinese retailing industry has matured compels food retail TNCs to reconfigure their established offline, store-based operations given competition from indigenous retailers. In contrast to years of expansion, retail TNCs must now regularly review their store networks, closing non-profitable outlets while innovating with new format stores. Meanwhile, under the shadow of increasingly powerful indigenous store-based retailers, retail TNCs are pressured to reconfigure their supply chain, and tighten control over their supply network to improve operational efficiency, while also offering quality merchandise and services in-store to attract and retain consumers. Building an efficient and exclusive supply network with both long-term local and global suppliers is seemingly the best strategy for retail TNCs to compete. However, few can accomplish the goal, not least because many incumbent foreign retailers have been operating with a more loosely organised supply network since they first entered the market two decades ago, certainly compared to the centralised supply networks in their home markets.
Third, with China’s retailing sector becoming intensively competitive, retail TNCs are pressured to upgrade their operations to penetrate specific local market segments that are characterised by distinct market demands. The new requirements of ensuring ‘a signature standard’ for the added value of products and targeting the valuable consumer segments require retail TNCs to be embedded into certain high-value local markets. New entrant Aldi Sud offers an example of such targeted localisation, successfully penetrating the high value Shanghai retailing market with a tailored premium store format and product selection (Hardaker and Zhang Citation2021). For most incumbent retail TNCs with extensive established store networks and systems, such targeted localisation remains challenging to implement.
Prior to exploring our empirical data relating to retail TNCs in China, we briefly review the methodological approach adopted in this research.
4. Methodology
The empirical evidence for this paper is drawn from a four-year research project (2018–2022) employing both primary and secondary sources. We carried out twenty-six in-depth semi-structured interviews with a purposeful sample of respondents, especially focused on senior executives from seven prominent global food retailers in China, as well as experienced industry consultants and academic researchers in the field. All respondents were assured of their personal (though not institutional) anonymity.
The thematic interview schedule was informed by the lead author’s reading of the academic literature as well as the wider research team’s own experience in this field. The schedule was semi-structured in nature and flexibly employed to ensure that it did not restrict exploring interesting points as they emerged in the discussions. Many of the respondents could be considered to be ‘elite’ within their organisational settings, which brings with it significant advantages in terms of accessing ‘privileged knowledge’ (see Coe, Lee, and Wood Citation2017).
Given the global travel restrictions resulting from COVID-19, only the first interview was conducted face-to-face in Shanghai during a 2019 field trip to China, with the remaining 25 informants interviewed online using digital communication tools such as Zoom. Access was achieved by building an extensive database of potential contacts from the trade literature, using the personal networks of the research team and with email and LinkedIn approaches combined with high levels of persistence.
Interviews were not audio recorded but memos were taken during and immediately following the interviews. The reason for not recording was due to an awareness that with elite interviews ‘some interviewees may be less forthcoming in the information they provide, if their comments are being recorded’ (Richards Citation1996: 202). Further, given the specificities of the Chinese commercial and cultural context aligned with the online medium, there was also a legitimate concern with attaining access at all if recording was insisted upon.
Interview notes and key secondary data were scrutinised through qualitative coding, embracing an interpretivist research strategy involving a process of data reduction according to key themes using NVivo (Leech and Onwuegbuzie Citation2011). Where direct quotations are used in this paper, to maintain the anonymity of interviewees, we offer only basic details regarding the institutional affiliation of the individuals and use an interviewee number as a data source and interview notation identifier.
5. Organisational challenges and strategic responses of retail TNCs in China in the 2010s
Mobilising the reframed notion of territorial embeddedness captured in , we now move on to present a detailed assessment of the major challenges facing international grocery retailers during the 2010s in China, and their strategic responses. We assess our empirical evidence by deploying the three primary dimensions of Tacconelli and Wrigley’s (Citation2009) conceptualisation of territorial embeddedness, yet, critically, and as will become evident, the constituent elements of these three dimensions have shifted significantly due to imperatives identified above. Our analysis also examines how these pressures have stimulated new strategic responses from retail TNCs, often with mixed outcomes evident in aspects of online and offline integration as well as strategic reinforcement that are detailed in and discussed below.
Table 5. Empirical examples of new imperatives of territorial embeddedness in China.
5.1. Logistics and supply networks
When large international food retailers first entered China over two decades ago, the underdeveloped logistics industry and fragmented inefficient local supply networks were a central challenge (Siebers and Xun Citation2014). Yet, these struggles were largely compensated for by the importing of modern retail technologies by retail TNCs, coupled with their advantage in dealing with less powerful competitors and suppliers (Hardaker Citation2017). However, in the past decade (circa 2010-present), with the rapid development of the country’s infrastructure and logistics industry, plus its world-class manufacturing and e-commerce sector, retail TNCs in China have faced distinctive operational challenges.
In terms of procurement procedures, retail TNCs have encountered both internal and external obstacles. First, triggered by concerns over perceived rising corruption in the Chinese market, retail TNCs have commonly revoked the autonomy of local stores in making direct purchases from individual vendors and applied more complicated centralised procurement systems, making them less productive than many indigenous competitors. For example, Carrefour’s merchandising system comprised: a sales development office that conducted market research to detect market trends and identify new products; a negotiator; an order centre; and an operation department that handled the final sales. According to one executive, ‘although such a system effectively puts an end to corruption […] under the checks and balances system among various departments, efficiency is relatively low’. He also contrasted these practices with indigenous retailers’ highly flexible and efficient systems, commenting:
‘as domestic retailers’ purchasing is often made by buyers with more autonomy […] they are more flexible and responsive to the market trends […] They first test the water in some regional stores, then promote it nationwide if the regional performance is good’ (Interview 4, September 2020).
Meanwhile, foreign retailers’ high-quality control on merchandise has also become a disadvantage when competing with domestic retailing chains. An executive from Carrefour China stated that:
‘Foreign retailers still have high-quality requirements for suppliers […] Once they receive a quality complaint, the consequences will be very serious. Carrefour’s quality control is sometimes higher than the national standard, resulting in many goods that cannot be sold, but domestic competitors can sell, which reduces competitiveness’ (Interview 6, September 2020).
The retail TNCs have commonly lost their prime position in contract negotiations with local suppliers as they are no longer the suppliers’ largest or best clients. After decades of development, local suppliers from both agricultural and manufacturing sectors have proliferated. Although there remain unbalanced power relations between large foreign retailers and relatively small Chinese producers, suppliers are increasingly presented with more choices in terms of who they use to promote and distribute their products in the domestic market, especially through online platforms. They tend to be less dependent on individual retailers, even sometimes operating their own online stores (Gao, Citation2017). One of Carrefour’s executives confirmed such a perspective:
‘In the beginning, there were few stores, and suppliers naturally tended to cooperate with foreign retailers, which were the most robust channel. Now that there are more and more channels and foreign retailers’ sales are declining […] suppliers naturally switch to other channels’ (Interview 6, September 2020).
Also, due to the significant sunk costs related to building a logistics and distribution system in the host market, retail TNCs have commonly avoided such a commitment, instead being heavily dependent on suppliers’ logistics systems and indigenous third-party logistics (3PL) services. As a Carrefour China executive commented:
‘They felt such a low sunk cost model was more efficient at that time, but in the long run, it was a missed opportunity for further development’ (Interview 4, September 2020).
In contrast, domestic retailers that have gradually built extensive, wholly-owned distribution networks over the past decade are able to exploit these efficiencies, which has left retail TNCs at a significant disadvantage. For example, by the end of 2019, Yonghui Superstore had 30 distribution centres in 28 provinces that ensured timely, accurate and efficient logistics across its portfolio (Wu Citation2019).
A home delivery service has also become an increasing requirement for food retailers in China since the mid-2010s, requiring heavy capital investment in delivery infrastructure or alternatively cooperation with third-party logistics firms. For the retail TNCs, the obstacles are also deeply rooted in an inadequate knowledge of local consumer culture and the wider e-commerce market. For example, when Tesco introduced a home delivery service in China, it replicated its home market model and charged customers 20 RMB for each delivery. As a result, a former Tesco China executive noted, ‘the take-up rate was really low, people didn’t like the idea that they had to pay for the delivery […]; with Alibaba and JD, people get free delivery on everything’ (Interview 7, October 2020).
Of course, facing all these emerging challenges, retail TNCs have developed a variety of strategies to remain competitive, though our empirical data suggests such responses in the domain of supply chain networks were rather limited. Nevertheless, several new approaches are noteworthy and relate to our augmentation of territorial embeddedness to encompass online and offline integration – constructing an integrated distribution and logistics system serving all channels, while also establishing an efficient and exclusive supply network made up of long-term local suppliers and global partners. Further, we note a desire for strategic reinforcement of these advantages in a ‘signature standard’ for the development of added value premium and often imported product and/or exclusive own brands.
First, international retailers have increasingly leveraged their global supply networks to import high quality foreign products into their Chinese stores. Such long-term cooperation with foreign suppliers is a competitive advantage, allowing them to negotiate lower prices for merchandise compared to domestic retailers that lack global supply networks. As a merchandise director reflected: ‘foreign suppliers’ contracts with us are for the global market, so our (imported products) are guaranteed in quality and value’ (Interview 6, September 2020). Such supply chain advantage not only helps retain valuable middle-class consumers, but also attracts higher-end custom.
Second, having a centralised supply chain, long-term close relationships with local suppliers, and a strong private-label product line has become critical for retail TNCs. The remaining Western large format operator, Walmart Sam’s Club and new entrant Costco have succeeded largely as a function of their membership warehouse store format, which offers consumers exclusive, member's-only products – a competency based around their sourcing and supply networks. Aldi Sud also attributed its successful expansion in China to its exclusive brand strategy:
‘Exclusive brands give us maximum control over our range, providing uncompromised quality and safety to our customers […] Products under our exclusive brands are both imported from around the world and locally sourced to give our customers what they want and love […] We work hand-in-hand with long-time suppliers and partners all around the world’ (Interview 16, November 2019).
Third, to overcome the challenge of last-mile delivery, retail TNCs have frequently opted to cooperate with e-commerce conglomerates. Since 2016, Walmart China’s strategic alliance with JD.com has given the retailer full access to its express home delivery service. Meanwhile, RT-Mart and Auchan have used Alibaba Group’s TaoXianDa system, which helps fulfil online orders. Meanwhile, new entrant Aldi Sud has partnered with Tencent, using its WeChat Mini Programme to fulfil home delivery requests since it first entered Shanghai in 2019.
5.2. Real estate markets and the online retailing environment
Retail TNCs have faced significantly rising rental costs for their stores in prime locations in first-tier cities. When foreign retailers first entered China in the mid-1990s, they secured prime locations in first-tier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, typically taking advantage of modest 15–20 year leases (Wood, Wrigley and Coe, Citation2016). As these commercial leases started to expire in the 2010s, rental costs have spiked, which has contributed to a wave of store closures by large foreign retailers (Huang Citation2013). Meanwhile, the past decade has also seen significant retail format regeneration, with small formats such as supermarkets and convenience stores outperforming big box hypermarkets, and online and omni-channel retailing surpassing purely store-based grocery chains (Zhang and Hardaker Citation2021). Retail TNCs in China have faced many obstacles from opening new shops with unfamiliar innovative formats and adding online operations to the established offline store networks. According to a senior executive from Metro:
‘Community stores are not easy to develop. A 500-1000 square meters store is challenging to operate […] Such relatively small stores and street shops have high rents in China, and it is difficult to control standards’ (Interview 2, September 2020).
In addition, retail TNC’s IT systems, which were once a comparative advantage, are now ageing and have slowed down the shift towards omni-channel retailing. The systems used in traditional retail versus e-commerce are, in many respects, incompatible, making agile and rapid digitalisation challenging. As one of Carrefour China’s key executives candidly admitted:
‘[…] the databases (inside the old system) are very precious, but the hardware equipment of the retail system has to be replaced […] we are faced with how to renovate the system, to what extent, how long it takes, and how to renovate these offline stores. This whole process is excruciating’ (Interview 3, September 2020).
The existing literature has documented how re-regulation of the domestic retailing industry in emerging markets by host governments has often targeted retail TNCs (e.g., Mutebi Citation2007; Dales, Coe, and Hess Citation2019). Foreign retailers in China initially encountered few regulatory restrictions in their early expansion, with many benefitting from preferential treatment from local governments, ranging from tax reductions to low-cost land acquisition (Zhang and Wei Citation2015). Yet, from the 2010s, China’s reliance on foreign investment decreased and the state no longer saw fit to offer retail TNCs privileges. As an executive from Walmart China reflected:
‘what the local government wants most is the performance brought by foreign investment, the registered capital and future profits, taxes and employment, but the foreign retailer’s profits and taxes may not be as good as Yonghui [a domestic retailer]. [… . Now] there are a lot of Fortune 500 companies, a foreign retailer like Walmart is no longer that important’ (Interview 5, September 2020).
Moreover, the Chinese government has been cautious about foreign investment entering the e-retailing industry. Thus, foreign retailers have often encountered regulatory restrictions when developing their online businesses. For instance, when Walmart was acquiring a Chinese online e-commerce platform, Yihaodian, in 2012, the transaction was subject to an anti-monopoly review as the government considered that Walmart might leverage its physical stores’ competitive advantages to dominate China’s online retailing sector, a stance that seemingly lacks credibility when one considers the low level of market concentration in the Chinese food retail market. The acquisition was finally approved after a long nine-month assessment, but with the condition that Walmart could only use Yihaodian to directly sell its own merchandise to consumers, rather than as an online marketplace like Alibaba (Reuters Citation2012). A former executive from Walmart China commented that such a restriction severely disadvantaged the US firm:
‘an online operation [that] only serves the retailer itself without hosting other vendors cannot be successful; even the leading retailing chains such as Yonghui and RT-Mart have failed such experiments because of lacking the ‘platform’ feature’ (Interview 12, October 2020).
As expected, the acquired online operation did not perform well, and Walmart finally sold it to JD.com in 2016 (Hirsch and Jourdan Citation2016).
Overall, incumbent retail TNCs in China have been faced with the synchronous challenges of managing offline store networks and implementing online and omni-channel operations against the backdrop of growing competitive pressure and shifting regulatory oversight from the state. This sees expression in through the need for online integration of virtual and physical stores, often via cooperation with established online platforms; offline reconfiguration via continuous reviews of existing store networks to encompass closures and format innovation; and strategic reinforcement through further understanding of, and engagement with, the national and regional regulatory environment to evaluate risks and allow timely responses. Three new strategies have been pursued by established foreign retailers in this vein.
First, to optimise store networks in the context of a fast-changing consumer market, retail TNCs have explored new locations, new formats, and new property management approaches. For example, during the early expansion stage (pre-2010), Metro only built large warehouse-style stores (15,000–20,000 square meters) in suburban areas far from the city centre. However, recent years have seen Metro’s expansion strategy evolve to include smaller-sized and food-focused stores being opened close to residential areas. In 2018, Metro opened its fourth store in Beijing, which was only 4100 square meters in size, and located in one of Beijing’s largest residential communities (Metro Citation2018). Further, to alleviate the challenges of high rental costs, retail TNCs such as Carrefour and RT-Mart have developed a ‘shopping mall’ strategy. By 2017, among Carrefour’s 225 hypermarkets in China, 218 stores were situated in its own-developed ‘Carrefour Shopping Centres’, hosting various businesses from restaurants to movie theatres (Yue Citation2017). RT-Mart has adopted a similar approach, leveraging the sublet income from the tenants to cover rising rental costs. Yet, the strategy had its downsides, as a senior executive from Walmart China conceded: ‘recently due to the erosion of e-commerce, large properties have become a burden because it becomes increasingly difficult to attract enough tenants’ (Interview 8, October 2020). Tesco had earlier adopted a similar approach through its ‘Life Space’ mall concept focused especially on second and third tier cities but was forced to abandon such an approach due to its excessive demands on capital investment (Wood, Wrigley, and Coe Citation2016).
Second, to overcome the challenges of building online operations, retail TNCs have increasingly reached out to indigenous e-commerce platform conglomerates for support. For instance, Walmart announced a major strategic alliance with China’s second largest e-commerce platform JD.com in 2016, selling its online operation Yihaodian in exchange for a 5% stake in JD.com (Hirsch and Jourdan Citation2016). By 2020, Walmart owned a 9.8% stake of JD.com, a relationship that sees Walmart China’s online operations closely tied with the platform. It has launched Sam’s Club Flagship Store and Walmart China Flagship Store on JD.com, runs Sam’s Club Global Flagship Store, Walmart Global Flagship Store, and ASDA Flagship Store on JD Worldwide, and utilises JD.com’s last mile home delivery service to fulfil its online orders. A senior Walmart China executive admitted the alliance was critical to the company’s online evolution:
‘our first online operation Yihaodian failed as we were trying to do everything on our own, but since we’ve cooperated with JD.com, the progress of incorporating online business accelerates’ (Interview 8, October 2020).
Third, facing a deteriorating regulatory environment, retail TNCs’ strategic responses have tended to be conservative and defensive. On the one hand, they have sought to retain and cultivate a good relationship with government by deepening their corporate social responsibility (CSR) agendas, developing philanthropic programmes for child health and education in rural areas, as well as launching environmentally friendly campaigns such as using solar energy for stores (Walmart Citation2019), and CO2 refrigeration systems (Metro Citation2020). On the other hand, retail TNCs have catered to Chinese regional and national governments’ preferences in exchange for favourable policies. For example, most of Walmart’s Sam’s Club stores in China are individually registered in host cities as independent entities, rather than a subsidiary of Walmart China. Such an arrangement increases the local government’s tax revenue, which makes the local authority more willing to offer the retailer a series of preferential treatments. As one informant explained:
‘being registered as a subsidiary means the store pays no tax to the local government, its profits will be merged into the headquarters’ total revenue, and the headquarters will pay the tax to the central government […] By registering as an independent entity, Walmart helps the local government increase its tax revenue […] in return, Walmart can negotiate a better offer on the location and rental cost for its Sam’s Club stores; even receive other preferential treatments from the local government’ (Interview 2, September 2020).
Another example occurred in the process of one retail TNC’s exit phase. In 2017, Lotte Mart was withdrawing from China because its owner, Lotte Group, was involved in an international political incident that was perceived by some to be against China’s interest, meaning the retailer found it difficult to divest its store network (Kim and Kim Citation2017). It finally sold a large part of its operation to Liqun Group, a previously state-owned local retailing company, for only one third of its valuation. The reason why Lotte Mart was so accepting of the loss was, according to an executive from the retailer:
‘[…] to save Lotte Group’s other investments in China, including Lotte department stores and real estate projects. It didn’t want to worsen the relationship with Chinese government, expecting the compliance could stop the government’s further sanction’ (Interview 10, October 2020).
As the retailer hoped, after two years, in 2019, one of Lotte Group’s largest investments in China, Lotte World Project – which comprises hotels, a shopping centre, and a theme park – was permitted to resume development by the Chinese government (Jiemian Citation2019).
5.3. Consumer markets and cultures
The realisation of territorial embeddedness in a host market has been framed as a dynamic process that encompasses the shifting responses of competitors, consumers, and regulators (Coe and Lee Citation2013; Wood and Reynolds Citation2014). As noted earlier, these environmental conditions in China have evolved significantly in the past decade, driven by a maturing economy, rising incomes, and digital access, with the subsequent shifting consumer cultures arguably framing foreign retailers as outsiders once again. Additionally, many of the challenges of attracting and retaining local consumers have intensified due to fierce competition from increasingly powerful indigenous retailers. We conceptualise the new related embeddedness imperatives in through online integration of customer services for all channels; offline integration of identifying and promoting the competitive advantage of merchandise and associated services compared to local retailers; and further through strategic reinforcement by targeting high value consumer segments. These approaches have been employed by the TNCs with varying degrees of success.
First, while the retail TNCs have typically struggled to respond to an increasingly segmented Chinese consumer market, many domestic retail chains have thrived by offering consumers localised and customised products and services. Not only have retail TNCs often found it challenging to compete with local retailers’ rich consumer knowledge, but they have also faced obstructions from these local retailing chains when sourcing from local suppliers. As a former executive from Tesco China recalled:
‘When Tesco went into Shandong province, local retailers did a lot to block the international operators […] they were telling the local suppliers, farmers, that if you supply these foreigners then we will cut you out […] It meant that we weren’t providing a lot of products that locals really wanted. [For example,] we can get perfectly good oil and other products, but it wasn’t the brand they [local consumers] were looking for’ (Interview 7, October 2020).
Second, the past decade saw Chinese consumers accessing an ever-growing choice of cheap products from online retailers, gradually eroding the market share of retail TNCs. Indigenous e-retailers such as Alibaba Group and JD.com have, to a large extent, replaced foreign retailers through offering products which are low-priced and good value for money (Drake-Brockman and Ying Citation2017). Digital platforms such as Alibaba Group and JD.com have partnered with prominent brands and manufacturers, using their big data analytics to help improve demand forecasting, product development and merchandising strategies (PwC Citation2017).
Third, the meteoric rise of online shopping and emergence of e-commerce conglomerates has also offered Chinese consumers streamlined online-to-offline services. Consumers use smartphones to browse, compare, buy, and pay for daily necessities, and most online retailers offer same-day or one-day delivery. Since 2015, large online retail platforms have specifically targeted the food retail sector and created a ‘new retailing’ format. Their newly established store networks offer a streamlined online-to-offline shopping experience, customised shopping recommendation and digital coupons, in-store dining service, and 30-minute home delivery for customers living within a 3 km radius (Wang and Coe Citation2021). Reflecting on these wide-ranging changes, an executive from Walmart commented on foreign retailers’ losing their initial advantages in serving Chinese customers:
‘when we first entered China, shuttle bus, member's card, and DM (direct mail) posters were three advanced services. Professional photographers were specially invited to take pictures every week in the store, and the exquisite posters were sent to the gate of the community, but all these services are obsolete now. Shuttle bus and free parking are not needed as retailers offer home delivery; [while] DM poster and membership card are digitalised; consumers only need a smart phone to receive customised coupons and advertisements’ (Interview 5, September 2020).
To confront such challenges, retail TNCs have attempted to strengthen their core competences in store format design, merchandising, and marketing. First, by investing in new store formats (as also detailed in the previous section), foreign retailers are well positioned to attract middle-class to high-end consumers – the most valuable consumer segments. Walmart Sam’s Club is perhaps the best example, as its membership system has developed a specific high-end, affluent customer base, contributing half of Walmart China’s annual profit (Bu Citation2021). Even the famous discount-store operator, Aldi Sud, adapted its store format in China to become a premium supermarket to target young and affluent consumers (Hardaker and Zhang Citation2021).
Second, some retail TNCs have leveraged their global sourcing power to promote imported products in their Chinese stores – something that also relates to the need to develop a ‘signature standard’ for the added value of products (see also Section 5.1). This has proved popular with the rising middle-class, but also among consumers with lower incomes and those who buy imported products for their babies and children in the light of concerns relating to the safety of domestic food and manufactured goods (Fung Business Intelligence Citation2017). The emerging cross-border e-commerce industry has educated consumers, cultivated the market, and promoted the efficiency of international trade into China. Following this trend, foreign retailers have expanded their importing business in China. Walmart introduced its UK private brand ASDA to China in 2017, through its online flagship store on JD.com and some main categories such as milk and snacks in its offline stores. In 2018, when Metro expanded its business into Beijing’s residential area, over 30% of the store’s merchandise were imported (Metro Citation2018). A store manager from Metro suggested:
‘Thousands of imported product lines are Metro’s absolute advantage in merchandise. The high quality of our imported fresh products, such as vacuum-packed beef, frozen products, as well as our red wine, are all our advantages. Imported goods can account for about 10% of Metro’s sales across the country’ (Interview 9, October 2020).
Third, retail TNCs have developed their online marketing skills, leveraging multiple online channels to reach more consumers. Besides promoting their brand on Chinese social media such as WeChat and Weibo, foreign retailers consider the online store as an essential marketing platform. Nevertheless, there is an implicit understanding that sales volumes are often relatively insignificant compared to store-based operations. In the case of Metro, which used an online marketing campaign to build its reputation in high quality imported goods, this was a conscious strategy:
‘The Tmall online store’s sale is only a tiny portion of Metro China’s revenue; it cannot contribute much to the company’s profit […] but from the perspective of the overall influence and the brand’s publicity, it […] promotes the awareness of the Metro brand and gets more consumers to know us’ (Interview 9, October 2020).
6. Conclusion
We conclude by exploring the implications of the experiences of retail TNCs in China over the past decade for the continued relevance of the conceptualisation of territorial embeddedness that has become widely accepted in economic geography research focused on global retailing. Our empirical data has provided evidence that the means by which retail TNCs might anchor themselves in a host market can radically shift over a relatively short period of time. In the face of a maturing retail market characterised by strengthening domestic retail competition, less favourable host market regulations, the rise of digital platforms and evolving customer expectations, the advantages that retail TNCs initially enjoyed in expertise relating to store operations, sourcing, marketing and IT systems, coupled with favourable host market regulations, have rapidly diminished.
These developments necessitate a reframing of prevailing notions of the territorial embeddedness of food retail TNCs. While we contend that the threefold framework remains the foundation for anchoring in a host market – that is to say, integration into logistics and supply networks, real estate and regulatory systems, and consumer markets and cultures – this needs to be augmented with analysis of three cross-cutting strategic imperatives that capture the newly distinctive context of China’s food retailing market. As detailed in , these imperatives are denoted as online integration, offline reconfiguration, and strategic reinforcement. For transnational retailers, even if they have been active in the Chinese market for a decade or more, adapting to these imperatives is very challenging: several operators have left altogether, while the few that remain are struggling to maintain growth. New entrants such as Aldi Sud and Costco, using online-intensive and highly targeted formats, are themselves indicative of how the nature of the territorial embeddedness requirements in China have evolved.
While our study is specific to China in terms of augmenting a widely cited model of food retail TNC territorial embeddedness following a decade of radical change in a host market, we argue it has wider implications for social scientists studying retail globalisation. The pace of change in China has certainly been remarkable in terms of the rise of integrated online platforms, the widespread adoption of e-commerce and home delivery, and the associated advent of a ‘new retail’ or omnichannel system. Further, the nature of the growth of indigenous retail chains in the face of retail TNCs competition has been exceptional, not least when set against the experiences in other host markets. Nonetheless, we hypothesize that these wider market-based pressures will become increasingly relevant beyond China and therefore experienced by traditional retail TNCs elsewhere in Asia and beyond in the coming years. Far from being a recipient of retail innovations originating in distant ‘developed’ markets, China is now at the vanguard of retail innovation globally, and it is likely that several of the developments we detail, particularly in relation to the penetration of online and platform operations, will rapidly become commonplace in other markets. Further research will be necessary to assess whether the associated pressures in terms of achieving territorial embeddedness become as applicable in other contexts as we suspect they will be.
Our findings have wider relevance for social scientists studying retail globalisation by making explicit how the dynamic, multi-agent and continually shifting nature of competition within a market redefines the nature of territorial embeddedness. In such a context, firm-level strategies that might appear well aligned initially to a market context can rapidly lose effectiveness over time. In the case of China, the rise of digital platforms, markedly shifting consumer demands, increasingly competitive indigenous retailers, and a changing regulatory environment have significantly altered the drivers of successful territorial embeddedness within a ten-year timeframe – few existing studies have offered evidence of such dynamism. There remain significant opportunities for subsequent studies in other host markets to explore whether the shifts in the foundations of territorial embeddedness we have identified here are relevant in other regional and national contexts.
For retailers, these findings offer sobering conclusions regarding the need to continuously adapt to maintain market share amidst an ever-changing competitive environment. This relies on a degree of ‘strategic ambidexterity’ on the part of the retail TNC – that is to say, remaining focused on current market conditions to provide compelling store-based and online offers, while also continually scanning the competitive, consumer-based, and technological horizon to ensure the firm is prepared to adopt new approaches for the future. This challenge is well known within the strategic management literature. Williamson (Citation2003: 852) notes the limitations of organisations employing a single business model, instead advocating an approach whereby the company ‘maintain a portfolio of new options for its future by building new capabilities and simultaneously expanding its knowledge of new market segments and consumer behaviour’. This is difficult as it requires retailers pursue both exploitation and exploratory strategies simultaneously (Judge and Blocker Citation2008) – to be ‘tight’ in terms of executing efficiency, but also ‘loose’ and adaptable to new circumstances. This is increasingly the requirement across international markets that are rapidly developing in terms of their technological underpinnings, competitive rivalry, and consumer expectations. The era of dominant Western food retail TNCs exporting knowledge and expertise to control international markets is largely over.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Zhi Han
Zhi Han is a PhD student at Surrey Business School, University of Surrey. Her research focuses on the structural change and digital transformation in Chinese food retailing.
Steve Wood
Steve Wood is Professor of Retail Marketing and Management and Dean of Surrey Business School, University of Surrey. An economic geographer by training, his research particularly focuses on retailing, including its internationalization, store location planning, competition policy, supply networks and pricing.
Neil M Coe
Neil M Coe is Professor of Economic Geography at the School of Geosciences, University of Sydney. His research interests include GPNs and local economic development, the geographies of local and transnational labor markets, the geographies of innovation, and institutional and network approaches to economic development.
Andrew Alexander
Andrew Alexander is Professor of Retail Management at Surrey Business School, University of Surrey. His current research is focused on retail management decision-making, small store development, and the internationalisation of retailing.
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