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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the production of Islamic theology in its European contextual and vernacular articulations. The focus is on how young Muslims in Norway contribute to the ongoing reflection on and formation of Islamic theology. To that end, it examines texts produced and disseminated by a group called 'Stand4Hussain', which, between 2012 and 2014, organized street events in Oslo. The article argues that the content of their textual production, their mode of communication and the intentions behind their social practice can be analysed as a form of vernacular, contextual, theological reflection and production. The term 'street theology' is coined here for this non-scholastic, vernacular and contextual theology. A characteristic of 'street theology' is that it is mediated in the streets and shaped by the external audience, mainly non-Muslims.
The article argues that the study of vernacular productions and disseminations of theology should be included in programmes on the study of Islamic theology at Western universities since the production of theological reflections may take place outside scholarly settings and be motivated by external debates and perceptions. The study of vernacular theology can expand our understanding of the production of theology in given social contexts and refine our conceptualization of 'Islamic theology'.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
2 Mustafa Cerić is a Bosniak imam who served as the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999–2012) and is currently president of the World Bosniak Congress (since 2012).
3 The data were collected during two research projects, ‘Muslim devotional practices, aesthetics and cultural formation in migrancy’, 2010–2013, funded by the Norwegian Research Council; and ‘Authority in Contemporary Shi’ite Thought and Practice’, 2013–2016, funded by the Swedish Research Council.
4 The study of ‘lived religion’ is developed within a broader academic discourse, including, Hall (Citation1997); Ammerman (Citation2007); McGuire (Citation2008). For the study of Islam, see also van Bruinessen and Allievi (Citation2011); Krämer and Schmidtke (Citation2014).
5 Corbani here draws on Watson (Citation1995, 822–864).
6 Interviews with founding activists in early 2013.
7 See, https://whoishussain.org/ (accessed 25 July 2018).
8 According to the law on gender equality rights, ‘10 Likestillingsloven § 21 Representasjon av begge kjønn i alle offentlige utvalg mv’, a board must be equally representative of both genders, with closest proximity to 40%. The first law on gender equality among board members was passed in 1981. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/dok/regpubl/otprp/20042005/otprp-nr-35-2004-2005-/10.html?id=395565 (accessed 25 July 2018).
9 It is difficult to establish the exact number of Shia Muslim residents in Norway as there is no official register of the religions or faiths people follow. Official membership records of Shia mosques and associations for 2015 list 13,616 members (Regjeringen. no 2015) while the number of residents originating in countries with a Shia Muslim population is estimated to be 40,000. The population of Norway is about five million. From a total of 749 religious organizations registered in public records in 2015, about 163 were Muslim, and 17 of these were Shia. See Bøe and Flaskerud (Citation2017).
10 A Profetens Ummah leading figure, Ubaydullah Hussain, claims that the majority of the Norwegian Muslims who are fighting in Syria are members of their organization (Akerhaug Citation2012a).
11 As of 2012, IslamNet had around 2000 members (Mårtensson Citation2012, 114).
12 Profetens Ummah support Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the ‘Islamic State’, in Syria and Iraq.
13 Although, according news reports, IslamNet’s front figure Fahad Qureshi has said that it is against Islam to reject capital punishment. See Færaas (Citation2011). This report received a lot of attention, with 688 comments from the public.
14 Spokespersons for the group have provided ambiguous answers to journalists about their understanding of ‘terror’, and possible attacks in Norway (see Torgersen and Aspunvik Citation2012). See, also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOk35IPTDLw (Arfan Bhatti warns the Norwegian people that their security will be jeopardized if Norwegian soldiers are not pulled out of Afghanistan); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzZ9vZXKol4 (promotion video for a demonstration against the Norwegian presence in Afghanistan).
15 There is some disagreement among Norwegian researchers as to how to interpret and evaluate the activities and intentions of IslamNet. Ulrika Mårtensson (Citation2012, 121) argues that IslamNet is an expression of activist Salafism (European haraki). Their daʿwā may be interpreted as a ‘political language’ that enables young Muslims to ‘resist family, Islamic and public discourse in order to express their subject positions’, which she understands to be their ‘individual freedom and a civil right’. Bangstad and Linge (Citation2015, 190) instead connect IslamNet’s activities to a gradual ‘politicization’, and argue that IslamNet ‘takes part in a form of activism that may be characterized as political through and through’.
16 For a discussion of lines of conflicts and attempts to ecumenical dialogue between Sunnis and Shia in the Middle East, see Brunner (Citation2009). The conflict is partly fuelled by theological differences and partly by political hegemonies. Examples are the Iranian revolution and the First Gulf War (1980–1988), when Saddam Husayn attacked Iran.
17 Arbaʿīn (Arabic, ‘fortieth’) marks the fortieth day after Imam Hussain was beheaded at the battle at Karbala in 680, and is a day of commemoration throughout the Twelver Shia world.
18 Husayn Va’iz-i Kashefi was born in Iran in the fifteenth century. His book Rowzat al-Shohada (1502), narrating the battle of Karbala, is still used liturgically today for commemorative rituals. See Flaskerud (Citation2010).
19 Drawing on Aghaie’s analysis of Morteza Motahhari’s texts (see Motahhari Citation1985), the movement and martyrdom of Hussain and his followers had four functions. The first is to demonstrate that the system of the Caliphate was unjust and that the caliph himself was corrupt. The second was as a universal call to oppressed Muslims. The last two were of greater importance: the third was to promote good and discourage evil, for example by acting against religious corruption, and the fourth was tablīgh (propagation of a concept), by teaching the true meaning of Islam. Hussain had sacrificed himself in order to realize the true Islamic ideals that would otherwise be extinct. For an introduction to Motahhari and a discussion of his role in the Iranian revolution, see Dabashi (Citation2008, 148–156).
20 For a thorough discussion of the redemptive aspects of the Karbala event, see Ayoub (Citation1978).
21 Gandhi (1869–1948) reportedly referred to Hussain as a model during his non-violent struggle against British in India. It should be noted that the strategy to introduce a non-Muslim ‘witness’ to Hussain’s virtue resembles the convention established in the Twelver Shia theatre tradition, called taʿziyeh (Persian), and tashābuh (Arabic), in which a Western diplomat, called ‘farangi’, visiting the caliph’s court in Damascus, speaks in favour of Hussain and his family.
22 A newspaper article discussing political attitudes among Muslim religious leaders, based on a Master’s thesis written by Olav Elgvin (Citation2011), claimed that: ‘Nobody wants traditional Sharia to be introduced in Norway, and that apostacy should be punished by death penalty’ (Ingen ønsker at tradisjonell sharia skal innføres i Norge. at frafall fra islam bør medføre dødsstraff) (Norheim Citation2012).
23 The Norwegian Defence League is an anti-Islamic group formed around 2010–2011, and is an offshoot of the European Defence League.
24 On 13 October 2012, 25 imams met in Oslo to discuss Islam and extremism (see http://www.webavisen.no/artikkel/7571982/norges-imamer-diskuterer-ekstrem-islamisme.htm; accessed 15 July 2018). In December 2012, there was an initiative against Muslim extremism, when about 100 religious and political leaders participated in a fakkeltog (Aftenposten Citation2012).
25 See https://www.pst.no/alle-artikler/trusselvurderinger/trusselvurdering-2012/ (accessed 26 July 2018). Keeping in mind Behring-Breivik, 22 June 2011.
26 The quotations are from Mahatma Gandhi; Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), Scottish historian and essayist; Edward Gibbon (1737–1794), English historian and Member of Parliament; Charles Dickens (1812–1870), English writer and social critic; Antoine Bar, Contemporary Syrian or Lebanese Christian author; Dr Radha Krishnan (1888–1975), Indian philosopher and statesman, President of India 1962–1967, and Swami Shankaracharya (1868–1953), founder of the Jyotir Math monastery in the Advaita Vedanta tradition in India. For the full quotations, see https://www.facebook.com/notes/hazrat-abbas-ibn-ali-as/quotes-about-imam-hussain-as-by-renowned-personalities/10150114619304345 (accessed 25 July 2018).
27 The quotation is from a book on Shiism published only months earlier by Kari Vogt (Citation2012).
28 3 Shaʿbān (12 June) birth of the third Imam, Husayn; 5 Shaʿbān (14 June) birth of the fourth Imam, Zayn al-Abedin; 15 Shaʿbān (24 June) birth of the twelfth Imam, al-Mahdi.
30 Interview with member of Stand4Hussain, June 2013.
31 Interview with member of Stand4 Hussain, September 2012.
32 Interview with a member of Stand4Hussain in February 2013.
33 According to some traditions, the thaqalayn was presented at Ghadir Khomm during Muhammad’s last pilgrimage to Mecca in 632 (Momen Citation1985, 16–17).
34 This interpretation is supported by Q 4.59, also called ‘the authority verse’: ‘O ye who believe! Obey God and obey the Apostle and those vested with authority from among you.’
35 The thaqalayn is thus fundamental to the theory of the Imamate. The sixth Imam, Jaʿfar al-Sadiq (d. 765) was instrumental in developing the notion that the world would be in permanent need of a divinely guided Imam who could act as the authoritative teacher in all religious matters (see Arjomand Citation1987, 35).
36 For a discussion of the rise of the institution of the marjaiyyat al-taqlīd, and how social, political, and economic factors interwove with theological debates, see Walbridge (Citation2001).
37 Dabashi’s (Citation2008, xii–xiv) argument is that, historically, Islam has always been in conversation with major interlocutors, such as Greek philosophy, Buddhist asceticism and Christian monasticism, Jewish theology and, much later, European modernity.
38 Daʿwā literature is published on a global scale. For translations of books published by the Alexandria-based daʿwā institute Conveying Islamic Message Society (CIMS established in 1929), see http://www.islamic-message.net/cims/default.aspx and the Salafi daʿwā International Education and Research Academy (IERA) in London.
39 See http://www.islamnet.no/aktiviteter/dawahskolen/item/210-world-dawah-mission-norway-2016 (accessed 25 July 2018).
40 See https://whoishussain.org/.