Henry More on Spirits, Light, and Immaterial Extension

Abstract

According to the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, individual ‘spirits’ – the souls of humans and non-human animals – are extended but cannot be physically divided. His contemporaries and recent commentators have charged that More has never given an explication of the grounds on which the indivisibility of spirits is based. In this article, I suggest that exploring the usage that More makes of the analogy between spirits and light could go some way towards providing such an explication. More compares the relation between spirit and matter to the relation that, according to Aristotelian theories of light, holds between ‘intentional species’ and matter. I will argue that the purpose of his comparison is to highlight that both intentional species and spirits are existentially independent from matter. The existential independence of intentional species from matter expresses itself in the fact that light is not moved through the motion of the illuminated body. The existential independence of spirits from matter expresses itself in the fact that when a body that is coextensive with a spirit is divided, the spirit is not thereby divided but rather contracts into the remaining living organism.

Keywords:

• existential dependence
• intentional species
• emanative causation
• Fortunio Liceti (1577–1657)

Notes

¹An earlier version of this article was presented at the Philosophy Department of Bogazici University, Istanbul, in March 2012. I would like to express heartfelt thanks to Lucas Thorpe for the kind invitation and to all of those present for their challenging comments.

²On the influence of this view, often dubbed ‘holenmerism’, in the Neoplatonic and scholastic traditions, see Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 222–5; Des Chene, Life's Form, 191–202; Rozemond, ‘Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism’; Reid, ‘Evolution of Henry More's Theory’, 88–9; Kochiras, ‘Spiritual Presence and Dimensional Space Beyond the Cosmos’, 44–53. For authoritative formulations of the doctrine, see Plotinus, Enneads, 4: 418; 4: 294, Ficino, Platonic Theology, 1: 237–39; 2: 229.

³On Cartesian views on the location of souls, see Reid, ‘Spatial Presence of Spirits among the Cartesians’, 105–10. For particularly clear formulations of the Cartesian doctrine, see Le Grand, Entire Body of Philosophy, 325b–326a; Clauberg, Opera omnia, 1: 222.

⁴For the notion of ‘heterogeneity’, see The Immortality of the Soul (henceforth: Immortality), 152. All references to Immortality are to the text in More, Collection of Several Philosophical Writings. The works in this collection have separate paginations.

⁵For the notion of ‘indiscerpibility’, see Immortality, 20.

⁶In all quotations, the italics are More's.

⁷The substance of this article is taken up in Reid, Metaphysics of Henry More, Chap. 6.

⁸Ibid., 531–7.

⁹See note 20.

¹⁰See Descartes, ‘La Dioptrique’, 81–93; Descartes, ‘Les Météores’, 325–44. On the Cartesian theory of light and its reception, see Sabra, Theories of Light.

¹¹On Kepler's theory of light, see Lindberg, ‘Kepler and the Incorporeality of Light’; Pantin, ‘Simulachrum, species, forma, imago’.

¹²On Marci's theory of light, see Garber, ‘Chymical Wonders of Light’.

¹³Ibid., 162: ‘figurae concinnitas ab aequabili omnium partium fluxu … provenit’.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵See Kircher, Ars magna lucis et umbrae, 23: ‘originem luminis non esse simplicem in diaphano emanationem, sed veram productionem nixam actione lucis … ’

¹⁶Ibid., 24.

¹⁷As Ficino renders the relevant passage in his influential translation:

Sic utique reliquum animae est, quod prae se ferre diximus imaginem intellectus lumen ipsius aliquod reservantem, instar luminis, quod post ipsum solis globum proxime micat, circa ipsum ex ipso refulgens. Lumen profecto solis penes se ipsum et circa ipsum nemo concesserit esse solem; ex quo quidem pendens permanet circa ipsum … Anima vero lumen quiddam est ex mente productum et circa mentem menti connexum: neque sedet in alio, sed exstat prope mentem.

(Plotini Enneades, 316)

¹⁸I am grateful to one of the referees for pointing this similarity out to me. On the Neoplatonic strands in More's usage of the light analogy, see Henry, ‘Cambridge Platonist's Materialism’, 179–80.

¹⁹Again, in Ficino's words:

Quapropter in qualibet sui denominatione mentitur et fallit, nempe si magnum excogitetur, interim parvum est, ac si magis, est et minus: atque ens, quod in ejus imaginatione occurrit, non ens est, velut ludicrum quiddam fugiens, adeo ut, quae in ipso fieri videntur, ludicra sint, simulacra in simulacro ….

(Plotini Enneades, 157)

On Plotinus's theory of matter, see Jevons, ‘Dequantitation in Plotinus's Cosmology’; Kalligas, ‘Structure of Appearances’.

²⁰As Ficino puts it: ‘Materia … nullam habeat excutiendi potentiam (nullam enim habet actionem) … ’ Plotini Enneades, 166.

²¹On Late Aristotelian theories of intelligible species, see Spruit, Species intelligibilis.

²²On Bacon's theory of light, see Lindberg, ‘Genesis of Kepler's Theory of Light’, 19–22.

²³On Grosseteste's metaphysics of light, see Baur, Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste, 76–84; McEvoy, Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, 151–8.

²⁴On Liceti's late theory of light, see Zoubov, ‘Une théorie aristotelicienne de la lumiere du XVIIe siècle’. For a short summary on the role of species in Liceti's theory of the active intellect, see Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 324–6.

²⁵On Aristotle’ notion of the diaphanous and its influence in medieval thought, see Vasiliu, Du diaphane: image, milieu, lumière dans la pensée antique et mediévale.

²⁶On the origins of the emanation theory of light, see Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler, 96–8.

²⁷Albertus Magnus, De anima, 74:

Anima autem etiam in se dicitur vivere causaliter, quia est causa vitae et viva in seipsa, sicut lux dicitur luminosa et causa luminis; et propter hoc etiam superiora dicuntur vivere nobiliri vita, quia nihil est in eis ex parte motoris vel mobilis … 

Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own.

²⁸Ibid., 65:

[L]ux lucentis est esse et actus primus, et lucere est actus essentialis eius secundus, eo quod haec est actio eius, quae suae formae diffusio quaedam est essentialis; omnis enim essentia propriam et essentialem habet operationem, qua numquam destituitur, quando est essentialis, sicut lux non destituitur a lucere, quod est eius actio.

²⁹Liceti, De animarum rationalium immortalitate, 154:

A Deo … , ut a causa efficiente, pendere dicitur caelum, & natura … ; solem obtinet causam effectricem, a qua per simplicem emanationem absque novitate essendi ab aeterno prodierit; sic a Solis luce … lumen ab aeterno prodiit absque novitate essendi per simplicem emanationem ut a sui causa effectrice proxima, & immediata … .

³⁰Ibid., 151: ‘[L]umen dicitur esse aeri extrinsecum, cuius est forma assistens, quoniam ab aere non pendet, quamvis intimas quasque partes aeris actuet’.

³¹Liceti, De intellectu agente, 184:

[N]ihil moveri potest ad motum alterius nisi in eo insit vel tamquam locatum in loco; vel tamquam forma, sive accidentalis in subiecto inhaesionis, sive substantialis in subiecto inexistentiae; vel tamquam organum in potestate agentis praecipui, ac omnino nisi quoquopacto ab eo dependeat in esse. Forma vero assistens adest quidem, ac praeest subiecto corpori, sed in eo non inest ut in loco, nec ut in subiecto aut inhaesionis, aut inexistentiae, nec ut organum in potestate agentis praecipui, atque omnino a corpore non dependet, cui assistit.

³²Liceti, De vita, 324: ‘formae assistentes, quae non sunt in subiecto, velut in loco, aut continente, ut quae nulla ratione pendeant a subiecto … ’.

³³Liceti, De animarum coextensione corpori, 69:

Lumen etenim, quod non est ad subiecti aeris motum localem loco mobile; quod indicant umbrae stabiles in aere moto … ; plane ad eiusdem substrati aeris divisionem partibile dici non possunt, quia cum reali divisione coniunctus necessario est eorum, quae dividuntur, motus localis.

For a detailed discussion of Liceti's views on immaterial extension, see Blank, ‘Fortunio Liceti on Mind, Light, and Immaterial Extension’.

³⁴Liceti, De animarum coextensione corpori, 69:

[F]ormarum subiacenti sibi corpori coextensarum aliae sunt quantae per accidens ad subiecti corporis quantitatem, ut quarum quantitas a substrati corporis quantitate omnino dependet; ac huiusmodi formae revera sunt per accidens divisibiles ad subiecti corporis partitionem … [A]liae vero sunt formae quantae per se immateriali quadam quantitate, proportionata coextensae subiacentis corporis dimensioni; quae formarum propria quantitas a subiecti corporis quantitate minime dependet: huiusmodi autem formae sunt, non quidem divisibiles per accidens ad subditi sibi corporis partitionem; sed per se divisibiles sunt sola designatione, ac mente, non reipsa, ut lumen, & immortales animae … .

³⁵Liceti, De animarum coextensione corpori, 63: ‘[M]ens extenditur, & contrahitur per se in augmento, & in decremento corporis independenter a corpore, ut servet cum corpore proportionem extensionis … ’.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., 28.

³⁸Ibid., 28–9.

³⁹See the ‘Digression’ in More, Annotations upon the Discourse of Truth.

⁴⁰More, Manual of Metaphysics, 2:147; More, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 241: ‘si omnino essent, ut sint revera substantiae spirituales necesse sit’. All translations from the Manual are Jacob's, with some modifications.

⁴¹More, Manual of Metaphysics, 2:147; More, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 240–1:

Substantias enim, primo in loco, potius quam Accidentia referunt, propterea quod in nullo inhaerent Subjecto. Non in ipso Objecto visibili corporeo, cum extra ipsum sint, ab eoque fluant tanquam a Causa sua emanativa, cujus non tam Accidentia sunt quam Effecta. Non in Medio quod occupant, puta in Aere, cum ipsae non moveantur ad motum Aeris, sed ad Objecti solius a quo fluunt. Ergo Substantiae secundariae sunt a Substantiis suis primariis … .

⁴²More, Manual of Metaphysics, 1:10–11; More, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 11:

Est … Unum per se cujus essentia est una per se, & non per aliud, hoc est, cujus Materia & Forma sunt unum per se absque ullo alio vinculo, atque etiam Partes utriusque; si modo Partes appellare fas sit quae immediate & per se unum sunt, nec per aliud quicquam connectuntur, ac proinde nullo pacto dissolvi possunt, vel physice dividi.

⁴³Ibid., 1:9; More, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 10: ‘Est enim unumquodque Unum quatenus Indivisum a se & quoad totum & quoad partes, & Divisum a quolibet alio … ’.

⁴⁴Ibid., 215.

⁴⁵On atomism in the Northumberland Circle, see Jacquot, ‘Harriot, Hill, Warner’; Clucas, ‘Infinite Variety of Formes and Magnitudes’; Clucas, ‘Corpuscular Matter Theory’. On the influence of the vis radiativa theory on Francis Bacon, see Manzo, ‘Francis Bacon and Atomism’.

⁴⁶Clucas, ‘Corpuscular Matter Theory’, 198, note 89 cites a related passage from Warner's manuscripts.

⁴⁷Ibid., 121.