The political theology of Fichte’s Staatslehre: immanence and transcendence

ABSTRACT

Given its use of religious concepts and language, it is tempting to class Fichte’s rarely discussed Staatslehre as a political theology. I argue that the Staatslehre can be classed as a political theology because of the way in which it can be understood in terms of the concepts of immanence and transcendence. The concept of immanence applies to Fichte’s account of history in particular. Fichte himself allows for a moment of transcendence at the very beginning of history. I argue that the concept of transcendence is also implicit in the Staatslehre in relation to some problems faced by Fichte’s own account of the role of the Zwingherr in the historical development and actualization of right and moral freedom, despite his attempt to avoid introducing theologically based explanations of political concepts at this stage of his Staatslehre.

KEYWORDS:

• Fichte
• political theology
• Staatslehre
• Zwingherr

Notes

1 This work was not prepared for publication by Fichte himself. Rather, the text was prepared for posthumous publication on the basis of the notes for a series of lectures he gave at the University of Berlin shortly before his unexpected death in the same year. The full title given to the published version of the lectures was Die Staatslehre, oder über das Verhältniß des Urstaates zum Vernunftreiche (The Theory of the State, or Concerning the Relation Between the Original State and the Realm of Reason). This title is not one that Fichte himself gave to his lectures.

2 In what follows the critical edition of Fichte's works (Fichte, J. G. Fichte – Gesamtausgabe) will be cited as GA according to series (Roman numeral), volume (Arabic numeral) and page number.

3 It has been argued that the Staatslehre is based on a religious view of world history that excludes the possibility of a failure of history to achieve its final end, and that in this respect it differs from the view of history found in the earlier Addresses to the German Nation (Reden an die deutsche Nation) which speaks of only the possibility of achieving this final end. Cf. Metz, ‘Die Weltgeschichte beim späten Fichte’, 129–30. This invites the question, however, as to how this historical necessity can be reconciled with the moral freedom that is a central concern of the Staatslehre. On the one hand, historical necessity threatens moral freedom, in that human actions are then ultimately determined by the end towards which history tends. On the other hand, moral freedom threatens historical necessity, in that it introduces an element of contingency.

4 Fichte's interest in this concept extends right back to his first (anonymously) published work, Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung). See GA I/1; Fichte, Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation.

5 This idea relates to a theme that is already present in Fichte's defence of the French Revolution published in 1793 (cf. GA I/1: 253), namely, that by playing its part in bringing about the universal reign of the moral law among human beings, the state aims at its own abolition. For more on this theme, see James, Fichte’s Republic, Chapter 5.

6 Fichte had already written a critical piece on Napoleon entitled Concerning the Nameless One (In Bezieh-ung auf den Namenlosen) in 1806. See GA II/10: 83–5.

7 This explains Kierkegaard's association of the Incarnation with the absurdity of that which he calls the ‘absolute paradox’. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 217–18. Kierkegaard describes the Incarnation as ‘a break with all thinking’ (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 579), and he speaks of the ‘crucifixion of the understanding’ (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 564) in connection with it.