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ABSTRACT
Many texts in the Epicurean tradition mention gratitude but do not explicitly explain its function in Epicurean ethics. I review passages that mention or discuss gratitude and ingratitude and consider what they have to say about its importance for a good Epicurean life. I argue that, for Epicureans, gratitude functions as something like a virtue, developed as a disposition of character through regular reflection and practice, that focuses attention on present goods, consolidates memories of past pleasures, and thus provides resources for facing the future confidently and joyfully. I also suggest that recognizing the role of gratitude in Epicureanism can provide a more expansive interpretation of an Epicurean life, one that includes both openness to variety and philanthropic concern. If my interpretation is right, Epicureans anticipate findings from recent positive psychology showing strong links between gratitude and happiness.
Notes
1 DeWitt, ‘The Epicurean Doctrine of Gratitude’, catalogues several roles for gratitude in Epicurean philosophy. He also highlights how these ideas are expressed by the Roman poet Horace, whose work clearly reflects Epicurean influences. (DeWitt says, ‘Horace […] often reproduces the spirit of Epicurean ethics more faithfully than Lucretius’ [321].) My work overlaps with DeWitt’s on many points, though I seek a deeper philosophical analysis.
2 Aristotle analyzes charis as a pathos at Rhetoric 2.7. Many English translations render charis in this passage as ‘kindness’ or ‘benevolence’ (see Freese’s translation), but Konstan argues in ‘The Emotion In Aristotle Rhetoric 2.7’ that Aristotle is talking about gratitude.
3 Latin text from Clark, M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes; English translation by C. D. Yonge, slightly modified.
4 Compare Annas in ‘Epicurean Emotions’: ‘I shall admit at the start that the theory I find is inferred rather than read off from our sources—a frequent situation in Epicurean studies’ (145).
5 Philodemus describes in greater detail how a teacher matches his strategies to his audience in On Frank Criticism, column VI.a.
6 Most translations from Epicurean texts are from Inwood and Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy. I note the equivalent reference from this volume in my citation. I take the Greek text from Diogenes Laertius, Lives.
7 Compare also: ‘Sweet is the memory of a dead friend’ (from Plutarch, A Pleasant Life 1105e = IG I-121). A friend may be gone, but her grateful partner may continue to benefit from the time they spent together.
8 Greek text for Vatican Sayings is from Usener, Epicurea.
9 Lucretius employs similar imagery in the famous Proem of DRN Book 2. As in SV 17, Lucretius describes how Epicurean teachings, by applying rational analysis to Nature and the sources of happiness, provide ‘secure templa (sanctuaries)’ to shelter us from the competitive ambitions and empty fears that plague most people’s lives, subjecting them to the random twists of fortune. See also DRN V.10–12.
10 In his article on this topic, ‘Storing Up Past Pleasures,’ Görler rightly notes that surviving Epicurean texts have a ‘missing term’—Epicureans definitely endorse the strategy of storing good memories, and they say gratitude makes it possible (201–2). But extant texts do not precisely describe the process by which this happens. Görler speculates on ways the connection could have been made. His suggestions support my reading here.
11 Some English translations obscure the role of gratitude and ingratitude in this section. For example, the Loeb translation (by W. H. D. Rouse revised by M. F. Smith) renders grata at 935 as ‘to your liking’ and ingrata at 937 as ‘without gratification’ (261–3)—suggesting, paradoxically, that the pleasures in the person’s life are not enjoyable to him. In his commentary, however, E. J. Kenney rightly contends that grata (935), ingrata (937), and ingratum (942) here should be read through the lens of the earlier Epicurean passages I analyzed in § I, which focus on gratitude and ingratitude (see Kenney, De Rerum Natura, 213, comments on lines 936–7). Thus, for ingrata in line 937, Kenney suggests, ‘thanklessly’, i.e., without receiving thanks from you … The word must be so understood throughout the passage, and so also grata at 935 = ‘having had its meed of thanks’’ (213–4, sv. 937).
12 Plato’s Socrates invokes the Danaïds to make a similar point in response to Callicles at Gorgias 493a-c. Austin, in ‘Corpses, Self-Defense, and Immortality’, connects Callicles’ attitudes to his fear of death.
13 Compare also Seneca, Epist. 24.22–24 = I–150.
14 So David Konstan argues in A Life Worthy of the Gods:
For the Epicureans, irrational fears are the cause, at least in part, of irrational desires such as greed and ambition, and that the life of immoderate desire, in turn, is projected onto an afterlife in the form of a falsely anticipated retribution, thus reinforcing anxiety. Irrational fears and desires alike are grounded in false beliefs and the avoidance or pursuit of simulacra.
15 See Cooper, ‘Pleasure and Desire’, 503–6; O’Keefe, Epicureanism, 126. Another class of natural but not necessary desires is represented by the desire for sex (see Usener, Epicurea, 456); it is natural, but a person can live well without satisfying it.
16 See also Hossenfelder,‘Epicurus—Hedonist Malgré Lui’. O’Keefe provides context for the role of wealth and luxury in Epicurean happiness in ‘The Epicureans on Happiness, Wealth, and Property Management’, pages 37–52.
17 Cooper defends this interpretation on 503–5, as does Annas in The Morality of Happiness, 191–3.
18 In comments on an earlier draft, O’Keefe argued that SV 63 does not support my interpretation. He thinks the passage means only to criticize the ‘parsimony’ (leptotēs – literally ‘thinness’) of Cynics who are so scornful of wealth and external goods that they fail to act prudently to ensure the stable satisfaction of future necessary desires. On this reading, the passage says nothing about merely natural desires. But I am not sure the point made by SV 63 must be so narrow. Showy but pointless ‘thinness’ can take many forms, including spurning harmless luxury and variety. In any event, the wording is difficult to interpret, so I will not rest my argument on it.
19 The position I am attributing to the Epicureans here is like Seneca’s in On the Happy Life:
In my case if wealth slips away, it will deprive me only of itself, but you will be struck dumb, you will think you have been deserted by your own self, if it leaves you; in my eyes wealth has a certain place, in yours it is centre-stage; to sum up, my wealth belongs to me, you belong to yours.
20 Recent articles that consider these problems include Long, ‘Pleasure and Social Utility’; Fish, ‘Not all politicians are Sisyphus’; Armstrong, ‘Epicurean virtues, Epicurean friendship’.
21 Woolf, in ‘What Kind of Hedonist was Epicurus?’, provides strong evidence that Epicurus endorsed not only ethical but also psychological hedonism.
22 Roskam, Live Unnoticed, explores the origins and meaning of this doctrine.
23 In De Fin. II, Cicero complains that Epicurean egoistic hedonism cannot explain or justify the selfless devotion to duty and patriotism of past heroes, including Torquatus’ ancestors (2.58–77). Indeed, Cicero chose Lucius Manlius Torquatus as his Epicurean spokesman precisely because of the apparent mismatch between his philosophy and actions, since he had recently died fighting in the civil war (see Annas’ introduction to On Moral Ends, xv-xvi). Epictetus criticizes Epicurus’ position on social commitments and responsibilities in Discourse I.23.
24 Following Roskam, Fish argues that many Epicurean recommendations and prohibitions (avoid politics, do not compose poetry, live unnoticed) must be read as situational rather than dogmatic (96–100). Armstrong makes similar points.
25 For recent discussions of friendship and egoism in Epicureanism, see O’Keefe, ‘Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic?’; Brown, ‘Epicurus on the Value of Friendship’; Evans, ‘Can Epicureans Be Friends?’.
26 For a similar interpretation of Epicurean attitudes about anger, see Asmis, ‘The Necessity of Anger’ and Tsouna, ‘Philodemus, Seneca and Plutarch on anger’.
27 Urstad, in ‘The Moral Virtues and Instrumentalism’, surveys the evidence that Epicurus assigned only instrumental value to virtues.
28 Psychology Today has a web page that collects recent material about gratitude, happiness, and mental health: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/gratitude. According to the introduction,
Gratitude is an emotion expressing appreciation for what one has—as opposed to, for example, a consumer-driven emphasis on what one wants. Gratitude is getting a great deal of attention as a facet of positive psychology: Studies show that we can deliberately cultivate gratitude, and can increase our well-being and happiness by doing so. In addition, gratefulness—and especially expression of it to others—is associated with increased energy, optimism, and empathy.
29 See Wellman, ‘Gratitude as a Virtue’; Carr, ‘Is Gratitude a Moral Virtue?’
30 I would like to express my gratitude to Kelly Arenson, Tim O’Keefe, and Taine Duncan, as well as the editors and anonymous referees for this journal, for their helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions.