ABSTRACT
This is the first English translation of A.W. Rehberg's Über das Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis which was a published as a response to Immanuel Kant's On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but is of no use in practice. Rehberg's response appeared originally in February 1794.
I
(DH 115/BM 114) All theory consists in the development of concepts under which the objects of the real world, or of a world imagined as possible, can be conceived from certain perspectives and in certain relations. Where theory is aimed at a precisely defined limited effect, the simple application of the rules deduced from that scientific development of concepts (BM 115) is perfectly sufficient to achieve the intended purpose. More complex cases, in which the result is composed of various phenomena [Erscheinungen] that are subject to very different laws (e.g. such physical phenomena which are composed of mechanical and chemical operations, or of even more, such as the changes of animal nature), must be judged at the same time according to multiple theories, the interrelations of which are subject to as of yet undiscovered laws, from which the more general theory would have to be derived, which would link the individual theories together and would encompass the objects and phenomena of the world from all sides. It is doubtful whether it is possible for the human cognitive faculty to accomplish this perfectly and thus to reach nature itself; furthermore, it seems that there is an insurmountable obstacle that lies within the matter itself, because that highest, all-encompassing system could rest on nothing other than the laws according to which things themselves appear in nature, but these laws of connection under the intelligible and sensible world will remain an eternal mystery to the human understanding by its very natureFootnote1.
(DH 116/BM 116) This may be one reason for the inexplicable superiority of practical observers and artists formed by practice over the most perfect theoretically formed mind; and the reproach, that theory teaches some things that are found differently in practice, can therefore never be rejected completely and will not itself harm the former, but only serve to limit its claims to that which it is capable of achieving.
It is completely different in sciences which prescribe what the human beingFootnotei should do and leave undone. The usual objection to the validity of the theory of moral science, that it is never rightly followed in the world, rests on misunderstandings. What happens may (BM 117) well be in eternal contradiction with what should happen. After all, a crude mob may mock the demands of morality because they have never been followed perfectly. The number of transgressors may lessen the shame, but it cannot remove the guilt. Even the essential imperfection of human nature cannot detract from the rigour of the moral theory in which laws are laid down, which are prescribed for all moral beings by their nature, so that they are bound to respect themselves by at least striving for obedience.
But there is another dispute about the extent and sufficiency of that moral theory which can be derived from the highest and most evident moral law; and this dispute is of the greatest importance: firstly, for science, which is in danger of being falsified, and secondly, for the morality and moral satisfaction of its pupils, who are in danger either of misjudging the highest laws of morality itself or of being thrown into skeptical despair when they discover the contradiction in which the principles of pure cognition (BM 118) from concepts fall apart as soon as they are unconditionally applied in a foreign field.
(DH 117) The highest moral law is independent of all experience: it exists for itself, without any connection to happiness; morality [Moralität] is therefore essentially different from the art of living happily, which is built on empirical knowledge of human nature.
All this has been fully proved by the critical reformer of philosophy. His presentation of the true ground on which morality rests is of inestimable value to scientific philosophy; and moreover, his writings must still, through the unsurpassably beautiful expositions of these highest principles of pure morality, contribute very much to the propagation of the dispositions [Verbreitung der Gesinnungen] whose grounds they discover.
But, if from that principle a system of moral sciences is to be derived, which is capable of direct application to the actions of men, then difficulties arise, not against the validity, but about the sufficiency and completeness of that evident (BM 119) principle in its application, which I will discuss here.
The highest fundamental law of morality cannot be anything other than a formal one, precisely because it must originate from pure laws of reason. – This highest law, which Professor Kant puts perfectly well is: Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can always be considered as a principle of universal legislation, is sufficient as a rule for the moral evaluations of human decisions. Everything that I can will everyone be allowed or commanded to do in the same circumstances, is unfailingly allowed or commanded of me as well. However, from this rule of assessment, no objective determination of human actions, on which a system of individually determined duties could be built, can be derived. That rule only says that reason should govern all human endeavours, but not what the purpose of those endeavours should be. To this last question no answer can be derived from the pure law of reason itself other than (DH 118) this: complete agreement of all purposes – so again, something merely formal, whereby the duties in view (BM 120) of their objects are not determined.Footnote2
In order to achieve this, something empirically recognized must always be added to the highest (formal) law. The above-mentioned unconditional practical imperative must be transformed for this purpose into another, which reads: Act in such a way that you use humanity, both in your person and in the person of every other, at all times simultaneously as an end, never merely as a means.
However, the expression “humanity” [Menschheit], on which everything here depends, is ambiguous.
That reason and morality must be respected in every human being as an end in itself is undeniable. However, this reason, which exists in every human being, is not an object (BM 121) in itself. It exists only as a form of representations [Form der Vorstellungen], within some matter. (It is hardly necessary to recall that here not bodies but that which constitutes the content of human representations is meant). Humanity, as an object of will and morality, is something more than mere reason and morality. The ground for that principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. However, rational nature, on its own, exists nowhere. Thus, while reason must be respected as an end in itself in every human being, humanity must not. In every really existing human being, in every moment of its existence, reason is mixed with something in which it lives; and that which is inseparably linked to it cannot claim to be treated as an end in itself. The examples in which Professor Kant shows the application of this (DH 119) lawFootnote3 are indeed correct, because in them the reason of every human being is treated as an end in itself. But it is just as easy to set up examples of actions in which rational beings (BM 122) would not be treated as an end in itself and which would not be condemnable nevertheless.
“The human being is not a thing [Sache]” (it is said at the place mentioned), “therefore not something that can be used merely as a means, but must at all times be considered in all his actions as an end in itself”.
This is false. Reason alone, as an end in itself, is sacred. But the human being is, only in so far as he is really controlled by his reason and the application of his powers remains his own independent property, so that he does not encroach upon his reason (and morality) in this self-control. All remaining application of his powers is only a tool for arbitrary purposes and, like the rest of nature, is subjected as a means to the intentions [Absichten] of every rational being. The human being is therefore at the same time a thing that can be used merely as a means. External freedom (independence from the will of every other person) is therefore only reserved for practical reason, the rational will [vernünftigen Willen] of the human being.
But if the highest principle of morally good decisions is to be transformed into an objective determination [Bestimmung] of moral acts (BM 123), then the expression of freedom in a sensible world, the act of free power in a sensible substance, must be added to the concept of freedom on which that principle is based. It is not possible a priori to prove the necessity, or even to comprehend the possibility, of such an effect of intelligible beings.
This itself, that intelligible beings (who have freedom and morality) are connected with a sensible nature, reveal themselves to each other and interact in a world of appearances (DH 120), is an empirically recognized fact; just as the material in which they operate and recognize each other is not self-created but given to them. The external effects of human freedom can therefore not be brought into a system based solely on principles a priori and allow for a continuous application of the basic laws of morality in clear demonstrations. I believe that not a single determinate duty can be stated for which there is no need to devise cases in which it is necessary to depart from the rule in order to satisfy the highest law of morality. Diderot might want to write stories in which (BM 124) the transgression of the most universal and sacred duties should appear as the most sublime expression of the most heroic virtue. Such stories, however, could only serve to confuse the moral feelings of most readers; and it is undoubtedly far better to leave such resolutions to the practical feelings of the one who is led into such severe trials than to sacrifice the common and necessary culture of morality to an attempted and always impossible perfection of theoryFootnote4 (DH 121/BM125).
But if, in morality, which contains the rules for judging actions before one's own conscience, the strictest and most general proof of individual duties is not so important (BM 126) because everyone carries with themselves the principle from which that error must be improved and supplemented, then it is quite different with respect to the determination of external rights, which must be able to be determined and judged by several persons collectively, which cannot be done otherwise than according to certain formulas, the origin and scope of which is therefore of utmost importance in every respect (BM 127).
II
A system of perfect external rights can only be derived from the principle that reason in humankind must certainly be treated as an end in itself, under the condition that every rational and free being has a sensible substance added to it, a matter through which it can reveal and communicate itself to others (DH 122) as it wills. This material substance must be the original and unconditional property of any rational person. The possibility of acquiring unconditional property (complete and exclusive ownership with respect to the claims of other rational beings) is therefore the first task on the resolution of which the whole of natural law, in its application to the real world, is based, and is therefore rightly regarded as the basis of the whole of natural constitutional law. Such a perfect property a priori demonstrable by principles would presuppose a metaphysically perfect property. But such a property does not exist anywhere in our world. The physical laws to which rational beings are subject in their association with sensibility create conditions (BM 128) which they cannot escape; and this eliminates the possibility of an absolutely unconditional property.
To give an example of the principle in its complete purity, let us say that a human being cannot find any other food to sustain his life than that which is inaccessible to his powers: Fruits on trees which he cannot reach, or fruits of the earth which he does not know how to prepare. Another person can provide him with help, but this person refuses to help. May he force this person to serve him? The law, which is the highest rule of external relations among men, forbids using him as a means to my end. But nature reveals these men as the only means to reach an (in itself legitimate) end. By what means does he prove that his body is given to his own reason in such a way as to be exclusively his own property such that another reasonable being may not use it for his own ends? – That it is proper to use one's powers for others, where one does not harm oneself by doing so, does not apply here, where it is a question of external rights (BM 129).
If such exclusive property cannot (DH 123) even be proved a priori of one's own body, it is even less possible to prove it of other bodies, of external objects.
The only perfect property is free choice [freie Willkür] itself; the first origin of perfect ownership of external things can therefore only be thought of by voluntary agreement, and the public law on which civil society is based requires such agreement in its first basic conditions.
It is therefore possible to establish a constitutional law that would be directly derived from the fundamental law of morality and based on principles a priori; but this law can only be applied to beings who have expressed their freedom in a totally perfect property (as explained above). When applied to people whose free and reasonable activity is subject in its expression to the laws of nature, the principles of the civil condition, which are established a priori, are as follows (BM 130).
First. The freedom of each member of the society, as a human being, is applicable only to the truly free in human beings, that is to his will [Willen] itself. The right of freedom does not apply to a member of the common being, the whole human being, but only to the human being, in so far as he is a rational being.
No one may force me to be happy in his own way – inasmuch as this violates my true freedom; that is, in other words: no one can force me to do anything immoral. All expressions of a human being's natural powers (as opposed to moral powers) are, in the state of civil society, subject to the regulations of the legislative power, which must devise such conditions by which, without restricting moral freedom, the aspirations of all citizens to achieve their ends (happiness) is placed in the best harmony (which, of course, must always remain imperfect (DH 124) because these aspirations of men, by their very nature, counteract each other).
Just as ambiguous as the expression “freedom” (since that which belongs to the metaphysical inner freedom is also falsely appropriated to the external physical activity (BM 131) of the subject) is the explanation of right, which is based on that concept. Right, it is said, consists in limiting the freedom of every other person to the condition that it can co-exist with mine on the basis of a universal law. Should this declaration only mean that the restriction of freedom must be subject not to the choice of the individual [Willkür des Einzelnen] but to universal laws, it is quite correct and its applicability is subject to no doubt; but equality of rights does not follow from it. If, on the other hand, it is said that any particular restriction of the freedom of each individual by the freedom of all others must be reciprocal, this would not only give rise to a right for everyone to be able to rise to any level in civil society, but a right to really stand on an equal level (true political equality, as demanded by the new French theory). But then, with equal rights, everyone could also demand the same sphere of influence [Wirkungskreis] for everyone else (equality of property). In this sense the principle is wrong, because it has been proved above that the degree of the freedom of citizens (BM 132) in their various states and circumstances is essentially subject to choice [Willkürlicher Bestimmung].
The second principle a priori of the civil constitution, equality as a subject, thus means only that each subject's rights are equally sacred and they must all be subject to legal regulations and lawful claims. There is, however, a difference in the scope and content of the rights which are determined by the circumstances [Verhältnisse]. These circumstances are inevitably linked to the circumstances of our (DH 125) forefathers; and from them arise the inherent differences among the civil rights of men, against which so many rise up as against the greatest and most obvious injustice. They usually have only certain hateful hereditary differences before their eyes (in which, from time to time, some injustices have been intermixed), but they do not see that their principle, in perfect universal validity, cancels out the legitimacy of marital society as well, in view of its consequences for the status of the children. A quite undeniable and yet indeed terrible consequence of that thoughtless assertion. (BM 133) For in the present world, the rights of marital status, that chosen institution of civil society, is based on not the whole of morality (which indeed must be conceivable in every condition of humanity because the predisposition lies in what is most essential in a human being themself), but the entire culture of morality.
The third principle of an a priori determined civil condition is the independence of the citizen. Professor Kant says (at the place mentioned in the Berlinische Monatsschrift [p. 65 f.]Footnoteii) that it is difficult to determine the requirements for claiming the status of a person who is his own master. But the truth is that there is no human being anywhere in the world who is (perfectly) his own master. In the state of nature, the free human being is dependent on the laws of nature in his effects and expressions. The human being himself is also a part of this nature and subject to physical laws (including the psychological laws of affects), as well as the corporal world. The relations [Verhältnisse] between people are also subject to such laws. In the state of civil society (BM 134) these relations, which cannot be subjected to the pure law of freedom (as explained above), are regulated by (explicit or presumed) agreements and consent. This also determines the degree of independence that is considered sufficient (DH 126) to elevate the subject to any level of civil rights. These stages themselves are determined by choice [Willkürliche Bestimmungen] like the property with which they are so closely related. Property based on a mere natural acquisition is therefore not sufficient to establish any legal status whatsoever in civil society. (The acquisition of a skill is not such property at all, and the greatest and most educated talent has no claims in this regard. The craftsman does not become a citizen by the fact that he can feed himself through his skill, but only by the fact that he acquires the master's right in a guild, which arises from choice.) No one in the state is exempt from restrictions determined by choice. Even the most unrestricted monarch in civilized states is bound by conditions [Bedingungen] (BM 135) (e.g. in Denmark by the King's Law). The question whether the people, if these conditions are violated, are entitled to resist can easily arouse dangerous movements among the people; and among the innumerable frenzies of the first French National Assembly, sick with the rage of theories, it is not insignificant that, in its deliberations on the constitution of the Empire, it preoccupied itself and the people so much with this right of resistance, in the case of violation of the constitution in any respect by the highest ruler.
In abstract theory, however, this right can be subject to no doubt. According to this theory, the people do not have a valid, stable judgement as to how to govern, but they do have a judgement as to who should be allowed to govern. This right of the people is so harmless to rulers that their reputation is secured by it. For if it were denied to the people, in the case of the rebellion of a usurper favoured by fate, the people would not even be allowed to take the side of their legitimate ruler. Through the asserted obligation of unconditional obedience (passive obedience) (DH 127/BM 136), the entire authority of the head of state is simply exposed to violent seizure.
* * *
Thus, the whole system of a civil society, based on principles a priori, is an idea that could only be applied in a world whose members would be completely (metaphysically) free beings and each of them the creator of his own sphere of activity. Rousseau (with whose principles Professor Kant's theory so perfectly agrees that essentially one only needs to insert the terminology from Du contrat social at proper places) also notes himself that his system only fit for a republic of gods, which, however, would not need a civil constitution. On the contrary, this civil constitution, among beings who are indeed partial to reason, but by no means entirely reasonable, is based on conditions which are not based on necessity but on judgements about what is beneficial [zuträgliche], and which must be subjected a priori only to the one law, that no single condition cancels morality (BM 137), negates the original freedom of human beings (to which original freedom, however, do not belong the expressions of the powers of the human beings in such a way that they should not be restricted in various ways), and completely negates all the independence of human beings.
The formation of positive determinations of the basic laws of civil society is to be expected solely from observation and experience of the needs and conduct of human beings in civil circumstances; and theory from principles must here give way not to blind practice (which follows mere natural drives and rules of habit), but to theory from experienceFootnote5.
(DH 128/BM 138) If, on the other hand, positive determinations of natural law, proven a priori, are applied to the human world, it cannot but result in the complete dismantling of the present civil constitutions. According to the same law, (BM 139) only a constitution that complies with the determinations of the ideal of reason is legitimate [rechtmäβig]. In this case, not a single one of the currently existing ones is included, for all of them contain rights of hereditary estates whose principle has been rejected. But if they are in such a way that they contradict the first requirement of a just, that is, rational, constitution, then the human race is not just entitled, but is obliged, to destroy those constitutions which are contrary to the original moral law. The form of the state constitution is indifferent, only perfect equality is introduced. In order to satisfy this, all else must be sacrificed. – Thus the theory of revolutions is a necessary consequence of the physiocratic system.
The twist with which Professor Kant seeks to secure the existing constitutions against the fanaticism of the revolutionaries is astute and leads to results with (DH 129) which I agree to a large extent; but precisely for this reason I consider it my duty to make it clear how much the premises stand in contradiction (BM 140).
There is one single object of public civic activity to which it seems that the principles of unrestricted freedom should be applicable: this is the engagement with speculative opinions which, although they are closely connected with a way of life, nevertheless, are not completely ruled by this way of life; one should therefore believe in being able to, indeed having to, leave men alone, insofar as one only establishes principles in which their treatment would be kept pure of anything directly practical. However, it is this very connection, in which speculative systems are placed with a way of life in so many different ways, which compels rulers to resort to a prudent [klugen] approach far removed from purely theoretical principles; and the separation of theory and the establishment of a system of laws, which refers only to the separate engagement of men with matters of abstract belief, is therefore not satisfactory to those who wish to be taught what the welfare of the human race requires in this respect. I have attempted such an elaboration of the theory (BM 141) of unmixed political principles through the church constitution itself,Footnote6 but I have been so much more vividly convinced by this attempt that this path never leads to anything satisfactory, and that pure theory only leads to difficulties without resolving them.
III
Nowhere are these difficulties greater than in determining the morally good conduct of whole peoples toward (DH 130) one another. If justice is insufficient to regulate the internal relations of the State, and if prudence, well-understood interest and good will have such a great part to play in all its provisions, this must be done even more where the objects are so much greater, the immediate consequences of every action so important, and the circumstances and situations which may arise in the future so unpredictable. Strict justice always depends on the form of the law; the preservation of order, (BM 142) under the protection of which alone the moral being can be educated and enjoy the goods of this world, requires that the essence of things should often be sacrificed to this form within States. As soon as a system of States under positive conditions of justice (which, as has been proved above, cannot by its nature arise directly from the original laws of morality, but must be added by the intellect of the rulers) – as soon as, I say, such a system would really exist – it may be thought that for the common final purpose the essence of things would be sacrificed to legal form by every State participating in this system, as well as by private individuals. In natural circumstances, on the other hand, it is very often the case that those who act in the name of peoples must violate the letter of the law of justice in order to remain faithful to its spirit.
It is not the place here to apply these principles to the most interesting political circumstances and events, since here it is only a question of determining the principle.
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Pauline Kleingeld, Reidar Maliks, Anne Pollok, Hugo Hogenbirk and two anonymous reviewers from the BJHP, who each made this translation better. Thanks also to Marshanda Gregory for continued support.
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Notes
1 Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics contains the most admirable attempt to reveal this mystery; and yet, as is proved in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it is a futile one. I believe I have shown in my book On the Relationship of Metaphysics to Religion (Berlin 1787) that no other attempt to solve the problem is possible except for and in accordance with that one.
2 Professor Kant shows in the note to the preface of his work Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (6:6–8) how a synthetic sentence a priori, which connects an object of the same with the formal laws of morality, is possible. This possibility alone is not sufficient to base a system of evident moral sciences on. Necessity must shed light on this.
3 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (4:429ff).
4 The law of morality rules human beings by the feeling of displeasure, which is directly connected with every violation of it. Although, Professor Kant says (Berlinische Monatsschrift, Sept. 1793 [P. 51]) that this purely moral dissatisfaction cannot be the motivating force of a human being’s morality, because only the virtuous is capable of it; it is not the cause but the effect of virtue; only here is it just like natural predispositions. Every power develops in him first by itself. The feelings that arise from their development and are connected with their effects are then used for their culture. Thus also (not according to time, but according to the order of concepts in abstraction) every human being must be thought of as morally good; for it is incomprehensible how a rational being should be able to act irrationally (immoral is contrary to the law of reason) if it is otherwise conscious of its reason in its actions. The possibility of immorality arises from the incomprehensible connection of a rational being with a nature whose motivating forces consist in inclinations that refer to the sense-constrained condition. From mere socialization, since reason has no influence on sensible actions and only makes an idle judgement of our own actions, no moral being emerges, but a monstrosity, which some people actually approach, especially through vice (or through the long use of certain metallic medicines), which has the immediate effect of an extraordinary blunting of the nervous system and destroys the finer organization.
That connection by which a human being becomes a truly moral acting being (which is more than a machine) is created by the feelings of pleasure and displeasure which are connected with the purely mental consciousness of one’s own reason or irrationality (which, however, must be thought of purely by those feelings which refer to the condition of the subject, to his personality in the sensory world, which includes the moral pride of being better than others). In our judgements on the morality of human beings we do not therefore demand that a man, in whom the consciousness of his own immorality does not arouse any feeling of displeasure, should nevertheless act morally; but we demand of him that the consciousness of his own immorality should cause him an unbearable torment; just as we demand of every human being that he should feel the charm of beauty, on pain of contempt as a being incomplete in the first predispositions of his nature.
5 The controversy over the original contract, whether it is based on reason or on judicious choice, and whether it consists of necessary or accidental conditions, is seldom settled. Even the author of an essay in the July 1793 edition of the Berlinische Monatsschrift does not seem to have seen it clearly. [“Overview of the different opinions on the true sources of general constitutional law”]. The rationalists among the politicians do not even claim (as in the cited place, p. 38) that the legitimate origin of a state can only be conceived through the voluntary agreement of the citizens; but rather the opposite, namely that a state can never legitimately originate from voluntary agreement (on chosen conditions), but that the conditions of this unification are prescribed by reason and are therefore necessary: not that the general will of the nation, which will always be a rational will, must be the basis, but rather that the general will can be taken as a basis, because this way it probably comes closest to the rational will in most cases, whereby the rational will (in abstracto) is the only basis of all constitutional law. Already the title of Rousseau’s writing tempts some to this misunderstanding. This writer proves in his book “Du contrat social” that there should be no original contract on chosen conditions, but that the original conditions on which civil society is based are prescribed by reason itself.
6 In Berlinischen Monatsschrift, April 1789, No. 2.
i In this translation I will translate Mensch and Menschen as human being and human beings respectively. I have preserved, however, the use of the male pronoun throughout in order to preserve some of the tension in the use of this term in the eighteenth century.
ii Theory and Practice 8:295f.