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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue that the Parts of Animals [PA] should be seen as continuing in the tradition of those earlier natural scientists who “investigated the material principle of things and that sort of cause” (PA I 1, 640b4–5), but with its own Aristotelian twist. First, Aristotle expands the scope of this inquiry to include animal parts (PA 646a13–b27) since these constitute the matter out of which animals are composed. Second, and more importantly, he reconceptualizes this matter as definitionally-dependent on, and teleologically-oriented towards, the form for whose sake it exists (PA 640b29–641a6, 645b15–20, 646b10–26). It follows from this that we cannot define that matter without also mentioning the form (PA 640b26–9, 645a30–b1). Thus, Aristotle recommends defining “the matter of the composite” (PA 640b24–9) as the most effective way of accomplishing the definitional aims of the PA; for this strategy alone yields a complete definition of the composite itself.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to David Charles, Emily Kress, Michael Peramatzis, Sophia Connell, and Mariska Leunissen for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees as well as the editors of the journal.
Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 In addition to the following see also PA 639a12–19, 639b13–640a6. There is now broad agreement among scholars that what Aristotle does in his biological works is not only compatible with the theory of science in the Analytics but is also (at least in part) guided by it. See Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology and Gotthelf, Teleology, Parts II and IV. While I will note some places where the PA treatment of definition seems to mirror the Analytics, my goal in what follows is to explore the PA account of definition in its own right.
2 See also Balme, “Division”, 70. The method of division outlined in PA I 2–3 is clearly meant to inform the broader method of inquiry discussed at various other points throughout Book I (e.g. PA 639a15–b6, 644a23–b14, 645b1–14) and put into practice in Books II–IV (e.g. PA III 6).
3 This ‘hypothesis’ is meant as a starting assumption. But it is by no means uncontroversial. For example, one might agree that Aristotle thinks arriving at definitions is an important part of the science of living things but deny that it forms part of Aristotle’s specific project in PA II–IV. On this alternative, PA II–IV presupposes definitions arrived at elsewhere, which then serve as the starting-points for the causal explanations of animal parts we get in PA II–IV (M. Leunissen, personal communication). I will not pursue this alternative hypothesis here. As we shall see, there is evidence that the project of generating definitions is closely tied to the broader explanatory goals of PA II–IV. Lennox, Parts of Animals, e.g. 206–7. This would accord with the Analytics’ view that definition and explanation are two-sides of the same project rather than separate projects conducted independently of one another (APo. II 1–2, 8–10).
4 Compare the three approaches canvassed in Lennox, “Aristotle’s methodos”, 18.
5 PA I 2–3 suggests that Aristotle continued to employ the theory of definition by genus and differentiae in the biological works. But he argues there that species must be defined by multiple differentiae located at the ends of multiple branches of division, not by a single differentia obtained by a single line of division. For a suggestion on how to reconcile this with the Metaphysics VII 12 account see Charles, Meaning and Essence, 313, 330.
6 This interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics has come to be associated with what David Charles (personal communication) calls ‘pure’ forms.
7 Compare GC II 9, 335a34–b5.
8 This interpretation is defended by Gill, Aristotle on Substance, 126–8, Frede, “Definition of Sensible Substances”, and Johansen, Powers, 155–6. For a very different interpretation of these chapters see Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This alternative forms the basis for the second version of our hypothesis considered below.
9 I take snubness here as a model for the compound on a par with the composite statue in the follow-up example (kai at 1035a6 connects, rather than contrasts, the two examples). Indeed, when Aristotle summarizes the point a few lines later (a26), it is explicitly treated there as a composite of matter (flesh) and form (concavity) on a par with the bronze ring (see also Metaphysics 1025b30–1026a7, 1030b17).
10 This remark comes in the context of an argument about natural generation (PA I 1, 640a15–33) that finds a close parallel in Metaphysics VII 7 (1032a24–b14) where Aristotle also identifies the essence with the form of the product without the matter.
11 See, especially, PA 639b13–640a10 (see also Physics II 9, 200a33–5).
12 These passages are collected and discussed in Gotthelf, Teleology, Ch. 10. I agree with Gotthelf that Aristotle’s language in these passages indicates that he is talking about what is present in the account of a thing’s essence (e.g. 685b15: logos tês ousias).
13 Charles, “Aristotle’s Psychological Theory”, Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
14 See Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 137.
15 For a detailed examination of the Metaphysics debate see Meister, “Purity of Forms”.
16 The following is based on arguments found in Peramatzis (Forthcoming). I do not have space to give a point-by-point rebuttal of all of Peramatzis’ arguments.
17 Peramatzis (Forthcoming): “ … it is of the essence of the form to be a matter-involving difference” or “the matter-involving form is essentially the difference”.
18 Balme translates eidos as “species” throughout PA I 2–3. I will pass over the long and complicated history of the genos-eidos distinction among interpreters of Aristotle’s biology (Balme, “GENOS and EIDOS”), which is not relevant to the argument here.
19 Ogle (in Barnes’ Complete Works) over-translates the Greek but in the same spirit: “A species is constituted by the combination of differentia and matter”.
20 One could accept that eidos in [A2] refers to a species but argue that a species is identical with its form. However, at Metaphysics 1033b25–6 (see also 1035b27–5, 1037a5–7) Aristotle distinguishes the form from both the concrete individual (e.g. Socrates), on the one hand, which he compares a particular bronze sphere, and from certain composite kinds (e.g. human, animal), on the other, which he compares to “the bronze sphere in general (holôs)”. This, together with PA 645a34–5, supports the idea that eidos can not only be translated as ‘form’ and ‘species’ but that these pick out distinct entities within his hylomorphism.
21 This passage may be intended to buttress the previous objection that the Platonists cannot accommodate common differentiae (PA 643a7–15). Alternatively, Aristotle may be arguing that it is absurd to suppose that Platonic division would manage to identify an exhaustive set of unique and indivisible differentiae equal in number to the actual species of animal there are in the world (as opposed to their own self-serving list of abstract Forms).
22 Compare PA I 1, 640a33–5. The explanation for avian bipedalism at PA 693b7–13 depends on principles developed in Progression of Animals.
23 See APo. 89b25, 90a32, 90b3–4, 92a34–5, 93a29, 93b15.
24 Peramatzis (Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 100–1) concedes that this passage primarily concerns natural compounds but argues that Aristotle means to extend the conclusion to their forms as well. Although I disagree, this is compatible with the point I wish to draw here (see below).
25 We can concede Frede’s (“Definition of Sensible Substances”) point that only those accounts that mention the form alone count as definitions in the strict sense, while those that mention both form and matter together are ‘definitions’ only in some weaker or extended sense. All that is necessary to insist on here is that we should expect to find the latter type of accounts in the PA, since those are the type proper to natural science. It makes no difference to my argument whether these count as definitions in the strict metaphysical sense.
26 See also Lennox, “Aristotle’s methodos”, 18.
27 Peramatzis (Forthcoming) uses this passage as evidence for strong hylomorphism. The difference is that, whereas he takes the example of a bed to refer to a form, I take it to refer to the composite bed (which is the most natural way of reading the claim just below that a bed is a ‘this-in-that’). While Aristotle does draw an analogy with the form of the bed at PA 641a14–21, by that point the discussion has shifted away from talking about the material parts of composite animals (640b15–29) to the proper way of conceptualizing their forms (640b29–641a6). In light of this, I suggest that ‘parts’ at PA 641a16 should be taken to refer to parts of soul, which is what Aristotle compares to the form of the bed there.
28 An anonymous reviewer of this paper suggested that the context of PA 640b15–29 does not easily lend itself to being read as a programmatic passage; it is merely a negative criticism of those natural philosophers. However, PA I is one long argument about the norms governing the natural inquiry into living things (PA 639a1–14, Lennox, “Unity and Purpose”). And so it is reasonable to interpret [D] and [E] in light of that project. In other words, Aristotle is not only criticizing the way the earlier natural scientists conducted their inquiry but also spelling out how natural science should go about defining animals and their parts. Compare Aristotle’s methodological remarks at PA I 5, 645a30–b1 (discussed below) where he recalls this point about how one should proceed when defining/explaining the parts of composite animals.
29 See Lennox (Parts of Animals, 137).
30 I am not suggesting that Aristotle thinks [E2] is superior in the unqualified sense. Rather, it is superior relative to his project in the PA which (I am claiming) aims at defining the composite animal. [E1] would be preferable for Aristotle’s project in (say) the De anima, which is aimed at defining the animal form (soul) rather than the composite animal (see also PA 641a14–b9).
31 See Charles, “Aristotle’s Psychological Theory”, and the reply from Caston, “How Hylomorphic”. As I see it, this debate suffers from the same ambiguity mentioned earlier in connection with the Metaphysics debate, namely, it is unclear whether by “functions common to body and soul” (e.g. anger) Aristotle is talking about forms (Charles) or composites (Caston).
32 Kullmann (Aristoteles, 305): “Dies ist eine simple, aber für Aristoteles wichtige Aussage: Die außere natürliche Gestalt ist wichtiger als die materielle Beschaffenheit, wobei die natürliche Gestalt jedoch nicht auf die geometrische Umrißform und Farbe reduziert werden kann”.
33 Aristotle makes this point explicitly at the end of PA I 5 (645b15–20) and again at the beginning of PA II 1 (646b10–27). See Charles (Meaning and Essence, 313–14) and Lennox (Parts of Animals, 182).
34 I suspect Aristotle says ‘define the matter of the composite’ rather than ‘define both the matter and the form’ in order to preserve the unity of natural inquiry (see also Physics II 2). For an exceptionally clear discussion of this point see Lennox, “Investigating snubness”. Lennox (180–1) frames Aristotle’s approach to natural science there as an inquiry into the natural form of the composite, which (on his account) forces us to mention its matter. I agree that the teleological unity of matter and form grounds the unity of natural inquiry, but my account has it the other way around: we inquire into the natural matter of the composite, which forces us to mention the form for whose sake it exists. By contrast, at least if purism is correct, then one can define the form of a natural composite without mentioning its matter.
35 Lennox (Parts of Animals, e.g. 206–7). This is what we should expect if the PA is following the Analytics model of scientific inquiry where definition and explanation are presented as two sides of the same epistemic coin (APo. II 1–2, 8–10).
36 I am grateful to Emily Kress for pressing me on this point.
37 On this reading, “the matter of the elements” at 646b5 refers to the element-potentials.
38 When Aristotle says, “perhaps it is better to speak of composition from element-potentials”, he is not suggesting (as I had previously thought) that we replace the traditional elements with his own element-potentials; the traditional elements are still included in his ontology. His point is that it is better to carry the analysis further down and begin with the composition of the traditional elements out of the element-potentials (see also Meteor. IV 1). The traditional elements are only ‘so-called’ here because the word stoicheiôn is typically reserved for the most fundamental building blocks, which is the role played by his element-potentials (hot, cold, moist, dry).
39 With the following see Gotthelf, Teleology, 158–9.
40 See also PA 643a16–20, 643b25–6; see also 639a15–17 (human, lion, ox), 644a33–4 (sparrows, cranes). See also Lennox (Parts of Animals, 153).
41 Pellegrin (“Zoology Without Species”, 102–3) agrees that PA 644a1–10 sets out a procedure for generating definitions by collecting together differentiae obtained through multiple lines of division. But he claims that the passage is aimed at defining ‘the human way of having feet’ (the part) and not the human species itself. I do not see any good reason for taking the passage that way. On the contrary, this example is supposed to show how ‘it is impossible for those who divide in two to grasp any of the particular animals’. This makes it clear that PA 644a1–10 is sketching out a procedure for defining whole animals (e.g. human) by collecting together multiple final differentiae (e.g. two-feet, hands) located at the ends of multiple branches of division. Compare PA 693b6–7 (text [C] above).
42 With the following compare Physics II 2, 194a12–b15. Notice that when Aristotle raises the question there, ‘Up to what point should natural science study the form?’, he answers in terms of how one should study the matter (194b10–13).
43 See also Lennox, Parts of Animals, xiii, Gotthelf, Teleology, 155–6, and Kullman, Wissenschaft und Methode, 1–5; Aristoteles, 134ff..
44 This is how Lennox (Parts of Animals, xiii) frames the question about the relation between the actual investigations in PA II–IV and the methodological norms set out in PA I. And one of the areas that scholars have tended to see a gap between them concerns the role of definitions (see Gotthelf, Teleology, 151).
45 In addition to what I have attempted to do here, establishing the unity of the PA would also involve emphasizing the continuity between the argument at the end of PA I 5 and the opening argument of PA II 1, both of which attempt to show how the body and its parts ultimately exist for the sake of “the complex actions and movements that belong to animals as a whole” (646b10–27; see also Gotthelf, Teleology, 158–9).