Advocacy in the Amazon and the Camisea gas project: implications for non-government public action

Abstract

The article considers international advocacy concerning the exploitation of gas reserves in an area inhabited by an isolated indigenous group in Peru, the Machigengua. Considerable international advocacy activity was centred mainly in Washington, DC. Poor communication between those directly affected and international environmental NGOs characterised very different and not always compatible agendas. The article concludes that this failure to adapt the international lobby both to the views of the indigenous population and to political realities in Peru severely weakened the impact of the international advocacy work.

Keywords:

• Civil Society
• Gender and Diversity
• Aid
• Methods
• Latin America and the Caribbean

Acknowledgement

The fuller study on which this article is based is the work of Lucy Earle and Brian Pratt 2006, the research for which was supported by the ESRC Non-governmental Public Action Research Programme. The views expressed in the article are entirely those of the author.

Notes

1. Certain donors, including the UK government's Department for International Development under the direction of Clare Short, argued in favour of advocacy and against direct service delivery.

2. In this article I have referred to Northern-based NGOs working in several countries as International NGOs (INGOs) rather than Northern NGOs (NNGOs), as this seems to be the common term, although I am not convinced that their governance and other structures make them truly international.

3. To begin with, in the UK, it was suggested that these lobbying activities were putting ‘charities’ outside the law. However, Baroness Chalker, head of overseas development assistance under the Conservative government, argued that British NGOs should be more, not less, engaged in such work.

4. Some lobbyists argued, however, that the delay in reaching a final decision in the IDB on the loan approval was not due to stonewalling, but reflected the attempts by the US representative to define a set of conditions on the loan which would make it acceptable on the one hand to the INGO lobbyists and their allies (in Congress and the media, among others), and on the other hand to the company, the consortium, and the Peruvian government and their allies. However, in a confidential interview for the study, an IDB staff member remarked that it was the companies and the Peruvian government that benefited from the delay in reaching final agreement on the loan.

5. It has been argued that while the project's critics were focusing their attention on the decisions in Washington, DC, the project was progressing on the ground. However, some of those involved argue that this was not only or even mainly due to the imposition of an INGO agenda over that of their Peruvian allies, but that the energy companies and the Peruvian government had consistently shown a lack of interest in listening to the critics, whereas the IDB, especially after the visit to Peru of (former US Ambassador) Alexander Watson as an IDB consultant, was perceived as an actor that could be influenced by lobbying.

6. In a sleight of hand, when it became clear that external funding would be delayed and might not be available in the quantities required, the government of President Toledo engaged in some dubious manoeuvres to obtain financing from national resources such as private banks and pension funds.

7. The Defensoría del Pueblo (official state ombudsperson), one of the few mechanisms respected by people at large as effective and legitimate, withdrew from involvement with the project when without consulting the Defensoría the Peruvian government contracted the services of a unit in the Catholic University to act as ombudsperson for the Camisea project. The Camisea ombudsman was widely regarded as partial to the companies and ineffective. At the time of writing it had yet to be seen whether the new government's involvement in the Camisea project would have a more beneficial impact on the Machiguenga.

8. Some of those involved felt that the focus of Peruvian NGOs and others on the IDB was due not to INGO dominance but rather to the fact that they perceived an opportunity to influence the IDB, whereas they saw no chance of influencing the government of Peru.

9. In the particular case of Camisea, the INGOs began with their own agendas and concerns but did eventually adapt them in the face of a broad coalition of (more than 20) Peruvian organisations. The larger environmental organisations were obliged to abandon their interest in negotiating a contract with the IDB to manage a Camisea Fund for the environment, whereas smaller activist organisations had to abandon their message of an outright ‘no’ to Camisea in order to support a more nuanced message and accept a loan with conditions.

10. Confidential interviews in 1999 during an evaluation of a major environmental NGO showed the organisation moving from funding partners to building up its own programmes run by its own staff. Similarly, at the time a large development INGO increased its own staff significantly, while reducing its grant making to local partners.

11. See Chapin 2004 as well as interviews conducted by the author in 1999, 2005, and 2006 with major agencies working in Peru.

12. The international exception was the financial support from Oxfam America, although one should also note the long-term support from CEDIA, a local NGO. This organisation has recently encountered serious problems in raising resources for its work, despite having worked in the Camisea region for more than 25 years.

13. Overall the ability of COMARU to absorb funds was limited by the capacity of its own staff, but the capacity building offered to them often seemed to be very short-term or poorly conceptualised and failed to promote a longer-term strategy for COMARU.

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Notes on contributors

Brian Pratt

Brian Pratt first worked in Peru in 1975 on his doctoral research. During the late 1970s, representing Oxfam GB, he authorised grants for several then nascent indigenous groups. The present research was carried out between 2005 and 2006 and enabled him to revisit many of the issues that began to emerge nearly 30 years ago. He is Executive Director of INTRAC, an NGO engaged in research, capacity building, programmes, and consultancy related to the strengthening of civil society internationally.