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ABSTRACT
Why do illiberal regimes restrict the activities of marginal and benign religious groups? Since the late 1990s, increasingly illiberal governments across the post-Soviet space have redefined freedom of conscience as freedom from the influence of ‘non-traditional’ religious groups, which range from Evangelical Christians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, to Falun Gong and Tablighi Jamaat. Examining state discourses on national and religious tradition in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, I demonstrate that these policies represent part of a broader effort to recast pluralism as a subversive threat to national sovereignty. Drawing from Bourdieu’s later work on public politics and representation, I argue that political and religious elites seek to monopolise public authority by claiming a mandate to speak for an essential and sacrosanct popular will that transcends politics. I examine the new discourses on national tradition and religious orthodoxy that result from such claims, as well as the reasons for the popularity of such populist and illiberal policies among key strata. This research is based on a corpus of public documents (legislation, court rulings and policy papers, etc.) drawn from state databases in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I also make use of data from waves four and six of the World Values Survey.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. All scores drawn from the Freedom House annual Freedom in the World report, accessed 17 January 2018 at https://freedomhouse.org.
2. The relationships demonstrated in this chart between country and support are significant at the 0.001 level; country and support for a strong leader: Χ2 (3, 3000) = 137.2, p < 0.001; country and support for democracy: Χ2 (3, 2997) = 140.9, p < 0.001; data from wave six of the WVS, conducted in Kyrgyzstan and (Committee Citation2010), available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
3. From 22 May 2008 N 409-IV, The Decision of the Kyrgyz Republic. ‘About formation of the parliamentary commission on studying, Religious situation in the Kyrgyz Republic (As amended by the Resolution of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic,’ From 13 June 2008 N 507-IV), Speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Madumarov.
4. Askar Bimendin, ‘It Is Necessary to Make It So That People Will Not Want to Leave the Largest Traditional Confessions,’ Inform.kz. 13 March 2013. Source: http://www.inform.kz/ru/nuzhno-sdelat-tak-chtoby-lyudyam-rashotelos-uhodit-iz-krupneyshih-tradicionnyh-konfessiy-kayrat-lama-sharif_a2543559.
5. Oleg Gubaydulin, ‘Whom to believe?’ Zakon.kg Source: https://www.zakon.kz/117219-komu-verit.html.
6. Interview with a Presbyterian pastor in Astana, Kazakhstan, July 2014.
7. Alexander Tuzov and Bermet Malikova, ‘How can we save secular Kyrgyzstan?’ Vecherniy Bishkek, No. 208, 4 November 2009.
8. Interview with agent of the Bishkek mission of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which coordinates military and security activities among participating post-Soviet countries, 8 July 2014.
9. Torgyn Nurseitova, ‘Hijab Test – A New Exam for Tolerance,’ Islam v SNG, January 2011. Source: http://www.nomad.su/?a=10-201108110025.
10. Kyrgyz Republic. 1995. Government Decree ‘On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and the Tasks of the Authorities to Formulate State Policy in the Religious Sphere.’ Signed by Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Djumagulov, August 1995, No. 345.
11. Strategic plan for the management of internal policy of Pavlodar region for 2010–2014, approved by decree of Akimat, Pavlodar Region, 25 December 2009, No. 257/18.
12. Diaz Kusainov, ‘Why Salfasim Is Not Our Way?’ Abai Akparat, January 2011. Source: http://abai.kz/post/10441.
13. Concept: National security of the Kyrgyz Republic, Approved by Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic on 9 June 2012 N 120.
14. Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 5 December 2007 No. 1185Ob approving the Program for Ensuring Freedom of Religion and Improving State and Confessional Relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2007–2009.
15. Gennadiy Kholkin, ‘The State Concept in the Religious Sphere,’ Moya Stolitsa, September 6 2005. Source: https://ca-news.info/2005/09/06/31.
16. Magzum Sultangaliev, ‘Islam is the religion of unity, peace and kindness,’ Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, August 2011. Source: http://www.nomad.su/?a=10-201108110025.
17. Interview with Aidar Ambrebayev, ‘An active spiritual dialogue is being conducted in Kazakhstan,’ Deputy Director of the IMEP under the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Leader of the Nation.
18. Amanzhol Smagulov, ‘Save Spiritual Sovereignty,’ Abai Akparat, 16 January 2011. Source: http://abai.kz/post/10492.
19. Shlymova G. ‘After the adoption of the new law on religion, the country managed to form a new legal framework governing the confessional relations,’ Director of the Research and Analytical Center on Religion of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Religious Affairs.
20. Interview with a professor of religious studies in Almaty, KZ, May 2013.
21. Ibid.
22. Interview with official from the SCRA, Bishkek, KG, December 2012.
23. Interview on with local scholar of religion and member of the Tabligh Jamaat movement, Bishkek, KG, June 2014.
24. Data from wave six of the WVS, accessed 2 February 2018, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
25. Year and support for a strong leader: Χ2 (3, 2497) = 24.5, p < 0.001; year and support for democracy: Χ2 (3, 2517) = 164.5, p < 0.001; data from wave six of the WVS, conducted in Kyrgyzstan and (Committee Citation2010), accessed 2 February 2018, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
26. I created this index from four different measures, retaining the same scales and weights used in the original survey. The first three measures are class (on a scale of 10 relative to each country), education (on a scale of 9), urban versus rural residence (on a scale of 8). The fourth measure is itself a composite scale of 10 based on three measures of the kind of work done by the respondent currently or in the past if not currently employed – degree of manual versus intellectual, routine versus non-routine and supervised versus autonomous, all measured on a scale of 10.
27. The chart below includes aggregate scores for all current EU member-states included in wave six of the WVS, including Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. Relationship between SES and support for ‘having a strong leader’ significant at the 0.001 level: Χ2 (6, 9015) = 283.1, p < 0.001; relationship between SES and support for ‘having a democratic system’ significant at the 0.001 level: Χ2 (6, 9201) = 130.6, p < 0.001.
28. Relationship between SES and support for ‘having a strong leader’ in Kazakhstan significant at the 0.001 level: Χ2 (6, 1499) = 27.4, p < 0.001; relationship between SES and support for ‘having a strong leader’ in Kyrgyzstan significant at the 0.001 level: Χ2 (6, 1434) = 26.6, p < 0.001; relationship between SES and support for ‘having a strong leader’ in aggregated EU member-states significant at the 0.001 level: Χ2 (6, 9015) = 283.1, p < 0.001.
29. Relationship between SES and agreement that ‘the only acceptable religion is my religion’ in Kazakhstan significant at the 0.01 level: Χ2 (6, 1324) = 21.2, p = 0.002; relationship between SES and agreement that ‘the only acceptable religion is my religion’ in Kyrgyzstan significant at the 0.001 level: Χ2 (6, 1369) = 26.7, p < 0.001; relationship between SES and agreement that ‘the only acceptable religion is my religion’ in aggregated EU member-states significant at the 0.001 level: Χ2 (6, 8749) = 446.8, p < 0.001.
Additional information
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David Levy
David Levy received his Master’s Degree in Nationalism Studies from Central European University and spent the years following in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where he taught at the Department of Sociology at American University of Central Asia. He subsequently pursued a Doctorate in Sociology from Boston University, and researched the growth of populist and authoritarian politics in the post-Soviet space, with a focus on religious freedom in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. He is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor of Sociology at Providence College, Rhode Island, USA.