https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0638-0601
![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
In explaining sectarian violence and conflict in Indonesia, some scholars have highlighted the crucial role played by key political actors. Taking online Salafi rivalries as its point of departure, this contribution aims to further advance the discussion on the sectarianisation thesis offered by Hashemi and Postel, which argues that one of the key factors in religious sectarianism is not theology but authoritarianism. Unlike the thesis, this contribution argues that Salafi sectarianism is facilitated by Indonesia’s democratic atmosphere rather than by authoritarianism. However, this contribution agrees with the thesis that theology is not a determining aspect in Salafi sectarianism. Although framed in theological terms, Salafi rivalries are driven by competing to demonstrate their religious identity, authority, and ‘good’ citizenship.
Acknowledgements
My sincere gratitude goes to Alex Arifianto, Saleena Saleem, and two anonymous reviewers for their critical comments on the draft of this contribution. However, all shortcomings are my sole responsibility.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. For a thorough study of MUI and its influential role in defining Islamic orthodoxy after the New Order era, see Ichwan (Citation2013).
2. Wiktorowicz (Citation2006) classifies them into three different Salafi groups, including purists, politicos, and jihadis.
3. Purist Salafis are those who focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education. See Wiktorowicz (Citation2006).
4. These groups have different views on politics. For purist Salafis, politics is a diversion that encourages deviancy, while, for politicos, the Salafi creed should be applied in the political arena in order to have impacts on social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant political stance through violence and revolution.
5. This means that I did not engage with the social media users and only observed the posts. Although my university does not yet have an ethics board responsible for reviewing research, my research was based on data collected entirely from social media located in the public domain and there was no human interaction.
6. Scholars like Wagemakers (Citation2016a) and Lauzière (Citation2016) call this form of Salafism purist Salafism, which is different from modernist Salafism.
7. A comprehensive study on Salafism in Indonesia can be found in Wahid (Citation2014).
8. Laskar Jihad is a Salafi paramilitary group founded by Ja’far Umar Thalib. The most comprehensive study of Laskar Jihad is that by Hasan (Citation2006).
9. It should be noted here that I intentionally removed a Salafi organisation named Wahdah Islamiyah foundation based in Makassar, South Sulawesi from the discussion, as I focus more on the Salafi networks that emerged directly from the conflicts initially instigated by Ja’far Umar Thalib. Wahdah Islamiyah was initially linked to the modernist Muhammadiyah organisation and broke with the latter in 1985. See Chaplin (Citation2018). I also do not include Salafi individuals outside these networks such as Khalid Basalamah in the networks, although he was once affiliated with Rodja TV.
10. www.rodjaradio.com.
11. The text of the Law is found in https://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/users/4761/UU%2019%20Tahun%202016.pdf.
12. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/09/ahok-guilty-of-blasphemy-sentenced-to-two-years.html.
15. https://www.instagram.com/p/BS8sM1GBwQi/; https://www.instagram.com/p/BS64cHIhqTS/; https://www.instagram.com/p/BS59tzSBqDl/.
16. His audio sermon is found in Al-Fawaaid’sYoutube channel at https://www.youtube.com/embed/x3b_nFWsdf8.
18. Khawarij (sing. khariji) is an early Islamic sect or group who rejected a peacefully negotiated agreement between Ali, the fourth Caliph, and Mu’awiya, and declared those involved to be unbelievers (kafir). Murji’a consists of those who abstained from supporting or rejecting both Ali and Mu’awiya. Mu’tazila is a sect or group led by Wasil b. ‘Ata who separated from the teaching of his teacher, Hasan al-Basri.
20. Previously, Khalid Basalamah was once a preacher of Rodja TV, but he is no longer affiliated with it. He has his own TV channel called Wesal TV.
21. https://forumsalafy.net/tanya-jawab-bersama-al-ustadz-luqman-baabduh-daurah-balikpapan/, accessed 19 January 2020.
22. For further information on the As-Sofwa foundation, see Hasan (Citation2006, 55–56).
25. In the online context, we can see this campaign, for example, in the following Instagram post: ‘Terrorism and radicalism are our common enemies’, which is followed by two hashtags #kamibersamaTNIPOLRI and #bersatumelawanteroris, which mean ‘we are with the Indonesian army and police’ and ‘together [we are] fighting terrorists’. See https://www.instagram.com/p/B3iqNPchxDG/?igshid=1tl7o1ubztyuk.
26. This can be seen, for instance, in Luqman Ba’abduh’s book Mereka adalah Teroris (They are terrorists) in which he attributes terrorism and radicalism to the teaching of the Khawarij. See Ba’abduh (Citation2005, 358).
27. Pancasila (five principles) includes monotheism, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sunarwoto
Sunarwoto completed his PhD at Tilburg University, the Netherlands in 2015, and currently teaches at Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies (IIS), School of Graduate Studies, State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta.