Using Public–Private Interplay to Climate-Proof Urban Planning? Critical Lessons from Developing a new Housing District in Karlstad, Sweden

Abstract

While strengthening public–private interplay is expected to improve the climate profile of urban planning in terms of mitigation and adaptation, less is known about the practice of such new interactive modes of governing. The paper critically examines the role, benefits and limitations of extended public–private interplay in developing a new housing district in Sweden. The developer dialogue between municipal officials and property developers confirms mutual interests, shared understandings and the added value of interacting. However, the closer the dialogue comes to settling agreements, the more difficult it gets for municipal officials to steer the process and its outcomes in favor of climate proofing. Complications with adapting to the new interactive setting means that municipal officials balance between acting as facilitators and/or regulators and property developers between acting as partners, competitors and/or defenders. Refining steering-strategies for sustaining commitments and securing formal agreements are pertinent for using public–private interplay to climate-proof urban planning.

Keywords:

• climate governance
• public–private interplay
• developer dialogue
• climate proofing
• urban planning

1. Introduction

In the climate governance literature, strengthening the current interplay of public and private actors has been deemed critical for more efficiently governing climate change. Enrolling private actors, depicted as potential “agents of change”, is assumed to hold “an untapped potential for innovation” by pooling expertise and increasing problem-solving capacity (Schroeder, Burch, and Rayner 2013, 761f.; Bauer and Steurer 2014). Such improved public–private interplay is expected to enhance legitimacy and climate change ownership, thus influencing the overall effectiveness in implementing climate adaptation measures (Eakin and Lemos 2006; Juhola and Westerhoff 2011; Agrawala et al. 2011; Tompkins and Eakin 2012; Juhola 2013; Mees et al. 2013; Mees, Driessen, and Runhaar 2014; Milman and Warner 2016) and mitigation (Nilsson, Hillman, and Magnusson 2012; Khan 2013; Hrelja, Hjerpe, and Storbjörk 2015). Evidence is also amassing that the practice of public–private interplay varies greatly. For instance, the interplay stretches from involving private actors but still enabling public steering of outcomes, to interactive arrangements that replace hierarchical relationships with horizontal ones; thus, restructuring previous relations by creating new interactive practices (Driessen et al. 2012; Schroeder, Burch, and Rayner 2013; Mees et al. 2013; Bauer and Steurer 2014). Generally, climate governance scholars stress the need for further empirical insights on the role, benefits and limitations of new interactive modes of governing climate change (Juhola and Westerhoff 2011; Tompkins and Eakin 2012).

This paper takes urban planning and development as its empirical starting point, since this is a key area for enacting local climate ambitions (Wilson and Piper 2010; Matthews 2013; Storbjörk and Hjerpe 2014; Storbjörk and Uggla 2015). Researchers have argued that urban planning in practice becomes a challenging switchboard for mediating adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development concerns with other local concerns (Biesbroek, Swart, and van der Knaap 2009; Hurlimann and March 2012). Urban planning is also an arena where the interaction between public and private perspectives has been deemed critical for exploring new response options and mobilizing change with respect to both mitigation and adaptation (Tennekes et al. 2013; Hrelja, Hjerpe, and Storbjörk 2015; Storbjörk, Hjerpe, and Isaksson 2018). Currently, new forms of public–private partnerships (Frantzeskaki, Wittmayer, and Loorbach 2014; Harman, Taylor, and Lane 2015; Taylor and Harman 2016) or – as in Sweden – developer dialogue [byggherresamverkan] between municipal officials and property developers (Smedby and Neij 2013; Fitzgerald and Lenhart 2016) are being tested as a means for improving the climate profile of municipalities in specific urban regeneration or development projects.

Practical experiences diverge and the effectiveness of enhanced public–private interplay to change urban planning and development practices has been questioned. Authors have argued that new forms of interplay may increase the complexity and tensions involved in planning and decision-making (Meadowcroft 2007). Australian studies have documented challenges related to design and execution, transparency, accountability and weakened rules and regulations in urban planning and development (Harman, Taylor, and Lane 2015; Taylor and Harman 2016). European studies have suggested that new partnership arrangements have put property developers in a privileged position vis-a-vis the municipality (Mäntysalo and Saglie 2010; Root, van der Krabben, and Spit 2015). It is suggested that we know too little of what type of interactive arrangements are needed to facilitate productive public–private interplay in urban planning and to what extent the intentions of improved implementation are fulfilled in practice (Smedby and Neij 2013; Harman, Taylor, and Lane 2015; Taylor and Harman 2016). These are urgent analytical tasks.

Considering this, the aim of this paper is to critically examine the role, benefits and limitations of extended interplay between public and private actors to support and accelerate the climate proofing of urban planning and development. Emphasis is placed on developer dialogue as a specific type of interplay between municipal coordinators and property developers in Swedish urban planning. The following research questions are targeted:

(1)	What are the initial expectations of the developer dialogue among participants?
(2)	How is the dialogue organized and what steering strategies are used for climate proofing?
(3)	How do participants depict the practice of the dialogue: what interactive challenges are identified?
(4)	What scope of influence for public and private actors can be identified in different stages of interaction?

Empirically the paper builds on a case-study of developer dialogue in planning the housing-district of Grundviken, Karlstad, Sweden. Similar forms of interplay have initially been tested in populous Swedish urban areas, where cities such as Malmö have led the way and inspired others (Smedby and Neij 2013; Lenhart et al. 2014; Fitzgerald and Lenhart 2016) by their method for developer dialogues in Västra hamnen (Malmö 2014). However, we currently lack knowledge of what happens when ideas of such interactive practices are transferred to smaller municipalities facing other conditions. Studies have suggested the importance of studying a variety of local contexts since, e.g., municipal size influences the ability to act on climate change (Lundqvist and von Borgstede 2008; Aasen, Westskog, and Korneliussen 2016; Tørnblad, Westskog, and Rose 2015). In this respect, the Karlstad-case allows us to draw valuable lessons regarding challenges involved in transferring practices of developer dialogue beyond the initial high-profile pilot projects in larger cities. The process of public–private interplay in Karlstad is illustrative, since it shows both positive and negative sides of new interactive arrangements. This is particularly important as more research has been undertaken on successful cases than on challenging ones (Börzel 2011). The developer dialogue in Karlstad included municipal officials and private property developers, but not citizens as a group, as in public–private-people-partnerships (Ng 2013). This is the reason why citizen perspectives are left out of our analysis.

The next chapter of the paper presents our conceptual framing and the analytical perspectives needed to explore the role, benefits and limitations of the new interactive arrangement in Karlstad. The methodological section introduces the case study and the empirical data used. Thereafter follows the empirical analysis of research questions 1-3. In the concluding chapter research question 4 is put in focus and the main conclusions are highlighted.

2. Conceptual framing and analytical perspectives

A large body of literature on environmental governance (e.g. Meadowcroft 2007; Glasbergen 2011; Börzel 2011) has explored planning dynamics at the intersection between the public and private spheres. Public actors are depicted as increasingly dependent on actors outside their hierarchical control to mobilize action. In the field of climate governance, it is emphasized that various forms of interactive arrangements, e.g., partnerships or networks are expected to serve as vehicles for change, “pooling of expertise, capacity, experience, and creativity” to solve complex problems (Schroeder, Burch, and Rayner 2013, 762. Bauer and Steurer 2014; Harman, Taylor, and Lane 2015). New interactive arrangements shift the distribution of responsibilities and division of tasks between public and private actors. These are often distinguished from hierarchical top-down arrangements, where public actors ensure collectively binding decisions by mechanisms of command and control, and market-based spontaneous arrangements, emerging from the self-coordination of autonomous actors (Börzel 2011; Driessen et al. 2012; Mees et al. 2013; Mees, Driessen, and Runhaar 2014). The interactive arrangements are characterized by horizontal relationships with shared responsibilities (Glasbergen 2011; Mees et al. 2013; Bauer and Steurer 2014) where non-governmental actors are “put on a more equal footing with public actors”, giving them “a real say” in decision-making practices (Börzel 2011, 53). The dominant policy instruments are communicative and negotiated agreements (Mees et al. 2013). While such shifting interactions are intended to serve as instruments for improved governance (Taylor and Harman 2016) they raise critical questions of legitimacy and accountability (Mees, Driessen, and Runhaar 2014). At the same time, there are large variations in their practical outcomes (Koppenjan 2015). Interactive arrangements are also set up differently depending on, for example, the institutional history of a country, emphasizing various traditions of private actor involvement (Meijerink and Dicke 2008; Mees, Driessen, and Runhaar 2014).

Scholars have distinguished between different types of interactive arrangements with respect to “the themes addressed, their purpose, actor constellations and relations, spatial and temporal scope, funding, activities and outputs” (Bauer and Steurer 2014, 122). This means that such arrangements vary in intensity, scale, intention and activity (Glasbergen 2011), stretching from being informal and temporary to more formal, stable and ongoing (Schroeder, Burch, and Rayner 2013; Bauer and Steurer 2014; Harman, Taylor, and Lane 2015). They may further be initiated either top-down or bottom-up on either a mandatory or self-initiated basis (Mees et al. 2013). Actors can be highly or loosely integrated (Börzel 2011), meaning that the operative interplay can be based on different degrees of public and private sector involvement (Driessen et al. 2012; Bauer and Steurer 2014). There are examples where public actors steer outcomes (Harman, Taylor, and Lane 2015) and where initiatives are initiated and led by private actors (Mäntysalo and Saglie 2010). The interplay can also shift in different stages of planning, e.g., agenda setting and initiation, implementation, evaluation and maintenance (Mees, Driessen, and Runhaar 2012). This means that we need to acknowledge variance in the type of interactive arrangements, as well as potential changes in how the arrangements play out over time.

To be able to discuss the role, benefits and limitations of interactive arrangements in Karlstad we further make use of literature discussing critical components for initiating and sustaining dynamics in interaction (Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011; Glasbergen 2011). One of these involves exploring the added value and advantages of interacting for the participating parties (Glasbergen 2011). Here, identifying joint interests is critical. Generally, the private sector has been shown to engage in new arrangements for development opportunities, to create prospects for return on investments, to better manage risks and to reduce political uncertainty (Taylor et al. 2012; Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011; Taylor and Harman 2016), whereas public actors, for example, engage to enhance efficiency in policy-making and implementation (Mees, Driessen, and Runhaar 2012, 2014; Mees et al. 2013). Another component concerns building mutual trust and understanding, which includes establishing a sense of fairness in the balance of benefits and risks involved to overcome the sometimes deep-seated differences and conflicts of roles and interests initially found between parties (Glasbergen 2011; Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011; Taylor and Harman 2016). Furthermore, sustaining internal legitimacy and shared commitment is seen as critical for supporting agreement upon problem-definitions as well as rules, procedures and substantive obligations. Here contracts can signify formal commitments, including how to ensure legitimacy in fulfilling agreements (Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011; Glasbergen 2011). How the process of interaction evolves and whether it results in success or failure, has further been considered to be dependent upon a mix of internal components such as past history of participants, organizational capacities, power-differences, identity issues, leadership issues, and external components such as the legal frameworks within which partnerships develop, the political and institutional context, the socio-cultural context and the economy (Glasbergen 2011; Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011).

For our paper, studies problematizing the effectiveness of interactive arrangements to enhance the climate proofing of urban planning and development also become important. Research experiences of enhanced public–private interaction show diverse results (Frantzeskaki, Wittmayer, and Loorbach 2014; Koppenjan 2015). There are empirical examples suggesting that enhanced public–private interplay can ensure increased benchmarking of climate ambitions by either serving as a testing-ground for experiments and innovation (Root, van der Krabben, and Spit 2015) or by normalizing mitigation and adaptation goals (Taylor and Harman 2016). Other studies have concluded that the more frequent use of interactive modes of governing is vitiated with conflicts in a way that increases the complexity of planning and decision-making to achieve sustainable development goals (Meadowcroft 2007; Mäntysalo and Saglie 2010). Börzel (2011, 57) states that it is unclear whether a “net increase in problem-solving capacity” is gained, arguing that “the involvement of non-state actors is often considered as clientelistic, nontransparent, exclusive, and, thus, undemocratic” and that “if those who have to bear the costs of compliance are involved /…/ they may attempt to weaken rules and regulations or prevent them altogether.” With respect to adaptation, Harman, Taylor, and Lane (2015) have documented challenges relating to design and execution, corruption, transparency and accountability of new interactive arrangements. Urban planning studies suggest that partnership arrangements put property developers in a privileged position, allowing them to set terms for development practices (Mäntysalo and Saglie 2010). Climate governance studies have documented reduced impact of climate ambitions (Handmer 2008; Storbjörk and Hjerpe 2014; Hrelja, Hjerpe, and Storbjörk 2015). It has been suggested that when public actors become facilitators rather than regulators they “loose up more than a little” in what they demand from the market, meaning leading investments to comply with the market rather than public objectives (Root, van der Krabben, and Spit 2015, 710). The practical consequences of an enhanced public–private interplay in terms of to what extent it supports the climate proofing of urban planning and development is thus an open question.

3. Methodological approach

Empirically, the paper builds on a case study of how strengthened public–private interplay contributes to the climate proofing of local development planning in the district of Grundviken, Karlstad, Sweden. In Karlstad, located in the west of Sweden in the delta of the Klarälven river on the northern shore of lake Vänern, managing flood risks is presented as an integral part of all urban planning (Karlstad 2012). In 2015, the population in Karlstad was about 87,000, including rural areas. Local goals of climate mitigation and adaptation are interlinked with the overarching vision of attractiveness and growth (Karlstad 2013). As part of the national program ByggaBoDialogen [The building and living dialogue], the larger district of Västkust with Grundviken as a starting-point has been on the local planning agenda since 1997 (Karlstad 2006, 2009). In the current municipal comprehensive plan, Grundviken is highlighted as a key area for development, linked to the goal of making waterfront areas available for housing and recreation (Karlstad 2012). Grundviken is intended to accommodate 1,200–1,700 homes, of which the first detailed development plan concerns 750. With the area-specific comprehensive plan for Västkust accepted in 2007, a planning program was accepted in 2009, and in 2011 the detailed development plan was initiated. A closer presentation of the Swedish planning system is found in Mäntysalo, Saglie, and Cars (2011). Property developers partake in the municipality-led developer dialogue. The current detailed development plan was sent out for consultation in 2013 and was politically approved by the City Council in 2015 (Karlstad 2015b). However, the plan did not gain legal force since neighbors and the Nature Conservation Society appealed, emphasizing biodiversity and shoreline protection. The plan was examined and thereafter revoked by the County Administrative Board. The municipality has in their turn appealed and the matter is to be settled by the Swedish Government. These tricky conflicts are elaborated in a forthcoming paper.

The empirical data consist of interviews with the public and private actors involved in the municipality-led developer dialogue (Table 1).

Table 1. Interviewees.

	Interviewee	Year
1	HSB, private housing cooperative	2014
2	Riksbyggen, private housing cooperative	2014
3	PEAB, construction and civil engineering company	2014
4	SKANSKA, construction and civil engineering company	2014
5	Kärnhem, project development company	2014
6	KBAB, municipal housing company	2014
8, 10	Municipal coordinator, Land and Development	2012, 2015
9, 11	Municipal coordinator, Urban Planning	2012, 2015

Interviews were conducted with the five private property developers engaged in the dialogue, as well as with the municipal housing company who later decided to drop out of the same. These six semi-structured interviews were held in 2014. Municipal representatives were interviewed in 2012 and 2015. In 2012, a 3-h focus-group interview was held with six officials working in departments relevant for urban planning, targeting the integration of climate ambitions in local policy and planning. Grundviken was highlighted but not sufficiently in-depth regarding the details of the development dialogue. This was done in 2015 instead when interviews were undertaken with the two municipal officials coordinating the dialogue (one working with urban planning and the other with land and exploitation). The individual interviews lasted between 1 and 1.5 h and followed an interview guide focusing on position, goals and ambitions regarding climate change in urban planning and/or property development, the case of Grundviken and, specifically, the expectations and practice of public–private interplay. Open questions were posed initially. Specific follow-up questions made it possible to pinpoint aspects of public–private interplay found in the scientific literature relating to type of interplay, critical components for initiating and sustaining dynamics and effectiveness for climate proofing.

All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interviewees gave us consent to use the names of their companies and/or their professional roles in writing and a preliminary compilation of the analysis was sent to the interviewees for member-checking (Baxter and Eyles 1997). The qualitative analysis was inductive and stepwise. First, interviews were analyzed separately to capture their specific characteristics. Second, the data were categorized, focusing on both specific content and different recurring analytical themes. Themes concerning public–private interplay were highlighted, guided by the aim and research questions. The validity of our interpretations is strengthened by comparing statements from different interviews (Silverman 2011; Baxter and Eyles 1997), meaning that many of the citations presented function as examples of general analytical patterns. Where similar statements are made by several interviewees this is systematically noted. We also present individual perspectives, as these sometimes highlight important alternative versions that deepen our understanding of the issues at hand (Baxter and Eyles 1997). Unfortunately, it was not possible to systematically use other types of data such as planning documents comparing, for example, the initial suggestion of climate measures with what was later accepted, as such internal working-material is not accessible. There is also a lack of textual documentation of how the dialogue evolved which limits the transparency and ability of method triangulation. Notifications of ambitions found in the detailed development plan are however referred to in our results. The empirical data were thereafter discussed in the light of conceptual framings and analytical perspectives found in previous studies.

4. The expectations and practice of developer dialogues in Grundviken

The empirical analysis of public–private interplay in Grundviken is structured in three subsections. The first two are briefer, clarifying the initial expectations of the dialogue among participants, how the dialogue was organized, and the steering-strategies employed. The third section illustrates critical aspects of the interaction by targeting three key interactive challenges restricting the intended climate proofing.

4.1. Initial expectations

Overall, our analysis illustrates that there is agreement among interviewees on the need to rethink public–private interplay in property development. Neither the traditional municipality-driven interaction – where conditions are set beforehand by pre-existing detailed plans – nor the developer-driven planning-on-demand – where private land owners initiate planning – are seen as constructive for the climate proofing of urban planning (Interviews 1–11). Improving public–private interplay is regarded as critical for urban planning. For the property developers, new interactive arrangements are a way to ensure that development projects come about:

We need to solve things together rather than the municipality running their race and we ours. We must sit down at an early stage and identify what to build. We must work together for things to happen in a small city like Karlstad. (Interviews 4. 1–3)

Municipal coordinators use interaction to “settle common ground”, which is deemed necessary for sustainable and climate-oriented property development (Interviews 10–11). The dialogue in Grundviken is seen as a step in this direction:

Local development planning takes place in close interaction with property developers to fulfil the vision. The intention is to jointly plan and build the new sustainable district. (Karlstad 2015a)

Since Grundviken enables attractive waterfront housing, interests of consumers, property developers and the municipality match:

Location. Location. Location. Everyone asks for location. On the housing displays customers focus on the view and how far away the water is. We want to build as close to water as possible. The municipality wants to attract new residents and we know that water attracts. (Interviews 3. 1–2, 4–5, 7)

Critical components for initiating interaction, i.e., identifying mutual interests and added value of engaging (Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011; Glasbergen 2011), are clearly in place. The goal was to agree on ambitions for how to develop the district, based on the participants sharing knowledge and experiences:

By the interaction, the different knowledge, experience and good ideas of the parties will be taken advantage of early in planning with the goal to reach a better result and consensus on important issues. (Karlstad 2015b, 33)

For the property developers, participation ensures market advantages by attaining attractive waterfront land. For the public actors, it is also depicted as a way to move forward positions in climate-oriented property development. Both financial gains and efficiency in implementation and achieving outcomes are thus found to be critical motives (Taylor et al. 2012; Mees et al. 2013).

4.2. Organization and steering-strategies

The municipal coordinators prepared for the dialogue by contacting municipalities, such as Malmö, with previous experience in developer interaction. Based on experience, it became clear that a key issue was to determine when in the urban development process to engage property developers:

Would it be appropriate to interact already when preparing the planning program but then the process would be very long, or would it be better if the municipality made preparations and reached agreement before the developers joined in? (Interview 10)

In Grundviken, property developers were invited early, but the interaction did not start with a carte blanche. The overall vision of what a climate-proofed district would entail was already settled by the municipality as a conscious steering-strategy to clearly establish municipal expectations (Interviews 10, 11). The following vision was formulated:

The ambition is to create an area with a sustainable profile. This means good prospects of sustainable mobility, using bicycle and public transportation, stormwater retention in the form of open ponds or green areas as well as closeness to nature. (Karlstad 2015a)

Seven property developers declared interest and were invited to partake in the dialogue. Two of them dropped out: the municipal housing company who decided that Grundviken did not fit their targeted customer group, since it would be too expensive for tenants, and one project development company who decided to phase out its activities in Karlstad altogether.

The deal was that the remaining five property developers would be offered 10% each of the building rights in the area, whereas the remaining 50% would be allocated by traditional praxis. Land allocation would be determined after the participants had decided how the vision of the green and climate-oriented profile would be realized in a jointly agreed sustainability program:

Based on the vision we have tried to determine what it means in practice, together with the property developers. (Interviews 10. 11)

When allocating land, the ambitions would then be formalized in a legally binding development contract (Karlstad 2015b). Not allocating land from the start was another steering-strategy to influence development, by maximizing efforts for the area at large:

We know approximate prices, but we don't know which plots we will be given. That makes it special. Instead of only developing our plots, focus turns to creating overall attractive housing and ensuring the interests of the district at large. (Interviews 3. 4–5, 10–11)

The dialogue was settled gradually, led by one official from the Land and Development Department and one from the Urban Planning Department, and supported by a steering group of heads of key municipal departments. Initially lectures, workshops and field trips to the eco-district Hammarby Sjöstad, Stockholm, were arranged as a steering strategy to increase knowledge and obtain common ground for what a sustainable and climate-oriented district could look like. Most activities were led by the municipality coordinators, but occasionally external moderators were used. Sometimes politicians, neighbors and other municipal officials working with urban planning were included to broaden the knowledge base within the municipality organization and among stakeholders. The vision and procedural terms were thus set by public actors as an attempt to steer the dialogue. The task thereafter was to determine its operationalization, reaching consensus and settling commitments with the property developers.

4.3. Exploring the interactive practice

Overall, the dialogue entailed both challenges and opportunities. Compared with traditional interaction, the participating property developers acknowledged gains of increased efficiency and argued that the overall planning benefitted from property developers voicing both expertise and customer demands early on (Interviews 3–5). The municipal coordinators similarly highlight improved legitimization and dialogue between public and private actors:

The strength is that we get a better anchoring. It is difficult if you are part of the process to come afterwards and bring up critique. (Interviews 10. 11)

There is agreement that the interactive setting allowed public and private actors to learn from each other's knowledge, experiences and ideas (Interviews 1–5, 10–11). Yet, at the same time, both public and private actors identify problems with fulfilling the interactive intentions, which influenced the extent and outcomes of climate proofing. Three main problems are found.

First, our analysis shows that reaching joint agreement and specifying what the general vision of a sustainable and climate-oriented profile in Grundviken stands for in practice was difficult. The municipal coordinators illustrate problems with using planning regulation to climate-proof urban planning:

It is tough to transform goals concretely in a detailed plan and set conditions for what is allowed or not. There are a lot of things we cannot regulate in the Planning and Building Act. We have decided to reduce car travel, but how can we use the plans to ensure that this becomes a reality? (Interviews 8. 9)

To ensure realization, the coordinators decided to settle climate-oriented measures in the land and development contract, established between the municipality and property developers when land is sold “to regulate in detail the commitments and obligations that are involved in property development” (Karlstad 2015b, 34). The ability to reach an agreement that pushed the boundaries for climate-proofing forward, however, became problematic according to the interviewees. A sustainability program, with the aim of consolidating the joint commitments and obligations of the parties, was processed, but not formally accepted. For the participating property developers, the municipal expectations and requirements for the new sustainable and climate-proofed district were too ambitious:

All property developers but one have already chosen a high certification standard but then the municipality have added a list of further requirements. (Interviews 3. 1–2, 4–5)

These extra requirements were seen as problematic from an economic perspective, since “the market must be prepared to pay” (Interviews 1–5). Seeing the sustainability program as a list of costly requirements did not correspond with the intentions of the municipal coordinators:

It was a detailed list, but it was not meant to be seen as a net list. We wanted to discuss the content with the property developers and work together to create something good, but they seemed to think ‘here's a long list from the municipality, let's see what we can delete’. (Interview 10)

The process thus appears to have triggered a sense of distrust between the parties regarding ambitions and intentions. According to interviewees, the focus in the sustainability program was on concrete measures, relating to storm water management, flood risks, public transport and bicycles, biodiversity and compensation measures, reduced amount of paved ground and parking (Interviews 10, 11). The measures concerned the buildings rather than the area at large, meaning that it would directly influence what needed to be done in specific plots. According to the municipal coordinators, the closer discussions came to deciding which measures to implement, the more difficult they became:

The property developers were much more positive when we discussed visions than when we were to get concrete. Then they fall back into calculating costs and removing items from the list. (Interviews 10. 11)

Some measures, such as sensitive biotopes, lowest allowable floor levels to avoid flooding and open storm water solutions, were accepted without being questioned (Interviews 1–5), whereas other measures revealed diverging priorities and were opened up for negotiations between the public and private actors. The property developers mention several controversial measures, such as reducing the amount of paved ground for increased water infiltration, changing mobility patterns by reducing car use and parking lots, introducing car pools and avoiding floor heating where property developer priorities did not match municipal intentions and where developers explicitly tried to limit what they saw as overly ambitious municipal goals and ‘extreme profiling’ in terms of climate change (Interviews 1–5). In general, measures that challenge perceived consumer preferences were more difficult to pursue (Storbjörk, Hjerpe, and Isaksson 2018). According to the property developers, the initially ambitious public requirements were gradually toned down:

The ambitious sustainability program that was discussed initially is less in focus now. Exceptions are possible. (Interviews 1. 3–4)

Currently the sustainability program only exists as an informal draft. Since the detailed development plan has currently been revoked by the County Administrative Board and is the subject of an appeal to the Swedish Government, the process of settling in detail the commitments and obligations of the parties has also been put on hold. The long duration of the interaction – due to complications in producing a legally binding detailed plan – led to a sense of fatigue and reduced engagement. It also meant that initial participants were gradually replaced, which necessitated a constant rebooting internally in the group and reduced continuity (Interviews 1, 3–4).

Second, we learn from our analysis that the municipal steering strategy intended to induce property developers to take a wider perspective in planning had undesirable side-effects. Focusing on the area at large instead of on specific building plots had the advantage of shifting perspectives which improved the overall discussions on what to pursue and accomplish with the larger area, as emphasized by both property developers and municipal coordinators (Interviews 3–5, 10–11). The disadvantage, however, was a perceived imprecision and vagueness in the discussions which, according to the municipal coordinators, reduced the engagement of the property developers:

When not knowing where to build, they had no real project to work on where they could push for their specific concerns and affairs. The result was that everything became too imprecise. Discussions were too general, and developers did not want to make commitments. (Interviews 11. 10)

Property developers confirm how the approach of taking a district perspective nurtured a reduced willingness to excel and distinguish themselves:

There are advantages for the municipality who are more in control, but if we would have known where to build early we would have given more input and put more efforts into how we would like to develop our individual parts based on what we want to accomplish. It becomes flatter now. (Interviews 2. 3)

Maintaining an overall district-focus thus facilitated a desirable shift in understanding, but simultaneously reduced the interest to excel. Climate-oriented measures became too undistinguished, which counteracted the key goals of the dialogue.

Third, the analysis shows that adapting to the new interactive roles to realize interactive advantages was tough. One interactional difficulty was dealing with a group of property developers who spoke uniformly with one voice. According to municipal coordinators, the interactions were complicated by property developers organizing themselves before the planned meetings:

Early on the property developers started meeting separately, discussing issues that they brought forward to us later. We didn't get an open dialogue because they had already formed their ideas and agreed on what they thought. (Interviews 11. 10)

According to municipal coordinators, this form of pre-meeting hampered the opportunities for open dialogue regarding options and commitments in Grundviken. Another interactional difficulty, as the interaction proceeded towards reaching agreement, was the tendency of participants to gradually fall back into traditional roles with little room for constructive dialogue. As exemplified by municipal coordinators:

[Property developers] are not used to these types of interaction and perhaps they didn't realize that we wanted an open discussion, but thought it was more of us having a suggestion and asking for their opinion. (Interview 10)

While most property developers were laconic regarding how interactions evolved, some illustrate difficulties in reaching an effective and fruitful dialogue:

The municipality felt that we did not collaborate, but rather that we said no, no, no. We as property developers are so much in agreement that the municipality feels like it is us versus them, unfortunately. (Interviews 3. 1, 4).

Property developers thus gradually abandoned the role as partners in an interaction, instead taking on the role as defenders of market perspectives and financial priorities which did not work in favor of exploring new climate-oriented solutions. Another interactional difficulty featuring in interviews was the fact that property developers – despite their united front towards municipal coordinators – are, at the end of the day, competitors. Gathering six parties around one table triggers rivalry:

They are companies and competitors at the same time as they are part of this. (Interviews 10. 11)

Some of the property developers claimed that competitiveness came gradually:

It worked excellently when we talked about the big issues and designing the larger area. When we develop our own projects, we start becoming competitors. (Interview 5)

Others suggested that competitiveness could not be set aside even during the more general discussions:

It boils down a lot to us not opening up and saying just everything. We are a bit cautious and monitor our interests. (Interview 3)

While such competitiveness could have triggered a willingness to push for enhanced climate profiling, in the case of Grundviken it did not. Rather competitiveness in terms of monitoring interests seems to have favored business-as-usual. Several difficulties in using extended developer dialogues to strengthen the climate profile of urban planning were thus identified. In the concluding discussion, we summarize the dialogue by means of the fourth research question; scope of influence in different stages of the interaction. Thereafter we highlight the main findings of the analysis and their implications for public–private interplay.

5. Using public–private interplay to climate-proof urban planning?

An extended public–private interplay has, both in research literature and Swedish discussions of urban planning, been presented as a way to rethink and move beyond traditional forms of property development to improve opportunities for urban climate proofing. The expectations and practice of such interactive settings, however, clearly diverge. Our study demonstrates that ambitions to use public–private interplay as a means to strengthen the climate profile of urban planning, in its practical realization, raise a number of critical issues.

We start by characterizing scope of influence between public and private actors in different stages of interaction, to summarize the case study. Previous studies show that interactive arrangements can differ greatly with respect to actor relationships, modes of interplay and steering strategies (Driessen et al. 2012; Mees et al. 2013; Bauer and Steurer 2014). In Grundviken, interaction was formal, spatially and temporally limited and aimed at designing and building a new sustainable and climate-proofed district. Grundviken is neither a case where hierarchical relationships are being replaced by horizontal ones, putting public and private actors on equal terms (Glasbergen 2011) nor a case where public actors play a peripheral role (Taylor and Harman 2016; Mäntysalo and Saglie 2010). Rather, public actors initiate and set the overall vision, carefully select which property developers are invited to participate and develop steering strategies for the dialogue, e.g., setting the vision beforehand, prolonging land allocation and enhancing a joint knowledge base, to secure the realization of public agendas. By deciding whether or not to engage, private actors accept the overall terms for developing the district. Thereafter the interaction focuses on taking different knowledge and experiences into account while jointly determining and operationalizing the vision, a process led by municipal coordinators.

Both public and private actors express shared interests in facilitating attractive property development in terms of either financial gains (property developers) or efficiency in securing public goals (municipal coordinators), thus recognizing the necessary added value and initial advantages of interaction (Glasbergen 2011; Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011). They also claim to have gained a shared understanding by learning from each other, which is also pointed out in the literature as a critical component for interaction. While such shared motivation, interests and learning have elsewhere been seen to trigger a self-reinforcing cycle contributing to legitimacy and commitment (Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011, 13), our study shows that such initial gains are no guarantee for maintaining shared commitments and securing legitimacy for the concrete measures being planned.

The initially positive cycle in Grundviken came to a halt in the process of settling formal commitments, distinguished as another critical stage in interaction (Emerson, Natatchi, and Balogh 2011; Glasbergen 2011). The participants’ definitions of an attractive, sustainable and climate-proof district diverged, revealing differing levels of ambition between public and private actors which the interaction could not solve. Although the study documents an initial sense of shared understandings, signals of clashes between public and private actors come to dominate the dialogue as it proceeds. The property developers made efforts to tone down what they saw as overly ambitious municipal goals, in line with an evasive response to climate change (Storbjörk, Hjerpe, and Isaksson 2018). The process of determining concrete priorities and obligations involved intense negotiations and compromise, uniting property developers as a group but dividing them in relation to municipal coordinators. This split contributed to weakened climate ambitions in comparison with the overall vision. The risks of ambitions, rules and regulations losing force throughout an interaction has been noted elsewhere in the literature, both on public–private partnerships (Börzel 2011) and on integrating climate considerations in urban planning (Handmer 2008; Storbjörk and Hjerpe 2014). Instead of increasing decision-making capacity and effectiveness in implementing climate ambitions, the interaction led to increased decision-making complexity (Meadowcroft 2007; Börzel 2011). Throughout the interactive process private interests come to outgrow public ambitions, mirroring conclusions drawn in other studies (Root, van der Krabben, and Spit 2015; Mäntysalo and Saglie 2010). The closer the interaction came to reaching agreement, the more the scope of influence increased for private actors to negotiate terms and the more difficult it became for public actors to steer the process and its outcomes towards enhanced climate proofing. This gradual shift in influence during the different stages of the interaction is summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Summarizing scope of influence in Grundviken.

Stage of interplay	Scope of influence for public actors	Scope of influence for private actors
Initiating the interaction	Public actors set the vision and level of ambition. Public actors decide which property developers become part of the interaction.	Limited except for the choice to declare interest to partake. By declaring an interest, private actors accept the overall goals.
Designing and starting-up the interaction	Public actors are responsible for designing steering-strategies and leading the process with seminars, trips and discussions.	Private actors engage in the process with their knowledge, ideas and experiences.
Facilitating a constructive dialogue	Public actors experience difficulties with facilitating dialogue. Interactions were time-consuming, complicated and limited the ability to steer the process.	Private actors start meeting on their own, forming a strong “we vs. them”, strengthening the voice of private actors.
Reaching an agreement	Public actors experience difficulties with steering the outcomes to reach the desired end result with a high-profile area. Discussions surface different priorities, results become flat and commitments undistinguished.	Private actors strive to find a compromise of a “good enough solution” financially by negotiating conditions and terms. Private actors steer outcomes by lack of incentives to excel and “deleting items.”

Moreover, we learn from the case study that the participants had difficulty adapting to the new interactive setting, and that their roles varied throughout the duration of the interaction. While starting off with acting as facilitators and partners striving for compromise, participants gradually fell back into traditional roles. Here, public actors attempted to regulate outcomes while private actors responded to public suggestions by “deleting items” rather than participants jointly formulating a common and innovative agenda for the new district. The municipal coordinators balanced between taking on a new role as facilitators, exploring new ways to interact by building dialogue and joint agreements, and upholding their traditional role as regulators, striving to use their formal mandates to achieve an innovative climate-oriented profile. In their latter role, municipal coordinators were frustrated with the unwillingness of property developers to excel and with their own limited ability to steer and regulate the process in favor of climate proofing. The property developers balanced between three different roles; a new one as partners in an interactive process which required them to seek new and innovative solutions; together with two more traditional roles as competitors around a table of rival, but also likeminded, property developers, and defenders of the market perspective and financial priorities of the property development industry. Whereas taking on the initial roles of facilitators or partners strengthened the interactive process (Root, van der Krabben, and Spit 2015), taking the roles of regulators, competitors and defenders during the later stages of the dialogue rather compromised the same. The change in roles was triggered when the interaction turned towards making the visions for a sustainable and climate-oriented district concrete and it became apparent that ambitions differed in practice. We would thus position the participants as standing between traditional regulative and new forms of public–private interplay.

The Swedish case allows us to shed light on some concrete difficulties involved in using public–private interplay to climate-proof urban planning. The implications of this are that both researchers and practitioners need to revise their expectations of how an extended public–private interplay contributes to climate proofing. We suggest that increased attention is paid to identifying how such interaction can evolve constructively over time and when, in this process, both difficulties and potential windows of opportunity arise. In spite of documented mutual interests and interactive advantages, interactive arrangements may throughout their course rather increase the complexity of planning and decision-making practices. Of the many critical steps involved in designing and enacting dialogues, how to sustain commitment and settle agreements that support high climate ambitions, appears to be the most challenging one. Here we can link our results to previous studies of how developer dialogues support urban regeneration and development. Malmö, with the district of Västra Hamnen, is often presented as a successful case where developer dialogue facilitated learning and knowledge exchange among property developers and municipal coordinators. The success was attributed to a long history of attempting forerunner status in environmental sustainability, a supportive political-administrative environment and the district constituting the European Housing Exhibition Bo01 (Lenhart et al. 2014; Fitzgerald and Lenhart 2016). Contrary to Karlstad, the dialogue in Malmö resulted in a shared sustainability contract. However, some studies have claimed that the sustainability outcomes were fairly moderate and did not really push the limits (Smedby and Neij 2013), suggesting that even in such high-profile areas there are difficulties with achieving climate proofing that re-orientates the urban planning agenda towards innovative measures and changed norms and practices.

From this we conclude that the steering strategies used by public actors to secure the realization of key public goals such as climate change in urban development practices need to be refined and sharpened, particularly at the stage of sustaining commitments and securing formal agreements. Combining district-level planning with strategies that spur willingness to excel and give credit to those who go beyond business-as-usual is potentially one way forward here. Furthermore, it needs to be acknowledged that the roles and scope of influence for public and private actors can vary over time and that what might start out as interaction between facilitators and partners may end up in antagonistic encounters between regulators and defenders. In designing dialogues, it becomes critical to balance the roles of public and private actors in a way that benefits a constructive interaction over time. This requires a more long-term team building to avoid the problematic we-versus-them, while at the same time not handing over important planning mandate and decision-making authority to private actors in a way that would – as Börzel cautions – limit transparency and democracy (Börzel 2011).

To what extent our results are related to the case-study context, where the place dependency of a municipality located far from the larger Swedish cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö might influence the outcomes in terms of climate proofing (Storbjörk, Hjerpe, and Isaksson 2018) and with no previous experience in innovative climate proofing or extended public–private interplay, needs further empirical clarification. Valuable lessons can be drawn by comparing interactive practices in different local contexts. Exploring ways to strengthen interactive processes gone astray, as well as how to support the necessary evolution from identified mutual interests to sustained motivation with respect to commitments and enactment are pertinent research tasks ahead. For such a comparison to be convincing, constructing a conceptual and analytic framework that can be broadly applied becomes necessary. Furthermore, research studying the role of developer dialogues compared with other types of instruments to support the climate proofing of urban planning and the role of property developers compared with other types of private actors are needed.

Acknowledgements

We wish to extend our gratitude to Formas for funding to Karolina Isaksson for valuable comments on a draft version and to our interviewees for generously sharing their views, perspectives and experiences. We are thankful for the detailed and constructive comments provided by the anonymous reviewers. This helped us greatly in revising the paper. The empirical and analytical work of this paper was undertaken by the lead author.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council Formas under Climate Change Policy Integration in Local Policy and Planning (CLIPP) [grant number Dnr. 242-2011-1599] and Exploring Urban Climate Transitions in the Making (ExTra) [grant number Dnr 942-2015-106].