Agenda setting in the German Bundestag: A weak government in a consensus democracy

Abstract

Government agenda-setting rights in the Bundestag are weak. The theoretical part of this article discusses various aspects of agenda setting and their theoretical relevance in the context of the Bundestag. It will be argued that analyses of agenda setting should distinguish between two analytical foci, one concentrating on policy effects in the context of spatial models, the other analysing executive–legislative relations in the broader context of political competition. In addition, agenda setting among veto players should be distinguished from agenda setting between veto players and non-veto players. While the article's theoretical part drives the subsequent empirical analysis, readers more interested in the empirical aspects of agenda setting in the Bundestag may wish to turn directly to the article's second section, which provides an empirical and descriptive account of the formal rules of agenda setting in the Bundestag. In this part, it will be argued that the weakness of the government under the Bundestag's first permanent rules of procedure introduced in the early 1950s can be explained by historic circumstances. Since then, party system characteristics and the strong role of the Bundesrat have made it unattractive for the federal government to seek increased agenda control in the Bundestag. Overall, agenda setting rules in the Bundestag underscore the characterisation of Germany as a consensus democracy.

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this article was presented to the workshop ‘The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting’ at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops in Granada, April 2005. The author thanks the workshop directors Bjorn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis as well as all workshop participants for valuable comments and suggestions. The author is also grateful for additional comments and suggestions by Erin Ackerman, Matthias Lehnert, Bernhard Miller, Wolfgang C. Müller, Thomas Saalfeld, and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. R.D. McKelvey, ‘Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control’, Journal of Economic Theory, 12/3 (1976), pp.472–82; N. Schofield, ‘Instability of Simple Dynamic Games’, Review of Economic Studies, 45/3 (1978), pp.575–94.

2. G. Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

3. J.D. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament. Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

4. But see H. Döring, ‘Worauf gründet sich die Agenda-Setzer-Macht der Regierung?’, in S. Ganghof and P. Manow (eds.), Mechanismen der Politik (Frankfurt: Campus, 2005), pp.109–48; G. Loewenberg, ‘Agenda-Setting in the German Bundestag. Origins and Consequences of Party Dominance’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 9/3 (2003), pp.17–31.

5. H. Döring, ‘Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda’, in H. Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), pp.223–46; Tsebelis, Veto Players, table 4.1.

6. Even though this article is theoretically grounded in rational choice theory and uses some of its terminology, the descriptive information and the historical explanation offered should be useful to scholars from other theoretical backgrounds as well. There are certainly additional dimensions that could be analysed. These two were chosen because they seem most relevant to clarify the debate on agenda setting sparked by Tsebelis' veto player theory.

7. Agenda setting also figures prominently in game-theoretic models of bargaining in legislatures; see e.g., D.P. Baron and J.A. Ferejohn, ‘Bargaining in Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, 83/4 (1989), pp.1181–1206. This literature is not dealt with here.

8. This argument extends the classic agenda-setter model developed by Romer and Rosenthal; T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, ‘Political Resource-Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo’, Public Choice, 33/4 (1978), pp.27–44.

9. Tsebelis, Veto Players, pp.33–7.

10. Ibid., p.111.

11. Ibid., pp.109–14 and 219–20; see also M.S. Shugart and J.M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

12. A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

13. Romer and Rosenthal, ‘Political Resource-Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo’; Tsebelis, Veto Players, ch.1.

14. M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle (eds.), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); K. Strøm and W.C. Müller, ‘The Keys to Togetherness. Coalition Agreements in Parliamentary Democracies’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 5/3–4 (1999), pp.255–82.

15. For example, K. Strøm, W.C. Müller and T. Bergman (eds.), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); D. Diermeier and T.J. Feddersen, ‘Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92/3 (1998), pp.611–21.

16. Tsebelis, Veto Players, ch.4; see also G.B. Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

17. Tsebelis, Veto Players, pp.78–81, 94.

18. S. Ganghof, ‘Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis’, Swiss Political Science Review, 9/2 (2003), pp.1–25; see also Döring, ‘Time as a Scarce Resource’.

19. Otherwise typological studies in the tradition of Lijphart or Powell would hardly be useful.

20. A. King, ‘Modes of Executive–legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1/1 (1976), pp.11–34.

21. We can conceptualise these rights to be controlled by a collective party leadership consisting of government members, leaders of the government parties in parliament, and the leadership of the extra-parliamentary party organisations. Government members play an important role in this collective leadership group. The leadership internalises the costs for coordinating members' behaviour in parliament and other arenas and induces unity in voting by means of positive incentives and (at least the threat of) negative sanctions. Members of the party leadership are rewarded for their services both through office benefits (within parliament and, for governing parties, in the cabinet) and in policy terms because they exercise disproportionately strong influence on the policy position taken by their party; see G.W. Cox and M.D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan. Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); U. Sieberer, ‘Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies. A Comparative Analysis’, Journal of Legislative Studies (forthcoming).

22. Relevant instruments of agenda setting in committees and between committees and the plenary are discussed in Döring, ‘Time as a Scarce Resource’; I. Mattson and K. Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Committees’, in H. Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), pp.249–307; I. Mattson, ‘Private Members’ Initiatives and Amendments', in H. Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), pp.448–87; E. Damgaard, ‘How Parties Control Committee Members’, in H. Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), pp.308–25.

23. Döring, ‘Worauf gründet sich die Agenda-Setzer-Macht der Regierung?’.

24. On the relationship between public opinion and parliamentary activity in the Bundestag see F. Brettschneider, Öffentliche Meinung und Politik. Eine Empirische Studie zur Responsivität des Deutschen Bundestages (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995) and K.v. Beyme, Der Gesetzgeber. Der Bundestag als Entscheidungszentrum (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), pp.73–91.

25. Tsebelis, Veto Players, chs.4, 7.

26. In addition to these two classes of agenda setting rights, rules on voting procedures such as the order of voting, the voting procedure used and vote counting rules may shift the balance in favour of the government in legislative decision-making; see B.E. Rasch, ‘Parliamentary Voting Procedures’, in H. Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), pp.488–527; B.E. Rasch, ‘Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25/1 (2000), pp.3–23. These rules are not discussed here, as they do not display particularly interesting aspects in the German case.

27. T. König, ‘Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany. An Empirical Social Choice Analysis’, Political Studies, 49/3 (2001), pp.411–37; T. Bräuninger and T. König, ‘The Checks and Balances of Party Federalism. German Federal Government in a Divided Legislature’, European Journal of Political Research, 36/2 (1999), pp.207–35. The percentage of bills requiring approval by the Bundesrat has been constantly above 50 per cent since 1969 and reached a maximum of 60.6 per cent from 1983–87. Qualitatively, very few important bills do not require the consent of the Bundestag. The numbers are from P. Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949 bis 1999 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp.2430–32.

28. Opposition parties held a majority in the Bundesrat in the periods 1970–76, 1978–82, 1994–98, and since 2002. The government held a majority in the years 1983–89, temporarily in 1990 and 1998–99. During the remaining periods, state governments containing both government and opposition parties could tip the balance in the Bundesrat.

29. T. Saalfeld, ‘The German Bundestag. Influence and Accountability in a Complex Environment’, in P. Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp.44–72; W. Zeh, ‘Das Ausschußsystem im Bundestag’, in H. Schneider and W. Zeh (eds.), Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), pp.1087–1102.

30. S.S. Schüttemeyer, ‘Hierarchy and Efficiency in the Bundestag: The German Answer to Institutionalizing Parliament’, in G.W. Copeland and S.C. Patterson (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World. Changing Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.29–58; Loewenberg, ‘Agenda-Setting in the German Bundestag’.

31. Loewenberg, ‘Agenda-Setting in the German Bundestag’; H. Roll, ‘Der Ältestenrat’, in H. Schneider and W. Zeh (eds.), Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), pp.809–28.

32. Loewenberg, ‘Agenda-Setting in the German Bundestag’; W. Zeh, ‘Altersschichten in der Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 17/3 (1986), pp.396–413; N. Lammert, ‘Zur Geschäftsordnung. Notizen zur Entstehung und Bedeutung parlamentarischer Verfahrensregeln’, in Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), Die Geschäftsordnungen deutscher Parlamente seit 1848 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, 1986), pp.10–18.

33. Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, pp.3094–3122.

34. N. Achterberg, Parlamentsrecht (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1984); H. Roll, Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages. Kommentar (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001).

35. For example, the role of the opposition is not formally acknowledged in the rules and – as will be discussed at length – the executive branch plays almost no role in organising parliamentary business.

36. All non-transient German cabinets after 1949 controlled a parliamentary majority; see T. Saalfeld, ‘Germany. Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement’, in W. C. Müller and K. Strøm (eds.), Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.32–85.

37. To cite just one recent example, a study of fiscal policy during the first red–green Schröder government (1998–2002) links the change from traditional social-democratic to more liberal, supply-oriented policies to agenda setting powers of the chancellor himself and the change in the office of finance minister; see R. Zohlnhöfer, ‘Rot-grüne Finanzpolitik zwischen traditioneller Sozialdemokratie und neuer Mitte’, in C. Egle, T. Ostheim and R. Zohlnhöfer (eds.), Das rot-grüne Projekt. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder 1998–2002 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), pp.194–214.

38. Art. 34, 37 of the French Constitution. France is treated as a parliamentary democracy because it fulfils the defining feature of parliamentary government, that is, the accountability of the prime minister to parliament which can vote the government out of office for political reasons (see W.C. Müller, T. Bergman and K. Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Democracy: Promise and Problems’, in K. Strøm, W.C. Müller and T. Bergman (eds.), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.3–32). Executive decrees are also important agenda setting instruments of presidential governments in Latin America, see Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies; J.M. Carey and M.S. Shugart (eds.), Executive Decree Authority, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

39. H.D. Jarass and B. Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kommentar (München: C.H.Beck, 6. ed., 2002), pp.516–20.

40. Negative government agenda control existed in the French Third and Fourth Republic, but has been very rare otherwise; see Döring, ‘Worauf gründet sich die Agenda-Setzer-Macht der Regierung?’, p.111.

41. On legislative initiatives see Döring, ‘Time as a Scarce Resource’; Mattson, ‘Private Members’ Initiatives and Amendments'; on last-offer authority see W.B. Heller, ‘Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments’, American Journal of Political Science, 45/4 (2001), pp.780–98; B.R. Weingast, ‘Fighting Fire with Fire. Amending Activity and Institutional Reform in the Postreform Congress’, in R.H. Davidson (ed.), The Postreform Congress (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp.142–68.

42. From 1949 to 1994, 59.0 per cent of all bills were initiated by the government, 34.4 per cent by groups of the Bundestag and 6.6 per cent by the Bundesrat. The relatively high number of initiatives from parliament and their reasonably high success rate do not necessarily indicate a strong independent role of parliamentary actors as initiators of legislation. Instead, many of these initiatives are introduced by the governing parties in order to save time because government initiatives have to be dealt with in the Bundesrat prior to the first reading in the Bundestag; see W. Ismayr, Der Deutsche Bundestag im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), pp.240, 245.

43. During the third reading, amendments can only be proposed by PPGs/5 per cent and may only refer to clauses amended during the second reading; §§82 I, 85 I GOBT; R. Kabel, ‘Die Behandlung der Anträge im Bundestag. Rechte, Formen und Verfahren’, in H. Schneider and W. Zeh (eds.), Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), pp.883–916, pp.902–3.

44. From 1972 to 1990, 62.2 per cent of all bills were changed during the committee stage; see Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, pp.2396–97.

45. K.v. Beyme, Der Gesetzgeber, p.202; Ismayr, Der Deutsche Bundestag im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp.275–83; H. Schulze-Fielitz, Theorie und Praxis parlamentarischer Gesetzgebung – besonders des 9. Deutschen Bundestages 1980–1983 (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1988), pp.304–48.

46. Mattson, ‘Private Members’ Inititatives and Amendments'. Mattson discusses additional formal requirements attached to private member initiatives and amendments in European parliaments. The only one relevant in the German case is the restriction of initiatives to groups of 5 per cent of all deputies or PPGs and the limits on individual amendments during the third reading (see above).

47. Mattson, ‘Private Members’ Inititatives and Amendments', p.476.

48. W. Rudzio, Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 6. ed., 2003), p.280.

49. Roll, Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages, pp.135–37.

50. Kabel, ‘Die Behandlung der Anträge im Bundestag. Rechte, Formen und Verfahren’, p.901.

51. Ibid., pp.901–2.

52. J.D. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 90/2 (1996), pp.269–82; see also Diermeier and Feddersen, ‘Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’.

53. Heller, ‘Making Policy Stick’, pp.782–3.

54. Thus, a government could win the vote on a bill by a simple majority and still lose the vote of confidence. Huber's description of the German procedure is wrong when he claims that the government wins the vote unless an absolute majority vote against it as in France; see Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, p.271.

55. H. Döring and C. Hönnige, ‘Vote of Confidence and “Gesetzgebungsnotstand”: Two Tooth- and Clawless Tigers of Governmental Agenda Control’, German Politics, forthcoming.

56. In addition to being an agenda setting instrument, the vote of confidence also offers the only chance for an early dissolution of the Bundestag. Chancellors Brandt (1972), Kohl (1982), and Schröder (2005) deliberately lost a vote of confidence not tied to any particular bill in order to obtain early elections.

57. W.J. Patzelt, ‘Chancellor Schröder's Approach to Political and Legislative Leadership’, German Politics 13/2 (2004), pp.268–99, pp.294–5.

58. After losing a vote of confidence, the government can ask the President with the consent of the Bundesrat to declare a legislative emergency for a period of six months, during which a bill becomes law solely with the consent of the Bundesrat. While this procedure allows a government without majority in the Bundestag to legislate, the government is still limited by the President's willingness to declare a legislative emergency and by the necessary consent of the Bundesrat; see Döring and Hönnige, ‘Vote of Confidence and “Gesetzgebungsnotstand”'.

59. Döring, 'Time as a Scarce Resource’.

60. At the beginning of each legislative period, the PPGs agree on how to divide speaking time in proportion to the percentage of seats held by each party. This allotment is stable over the entire legislative period; see Roll, Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages, p.51; H.J. Schreiner, ‘Die Berliner Stunde – Funktionsweise und Erfahrungen. Zur Redeordnung des Deutschen Bundestages’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 36/3 (2005), pp.573–88.

61. In order to avoid surprise proposals, motions to amend (but not to shorten) the agenda have to be filed with the president of the Bundestag on the day before the sitting.

62. Döring, ‘Worauf gründet sich die Agenda-Setzer-Macht der Regierung?’.

63. Loewenberg, ‘Agenda-Setting in the German Bundestag’; Roll, Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages, pp.37–9. Other minority rights include the right to demand a committee report about the progress on a bill after ten weeks and debate the report (§62 II GOBT) and the right to demand a debate on an interpellation (Große Anfrage, §102 GOBT).

64. R. Kabel, ‘Die Entstehung der Tagesordnung durch interfraktionelle Vereinbarungen’, in H. Roll (ed.), Plenarsitzungen des Deutschen Bundestages (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1982), pp.29–43; Roll, ‘Der Ältestenrat’, pp.816–8.

65. The number of motions to change the agenda was constantly below ten over the four-year legislative period prior to 1983. Between 1983 and 1998, their numbers rose to between 20 and 33. It is interesting to note that both the Greens and the post-socialist PDS introduced disproportionately many such motions during their first sessions in the Bundestag. At least the Greens have adjusted to the level of the older PPGs since 1990; Loewenberg, ‘Agenda-Setting in the German Bundestag, tables 1 and 2.

66. Mattson, ‘Private Members’ Inititatives and Amendments', p.476; Döring, ‘Time as a Scarce Resource’.

67. Kabel, ‘Die Entstehung der Tagesordnung durch interfraktionelle Vereinbarungen’, p.40.

68. One should keep in mind that the mere requirement of parliamentary approval for an executive decree is a limitation of government power rather than a sign of government prerogatives.

69. G.W. Cox, The Efficient Secret. The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

70. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament.

71. V. Otto, Das Staatsverständnis des Parlamentarischen Rates. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Düsseldorf: Rheinisch-Bergische Druckerei- und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1971), pp.95–7, 100–2. The constituent assembly even discussed a government elected by, but not accountable to the Bundestag (the Swiss model) as an alternative to the parliamentary system. This indicates that even parliamentary government itself was not completely uncontroversial.

72. D. Herzog, et al., Abgeordnete und Bürger. Ergebnisse einer Befragung der Mitglieder des 11. Deutschen Bundestages und der Bevölkerung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), pp.101–9. Very similar results were found in another study on the self-perception of members of the Bundestag, the state legislatures, and the European Parliament; W.J. Patzelt, ‘Deutschlands Abgeordnete. Profil eines Berufsstands, der weit besser ist als sein Ruf’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 27/3 (1996), pp.462–502.

73. Keep in mind that one of the decisive steps in installing the Nazi dictatorship was a law delegating all legislative power to the government (the Ermächtigungsgesetz of 23 March 1933).

74. K.F. Fromme, Von der Weimarer Verfassung zum Bonner Grundgesetz (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 3rd ed., 1999).

75. Loewenberg asks the same question though with a more limited focus on what this article refers to as the control of the timetable agenda. He explains the absence of centralising tendencies with the already strong institutionalisation of the Bundestag as an independent institution and the interests of parliamentary party leaders in defending the decentralised procedures inherited from before the parliamentarisation of the German political system. Note that this explanation is consistent with the historic argument presented above about the importance of the self-perception of parliamentary actors; Loewenberg, ‘Agenda-Setting in the German Bundestag’.

76. T. Saalfeld, ‘The German Party System – Continuity and Change’, German Politics, 11/3 (2002), pp.99–130.

77. T. Saalfeld, Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1990 (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1995). Party unity in the Bundestag is hard to measure because data on individual voting behaviour is only available for a small minority of votes. Most proposals are voted on by anonymous procedures such as voice votes, show of hands, or rising in places.

78. König, ‘Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany’.

79. M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

80. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’.

81. Tsebelis, Veto Players, pp.106–9.

82. For empirical attempts see Laver and Shepsle, Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government; Strøm and Müller, ‘The Keys to Togetherness’.

83. K. Niclauß, Kanzlerdemokratie. Regierungsführung von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004).

84. Rudzio, Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp.284–90; K. Korte and M. Fröhlich, Politik und Regieren in Deutschland. Strukturen, Prozesse und Entscheidungen (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004), pp.79–101.

85. Saalfeld, ‘Germany. Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement’, pp.51–65.

86. F. Müller-Rommel, ‘The Role of German Ministers in Cabinet Decision Making’, in M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle (eds.), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.150–68.

87. G. Tsebelis and J. Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch.8.

88. The only formal regulations refer to the quorum for decision (12 of the 32 members need to be present) and the decision rule (majority of the members present) (§§7, 8 GO-VermA).

89. M. Dietlein, ‘Vermittlung zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat’, in H. Schneider and W. Zeh (eds.), Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), pp.1565–78, pp.1574–5.

90. It is unclear whether unity is induced by these and other institutional rules such as rewards and sanctions at the disposal of the PPG leadership or results from shared interests and intra-party socialisation; see Saalfeld, Parteisoldaten und Rebellen.

91. K.v. Beyme, Der Gesetzgeber; S.S. Schüttemeyer, Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1997. Empirische Befunde und theoretische Folgerungen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998).

92. M.G. Schmidt, ‘Germany. The Grand Coalition State’, in J.M. Colomer (ed.), Political Institutions in Europe (London: Routledge, 2002), pp.57–93.